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ABSTRACT 
 
Philmore Alvin ALLEYNE 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUAL, TEAM AND CONTEXTUAL 
FACTORS ON EXTERNAL AUDITORS’ WHISTLE-BLOWING 
INTENTIONS IN BARBADOS 
 
 
Following the collapse of Arthur Andersen in the Enron debacle, whistle-blowing 
within audit firms has taken on greater importance. Given the profession's requirements 
to be confidential, independent and to act in the public’s interest, there is a need for a 
model that addresses auditors' whistle-blowing intentions. This thesis presents a 
conceptual model on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors, where 
individual-led antecedents influence whistle-blowing intentions, but are moderated by 
isomorphic and issue-specific factors.   
Survey questionnaires were administered to 226 external auditors, and 18 
individual interviews as well as 2 focus groups were conducted in Barbados. Results 
indicated that individual antecedents (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, 
independence commitment, personal responsibility for reporting, and personal cost of 
reporting) were significantly related to internal whistle-blowing, but only perceived 
behavioural control was significantly related to external whistle-blowing. Partial 
support was found for the moderating effects of perceived organizational support, 
moral intensity, team norms and group cohesion on the relationships between the 
majority of the independent variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, 
independence commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost of 
reporting) and internal whistle-blowing. However, partial support was found for the 
moderating effects of perceived organizational support, moral intensity, team norms 
 iii
and group cohesion on the relationships between fewer independent variables and 
external whistle-blowing.  
Overall, respondents preferred anonymous internal channels of reporting, and 
showed a general reluctance to report externally. The presence of an open-door policy, 
ethics partners, hotline, on-going training and clearly defined policies could encourage 
whistle-blowing. Further implications for research and practice are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Whistle-blowing, external auditors, individual antecedents, team norms, 
group cohesion, moral intensity and perceived organizational support. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
The main objectives of this research are to examine factors (individual, contextual and 
organizational) that are likely to influence whistle-blowing intentions among external 
auditors in Barbados, to understand the decision-making process with respect to 
reporting, the mechanisms within the firm, and the consequences and benefits of 
reporting such an act. Whistle-blowing has been viewed as an important control 
mechanism in organizations to detect and prevent wrongdoing (Hooks, Kaplan and 
Schultz, 1994). Whistle-blowing becomes very important within audit firms, as these 
firms strive to improve the image and reputation of the profession.  
Since the collapse of Enron and closure of the auditing firm of Arthur Andersen, 
the profession has been under scrutiny for the ethical decision-making of its members. 
Beu, Buckley and Harvey (2003) argued that researchers are seeking to explain why 
individuals act ethically in some situations and act unethically in others. Given that 
individuals have varied ethical decision-making processes, researchers will be looking 
for causal explanations. Researchers have argued that ethical decision-making 
processes involve a complex interaction between individual, organizational and issue-
related factors (Jones, 1991). This thesis puts forward and tests a conceptual model of 
factors that are likely to influence whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors 
in Barbados, using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The first section examines the background 
to the study on whistle-blowing. The second section presents the motivation and 
contributions of the study. The third section discusses the main concepts of whistle-
blowing and highlights cases of whistle-blowing. The fourth section presents a brief 
review of research theory on ethics and whistle-blowing. The fifth section provides the 
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research objectives and is followed by the next section that gives a brief overview of 
the proposed conceptual model. The seventh section discusses the research methods 
and is followed by the eighth section which presents a summary of the findings. The 
ninth and tenth sections highlight boundaries of the study and the definitions of key 
terms used in the thesis, respectively. The final section outlines the structure of the 
thesis.  
 
1.1 Background to the study  
The collapse of Enron and subsequent closure of the audit firm, Arthur Andersen, has 
cast the profession in a bad light, as questions were raised about the ethical values of 
the profession. The profession needs to recruit ethical members to improve its image 
and restore the confidence of the public in its ability to do quality audits. The 
profession has specific standards and rules which direct the work of auditors and stress 
the importance for auditors to be objective, independent and avoid any personal and 
financial relationships with clients (Umar and Anandarajan, 2004). The profession and 
public acknowledge the importance of ethics to the decision-making process of audit 
practitioners, since they are required to make independent judgements on audit issues.  
 The exercise of professional judgment and its related concept, auditor 
independence, imply that auditors must act ethically (Thorne, 1998). It is this 
distinctive feature of the audit that separates auditing from other professions (Mautz 
and Sharaf, 1961). Auditors are expected to fearlessly report any wrongdoing, such as 
fraud in the client’s accounting records. In addition, an independent auditor should 
make the sound ethical decision to report wrongdoing done by the client as part of 
his/her prescribed role as the external auditor. However, the problem is exacerbated 
when an audit staff member commits wrongdoing within the audit firm. From an ethical 
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standpoint, the wrongdoing should be reported by the observer of the act to a person or 
entity that is capable of correcting the wrongdoing. The literature has shown a general 
reluctance on the part of auditors to report wrongdoing committed by their colleagues 
(Finn and Lampe, 1992; Kaplan, 1995; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). 
 
1.2 Motivation and contributions of the study 
As a result of several accounting scandals (e.g. Enron and World Com) in 2001, the 
accounting profession’s image was severely tarnished and it was felt that the auditors 
involved were not independent because they failed to report the accounting 
irregularities when discovered. As a result, the question or dilemma that surrounds the 
profession is whether there is a moral or legal right to report questionable acts, either 
internally or externally. In the Enron case, none of Arthur Andersen’s audit staff blew 
the whistle on the firm or the wrongdoer, when its partner-in-charge instructed them to 
shred the documents to obstruct justice (Toffler and Reingold, 2003). Furthermore, 
none of the audit staff members were willing to report the irregularities occurring at 
Enron, where the audit firm assisted in facilitating Enron’s management to misrepresent 
the financial statements. 
In light of these public scandals, the profession now struggles to repair its image 
and credibility as independent experts, who are there to serve in the public’s interest 
and at the same time, maintain confidentiality to the client, as well as to comply with 
specified codes of professional conduct.  There are some benefits of ensuring that audit 
staff report wrongdoing within an audit firm (e.g. a partner or co-worker committing 
the questionable act). For example, a staff member can assist in enhancing the firm’s 
ethical reputation and the quality of the audit service provided by the firm.  In addition 
to the benefits of disclosing wrongdoing, it has been argued that good ethics within the 
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firm makes good business sense (Cowton, 2009). In contrast, failure to report 
wrongdoing can cause the closure of the firm, (as in the case of Enron’s auditors, 
Arthur Andersen), possible lawsuits and prosecution from authorities. Thus, the results 
of this study can help auditors or audit firms to develop the appropriate recruitment and 
selection strategies to ensure that “ethically-minded” employees are recruited. 
The present study contributes to the auditing ethics research by applying a 
theoretical model of whistle-blowing intentions. This model incorporates the influences 
of individual attributes (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, desired moral 
approbation, personal responsibility for reporting, independence commitment and 
personal cost of reporting) and moderating variables such as team factors (group 
cohesion and team norms) and contextual factors (perceived moral intensity and 
perceived organizational support). It is designed to measure these variables as they 
apply to whistle-blowing intentions. This model represents an integrative approach to 
the study of whistle-blowing among external auditors in the profession. It identifies a 
number of paths by which whistle-blowing could result, including various factors 
derived from existing whistle-blowing and ethical decision-making models.  Moreover, 
the model reconfigures Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behaviour, in which an 
individual’s attitude towards the behaviour, subjective norm and perceived behavioural 
control predict behavioural intentions.  
This thesis posits that team factors (such as group cohesion and team norms), 
and contextual factors (such as perceived organizational support and perceived moral 
intensity) will also have significant effects on the likelihood to whistle-blow. In 
particular, this model recognises that auditors usually work in teams. Organizations can 
readily appreciate how teams and other contextual factors interact to create an 
“ethically minded” organization. Moreover, there is a dearth of research on the 
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influence of team-based variables on the ethical decision-making process and indeed, 
whistle-blowing among external auditors. Overall, this study will test the influence of 
these factors on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
Most research tends to focus more on the individual characteristics but neglect 
the importance of contextual variables. This study addresses this gap by focusing on 
Jones’ (1991) moral intensity construct and its related dimensions, which considers the 
contextual factors (i.e., the characteristics of the issue itself).  Perceived moral intensity 
is important, given that one of its dimensions, magnitude of consequences, is similar to 
the term or concept of materiality in auditing. Jones, Massey and Thorne (2003) and 
Cohen and Martinov-Bennie (2006) suggested that there was a need for research to 
explore the influence of perceived moral intensity on auditors’ intentions to whistle-
blow, given the requirements of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002). 
Many of the previous studies on whistle-blowing are limited in the 
understanding they can provide about ethical decision-making among auditors. Prior 
models have not been designed specifically for the external audit field and neglect the 
importance of group factors on the whistle-blowing process (e.g. Graham, 1986). The 
current study attempts to bring greater depth of understanding to auditor decision-
making in audit-related issues.  It attempts to identify the extent to which individual 
attitudes, as well as other factors such as desired moral approbation and group 
dynamics influence auditors’ decisions to report questionable acts. This study seeks to 
provide additional support for, and extends the scope of the theory of planned 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), and incorporates some constructs of the model of principled 
dissent (Graham, 1986) and applies them to whistle-blowing among external auditors.   
There is significant pressure on the accounting profession to uphold high ethical 
standards. Gaining a better understanding of the factors that will encourage auditors to 
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report questionable acts has practical implications for the audit profession, accounting 
policy and auditing ethics research. The results of this study can aid professional 
associations and policy makers in developing and incorporating adequate ethics 
requirements in their codes of professional conduct. This should increase auditors’ 
ethical awareness and willingness to report wrongdoing committed by audit staff and 
clients.  Specifically, the results can also help auditors and audit firms to decide on the 
appropriate training needs for their staff.  
The thesis has an additional academic value, in that it tests a whistle-blowing 
model in the context of the external audit environment. Prior research on whistle-
blowing intentions showed that the majority of these studies have used convenient 
samples of students, who were asked to role play the functions of practicing auditors 
(e.g., Curtis, 2006). However, these experiments may not fully simulate how practising 
auditors in the profession would behave when faced with unethical acts committed by 
colleagues. Therefore, this research seeks to study whistle-blowing from a practical 
perspective, by surveying and interviewing auditors in audit firms, who will provide 
opinions on organizational wrongdoing.  Finally, this study hopes to gain insights about 
the extent to which auditors perceive themselves as moral agents. These perceptions 
about the profession’s role in auditor independence may have implications for 
accounting education. 
 
1.3 Whistle-blowing and its importance 
Whistle-blowing is perceived as the act of disclosing information internally or 
externally in the public’s interest.  Near and Miceli (1985) defined whistle-blowing as 
“the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations 
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that may be able to effect action” (p. 4). Within this definition, illegal, immoral or 
illegitimate acts can include professional misconduct, misallocation of resources, theft 
and bullying in an organization (Miceli, Near and Dworkin, 2008). Near and Miceli 
(1985)’s definition has been cited extensively in prior studies, including auditing (e.g. 
Miceli, Near and Schwenk, 1991; Hooks et al., 1994; Kaplan, 1995) and management 
(Keenan and Krueger, 1992). 
Miceli et al. (2008) differentiate this definition from other researchers’ 
definitions on the grounds that whistle-blowing is antisocial as well as prosocial, 
principled (Graham, 1986), altruistic and positive, and is not limited to cases where 
specific motivations may be present. Near and Miceli (1985) argued that whistle-
blowing can be both internal and external, since external whistle-blowers usually report 
the wrongdoing to someone that they trust internally first, before they go externally. 
For example, Enron’s Sherron Watkins first wrote a memo to Ken Lay, the CEO about 
the accounting irregularities, and then her memo was later publicly disclosed in her 
testimony to Congress (Miceli et al., 2008).  
Whistle-blowing has become popular especially in the US, with the high profile 
cases of whistle-blowers (Callahan, Dworkin, Forte and Schipani, 2002). Time 
Magazine selected three whistle-blowers (Enron’s Sherron Watkins, WorldCom’s 
Cynthia Cooper and Coleen Rowley of the FBI) as its “Persons of the Year” for 2002 
(Lacayo and Ripley, 2002). At Enron, Sherron Watkins sent a memo to CEO Kenneth 
Lay, highlighting the irregularities in the company. FBI agent, Coleen Rowley 
disclosed that her agency had mishandled a probe of a terrorist suspected of being 
involved in the September 11, 2001 attack in the United States. At WorldCom, Cynthia 
Cooper, the internal auditor, alerted the Board of Directors’ Audit Committee of $3.8 
billion in losses caused by accounting fraud, and commenced an internal audit, in spite 
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of a request by the company's Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to delay the investigation 
(Patel, 2006).  
However, some whistle-blowers have suffered tremendously from the effects of 
retaliation as illustrated in the following cases. In 1996, Jeffrey Wigand, Vice President 
of research, disclosed that Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation was fully aware 
that tobacco was addictive. As a result, Wigand experienced loss of earnings, retaliation 
and was threatened with legal action for breach of confidentiality. In 2004, Satendra 
Kumar Dubey of India blew the whistle on corruption in the National Highways 
Authority of India (NHAI), by writing to the Prime Minister’s office and requesting 
anonymity, which was ignored (Patel, 2006, p.11). He was later found murdered.  
 
1.4 Research theory  
Whistle-blowing can be viewed as an internal control mechanism in organizations since 
it can assist in highlighting and preventing wrongdoing, and is important for both 
internal and external auditors (Miceli et al., 1991; Hooks et al., 1994). The literature 
has also revealed that whistle-blowing can solve organizational problems (e.g. Brief 
and Motowidlo, 1986) and various stakeholders can benefit from the whistle-blowing 
act, as organizational wrongdoing may be terminated (Miceli et al., 1991). Whistle-
blowers are sometimes perceived as loyal and prosocial heroes. However, whistle-
blowers have also been branded as being troublemakers and disloyal employees. Within 
the audit context, whistle-blowing is about reporting questionable acts on wrongdoing 
committed by co-workers within the audit firm. Auditors, who are potential whistle-
blowers, usually act in good faith and in the public’s interest. 
Potential whistle-blowers may be discouraged from reporting wrongdoing due 
to fear of retaliation. The literature has shown that this fear of retaliation or 
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victimization may force the whistle-blower to seek out external (rather than internal) 
channels to report wrongdoing and unethical acts or remain silent (Near and Miceli, 
1995; Camerer 1996; Jubb 1999; Uys 2006). External whistle-blowing may negatively 
affect the future prospects for the whistle-blower and the organization.  The literature is 
divided on whether or not internal reporting of wrongdoing or questionable acts should 
be regarded as whistle-blowing (Near and Miceli, 1985; Jubb, 1999). This thesis 
utilises aspects of Near and Miceli’s (1985) definition of whistle-blowing, which 
supports both external and internal reporting on the grounds that both represent a means 
of dissent or direct challenge to the organization’s hierarchy. 
Moreover, Mitschow and Langford (2000) contend that there are several 
conflicts which prevent external auditors from whistle-blowing externally. External 
auditors are confronted with dual allegiance to the client and acting in the interest of 
society (Mitschow and Langford, 2000; Brennan and Kelly, 2007).  In addition, 
external auditors may experience the risk of sanctions, lawsuits, loss of licences, and 
tarnished reputation, if they blow the whistle externally on confidential information 
about wrongdoing committed by the client and other individuals within the audit firm. 
Thus, these potential conflicts ought to force the auditor to report internally. 
A number of theoretical frameworks for understanding ethical behaviour has 
been proposed in the literature (e.g. Trevino, 1986; Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991; 
Lampe and Finn, 1992; Finn and Lampe, 1992; Shaub, Finn and Munter, 1993; Finn, 
1995; Trevino and Weaver, 2003). These ethical models or frameworks have utilised 
theories from social psychology (Kohlberg, 1969; Ajzen, 1991; Rest, 1986) to explain 
ethical decision-making in business and, specifically, in the area of accounting and 
auditing. For example, Lampe and Finn (1992) proposed an ethical decision-making 
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model, following Rest’s (1986) model.1  Lampe and Finn’s (1992) model found a link 
between ethical reasoning and auditors’ judgement of ethical code violations. Beu et al. 
(2003) argued that ethical decision-making is complex and multidimensional. This may 
be based on how individuals will behave in different ways to the same ethical dilemma, 
especially in situations where societal moral norms are not sufficiently clear to guide 
the behaviour. This makes the research task particularly challenging, but all the more 
worthwhile. 
Prior models in auditing or accounting have shown that there are individual, 
situational and organizational factors influencing whistle-blowing (Arnold and 
Ponemon, 1991; Finn and Lampe, 1992; Hooks et al., 1994; Finn, 1995; Kaplan, 1995; 
Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). Prior research has shown a general reluctance by audit 
staff to whistle-blow on colleagues (e.g. Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). The various 
accounting irregularities (e.g. Enron and Arthur Andersen) have caused the public to 
raise searching questions about the ethical and moral values of a profession that has 
historically justified its existence based on trust and integrity. The audit profession is 
faced with ethical dilemmas, resulting from the struggle to act on behalf of the client 
and in the public’s interest (Westra, 1986). Auditor independence is important to the 
auditing profession, as it enhances the value of the audit function (e.g. Mednick, 1990).  
Prior research has shown that there are factors which are likely to affect auditor 
independence (Beattie, Brandt and Fearnley, 1999). These factors include provision of 
non-audit services, perceived importance of the client and lengthy auditor-client 
relationships. Specifically, the literature shows that the economic importance of the 
client to the auditor has been found to be one of the most influential factors likely to 
impair auditor independence (e.g. Gul, 1991; Bartlett, 1993; Beattie et al., 1999).   
                                                 
1 Rest (1986) proposed the four component model of ethical decision-making. Rest suggested that the 
four stages are recognising the moral issue, making a moral judgment, establishing moral intent and 
engaging in moral behaviour. Chapter 2 provides a further discussion of Rest’s (1986) model. 
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Codes of professional conduct, such as those of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Certified General Accountants of Canada 
(CGA) and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) 
require that a member should be independent in fact and in appearance.  It may be the 
lack of independence that causes the auditor to act unethically. Gendron et al. (2006) 
introduced a concept called independence commitment, which could support the view 
that the level of commitment to independence by the auditor, should lead to fair and 
honest reporting. The PIDA (1998) and Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) lend regulatory 
support to whistle-blowing in organizations. 
 
1.5 Research objectives 
This study has two main objectives. Firstly, it examines the factors that are likely to 
encourage or discourage whistle-blowing by external auditors.  Secondly, this study 
seeks to understand the whistle-blowing process, auditors’ perceptions of the reporting 
channels, the control mechanisms within the audit firm, the perceived consequences of 
reporting, and recommendations for increasing whistle-blowing.  
 
1.5.1 Hypotheses and research questions 
The present study is aimed at understanding the individual, situational and 
organizational factors that are likely to influence whistle-blowing among auditors.  The 
following hypotheses and research questions are presented:  
 
1.5.2 Hypotheses 
 The specific hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: Attitudes toward whistle-blowing will have a positive, direct effect 
on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Desired moral approbation from others and from self will have a 
positive, direct effect on whistle-blowing intentions among external 
auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Perceived behavioural control will have a positive, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1d:  Independence commitment will have a positive, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1e: Personal responsibility for reporting will have a positive, direct 
effect on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1f:   Personal cost of reporting will have a negative, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Perceived organizational support will moderate the relationships 
between individual-level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral 
approbation, perceived behavioural control, independence 
commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost 
of reporting) and whistle-blowing intentions among external 
auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Group cohesion will moderate the relationships between individual-
level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.  
 
Hypothesis 4:   Team norms will moderate the relationships between individual-
level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among auditors among external auditors.  
 
Hypothesis 5:  Perceived moral intensity will moderate the relationships between 
individual-level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, 
perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.   
 
The development and justification of these hypotheses will be discussed in Chapter 4 
on the presentation of the proposed conceptual model.  
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1.5.3 Research questions 
The research questions to be addressed in this study are: 
Research Question 1: How willing are external auditors to whistle-blow on 
wrongdoing committed by colleagues in the audit firm?  
 
Research Question 2: What are the preferred channels of reporting wrongdoing 
among external auditors? 
 
Research Question 3:  What is the role of individual factors on external auditors’ 
ability to whistle-blow? 
 
Research Question 4:  What is the role of team and contextual factors on external 
auditors’ ability to whistle-blow? 
 
Research Question 5:  What are the perceived consequences of whistle-blowing 
among external auditors?  
 
Research Question 6:  How can whistle-blowing be increased among external 
auditors?  
 
 
1.6 A brief review of the proposed conceptual model 
1.6.1 Description of the model 
The proposed conceptual model incorporates the influences of individual attributes 
(attitudes toward whistle-blowing, desired moral approbation, perceived behavioural 
control, independence commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal 
cost of reporting), team factors (group cohesion and team norms) and contextual factors 
(perceived moral intensity and perceived organizational support). Specifically, the 
model proposes that the relationships between individual-level antecedents and whistle-
blowing intentions will be moderated by group cohesion, team norms, perceived moral 
intensity and perceived organizational support. This model is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual model of whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors 
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a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
adopted from Ajzen (1991);  
adopted from Jones and Ryan (1997); 
adopted from Gendron et al. (2006); 
adopted from Graham (1986) and Schultz et al. (1993); 
adopted from De Jong et al. (2005); 
adopted from Price and Mueller (1986) and Schminke and Wells (1999); 
adopted from Jones (1991) moral intensity; 
adopted from Eisenberger et al. (1990); 
adopted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) 
The rest of the model is based on the review and understanding of how the external 
audit works. 
 
 
1.6.2 Attitude towards the behaviour, perceived behavioural control and 
behavioural (whistle-blowing) intention 
The theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and its successor, the theory 
of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) have been utilised in numerous ethics studies to 
predict ethical behaviour (Madden et al., 1992; Kurland, 1995; Chang, 1998; Gibson 
and Frakes, 1997; Flannery and May, 2000; Buchan, 2005; Carpenter and Reimers, 
2005). The theory of reasoned action posits that behavioural intention may be 
influenced by one’s attitude towards the behaviour (favourable/unfavourable 
assessment) and subjective norm (referent others). The intention to perform a specific 
behaviour is considered as a reliable predictor of that behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen, 
1975). Ajzen (1991) later added the antecedent variable, perceived behavioural control 
(obstacles and opportunities), to form the theory of planned behaviour. This current 
study uses whistle-blowing intention as a measure of behavioural intention. 
 
1.6.3 Desired moral approbation 
Moral approbation is the need for approval from self and others when making moral 
decisions (Jones and Ryan, 1997). A major limitation of most cognitive moral 
development and ethical decision-making models is the inconsistency between 
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determining the right decision and performing the actual behaviour (Jones and Ryan, 
1997). Kohlberg (1976) argues that an individual’s moral direction is derived from 
referent sources such as parents, family, peers and social norms.  Jones and Ryan 
(1997) argued that individuals rely on these referent groups for approval when making 
moral decisions.   
However, the influence of desired moral approbation on ethical intentions has 
not been tested empirically in the audit context. In an auditing environment, auditors 
are likely to rely on the approval of their team members, co-workers, management or 
even themselves before making ethical judgments or engaging in an ethically-sensitive 
situation. Hence, this variable is deemed particularly important in the current study.   
 
1.6.4 Personal responsibility for reporting 
Graham (1986) presented a model of reporting questionable acts, which proposed that 
the attribute of personal responsibility for reporting has a positive impact on the 
likelihood of whistle-blowing. Graham (1986) argued that the decision to whistle-blow 
is contingent on the whistle-blower’s perception of moral responsibility to report 
wrongdoing in the organization. Prior research has found support for this variable 
within the audit environment (Miceli et al., 1991; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). 
Thus, this variable will be incorporated into the proposed conceptual model. 
 
1.6.5 Personal cost of reporting 
Another important variable is the assessment of the personal cost of reporting. This 
variable has been proposed as being influential in the intention to whistle-blow 
(Graham, 1986; Schultz, Johnson, Morris and Dyrnes, 1993). It is perceived that 
individuals will make an initial assessment of personal costs (risk of retaliation or 
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reprisals), before engaging in whistle-blowing. Prior research has found support for this 
variable (Schultz et al., 1993; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). 
 
1.6.6 Independence commitment 
Auditors are required to be independent. This has been inculcated through membership 
in professional associations, training and codes of professional conduct. Gendron, 
Suddaby and Lam (2006) proposed a relatively new variable, independence 
commitment, which is to be used in the model. This construct tests the individual 
auditor’s level of commitment to independence requirements established by the 
profession and the public. This variable may be considered important to this study, 
since the independence of the observer may influence reporting intentions. 
 
1.6.7 Perceived organizational support 
The model incorporates perceived organizational support as a moderator. Social 
exchange theory proposes that staff members who perceive that the organization will 
provide satisfactory support when reporting wrongdoing will be more likely to do so, 
since there would be little fear of retaliation. Similarly, employees who feel a strong 
sense of organizational commitment or loyalty tend to reciprocate to the organization 
with positive work behaviours. In contrast, those employees who may feel that they are 
being treated unfairly in the organization are more likely to exhibit anger, resentment 
and dissatisfaction. The norm of reciprocity postulates that when individuals are 
dissatisfied with the organization or their superiors, they may embark on negative work 
behaviours such as possible sabotage via malevolent reporting or non-reporting 
(Gouldner, 1960). Thus, the organization must provide support in its ethical culture for 
the employee to be able to whistle-blow effectively. 
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1.6.8 Group cohesion and team norms 
Group cohesion can influence behaviour by setting standards and guidelines.  Auditors 
are requested to work in audit teams on multiple engagements. As a result, norms and 
the level of cohesion are formed through contact with team members. Social influence 
research has proposed that individuals are usually influenced by their peers (Ajzen, 
1991; Jones, 1991). Hooks et al. (1994) argued that group norms may colour one’s 
perception of the seriousness of the act. Being a member of an audit team can force 
members to conform to the team’s norms (which may be ethical or unethical), and 
which can put pressure on the individual auditor. Given that auditors typically work in 
teams, it is important to also assess how team norms and group cohesion can influence 
whistle-blowing. The present study seeks to address this gap.   
 
1.6.9 Perceived moral intensity 
An important variable in understanding ethical decision-making is perceived moral 
intensity (Jones, 1991; Morris and McDonald, 1995; Wright, Cullinan and Bline, 1997; 
Singer and Singer, 1997; Flannery and May, 2000). Jones (1991) suggests that the 
moral intensity construct focuses on the particular ethical issue, and is quite distinct 
from the individual’s characteristics and the context in which the decision is made. 
Jones (1991) believed that decision-makers respond differently depending on the nature 
of the ethical issue under examination. He proposed six dimensions: (1) magnitude of 
consequences, (2) social consensus, (3) temporal immediacy, (4) concentration of 
effect, (5) probability of effect and (6) proximity.  Prior research supports the 
contention that these six components exert significant influence over ethical decisions 
(Morris and McDonald, 1995; Singer and Singer, 1997). For example, magnitude of 
consequences is similar to materiality used by auditors to make judgments (Shafer et 
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al., 1999). Thus, moral intensity may be considered as being important within a 
whistle-blowing context.   
 
1.7 Research method 
This study was conducted in two phases, using positivist and interpretivist research 
methodologies. The positivist approach has been used extensively in ethical decision-
making and whistle-blowing literature (See Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). Positivist 
(quantitative) research relies on hypothesis-testing (theory testing), using various 
statistical tools (Babbie, 2004). This type of research is essentially based on numerical 
measurements and its main goal is generating predictive conclusions concerning a 
particular theory and its implications.  Quantitative research is primarily concerned 
with deductive logic and seeks to predict and explain some phenomenon.   
On the other hand, qualitative research is based on non-numerical information 
(Babbie, 2004; Neuman, 2003). In contrast to quantitative research, qualitative research 
assumes that data can be adequately collected and interpreted as a result of the close 
relationship between the researcher and the subject (Neuman, 2003). Thus, qualitative 
research refers to an approach on how to gain knowledge of the world, by obtaining 
descriptions, experiences, meanings and performing analyses of the behaviour of 
human beings from their own perspectives.   
Qualitative research also provides comprehensive descriptions of the social and 
practical settings that are being investigated and allows for rich insights into the topic 
from the participants’ perspectives. Finally, the qualitative researcher seeks to 
understand the phenomenon under study in its actual context. This differs significantly 
from the objective approach of the quantitative researcher, which seeks to separate the 
subject from any unnecessary intervention (Babbie, 2004; Holtzhausen, 2007).   
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1.7.1 Quantitative phase 
Firstly, a survey approach was performed to test the hypotheses in the proposed 
conceptual model. The research design employed by this study involved the use of a 
self-administered questionnaire, which collected responses from 226 external auditors 
in audit firms in Barbados. The study used scenarios to assess the whistle-blowing 
intentions among external auditors. Alexander and Becker (1978) defined scenarios as 
“short descriptions of a person or a social situation which contain precise reference to 
what are thought to be the most important factors in the decision-making or judgment-
making processes of respondents” (p. 94). Respondents were asked to place themselves 
in the position of the agent in the scenario and to express the likelihood that they would 
report the wrongdoing in the case.     
The current study used several established scales to measure the independent, 
moderator and dependent variables. The dependent variables, auditors’ reporting 
intentions (i.e. internal and external whistle-blowing), as well as attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing and perceived behavioural control were measured by adapting scales 
developed by Park and Blenkinsopp (2009). Desired moral approbation and 
independence commitment were measured by adapting scales developed by Ryan and 
Riordan (2000) and Gendron et al. (2006), respectively.  Schultz et al.’s (1993) single-
item scales were used to measure personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost 
of reporting.  Perceived moral intensity was measured by adapting scales developed by 
Coram, Glovovic, Ng and Woodliff (2008) and Schultz et al. (1993). Perceived 
organizational support was measured by adapting a scale developed by Eisenberger, 
Cummings, Armeli and Lynch (1997), while group cohesion and team norms were 
measured by using scales developed by Price and Mueller (1986) and De Jong, De 
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Ruyter and Lemmink (2005) respectively. Finally, the study also measured social 
desirability response bias, using Paulhus’ (1989) impression management scale.  
 
1.7.2 Qualitative phase 
Qualitative research can provide rich insights into a research topic such as whistle-
blowing. Its nature suggests that the researcher can gain knowledge through the 
subject’s interpretation of experiences, meaning and opinions on the phenomenon 
under study (Babbie, 2004). The study used 18 semi-structured interviews and 2 focus 
groups to obtain opinions and feelings on whistle-blowing in the audit firms. This 
qualitative approach helped to contextualise the findings from the quantitative phase.   
 
1.8 Summary of the findings 
1.8.1 Results of the hypotheses tests 
Results from the quantitative phase show that auditors were more likely to whistle-blow 
internally rather than externally. It was found that attitudes, perceived behavioural 
control, independence commitment, and personal responsibility for reporting were 
significantly and positively related to internal whistle-blowing intentions, while 
personal cost of reporting had a negative and significant effect on internal whistle-
blowing. In contrast, perceived behavioural control had a significant and positive 
relationship with external whistle-blowing. Thus, hypotheses H1a, H1c, H1d, H1e and 
H1f were fully supported for internal whistle-blowing, but support was only found for 
H1c (perceived behavioural control having a positive relationship on external whistle-
blowing). It was noticeable that H1b (desired moral approbation) did not have a 
significant main effect on internal and external whistle-blowing intentions.   
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 Partial support was found for the moderating effect of perceived organizational 
support on the relationship between the majority of independent and dependent 
variables. Specifically, the results show that when perceived organizational support was 
high, there were significant positive relationships between the independent variables 
(attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independence commitment and personal 
responsibility for reporting) and internal whistle-blowing intentions. When perceived 
organizational support was low, there was a significant negative relationship between 
personal cost of reporting and internal whistle-blowing intentions. When perceived 
organizational support was low, there were significant positive relationships between 
two independent variables (attitudes and perceived behavioural control) and external 
whistle-blowing intentions. When perceived organizational support was high, there was 
a significant positive relationship between personal cost of reporting and external 
whistle-blowing. Thus, H2 was partially supported. 
 Partial support was also found for the moderating effects of group cohesion on 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Specifically, when 
group cohesion was low, there were significant positive relationships between the 
independent variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independence 
commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and internal whistle-blowing 
intentions. It was also found that when group cohesion was low, there was a significant 
positive relationship between independence commitment and external whistle-blowing 
intentions. When group cohesion was high, there was a significant positive relationship 
between personal cost of reporting and external whistle-blowing. Thus, H3 was 
partially supported.  
 Partial support was also found for the moderating effects of team norms on 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Specifically, when team 
 23
norms were high, there were significant positive relationships between the independent 
variables (attitudes, desired moral approbation, independence commitment and personal 
responsibility for reporting) and internal whistle-blowing intentions. It was also found 
that when team norms were high, there were significant positive relationships between 
the independent variables (attitudes and independence commitment) and external 
whistle-blowing intentions. Thus, H4 was partially supported. 
 Partial support was found for the moderating effects of moral intensity on 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Specifically, when 
moral intensity was high, there were significant positive relationships between the 
independent variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independence 
commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and internal whistle-blowing 
intentions. It was also found that when moral intensity was low, there was a significant 
negative relationship between personal cost of reporting and internal whistle-blowing. 
Support was only found for desired moral approbation having a significant positive 
effect on external whistle-blowing, when moral intensity was low. Thus, H5 was 
partially supported. 
 
1.8.2 Results of the interviews 
The study found that whistle-blowing was perceived as an important and effective 
control mechanism in the enhancement of the integrity and reputation of the profession 
and the firm. Respondents generally considered that whistle-blowing includes the 
internal and external reporting of unethical or illegal acts that occur within audit firms. 
Attitudes toward whistle-blowing were perceived to positively influence respondents’ 
whistle-blowing intentions. The findings also show that the preferred channel was 
anonymous and internal reporting among respondents.  
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Personal, organizational and societal consequences of whistle-blowing were 
considered significant factors influencing whistle-blowing intentions among auditors. It 
is believed that whistle-blowing will increase trust in the firm and profession, and may 
reduce political intrusion and possible legal action. Whistle-blowing was perceived as 
protecting the public’s interest, given that respondents perceived whistle-blowing as 
being ethical. However, most respondents reported that potential whistle-blowers were 
faced with negative consequences such as reprisals, demotion, harassment and 
ostracism. It was found that these negative consequences (i.e. high personal costs) were 
more likely to deter potential whistle-blowers. Interviewees also felt that external 
whistle-blowing could tarnish the image of the firm and the profession, hence the 
general reluctance to report externally. 
Individual constructs (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independent 
commitment, personal responsibility to report and personal cost of reporting) were 
found to influence whistle-blowing intentions. Most respondents perceived themselves 
as having some control over reporting unethical acts to internal channels. There was 
also recognition that independence was critical to reporting and with emphasis placed 
on being independent in fact and appearance.  
Respondents also felt personally responsible for reporting wrongdoing 
internally, but not externally. These perceptions were derived from moral obligations 
and the need to act in the public’s interest. However, it was perceived that when 
personal costs for reporting were high, individuals were less likely to whistle-blow. 
Thus, self-preservation took precedence for all respondents. Interestingly, the need for 
desired moral approbation revealed conflicting responses, which indicated that 
individuals held mixed views on their referent sources for moral action. The study 
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found that at times, individuals looked for self-approval, and at other times, sought 
approval from others (e.g. superiors) when making ethical decisions.  
The study also sought to explore the role of moral intensity. Respondents felt 
morally intense in situations where the wrongdoing was perceived as being material, 
serious and could pose harm to others. However, it was found that moral intensity 
influenced auditors’ intentions to report internally rather than externally. This finding 
showed that auditors were not likely to report wrongdoing externally, even in situations 
where there was potential harm to others.  
The results of the interviews also indicated that when perceived organizational 
support was high, there was a greater tendency for respondents to engage in internal 
whistle-blowing, but not externally. This suggests that where the organization embraces 
whistle-blowing behaviour and provides a supportive culture, individuals are more 
likely to perceive lower personal costs, and a greater sense of responsibility to report 
any deviant behaviours that threaten the organization’s existence. 
Perceived organizational support (i.e. the culture of the audit firm), group 
cohesiveness and team norms were found to be influential on whistle-blowing 
intentions. Interviewees cited the group’s ethical norms, the relationship with the team 
and the levels of members of the groups as significant motivators. The majority of 
respondents perceived that groups were likely to influence whether one acted ethically 
or unethically. The results from this phase demonstrated that there was the likelihood to 
whistle-blow internally, when team norms were high and group cohesiveness was low.  
Overall, in this phase, the findings show that positive attitudes, greater 
perceived behavioural control, increased personal responsibility for reporting, higher 
independence commitment and lower personal costs are likely to influence auditors’ 
intentions to whistle-blow internally, but not externally. Several recommendations were 
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suggested to promote whistle-blowing behaviour among auditors, namely documenting 
the whistle-blowing policies and procedures of the organization, providing appropriate 
ethics training programmes, establishing an independent committee to assess the 
credibility of the whistle-blowing report, implementing an open-door policy, 
encouraging the greater use of ethics and risk managers, promoting the use of 
anonymous channels (i.e. the hotline) and ensuring protection for the whistle-blower 
(financially and psychologically).  
 
1.9 Boundaries of the study 
There are several boundaries that need to be drawn here. Firstly, this research focuses 
on external auditors working in audit firms. It does not consider internal auditors, who 
by their own scope, work with the client. External auditors are qualified accountants, 
who work as individual practitioners or as members of accounting firms (e.g. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst and Young), and issue independent judgments on 
financial statements of clients. In contrast, the internal auditors are employed by the 
organization that they audit and perform ongoing appraisals of the organization’s 
internal control system for efficiency and effectiveness.  
Secondly, an assumption of most proponents of whistle-blowing is that 
increased reporting is likely to lead to reduced wrongdoing. This study does not seek to 
empirically test this argument; rather, it seeks to determine what factors are likely to 
encourage the reporting of wrongdoing. Several studies have researched the cultural 
differences of whistle-blowing (e.g. Patel, 1999; Tavakoli, Keenan and Cranjak-
Karanovic, 2003). Research has shown that the North American culture is more 
supportive of whistle-blowing (Miceli et al., 2009). However, this current research does 
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not seek to measure the influence of culture on whistle-blowing in the Barbados 
environment. 
 
1.10 Definitions of key terms  
The thesis uses several concepts which are defined below: 
1. Attitude: A disposition or appearance toward a particular action. 
 
2. Behaviour: A construct in Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour 
which refers to an action undertaken by a person that results from a decision 
(intention). 
 
3. Code of ethics: A set of ethical principles and statements by which members 
of professional accounting bodies must abide, such as AICPA and ICAEW 
Code of Ethics.  
 
4. Desired moral approbation: The amount of approval required from oneself 
or others before undertaking moral actions. 
 
5. Disclosure: The act of reporting privileged information to internal or external 
sources. 
 
6. Ethics: A system of moral principles relevant to human behaviour in terms of 
the rightness or wrongness of certain actions. 
 
7. External auditors: Members of audit firms hired to assess and evaluate 
financial statements of their clients or to perform other agreed upon 
procedures. They are required to be independent. 
 
8. Group cohesion: The extent that individuals value their membership in the 
group. 
 
9. Independence commitment: The extent to which the individual auditor 
considers independence to be binding and enforceable. 
 
10. Internal auditors: Employees of a company (client) hired to monitor and 
evaluate the client’s system of internal control. 
 
11. Intention: A motivation to act on something. 
 
12. Moral intensity: The extent of the individual’s moral perceptions of issues. 
Moral intensity comprises magnitude of consequences, social consensus, 
probability of effect, concentration of effect, temporal immediacy and 
proximity (Jones, 1991). 
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13. Organizational wrongdoing: Includes illegal acts or irregular conduct such 
as stealing and mismanagement, which could negatively affect the 
organization and society (Near, Rehg, Van Scotter and Miceli, 2004). 
 
14. Perceived behavioural control: An individual’s belief as to the degree of 
ease or difficulty it takes to perform a particular behaviour (Bandura, 1997). 
 
15. Perceived organizational support: The extent to which the individual 
perceives that the organization values and supports him or her. 
 
16. Personal cost of reporting: An individual’s assessment of the level of 
discomfort (i.e. fear of reprisals or ostracism) in reporting an unethical act. 
 
17. Personal responsibility for reporting: The sense of commitment and moral 
obligation to report an unethical act (Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). 
 
18. Referent group: Any group that the individual identifies with (e.g. peers or 
family) that could influence the decision-maker. 
 
19. Team norms: The norms and values that regulate acceptable behaviour of 
group members. 
 
20. Theory of justice: A theory that proposes individuals make decisions based 
on acceptable principles of fairness and impartiality to all involved. 
 
21. Whistle-blower: An employee who makes an unauthorized disclosure of 
information about wrongdoing and illegal acts to internal or external 
channels. 
 
22. Whistle-blowing: The reporting of wrongdoing, illegal and unethical acts by 
staff members in an organization to internal and external channels that may 
have the authority to take action (Near and Miceli, 1985). 
 
 
1.11 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant 
literature on auditing and auditor independence and ethics, and explains the need for 
auditors to be ethical. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on whistle-blowing and its 
relevance to auditing. It looks at the concept of whistle-blowing, previous whistle-
blowing research and the antecedents, correlates and consequences of whistle-blowing. 
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Chapter 4 describes the conceptual model from which testable hypotheses and research 
questions are developed.  
Chapter 5 describes the research design and methodology, including the 
sampling procedures, collection of data, and statistical techniques used.  Chapter 6 
presents the results of the quantitative survey phase, while chapter 7 presents the 
qualitative findings, which are integrated and discussed with the quantitative results 
from chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 8 puts forward a discussion of the findings and the 
implications, highlights the limitations of the study, and offers suggestions for future 
research.  
 
 
 30
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW - AUDITOR 
INDEPENDENCE AND ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on auditor independence and ethical 
decision-making. Independence is an important factor in the auditors’ professional 
conduct, as it represents the profession’s covenant with society. Since auditors’ 
independence is critical to the integrity and objectivity of the external audit function, 
users and society expect that auditors will always follow strong ethical principles. 
Auditor independence is based on ethical principles which are guided by the various 
professional bodies’ codes of conduct and the requirement for auditors to report 
wrongdoing and questionable acts. The audit literature is replete with studies on factors 
that enhance or compromise auditor independence (Magee and Tseng, 1990; Beattie et 
al., 1999). However, research on the link between auditor independence and ethical 
decision-making processes is limited (Windsor and Ashkanasy, 1995). This is even 
more important within the context of whistle-blowing.  
The chapter is organised as follows: The first section examines the nature of 
auditor independence, and is followed by a section which looks at the importance of 
auditor independence. The third section reviews the role and status of the auditing 
profession in society, while the fourth section examines the codes of professional 
conduct and ethics. The fifth section provides definitions and descriptions of ethics and 
morality, and is followed by the sixth and seventh sections which examine the audit 
process in audit firms and several theories of auditor independence, respectively. The 
eighth section reviews factors that are perceived to influence auditor independence, 
based on various auditor-client relationships. This chapter then reviews previous 
literature on ethical decision-making within the auditing and accounting arena. The 
final section concludes the chapter. 
 31
2.1 Nature of auditor independence 
Independence provides the foundation of the audit profession and is essential for adding 
value to the audit of financial statements (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Vanasco, Skousen 
and Santagato, 1997). However, corporate failures and scandals in US companies such 
as WorldCom and Enron have damaged the level of trust placed in auditors by 
questioning integrity, independence and ethical values. To regain public trust and 
confidence, regulators have implemented several control mechanisms such as rotation 
of audit partners and restrictions on the provision of non-audit services (e.g. Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, 2002). 
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1987) defines the 
term, ‘independent’ as “not influenced or controlled by others in matters of opinion, 
conduct, etc.; thinking of acting for oneself…not depending or contingent upon 
something else for existence, operation, etc” (p. 970).  Similarly, the Collins English 
Dictionary (1998) defines independence as being “free from control in action, 
judgment, etc., autonomous; not dependent on anything else for function, validity, etc” 
(p. 783). 
The literature offers many different interpretations of auditor’s independence 
(Carey and Doherty, 1966; Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Higgins, 1962, Berryman, 1974; 
Moizer, 1985; Flint, 1988; Beattie et al., 1999). For example, Carey and Doherty 
(1966) provided three definitions of auditor independence. They suggest that auditor 
independence means (1) being honest, acting with integrity, objectivity and 
responsibility; (2) the avoidance of relationships that may subconsciously compromise 
the objectivity of the auditor; and (3) the avoidance of relationships that may impair 
other users’ perceptions of the objectivity of the auditor (Vanasco et al., 1997, p. 498). 
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Moreover, DeAngelo (1981a) defined audit quality as the likelihood of auditors 
detecting and reporting material errors, breaches and misstatements in the company’s 
financial statements, thus increasing the importance of auditor independence. Moizer 
(1985) also argued that an independent auditor is expected to disclose all errors, 
omissions and misstatements, which may affect the fair presentation of the financial 
statements. External auditors (i.e. audit firms) are engaged to provide an independent 
opinion on the reliability of a company’s financial reports. This claim of independence 
has been put forward as justification for the existence and need for auditors. Thus, 
auditor independence is important to all users (e.g. shareholders, financial institutions 
and employees), who depend on the auditors’ report to assess the financial status of the 
organization (Beattie et al., 1999; Hudaib, 2003).  
Beattie et al. (1999, p. 68) also explained that independence in fact is the 
auditor’s ability to maintain an unbiased mental attitude during the audit, and 
independence in appearance is the observer’s perception that the auditor-client 
relationship is not likely to be considered as a conflict of interest. Many studies have 
focused on identifying factors that are likely to influence the perceptions of 
independence (i.e. independence in appearance), since independence in fact is 
unobservable (Beattie et al., 1999; Fearnley, Beattie and Brandt, 2005). 
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) Code of Ethics highlighted 
auditor independence as comprising ‘independence of mind’ and ‘independence in 
appearance.’ IFAC (2010, p. 42) defined ‘independence of mind’ as  
The state of mind that permits the expression of a conclusion without being 
affected by influences that compromise professional judgement, thereby 
allowing an individual to act with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional skepticism. (290.6) 
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IFAC (2010, p. 42) also defined ‘independence in appearance’ as  
The avoidance of facts and circumstances that are so significant that a 
reasonable and informed third party, would be likely to conclude, weighing all 
the specific facts and circumstances, that a firm’s, or a member of the audit 
team’s integrity, objectivity or professional skepticism has been compromised. 
(290.6)  
 
Vanasco et al. (1997) argued that professional accounting associations have 
stressed the significance of auditor independence to the auditing profession as being 
both ethical and professional. Mednick (1990) felt that more emphasis on professional 
ethics will serve to help solve some of the ethical dilemmas and minimise the perceived 
threats to auditor independence. For example, the IFAC Ethics Committee has 
introduced the notion of independence as a salient issue within its ethical guidelines 
(Vanasco et al., 1997). This governs professional accountants’ behaviour within the 
areas of integrity, objectivity and confidentiality. ICAEW’s (2009) Code of Ethics 
identified five areas as constituting threats to independence: self-interest, advocacy, 
self-review, familiarity and intimidation. There is general agreement that independence 
may be perceived as objectivity, which is a state of mind that is free of influences 
which are likely to compromise judgment.  It is observed that the ICAEW, IFAC and 
AICPA have not focused on the issues or environmental contextual factors (i.e. the 
moral intensity). It may be argued that the professional codes are vague in their 
prescriptions, and do not focus on the moral intensity of the issues.  
The audit committee is required to recommend the auditor to shareholders, who 
ratify the appointment and remuneration. The auditor is expected to act independently 
of the client and on behalf of society. Briloff (1990) argued that this is the auditor’s 
covenant with society. The appearance of auditor independence is regulated by various 
detailed rules prescribing what should or should not be done. For example, the 
professional accounting associations have highlighted instances where independence 
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might be impaired. These areas include fee dependency, personal relationships and 
financial investment in clients (Alleyne et al., 2006; AICPA, 2006; ICAEW, 2009).  
 
2.2 Importance of auditor independence 
Audit quality has been recognised to be directly related to audit independence 
(DeAngelo, 1981a). The maintenance of audit quality can be viewed as the auditor’s 
competence to discover wrongdoing and ability to refrain from yielding to client’s 
pressure by reporting the wrongdoing (i.e., objectivity) (DeAngelo, 1981a; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Fearnley and Beattie (2004) argued that competence and 
independence can prevent audit failure. However, there is a difference between 
competence and independence. Competence means that the auditor should be capable 
of identifying errors, omissions and misstatements, while independence means that the 
auditor will be able to express an opinion that the financial statements are presented 
fairly or not (Fearnley and Beattie, 2004). DeAngelo (1981a) argued that any auditor 
who fails to adhere to auditing standards by performing a poor audit in an attempt to 
retain a client may risk damage to his or her reputation, which could result in a 
potential loss of revenue from existing and future clients. 
The auditor is hired and paid by the shareholders.  Ashbaugh (2004) argued that 
since top management is the party ultimately responsible for the financial statements, 
then the audit contract may be seriously affected from the old adage “a dog will not bite 
the hand that feeds him” (p. 144), and therefore threatens the concept of independence. 
However, an effective audit committee could provide adequate support to the external 
auditor, thus allowing the auditor to be able to resist management’s pressure to report 
unethically. 
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Research has indicated the relative importance of the need for auditors (e.g. 
Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Sucher and Kosmala-MacLullich, 2004) by arguing that 
without being independent, the audit opinion would have little value. Bakar et al. 
(2005) indicated that the absence of auditor independence was the major contributor to 
the accounting scandals with WorldCom and Enron. For example, Enron’s auditor, 
Arthur Andersen was viewed as being not independent because its earnings for non-
audit services (i.e. consulting fees) exceeded its audit fees (Alleyne et al., 2006). 
Lindberg and Beck (2004) argued that the auditing profession’s reputation was severely 
tarnished after Enron’s debacle.  
 
2.3 The role and status of the profession 
The authority granted to professionals is carefully maintained by professional 
associations, which prescribe regulations, level of training, acceptable professional 
codes of conduct, justification of the quantum of professional fees, prevention of 
encroachment from others, and thus promoting exclusivity, and oversight of the 
preservation of the profession’s prestige (Gould and Kolb, 1964, p. 542). Greenwood’s 
five (5) attributes of a profession include a systematic body of theory, authority (i.e. 
power), sanctioned by society, codes of ethics and a culture (Cosserat, 2004). Perks 
(1993) listed twenty-two (22) characteristics which help to determine whether a 
profession has achieved professional status. These 22 characteristics include the 
following: 1) acquisition of skills, based on theoretical knowledge; 2) the presence of a 
professional body; 3) a lengthy period of education; 4) the existence of competency 
tests; 5) undergo training; 6) the need for a practicing certificate (licence); 7) granting 
job autonomy; 8) existence of professional codes of conduct; 9) regulates itself; 10) 
perform public service and be altruistic; 11) enjoy exclusivity and legal acceptance; 12) 
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have control over fees and advertising; 13) benefit from elite status and rewards; 14) 
have clients; 15) acknowledged as middle-class vocations; 16) are male-dominated; 17) 
provide assurances; 18) be legitimate; 19) perform rituals; 20) the existence of a remote 
body of knowledge; 21) the presence of a vast body of knowledge; and 22) provide 
mobility in society (Perks, 1993; Hudaib, 2003).  
Sager (1995) stated that the main features  of the accounting profession could be 
further narrowed down to eight categories: 1) skills influenced by theoretical 
knowledge, 2) a lengthy period of formal education, 3) test of competence, 4) in-
training experience, 5) granting of licences to practitioners, 6) job autonomy, 7) 
professional bodies and 8) professional codes of conduct. Cowton (2009) suggested that 
the key characteristics of the profession or professional bodies include having 1) 
specialist skill and theoretical knowledge, 2) use of discretion and judgment, 3) 
training, formal certification of competence and licensure, 4) exhibiting independence, 
self-regulation and requirements for membership as well as discipline, (5) offering 
personal and financial reward and (6) establishment of ethical codes to guide 
behaviour.  
Professionals ought to have the experience, technical training and necessary 
skills to be able to practise their craft. They may achieve these competencies through 
formal education and training. Most professional organizations (AICPA and ICAEW) 
require prospective members to pass examinations prior to entry into the profession and 
to provide the required competency. Perks (1993) suggested that in-training experience 
allows the norms and attitudes of the more experienced practitioners to be passed on to 
trainees. Licensing (i.e. the attainment of a practicing certificate) is seen as a 
fundamental part of the professional process, whereby the licensed individual obtains 
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recognition and membership in the profession (Perks, 1993). The behaviour of the 
licensed professional is regulated by the profession’s code of conduct and ethics.  
The professional usually retains some measure of autonomy over his or her 
work, which engenders a level of independence and provides power and status (Perks, 
1993). Professions have professional bodies which serve to elevate members’ status, 
and have stringent requirements for entry. For example, in the accounting profession, 
members are required to undergo continuing professional education and training, and 
follow the rules and codes of professional conduct and ethics to achieve the highest 
standards of professionalism and meet the needs of society (Perks, 1993). Therefore, 
any member who deviates from the codes of professional conduct may be penalised by 
the professional bodies.   
 
 
2.4 Codes of professional ethics 
The existence of the professional codes of conduct is deemed important to guide and 
govern members’ behaviour in maintaining an independent attitude of mind and 
avoiding situations which would lead to loss of objectivity during their audit work 
(Moizer, 1997). Cowton (2009) argued that professions, such as accounting, through 
self-regulation, hold themselves “to a higher standard of ethics than ordinarily required 
by law and conventional morality” (p. 179).  As a result, auditors are assumed to act as 
society’s watchdogs and are expected to put society’s interests above self-interest 
(Sikka, Willmott and Lowe, 1989; Porter, 1992). 
The profession is guided by codes of professional ethics (Higgins and Olson, 
1972). The codes of professional ethics assume that all auditors have the required 
ethical ability to deal with moral crises and dilemmas. However, it has been argued that 
the existence of codes cannot prevent unethical practices (Cowton, 2009). For example, 
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auditors are assumed to have the required psychological ability to resist pressure from 
management to give a favourable audit opinion in audit conflict situations. Preston, 
Cooper, Scarbrough and Chilton (1995) argued that independence is the narrative of 
legitimacy that auditors used to justify society’s trust in the profession. Society’s trust 
is based on members of the profession acting ethically and with integrity. Cowton 
(2009) argued that sound ethics should lead to trust, which can enhance the reputation 
of the profession, and may be advantageous to the individual member. However, there 
are times when a member may put the profession at risk by profiting from unethical 
decisions.  
 
2.5 The meaning of ethics and morality 
Ethics is relevant to individuals who are faced with making moral decisions, which may 
lead to moral issues.  The presence of a moral code serves to act as an ethical guideline, 
which can aid the ethical decision-making of individuals. Flew (1984) defined morality 
or ethics as the acceptable standards for regulating human behaviour in order to 
accomplish life’s goals.  Jones (1991) argued that ethics includes the making of legal or 
morally acceptable decisions to society. Payne and Joyner (2006) defined ethics “…as a 
system of valued principles or practices and the ability to determine right from wrong” 
(p. 205). Morality and ethics are used interchangeably to mean the same thing. Acting 
ethically suggests that the individual will be focused on morality rather than the legality 
of the decision. For example, in most cultures, it is generally accepted that murder and 
lying are immoral. Although society has laws to prescribe socially acceptable 
behaviour, individuals who are rational and free thinking human beings, are competent 
to make moral determinations from their own values, experiences and lifestyles.  
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Ethical actions are based on the moral rightness or wrongness of a decision. 
Jones and Ryan (1997) argued that individuals have the choice and knowledge of 
possible alternatives in making moral decisions. Jones (1991, p. 367) further defined a 
moral issue as being present where the volitional act of an individual has the potential 
to harm or benefit others in society.  
 
2.6 The audit process in audit firms 
This section briefly explains the audit process and structure of audit firms to 
contextualise the environment that auditors operate. The auditor uses specific 
techniques to collect information in the form of evidence in order to give an audit 
opinion about the organization’s accounts.  This function is performed by an audit team 
comprising audit staff that may possess diverse levels of knowledge, experience, 
qualifications and tenure in the audit firm’s hierarchy. For example, the partner, audit 
managers and seniors, who will be qualified accountants, will be the most experienced 
staff, while university and high school graduates, who are currently sitting professional 
accountancy examinations, may be in the lowest position and the least experienced in 
the audit firm. The team may comprise the partner, audit manager, audit seniors and 
other junior staff.  The senior members of the audit team will plan, supervise, control 
and review the audit work of junior staff and determine the type of audit opinion to be 
given. Audit firm members are required to follow the profession’s code of ethics or 
conduct. Each firm will also have its own code of ethics, which would serve to 
complement the profession’s code. Thus, adherence to these codes should ensure 
objectivity, integrity, audit quality and acting in the public’s interest. 
The term “audit team” relates to a group of auditors who may be working on 
particular audit assignments (Solomon, 1987; Rich, Solomon and Trotman, 1997; 
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Dowling, 2009). Dowling (2009) defines the audit team as “the social clan of auditors 
an auditor works with across several audit engagements” (p. 778). Given that auditors 
work as a group or team on many engagements, Dowling (2009) further argues that the 
individual auditor’s identification with a team may go beyond any specific audit 
engagement. Each audit team will consist of individuals possessing different 
characteristics, experiences, knowledge and incentives.  
Antle, Griffin, Teece and Williamson (1997) suggested that the incentives for 
the team to behave ethically can be based on environmental factors, the audit firm’s 
governance structure and individual factors. Environmental factors can range from 
competition, the provision of non-audit services and codes of professional conduct.  
The audit firm’s governance structure can involve its compensation policies, internal 
control practices and the relationships that the firm have with its members.  Individual 
factors can include the auditor’s personal financial situation, sense of professionalism 
and personal relationships (Antle et al., 1997). Thus, the impact of teams on ethical 
decision-making can provide rich areas for future research. 
 
 
2.7 Theories and perspectives of auditor independence 
There have been several theoretical models of auditor independence. The theoretical 
assumption of auditor independence is that a separation exists between ownership and 
control which is synonymous with agency theory. Agency theory has its origins from 
the 17th century, where the concept referred to servant-master relationship in that agents 
(servants) focused more on self-interest rather than the interest of the principal (master) 
(Reinstein, Landers and Jennings, 2002). For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
explained agency theory as a relationship, in which principals (shareholders) engage 
another person (i.e. the auditor) to perform a service for the principals to ensure that 
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their agents (management) are running the business properly (Reinstein et al., 2002). 
To control management (agents) from benefiting at the expense of the principals 
(shareholders), a need for independent audits is created to act on behalf of the 
organization’s shareholders (Reinstein et al., 2002; DeAngelo, 1981a, 1981b).  
At the annual general meeting of the shareholders, the directors’ 
recommendations for auditors are usually approved. Auditors (as agents) normally 
determine the terms of reference for each audit engagement and forward the audit 
report to the board of directors (acting as principal). The agent-principal relationship 
has now been changed to encompass the audit committee as an agent.  Thus, Reinstein 
et al. (2002) argued that the principal will be the shareholders, while the agents will be 
the Board of Directors, the audit committee and the auditors. These authors further 
suggested that auditors, acting as rational economic individuals, will maximize self-
interest via increasing audit and non-audit fees to cover cost of lost reputation and legal 
costs.   
DeAngelo’s (1981b) economic model proposed that auditors earn ‘quasi-rents’ 
from the clients which may provide the auditor with incentives to do whatever is 
necessary to keep the client and these incentives are contingent on the importance and 
risk level of the client and the probability of being discovered. Furthermore, Antle’s 
(1984) economic model analyses situations which have three parties (owner, manager 
and auditor). The model assumes that if the auditor and management seek to maximize 
their own self-interest, they could conspire for their own benefit at the expense of the 
owner. Antle’s model assumes utility maximization, and suggests that management 
may fraudulently report the company’s financial status, and the auditor has the 
responsibility to report it, but may not make the effort to do so (Moizer, 1997).  
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In another attempt to explain auditor independence, Johnstone, Sutton and 
Warfield (2001) conceptually advanced an auditor independence framework. The 
authors argued that risk of independence is related to environmental factors, originating 
from direct and indirect incentives. They proposed that direct incentives consist of 
investments in the client, contingency fees, seeking future employment with an existing 
client, and financial dependence on any client (lowballing and reputational value). 
Indirect incentives may include close personal relationships and the audit of one’s own 
work. The authors further proposed that mitigating factors include corporate 
governance structures, regulatory environment, audit firm’s culture, and characteristics 
of the auditor. Fearnley et al. (2005), using a case study approach, identified the 
following threats to auditor independence: urgency, familiarity, self-review, 
intimidation and fear of losing a client. It was also found that management motivation 
was a key driver of pressure.  
 
2.8 Factors affecting auditor independence 
There is extensive previous research on auditor independence, which highlights the 
factors that are perceived to influence perceptions of the independence of auditors (e.g. 
Lindsay, 1992; Beattie et al., 1999; Hudaib, 2003; Geiger and Rama, 2003). This body 
of research identified the factors that either impaired or enhanced auditor independence 
in appearance among users and auditors. 
 Beattie et al. (1999) found that the threats to auditor independence were 
economic dependence on the client, competition among auditors, provision of non-audit 
services (NAS) and laxity of regulation. These authors also found that factors that were 
likely to improve auditor independence included regulatory changes, need for audit 
committees, the likelihood of being referred to the Financial Review Committee and 
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the possible loss of Registered Auditor Status. Prior research has also shown that other 
factors that could affect or impair perceptions of audit independence include length of 
tenure and unpaid fees (Teoh and Lim, 1996), firm size (Beattie et al., 1999), the 
financial position of the client (Knapp, 1985) and financial investment in the client 
(Lindsay, Rennie, Murphy and Silvester, 1987).  
The provision of NAS by audit firms has been debated in the audit literature.  
Some authors have argued that NAS creates an economic or financial relationship 
between the client and the auditor, and may create dependence, causing the auditor not 
to report truthfully (Simunic, 1984). Other empirical studies have also found that 
provision of NAS creates a perceived lack of auditor independence (Pany and Reckers, 
1984; Beattie et al., 1999; Alleyne, Devonish and Alleyne, 2006).  
Alleyne (2002) highlighted that the closeness of the audit market in small 
countries may place auditors in difficult and potentially conflicting positions, since 
competition may force them to do whatever is possible to keep clients. The finding 
indicates that there may be a link between the size of audit market, competition and 
auditor independence, where smaller audit markets are more likely to experience higher 
levels of competition. This high level of competition, in turn, may impair auditor 
independence. Alleyne’s (2002) finding was also confirmed by Alleyne et al. (2006), 
who found that size and closeness of Barbadian society (i.e. small) was perceived by 
users and auditors as being likely to compromise auditor independence.   
The large size of audit fees has also been perceived as being likely to 
compromise auditor independence. Prior research has shown that auditor independence 
may be impaired by users’ perceptions of high fee dependency on any client 
(Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1981; Teoh and Lim, 1996; Beattie et al., 1999).  Studies 
have also found support for a positive relationship between perceptions of auditor 
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independence and firm size (McKinley, Pany and Reckers, 1985; Gul, 1991). These 
studies have found that larger audit firms were more likely to be independent. It is 
assumed that large audit firms will be more likely to resist client pressure. However, 
this assumption may be refuted by the case of Arthur Andersen, being pressured by 
Enron.  
Auditor independence is also believed to be threatened by the auditors’ reliance 
on directors for their appointments (Miller, 1986). For example, Mitchell (1990) argued 
that auditor independence may be compromised, since auditors are appointed by the 
Board. As a result, auditors are more inclined to yield to management’s request to grant 
a favourable audit opinion, due to the fear of losing the audit client (Goldman and 
Barlev, 1974; Nichols and Price, 1976; Dunn, 1996).   
Other threats to independence may be close familial relationships and audit staff 
having shares in the client (ICAEW, 2009). Prior research suggested that the presence 
of such relationships constitutes major threats to auditor independence (Gorman and 
Ansong, 1998; Agacer and Doupnik, 1991; Hudaib, 2003).  Hudaib (2003) also looked 
at the personal level, and found that skills, competence and blood relationships were 
perceived as threats to auditor independence. The codes of professional conduct 
prohibit the auditor from holding shares in private or public companies audited by 
them.   
Lengthy tenure of the auditor in office has been argued to influence the risk of 
the auditor losing independence due to the development of allegiances and personal 
relationships (Flint, 1988; Hudaib, 2003). As a result, the auditor’s objectivity may 
become impaired as there may be a tendency to overlook issues and accept flippant 
responses to queries (Porter, Simon and Hatherly, 1996). Firth (1981) found that 
bankers perceived that lengthy tenure may impair auditor independence.   
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Teoh and Lim (1996) found a negative relationship between tenure of the 
auditor and auditor independence. The authors suggested that auditors should be 
mandatorily rotated as a means of maintaining auditor independence.  In Australia, 
Schelluch and Thorpe (1995) found that rotation of audit partners and staff was viewed 
as being critical to the enhancement of auditor independence. In addition, several 
regulatory factors that are likely to enhance independence include the presence of audit 
committees (Cadbury Report, 1992; Sarbanes and Oxley, 2002), adequate policies for 
hiring and paying auditors, strict adherence to standards and effective disciplinary 
procedures for auditors and clients (APB, 1994; Alleyne et al., 2006). The next section 
looks at the auditors’ ethical decision-making process. 
 
2.9 Auditors’ ethical decision-making process  
External auditors are required to make independent judgments about financial 
statements from an ethical perspective. The accounting professional bodies (e.g. 
ICAEW, AICPA and IFAC) have set guidelines via codes of ethics to motivate the 
membership to behave ethically. However, given the complexities of human nature, 
prior research suggests that the decision to act ethically may be more difficult to do 
than simply following the codes of the profession or the organizations (Lampe and 
Finn, 1992; Falk et al., 1999).  
The auditors’ ethical reasoning takes into consideration such factors as 
objectivity, independence, integrity, due care and professional skepticism (Thorne, 
1998; Jones and Ponemon, 1993). This ethical reasoning process represents the ability 
of the auditor to make an unbiased opinion (via the audit report) on the accounts of the 
client and to appreciate the impact of that opinion on other users (Ponemon and 
Gabhart, 1994; Jones, 1991). There are situations when the auditor’s expertise and rules 
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of professional conduct are not sufficiently clear for the auditor to render a judgment on 
a particular issue. Thus, one may argue that it is the ethical reasoning of the auditor, 
which determines the quality of the audit opinion.  
 
2.9.1 Previous ethical decision-making models 
Many of the studies on ethical decision-making have researched factors that are likely 
to influence auditors’ ethical reasoning process. These studies used Kohlberg’s (1969) 
cognitive moral development model as the basis for developing their ethical decision-
making models. Kohlberg’s theory postulated three broad progressive stages of moral 
(ethical) development: 1) pre-conventional, 2) conventional, and 3) post-conventional. 
At the first stage (the pre-conventional level), an individual’s ethical reasoning process 
concerns issues surrounding what is right and wrong based on the consequences of the 
act. At stage two (the conventional level), the individual’s decision as to what is right 
or wrong is determined by rules and laws and the expectations of peers and significant 
others (Jones et al. 2003). Finally, at the post-conventional level, the individual’s 
ethical decisions are based on using general ethical principles such as acting for 
society’s welfare and justice (Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma and Bebeau, 
1999). While Kohlberg’s approach used a qualitative methodology, Rest (1979) 
developed a quantitative instrument, referred to as the Defining Issues Test (DIT), to 
measure moral development. 
Many ethical studies have used Rest’s (1979, 1986) ethical decision-making 
model (also known as the Four Component Model) (See Figure 2). This model is made 
up of four components: (1) moral recognition, (2) making ethical judgment, (3) 
intentions to act ethically, and (4) ethical action or ethical behaviour. The first 
component is the recognition of ethical issues (ethical sensitivity), which suggests that 
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ethical decision-making ought to start with the awareness that there is an ethical 
situation or dilemma, and the identification of alternative strategies and potential 
consequences of those actions on others. For example, the individual audit staff may 
choose to agree or not to agree with management (client) or another audit firm member 
(e.g. manager or partner) on a questionable inventory or accounts receivable practice, 
and considers the potential harm or benefit to other users of the financial statements.  
In the second stage, after the individual identifies the dilemma, he or she will 
make an evaluation of the possible outcomes and make an ethical or moral judgment as 
to what he or she ought to do. For example, an overstatement of inventory or accounts 
receivable, or understatement of liabilities may be identified as being ethical or 
unethical, depending on whether the audit staff accepts or rejects either the client’s, the 
audit manager’s or partner’s position. The third stage, the individual’s ethical 
intentions, focuses on the evaluation of the right decision when compared to other 
options. This component deals with the individual’s behavioural intentions (i.e. the 
auditor’s decision of what to do). The final component of the model refers to the actual 
performance of the behaviour. 
 
Figure 2: Rest’s (1986) ethical decision-making model (adapted) 
 
Some interactionist models have incorporated individual and contextual factors 
to determine the variables that are likely to influence one’s ethical decision-making. 
Jones et al. (2003) highlighted that these interactionist models have proposed that 
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ethical decision-making is influenced by individual factors such as gender (Gilligan, 
1982), ethical development (Thorne, 1998), attitudes (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985), 
character (Thorne, 1998) and experience (Hiltebeitel and Jones, 1992; Bebeau, 1994). 
These models have also proposed contextual factors such as workplace characteristics 
(budget pressures, rewards, penalties and social influence) (Trevino and Weaver, 2003), 
organizational commitment (Trevino, 1986) and moral intensity (Jones, 1991).  
Several studies have built on cognitive-developmental psychology to explain 
auditors’ ethical reasoning. For example, Trevino (1986) highlighted that the ethical 
decision-making may be influenced by several contextual and individual-based factors 
such as organizational culture, the characteristics of work, locus of control and the 
degree of reliance on others for guidance (See Figure 3). Trevino (1986) cited the 
arguments of Higgins, Power and Kohlberg (1984) and claimed that a sound 
explanation of ethical decision-making in organization must address both individual 
and situational variables.  
Several authors have already capitalised on this opportunity to advance such an 
integrated model. For example, Ferrell and Gresham (1985) integrated contextual and 
individual factors in a contingency-based model of ethical decision-making. They 
argued that several contingent variables are likely to influence the decision-maker such 
as individual factors (values and attitudes), and contextual or organizational factors 
(significant others, professional codes and corporate policy).  Similarly, Bommer, 
Gratto, Gravander and Tuttle (1987) proposed a broad model of ethical decision-
making comprising the work setting (organizational culture and policies), personal 
environment (e.g. referent groups), professional environment (e.g. codes of conduct), 
regulatory environment (e.g., legislation), societal values and individual factors (e.g. 
demographics and moral reasoning).  
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Figure 3: Trevino’s (1986) person-situation interactionist model  
 
 
Jones (1991) claimed that, despite researchers’ attempts to develop models that 
capture various forms of factors (both organizational and individual), they failed to 
acknowledge the relevance of issue-specific variables in their conceptualisation. As a 
result, Jones (1991) proposed the moral intensity construct, which is based on the view 
that ethical behaviour is contingent on the moral issue itself. Jones (1991) highlighted 
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the significance of the moral issue (in a particular situation) in the development of 
future of ethical decision-making models. Moral intensity comprises magnitude of 
consequences, social consensus, probability of harm, concentration of effect, proximity 
and temporal immediacy (See Figure 4). The greater the moral intensity of the issue, 
the less likely a person will engage in unethical behaviour. Jones (1991) argued that 
high moral intense issues are more significant and vivid than low intensity ones, and 
the more intense (or severe) the issue becomes, the higher the level of awareness from 
the individual that may reduce the intention to behave unethically.  
 Magnitude of consequences may be defined as the amount of potential harm an 
act can cause to people. It is proposed that the greater the magnitude of consequences 
(harm to more persons), the greater will be the moral intensity of the issue. Support was 
found for a positive relationship between magnitude of consequences and ethical 
decision-making (Fritzsche, 1988; Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga, 1993). Social consensus 
refers to the level of agreement from significant others (family, peers, friends and co-
workers) on whether an intended act may be evil or good (Singhapakdi, Vitell and 
Kraft, 1996). Probability of effect refers to situations where, as the likelihood of a 
potential harm (benefit) increases, the level of moral intensity increases (decreases). 
Temporal immediacy refers to instances where an act which has immediate negative 
consequences is deemed to have higher moral intensity than one which may have 
possible negative consequences in the future. Proximity implies the closeness of the 
decision-maker to the beneficiaries or victims of the moral act. Jones (1991) argued that 
people tend to be more caring about individuals who are close to them (i.e. becoming 
more morally intense) than those who are distant. Concentration of effect refers to the 
inverse relationship between the number of persons that are likely to be affected by a 
given act and its related magnitude (Jones, 1991, p. 371). 
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Figure 4: Jones’ (1991) issue-contingent model 
 
 
Given the above, it is deemed necessary to construct a model that contains 
diverse factors derived from relevant literature and which depict the multi-dimensional 
and complex reality of ethical decisions in organizations and society. Flannery and 
May’s (2000) concluded that “by enfolding the influences of the individual, context, 
and issue into organizational ethics…researchers may begin to understand the decision-
making processes” (p. 659). 
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(1986) model: 1) recognition of moral issue (ethical sensitivity); 2) ethical (moral) 
judgment; 3) ethical intention; and 4) engage in ethical behaviour. The following 
sections briefly review the literature in that context. This review is not intended to be 
exhaustive, but serves to highlight important studies of ethical decision-making and sets 
up the discussion for whistle-blowing in Chapter 3. 
 
2.10.1 Studies on auditors’ ethical sensitivity (recognition of ethical issues) 
Ponemon (1993) argued that ethical sensitivity is important in situations where the rules 
of the firm or the profession are not clear. In an audit context, auditors must be able to 
judge the integrity of clients (Shaub and Lawrence, 1996). Ponemon and Gabhart 
(1993) found that auditors who had higher ethical development were more sensitive to 
issues of competence and integrity of the client than auditors who had lower moral 
reasoning, when assessing the materiality of a proposed adjustment. Ponemon (1993) 
had similar findings among audit managers. Cohen, Pant and Sharp (1996, 2001) found 
that auditors were more inclined to make ethical judgements, based on utilitarian, 
justice and obligatory grounds.   
Studies have used Jones’ (1991) issue-contingent model to examine the 
relationship between moral intensity and auditors’ ethical sensitivity. For example, 
Karcher (1996) found that respondents were more inclined to be ethically sensitive, if 
the magnitude of consequences was great. Ketchand, Morris and Shafer (1999), by 
varying the potential misstatement (magnitude of consequences or materiality) and the 
proposed use of the financial statements, found that in high moral intensity situations, 
auditors perceived actions as being more highly unethical than in low moral intensity 
situations. These results suggest that magnitude of consequences is positively related to 
auditors’ ethical sensitivity (Jones et al., 2003; Cohen and Martinov-Bennie, 2006). 
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Ketchand et al. (1999) argued that an important issue facing the profession is the fact 
that auditors face significant client pressures to use questionable accounting practices. 
Research has tested for the influence of the auditors’ professional environment 
on their ethical awareness (Dreike and Moeckel, 1995; Douglas, Davidson and 
Schwartz, 2001; Jones et al., 2003). There has been mixed findings on the influence of 
the code of ethics and organizational culture on the ethical sensitivity of auditors. While 
some research has shown that the codes should reduce uncertainty, others have argued 
that professional codes could restrict the ethical sensitivity for issues not adequately 
considered in the codes (Douglas et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2003).  
 
2.10.2 Studies on auditors’ ethical judgments 
Rest’s (1979, 1994) second component, making an ethical judgment, has been 
researched fully within the auditing context (Ponemon, 1990). At this stage, the auditor 
identifies the ethical issue and decides on the appropriate strategy needed to resolve it 
(Jones et al., 2003). Many studies have used Rest’s (1979) DIT instrument to measure 
ethical judgment. Most studies using the DIT have found that female auditors scored 
higher on the ethical reasoning scales than their male counterparts (Ponemon and 
Gabhart, 1993; Eynon, Hill and Stevens, 1997; Thorne and Magnan, 2000). Most of 
these studies have used audit-specific instruments and scenarios as proxies to measure 
the ethical judgment of auditors (Thorne, 2000; Massey, 2002; Jones et al., 2003). 
Several studies have indicated that the influence of peers on the resolution of ethical 
dilemmas is likely to improve the ethical judgment of auditors (Brugman and Weisfelt, 
2000; Thorne and Hartwick, 2001).  
Ponemon (1992b) found that auditors who possessed high moral development 
tended to under-report audit time more than those audit staff with relatively lower 
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levels of ethical development. In a later study, Ponemon (1993) found that auditors 
with higher ethical reasoning scores had negative perceptions of under-reporting, 
slacking and premature signoffs than auditors with low ethical reasoning. Sweeney and 
Roberts (1997), using 119 audit partners and managers, found that auditors’ ability to 
make independent judgments were significantly influenced by the presence of a penalty 
and level of moral development.   
Coram et al. (2008) examined moral intensity of reduced audit quality acts 
among auditors in Australia. These authors used only three of Jones’ (1991) perceived 
moral intensity constructs (probability of effect, social consensus and magnitude of 
consequences). Coram et al (2008) found empirical support for the moral intensity 
construct in the audit context. Specifically, they found that false signing off was 
deemed more morally intense as an issue of reduced audit quality.  
 
2.10.3 Studies on auditors’ behavioural intentions 
The literature highlights a significant and strong relationship between ethical intentions 
and ethical behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen, 1991). Prior research has also 
tested for the influence of individual (e.g. attitudes, perceived behavioural control, 
subjective norms, ethical development) and contextual (e.g. moral intensity, 
organizational culture, group or peer pressure) factors on auditors’ ethical intentions 
(Shafer, 2008; Karacaer, Gohar, Aygun and Sayin, 2009; Sweeney, Arnold and Pierce, 
2010). For example, prior research has found strong support for the significant and 
positive relationship between moral (ethical) development and auditors’ behavioural 
intentions on issues such as resisting client and other work related pressures (e.g. 
Windsor and Ashkanasy, 1995; Sweeney and Roberts, 1997; Gul, Ng and Tong, 2003; 
Tsui and Gul, 1996; Jones et al., 2003; Sweeney et al., 2010).  
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Using locus of control, Tsui and Gul (1996) found that internals (i.e. auditors 
who feel that they have control over their own lives) were more likely to give in to 
client requests, compared to externals (i.e. those auditors who feel that others control 
their lives). Buchan (2005) investigated the ethical behaviour of auditors, using Ajzen’s 
(1991) theory of planned behaviour.2  He sought to determine the level of influence of 
attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, moral sensitivity and the 
firm’s ethical climate on auditors’ ethical intentions. Support was only found for the 
significant and positive relationship between attitudes and intentions to act ethically.  
Lord and DeZoort (2001) found that peer pressure (i.e. obedience pressure from 
superiors or conformity pressure) significantly influences auditors’ ethical intentions. 
These authors found that audit seniors were more likely to act unethically (i.e. sign off 
on materially misstated client balances), due to obedience pressure.  Prior research has 
also used Jones’ (1991) moral intensity model as a contextual variable to determine a 
link with auditors’ ethical intentions. Shafer, Morris and Ketchand (2001) found that in 
situations of high moral intensity (using magnitude of consequences and probability of 
harm), auditors were less likely to give in to client pressure to support aggressive 
accounting treatments. 
Cohen and Martinov-Bennie (2006) also found support for the importance of all 
moral intensity factors in the making of ethical decisions within the audit profession. 
These authors found that magnitude of consequences was the most important moral 
intensity factor, which they argued was not surprising given that risk and materiality 
influence the choice of audit procedures. Cohen and Martinov-Bennie (2006) suggested 
research should be conducted on the role of perceived moral intensity factors on auditor 
independence issues (e.g. client tenure, external competition and client pressure).  
                                                 
2 The theory of planned behaviour will be fully explained in chapter 4. 
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Previous studies have used the DIT to look at ethical decision-making among 
groups (e.g., Nichols and Day, 1982; Abdolmohammadi, Gabhart and Reeves, 1997; 
Abdolmohammadi and Reeves, 2003). Nichols and Day (1982) found that groups 
reached decisions, reflecting higher DIT (ethical reasoning) scores than the average 
ethical reasoning level of the individual members. Using the DIT, Abdolmohammadi et 
al. (1997) found that the most capable and dominant members of the group significantly 
influenced the decisions of interacting groups. This led Abdolmohammadi and Reeves 
(2003) to conclude that superior decision-making was made by groups when compared 
to individuals. Given that the literature shows that there is a relationship between peer 
pressure and auditor’s ethical intentions (e.g. Lord and DeZoort, 2001), Jones et al. 
(2003) suggested the need for future research on the influence of groups or teams on 
auditors’ ethical intentions.  
 
 
2.10.4 Studies on auditors’ ethical action or behaviour 
A review of the audit literature revealed that there were not many studies that looked at 
the ethical action or behaviour component (i.e. the final phase of the ethical decision-
making process) (Jones et al., 2003). For instance, Falk, Lynne, Mestelman and Shehata 
(1999), using an experimental approach, found that when auditors were faced with the 
prospect of losing a client, they were more likely to compromise their independent 
judgment. Ponemon (1992b) found that auditors, with low moral development, 
appeared to be more willing to under-report time. Thus, these studies show that 
contextual factors (e.g. budget or client pressure) may influence auditors’ ethical 
actions (Jones et al., 2003).  
Researchers have argued that there are inherent difficulties in measuring and 
observing actual auditors’ ethical behaviour, a point that will be elaborated upon in 
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Chapter 3. Research investigating factors associated with auditors’ whistle-blowing 
behaviours remains to be considered. Thus, most of the work in the area has focused 
primarily on measuring behavioural intentions (i.e. ethical intentions) rather than actual 
ethical behaviour. A table has been adapted from Jones et al. (2003) and updated to 
reflect the key aspects of the current literature on ethical intentions within the 
accounting and auditing profession. Thus, Table 1 shows a summary of studies that 
have researched ethical intentions among auditors, since intention is the dependent 
variable and main focal point of this thesis. 
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Table 1:  Summary of studies investigating auditors’ ethical intentions 
Authors Respondents Factors Methodology Main findings 
Ponemon & 
Gabhart 
(1990) 
119 audit 
practitioners 
Moral 
development 
(DIT), 
probability of 
detection and 
harm to others. 
Scenario 
approach with an 
independence 
dilemma (asking 
whether the 
auditor should be 
involved in the 
client’s search 
and recruitment 
process). 
Auditors with high 
levels of moral 
development were 
less likely to 
compromise 
independence 
judgements, 
compared to those 
with low levels of 
moral reasoning. 
 
Ponemon & 
Gabhart 
(1993) 
235 auditors. Examined 
moral 
development,  
staff 
performance 
appraisal, 
penalties, and 
pressure to 
conform. 
Scenario 
approach 
covering  audit 
budget pressure 
situations 
(underreporting 
time and 
premature sign 
off). 
 
Auditors with low 
levels of moral 
development 
tended to be willing 
to underreport time 
and prematurely 
sign off, when they 
may be penalised 
for poor 
performance. 
 
Windsor & 
Ashkanasy 
(1995) 
168 auditors in 
Australia. 
Examined 
moral 
development,  
character  
(belief in a just 
world), and 
bargaining 
power of the 
client. 
Scenario study, 
using an 
independence 
dilemma 
highlighting   
client bargaining 
power (financial 
condition, size of 
fees, and threat of 
changing the 
auditors). 
 
Auditors, with high 
moral development 
and high beliefs in 
a just world, were 
more likely to 
withstand client 
bargaining power. 
 
Ketchand, 
Morris & 
Shafer 
(1999) 
508 
accountants. 
Moral intensity 
(materiality and 
proposed use of 
financial 
statements). 
Scenarios – 
Testing ethical  
dilemmas for 
magnitude of 
consequences, 
probability of 
effect, social 
consensus and 
temporal 
immediacy.  
 
Behavioural 
intentions is 
influenced by 
materiality and 
proposed use of 
financial 
statements. 
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Authors Respondents Factors Methodology Main findings 
Shafer, 
Morris & 
Ketchand 
(2001) 
323 auditors. Moral intensity, 
using 
magnitude of 
consequences 
(materiality) 
and probability 
of harm 
(intended use 
of financial 
statements). 
 
Scenario study 
involving 
independence 
dilemma with 
auditors acceding 
to client request. 
 
Magnitude of 
consequences and 
probability of harm 
significantly 
influence auditors’ 
intentions.  
 
 
 
Lord & 
DeZoort 
(2001) 
171 auditors. Measured 
moral 
development, 
obedience 
pressure, 
pressure to 
conform, 
organizational 
and 
professional 
commitment. 
Using scenarios 
(independence 
dilemma). 
Testing the 
likelihood of 
audit seniors 
signing off on a 
client’s account 
balance that is 
materially 
misstated. 
A positive 
relationship exists 
between obedience 
pressure and 
auditors’ intentions 
to sign off on the 
incorrect account 
balance. Moral 
development was 
not significantly 
related to 
intentions. 
Shafer, 
Morris & 
Ketchand 
(2001) 
323 auditors. Moral intensity, 
using 
magnitude of 
consequences 
(materiality) 
and probability 
of harm 
(intended use 
of financial 
statements). 
 
Scenario study 
involving 
independence 
dilemma with 
auditors acceding 
to client request. 
 
Magnitude of 
consequences and 
probability of harm 
significantly 
influence auditors’ 
intentions.  
Buchan 
(2005) 
95 auditors. Examined the 
influence of 
attitudes, 
subjective 
norms, 
perceived 
behavioural 
control, moral 
sensitivity and 
ethical climate, 
on ethical 
intentions 
A survey 
questionnaire, 
with scenarios. 
Attitudes were 
significantly related 
to ethical 
intentions.  
Subjective norms, 
perceived 
behavioural 
control, moral 
sensitivity and 
firm’s ethical 
climate were not 
supported.   
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Authors Respondents Factors Methodology Main findings 
Cohen and 
Martinov-
Bennie 
(2006) 
37 Australian 
auditors. 
Examined 
Jones (1991) 
moral intensity 
construct and 
its influence on 
Rest’s (1986) 
four-stage 
ethical 
decision-
making 
framework. 
  
Survey.  
 
Moral intensity 
influenced 
auditors’ ethical 
intentions.  
 
Shafer 
(2008) 
128 Chinese 
auditors. 
Measured 
ethical 
judgement, 
ethical climate, 
ethics position 
(orientation) 
and 
behavioural 
intention. 
 
A survey 
questionnaire, 
with vignettes. 
Ethical climate was 
significantly related 
to ethical 
intentions.  Local 
auditors reported 
higher intentions to 
commit unethical 
acts compared to 
auditors from 
international firms. 
 
Karacaer, 
Gohar, 
Aygun & 
Sayin (2009) 
125 Pakistani 
and 196 
Turkish CPAs 
Examined 
personal values 
(Rokeach 
values survey), 
perceived  
moral intensity, 
ethical 
judgement and 
behavioural 
intentions.  
Survey 
questionnaire.  
Ethical judgement 
and behavioural 
(ethical) intentions 
were influenced by 
moral intensity. 
Personal values 
were significantly 
related to moral 
intensity and 
ethical intentions. 
 
Sweeney, 
Arnold & 
Pierce 
(2010) 
555 auditors Measured 
ethical culture, 
demographics 
and auditors’ 
ethical 
evaluation and 
intentions. 
 
Survey 
questionnaire. 
Perceived unethical 
pressure was 
positively and 
significantly related 
to intentions to 
engage in 
dysfunctional 
behaviours. 
 
Adapted from Jones et al. (2003, pp. 80-85) 
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2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed prior studies on auditor independence and ethical reasoning 
among auditors. The purpose of the review is to provide a discussion on key concepts 
that relates to the audit profession, and sets the stage for the review of whistle-blowing 
in an audit context in Chapter 3. Auditor independence legitimises the work of auditors 
(Sikka and Willmott, 1995). It involves the auditor adopting an unbiased perspective 
during the engagement (Arens, Loebbecke, Lemon and Splettstoesser, 2002) and is 
regarded as a moral issue (Preston et al., 1995). Auditor independence figures 
prominently in auditing, including the use of formal codes of ethics.   
It is evident that research has also focused heavily on the effect of the provision 
of NAS impairing auditor independence. This issue has had mixed reviews. However, it 
has become even more critical, given that Enron’s collapse has been partially blamed 
on Arthur Andersen’s provision of NAS.  In addition, the undue dependence on any one 
client may put pressure on the auditor to agree with the client. It is assumed that high 
independence should lead to high probability of whistle-blowing. The greater the 
independence of an auditor, the more likely the auditor would report questionable acts 
within or outside of the firm.  Independence is synonymous with the individual’s ability 
to be free of bias, withstand pressure and report honestly. This chapter also showed that 
substantial research has been conducted on the ethical decision-making process of 
auditors. It was also seen that auditors’ ethical intentions were influenced by individual 
and contextual factors which are the focal points of this thesis. This thesis now 
proceeds to look at whistle-blowing in an audit context. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW - WHISTLE-BLOWING 
AND ITS RELEVANCE TO AUDITING 
 
3.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, auditor independence and ethics were discussed to provide an 
understanding of the key concepts of auditing which are relevant to the current study. 
The objective of this chapter is to review the research on whistle-blowing intentions 
and its relevance to auditing. It addresses the concept and reviews the literature of 
previous studies on the audit profession. Prior research suggests that individual and 
situational factors are influential in the likelihood of reporting of wrongdoing or 
questionable acts (Arnold and Ponemon, 1991; Hooks et al., 1994; Finn, 1995; Near 
and Miceli, 1995). However, more research is needed to facilitate the understanding of 
the factors that are more likely to increase and promote effective whistle-blowing, 
especially within an auditing context (Chung, Monroe and Thorne, 2004).  
This chapter is organised as follows: The first section examines the concept of 
whistle-blowing, and is followed by a section that explains whistle-blowing in the 
context of auditing. The third section reviews the whistle-blowing case of Enron and is 
followed by a section which reviews previous whistle-blowing models. The fifth, sixth 
and seventh sections look at definitions of wrongdoing, differences between internal 
and external reporting and whistle-blowing legislation, respectively. The eighth section 
reviews the literature on the personal and situational factors as well as the 
characteristics of the wrongdoing that are likely to influence whistle-blowing, and the 
consequences of whistle-blowing. The final section concludes the chapter. 
 
 
3.1 The concept of whistle-blowing 
There has been debate in the literature on what constitutes whistle-blowing (e.g. Near 
and Miceli, 1985; Jubb, 1999; King, 1997). Near and Miceli (1985) defined whistle-
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blowing as “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, 
immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action” (p. 4). Due to the controversial nature 
of whistle-blowing, many differing perspectives have been put forward, but yet there 
are commonalities that directly correspond with those of Near and Miceli (1985). Jubb 
(2000) stated that the importance of morals is a major component for some researchers 
(such as De George, as cited in Elliston, Keenan, Lockhart and Van Schaick, 1985; De 
Maria, 1994), who have argued that the act of reporting cannot be termed as whistle-
blowing, if the element of morality is omitted. However, he further noted that the 
presence of a good motive would not suffice to be constituted as whistle-blowing, 
although there is recognition that justification for the act should include it.    
A more recent and very different definition is offered by Jubb (1999), who 
stated that:  
Whistle-blowing is a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets 
onto public record and is made by a person who has or had privileged access to 
data or information of an organization, about non-trivial illegality or other 
wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated which implicates and is 
under the control of that organization, to an external entity having potential to 
rectify the wrongdoing. (p. 78) 
 
 
Jubb’s (1999, p. 78; 2000, p. 158) definition highlights six elements: 1) act of 
disclosure (deliberate and non-obligatory), 2) the whistle-blower who is privy to the 
organization’s important data, 3) disclosure subject – organizational wrongdoing or 
illegalities (actual, potential or suspect), 4) target organization, 5) disclosure recipient – 
an external entity that has the potential to rectify the wrongdoing, and 6) outcome – on 
public record.  Jubb (2000) specifically argued that internal reporting by an external 
auditor should not be considered as whistle-blowing on the grounds that: 
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All auditors have opportunity and occasion to make disclosures but they can 
only be candidates for inclusion in the ranks of whistle-blowers, if the 
disclosures are made externally and go beyond the scope of their official role in 
the organization. (p. 154)  
 
Jubb (2000) further argued that where the external auditor makes an internal 
disclosure, it is role-prescribed, since it is acting in the public’s interest and is a duty 
owed to the organization, and goes beyond the violation of confidentiality.  He also 
argued that any act of disclosure that is authorized and obligatory, does not represent 
dissent, and should not be considered as whistle-blowing.  As a result, he further 
deemed that whistle-blowing by the external auditor is the act, where it is on public 
record (i.e. to an external entity).  
Thus, it can be seen that Near and Miceli’s (1985) definition includes internal 
and external reporting. Jubb’s (1999) definition considers only external reporting as 
whistle-blowing on the grounds that internal disclosures do not violate the 
organization’s confidences. However, this contrasts with Near and Miceli (1985) and 
King (1999, p. 316), who argued that both internal and external reporting are 
conceptually similar in the whistle-blowing process. An overwhelming body of 
research has supported the latter view (e.g. King, 1997; Dworkin and Baucus, 1998; 
Park and Blenkinsopp, 2009).  
The relevance of internal reporting to organizations was corroborated by Brennan 
and Kelly (2007) and Kaplan and Schultz (2007). Chung et al. (2004) believe that 
internal reporting is critical to the audit process, since the auditor can use internal 
sources such as top level management in the audit firm to correct any wrongdoing. 
However, they can also use external sources such as media and other regulatory bodies 
to effect action. Thus, employees in an organization have these options when faced 
with an unethical or unsatisfactory situation. 
 65
Near and Miceli (1985) argue that internal and external reporting may be 
viewed as whistle-blowing since both channels may represent the observer’s challenge 
to the organization’s authority structure in an attempt to effect change. Thus, this 
researcher supports Near and Miceli’s (1985) view on whistle-blowing.3  However, 
Brennan and Kelly (2007) argued that Near and Miceli’s (1985) definition does not 
stress the seriousness of the wrongdoing. Miceli and Near (1988, p. 268) suggested that 
no comprehensive theory existed that explained why staff would whistle-blow on 
unethical or illegal behaviour in organizations. While most organization members may 
view whistle-blowing as morally right, a far smaller proportion may actually blow the 
whistle when confronted with an unethical act.  An audit staff member may report 
internally any discovered wrongdoing, but if it is not adequately addressed through the 
normal procedures, the staff member can blow the whistle by reviewing the issue at a 
higher level, be it in the audit firm (e.g. managing partner, another partner, ethics 
officer, anonymous channel - telephone hotline) or the client (to designated authorities 
concerned with the auditor-client relationship such as the board of directors or audit 
committee) or externally to the media, professional or regulatory bodies (Finn, 1995; 
Chung et al., 2004). 
Dworkin and Baucus (1998) found that whistle-blowers who went externally are 
more likely to face organizational retaliation than those who went internally, because of 
the potential damage to the organization and its employees. Thus, internal reporting 
channels are preferred and should be exhausted before using external channels, since it 
allows the firm to internally correct the wrongdoing, before “airing it’s dirty linen” in 
public (Near and Miceli, 1995). Given that such information for the audit profession is 
                                                 
3 Within the auditing context, reporting internally means within the audit-client relationship, i.e. either to 
the accounting firm’s hierarchy or to the client’s relevant party such as a member of the audit 
committee. Reporting externally is to any party outside of the auditor-client relationship. 
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not publicly available, the scale of this form of whistle-blowing is relatively unknown. 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 in the USA, the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) 
1998 in the UK, as well as the accounting codes of professional conduct strongly 
support internal reporting as the first step in the process. Miceli, Near and Schwenk 
(1991) and Hooks et al. (1994) argued that whistle-blowing can be an important 
internal control mechanism in organizations, benefiting organizational members and 
other stakeholders in society from the disclosures by potential whistle-blowers. In a 
wider accounting context, Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom chose internal reporting of 
accounting fraud to the audit committee as the “right” channel, while Sherron Watkins 
opted to report the accounting irregularities at Enron to an internal channel, via an 
email to Chairman Kenneth Lay. 
Miceli and Near (1992a) further described whistle-blowing or reporting of 
wrongdoing as an act that is elective and not duty bound. Near and Miceli (1996) 
contend that it is an “attempt to terminate the current wrongdoing or prevent future 
wrongdoing of a similar type” (p. 510) and draw a sharp distinction between the acts of 
whistle-blowing and informing.   
In an attempt to eliminate unethical behaviour, Miceli and Near (1994) 
postulated that the status and power of the whistle-blower were instrumental in 
facilitating the process of reporting any wrongdoing. For example, they believed that 
the employee may be in a prestigious position or may be an invaluable employee as a 
result of their unique skills. The perception is that whistle-blowers who hold significant 
power are less likely to experience retaliatory acts (Holtzhausen, 2007). Miceli and 
Near (1994) argued that potential whistle-blowers who do not gain organizational 
support are much more likely to face retaliation and may remain silent or report 
externally or leave the organization.  
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Similarly, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) shared these sentiments 
and suggested three options for potential whistle-blowers: leave the organization, blow 
the whistle, or remain quiet. Given the awareness of the possible consequences (and in 
particular, the high personal cost) to be derived as a result of reporting wrongdoing, it 
should not be surprising that potential whistle-blowers do not, or are less likely to, 
commit the act of reporting after carefully considering the limited options available to 
them (Miceli and Near, 1992b).  
The literature has shown different types of whistle-blowers. They can be 
perceived positively as loyal, committed and prosocial employees (Miceli and Near, 
1988), while others may be negatively labelled as disloyal, selfish, disruptive and 
antisocial individuals (snitches, rats, or traitors) (Camerer, 1996; Holtzhausen, 2007).4  
In determining the type and motives of the whistle-blower, their credibility needs to be 
ascertained. Some authors have also considered whistle-blowing as being altruistic 
behaviour, because it is perceived as acting in the public’s interest (Miceli and Near, 
1992b; Camerer 1996; Holtzhausen, 2007). However, one may argue that, at times, 
they may be simply be looking after themselves or seeking publicity.   
Similar to Curtis (2006), it may be argued that whistle-blowing for audit 
practitioners can include the reporting of unethical acts committed by others to any 
reporting channels (internal or external), anonymous or not.  Thus, for this thesis, in an 
auditing context, whistle-blowing is defined as the audit practitioner’s voluntary act, 
over and above the profession’s standard requirements to report or disclose any 
unethical acts or wrongdoing committed by other staff within the organization to any 
entity (internal or external) having the potential to correct the wrongdoing. 
                                                 
4 Vickers (1995) further categorised whistle-blowers as being either watchdogs or protestors. A watchdog 
is perceived as being one who discovers and report any wrongdoing to prevent financial and safety 
problems. A protestor seeks to publicise wrongdoing which may be motivated by a hidden agenda. 
 68
3.2 Whistle-blowing in the auditing context  
Whistle-blowing may be perceived as a mechanism for reporting misconduct such as 
financial fraud and other wrongdoing in the organization (see Miethe and Rothschild, 
1994). Whistle-blowing brings with it the conflict between public accountability and 
allegiance to the organization (Vinten, 2003). Potential whistle-blowers fear the loss of 
employment, friends or potential for promotion, and isolation from present and future 
employees and employers (Chiu, 2002; Vinten, 2003). Thus, an individual external 
auditor’s decision to whistle-blow may be a complex phenomenon which may be 
contingent upon organizational, individual and situational factors (Miceli and Near, 
1988; Miceli and Near, 1992b; Hooks et. al., 1994; King, 1999).  
While a significant amount of research has been done to determine the 
influential factors of whistle-blowing in organizations, the motivational factors are still 
not clear (Brennan and Kelly, 2007).  Possible reasons for this may include the fact that 
whistle-blowing may not be politically or socially embraced (Brennan and Kelly, 
2007), or the high personal cost of reporting (Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001).    
Donaldson (1988) argued that ethics is primarily related to the determination of 
an action, behaviour, attitude or decision as either being good or evil, or right or wrong.  
Within the accounting field, audit practitioners are faced with moral dilemmas on 
whether or not to report observed questionable acts performed by other audit staff such 
as covering up irregularities in a client’s tax affairs, client’s manipulations of the 
financial statements to show a desired outcome rather than the true and fair view, non-
disclosure of information on significant conflicts of interest in business dealings, and 
giving an unqualified audit opinion when the financial statements are not presented 
fairly (Helliar and Bebbington, 2004, p. 12).  
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The audit profession is uniquely different from other professions.5 It has 
privileged access to client information and relationships with management or directors 
that can raise several conflicts, including loyalties to the client and public, and ethical, 
legal and professional restrictions from publicizing wrongdoing (e.g. Mitschow and 
Langford, 2000; Brennan and Kelly, 2007).  For example, the audit profession has a 
requirement to maintain confidentiality and loyalty to the client, and yet the auditor 
may be required to report sensitive information that could harm the client and be 
perceived as being disloyal. Gaa (1992) argued that moral judgment by public 
accountants is moderated by the conflicting norms and rules of their professional 
organization (e.g. code of conduct) and their employer (the audit firm’s various 
pressures). In addition, auditors are required to act in the public interest.  Hwang, 
Staley, Te Chen and Lan (2008) argued that the auditor, as a professional, has 
responsibilities beyond that of an employee, since the auditor’s allegiance is owed “to 
the public above and beyond their employer or client” (p. 507). 
From the profession’s point of view, the auditor is expected to be an 
independent professional, who will act with integrity in the public’s interest.  In the 
UK, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) (2007) and 
the Public Interest Disclosure Act (1998), and in the USA, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (2007) and Sarbanes and Oxley (2002) lend 
regulatory support for whistle-blowing.  The question then is what the auditor should 
do if he or she observes a misdeed committed by another staff member?  
 The ICAEW’s (2007) Code of Professional Conduct states that the audit staff 
should report to higher level management in the firm. A moral dilemma occurs when 
the auditor finds that senior staff is involved. If the individual decides to report, there 
                                                 
5 It is possible that in Enron’s case, other professionals such as lawyers and bankers may have been 
aware of the accounting irregularities. However, the audit profession is required to act in the public’s 
interest, whereas lawyers and bankers may be considered as advocates of the client. 
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are possible high personal costs such as being branded a ‘snitch’ and facing possible 
negative consequences such as loss of employment, harrassment and other forms of 
retaliation. If the practitioner chooses to report externally, the audit firm may also be 
perceived as violating client confidentiality and gaining a whistle-blower reputation, 
which could lead to a potential loss of current and future clients.  However, there are 
potential benefits to be obtained from whistle-blowing such as reduction of legal 
liability and enhancement of the firm’s reputation, if the wrongdoing is subsequently 
discovered and addressed (Miceli and Near, 1992b). When external auditors exercise 
independent judgements about financial statements, they are making ethical decisions. 
The profession’s code of ethics such as those put forward by AICPA and the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) are normally designed to guide the 
membership to behave ethically. 
Prior research suggests that there may be complex psychological factors that 
significantly influence professional behaviour than merely trusting that professionals 
will follow the profession’s or organization’s code of conduct (Falk et al., 1999). Based 
on the review of the literature, whistle-blowing intentions by audit practitioners require 
having a reasonable degree of independence and a sense of moral duty to protect the 
public, if no action has been taken against the reported wrongdoing, especially when 
the audit firm’s management is also involved. The significance of being independent 
stems from auditors’ social accountability, a role expected of the audit staff in ensuring 
that corporate management is held accountable for the resources entrusted to them by 
the various stakeholders.   
As indicated earlier, auditors are required to act in the public’s interest due to 
principles of accountability and equal liberty in society.  Tetlock (1985) observed that 
accountability refers to the perceived defence or justification of one’s conduct or 
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behaviour to an authority that can reward or endorse the behaviour.  This is critical to 
the audit process. For example, when an auditor sees another staff member committing 
wrongdoing, he or she can use internal audiences, such as top level management in the 
audit firm, and/or external audiences, such as the media and other regulatory bodies, to 
effect action. Employees in an organization have several options, when facing an 
unethical or unsatisfactory situation. Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) 
identified three options: either leaving the organization, blowing the whistle, or 
remaining silent. The last option may involve raising the irregularity with the 
perpetrators, but subsequently remaining silent, and effectively becoming involved in 
the unethical activity. All options are relevant to audit practitioners. 
It has been observed that none of the audit staff of Arthur Andersen, Enron’s 
auditors, blew the whistle when the partner-in-charge of the audit advised the audit 
managers to shred the documents (Toffler and Reingold, 2003).  Chung et al. (2004) 
queried what contributed to the failure or reluctance of Andersen’s staff to blow the 
whistle, given Gaa (1992)’s argument the auditors are role-prescribed whistle-blowers. 
Prior research, while limited, found that audit staff tended to be reluctant to whistle-
blow on colleagues (Finn and Lampe, 1992; Kaplan, 1995; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 
2001).  Chung et al. (2004) further argued that “there is very little empirical evidence 
on what factors promote whistle-blowing, especially in an auditing context” (p. 3). 
 An auditor’s re-appointment and retention may be contingent on the relationship 
with the directors which may cause conflicts. For auditors, these conflicts may be 
influenced by the requirements of the ethical codes of the profession, the reporting 
requirement and the appropriate reporting channels and the need to act in society’s 
interest as part of the profession’s social contract. Brennan and Kelly (2007) make a 
compelling argument that auditors make decisions and distance themselves from the 
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users who rely on their judgement, and as a result, auditors may not be cognizant of the 
consequences of their decisions. They may have the knowledge of wrongdoing (e.g. 
acceding to an unethical request by a client) committed by a colleague or superior 
within the audit firm. However, a dilemma arises on whether the auditor has a moral 
and legal obligation to report the wrongdoing internally or externally. This becomes 
very problematic in situations, where the auditor may not want to upset the client. 
 Pater and Van Gils (2003) suggested that adherence to the profession’s code of 
ethics and rules creates a ‘rule-following’ attitude, which is likely to discourage 
employees from making the right moral decisions. Brennan and Kelly (2007) argued 
that the justification for the need for auditors is based on society’s trust, and any breach 
of that trust will diminish the need for independent auditors.  Prior research has shown 
that audit staff may be less willing to whistle-blow on their peers (Kaplan, 1995). 
However, little is known of the reasons for this behaviour. Thus, more research on 
whistle-blowing will enable audit firms to promote the reporting behaviour of their staff 
(Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). 
 
3.3 Review of a whistle-blowing case – Enron  
Sherron Watkins, a CPA, was previously employed at Arthur Andersen as an auditor. 
In 2001, while employed at Enron and working under the Vice President and Chief 
Financial Officer, Andrew Fastow, she noticed that there were accounting irregularities 
which included artificial inflation of Enron’s assets, set up of off-book partnerships and 
creation of special purpose entities (Brickey, 2003). Given her perceived discomfort of 
the possibility of being terminated by reporting directly to her boss, Andrew Fastow, or 
the President, Jeffrey Skilling, she opted to send a memo to the chairman, Kenneth Lay, 
about the accounting irregularities.  
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 In August 2001, Ms. Watkins met with Kenneth Lay, who referred the matter to 
the company’s lawyers and auditors (who were complicit in the development of some 
of the schemes or irregularities) for preliminary investigation. She resigned, after 
perceiving inaction by top management and receiving a demotion. Baynes (2002) 
reported that:  
After her disclosure, Ms. Watkins testified that Cindy Olson told her that Mr. 
Fastow wanted to terminate her employment and have her computer seized. 
Instead, she was moved to a different position and was advised to download all 
pertinent data from her computer. (p. 881) 
 
In December 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy amid claims of regulatory indifference. 
Ms. Watkins was perceived as a hero for reporting the irregularities and taking a moral 
stance in the face of organizational pressure (Lacayo and Ripley, 2002; Lucas and 
Koerwer, 2004).   
As a result of this case, the audit firm of Arthur Andersen was closed down for 
its involvement in the irregularities and the shredding of important documents which 
was seen as an attempt to obstruct justice. Ms. Watkins did not report her concerns to 
an external channel, but rather via an internal memo (Baynes, 2002). She pointed out 
that other persons (Vince Kaminski, Head of Research and Jeff McMahon, Treasurer) 
who had spoken out on the issue, subsequently received reduced duties (Lucas and 
Koerwer, 2004). This highlights the personal cost of reporting (i.e. demotion or 
reprisals) that may be faced by potential whistle-blowers. 
 
 3.4 Review of previous models of whistle-blowing 
The literature has shown that there have been several models of whistle-blowing. Near 
and Miceli (1985, p. 2) surmised that whistle-blowing was procedural and consisted of 
four elements namely: a) the whistle-blower; b) act of whistle-blowing, c) the receiver 
of the complaint (report), and d) the organization against which the whistle-blowing 
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report is made. This view subsequently received the support of others who perceived 
that whistle-blowing is a process that goes through several stages (Dozier and Miceli, 
1985; Somers and Casal, 1994; Jubb, 1999; Grant, 2002; Brennan and Kelly, 2007).  
Consistent with Dozier and Miceli’s (1985) suggestion, the use of bystander 
intervention theory of Latané and Darley (1968, 1970) can help to explain the whistle-
blowing decision process. For example, with relevance to whistle-blowing, Latané and 
Darley (1970)’s five stage decision framework would suggest: 1) awareness by the 
observer of the seriousness of the wrongdoing and its potential harmful consequences 
to others; 2) determine whether the wrongdoing requires any action such as whistle-
blowing; 3) decision to bear responsibility for taking action such as reporting; 4) choice 
of an appropriate action, after weighing all possible alternatives and likely outcomes 
from reporting; and 5) taking the required action such as whistle-blowing (Miceli and 
Near, 1992b; Dozier and Miceli, 1985; Brennan and Kelly, 2007).   
Graham (1986) presented a model of principled organizational dissent to 
explain the reporting behaviour of individuals (see Figure 5). The model proposes that 
the probability of reporting questionable or unethical acts will increase with greater 
perceived seriousness of the act, higher personal responsibility to report and lower 
perceived personal costs. Seriousness relates to the severity or magnitude of the issue, 
and can be measured by its monetary impact, frequency or harm to others. Personal 
responsibility is the psychological state of being morally compelled or duty bound to 
report the act (Graham, 1986).  Personal cost relates to the observer’s perceived risk of 
reprisal or retaliation from others if the observer makes the report.  
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Figure 5: Model of principled organizational dissent 
 
Adapted from Graham (1986, p. 35) and Schultz et al. (1993, p. 79) 
 
Graham’s (1986) work, extended by Schultz et al.’s (1993) model of 
discretionary reporting, proposed that an individual’s evaluation of perceived 
seriousness and personal cost of reporting, and attribution of personal responsibility of 
reporting may influence reporting intentions.  Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) proposed 
an extension to this model by including professional commitment.  Given the 
uniqueness of public accounting with its formal certification and licensing and highly 
constrained role defined behaviours, Gaa (1992) suggests that some form of 
commitment (e.g. independence commitment) may be a necessary construct for any 
proposed model for auditors.  
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Finn and Lampe (1992) hypothesised that several individual and situational 
factors would moderate the individual’s decision to whistle-blow. Individual factors 
included ego strength, locus of control and field dependence, while situational factors 
were immediate job context, pressures in the organization, social influences (significant 
others), obeying authority, moral conflict resolution and the understanding of others’ 
views (Finn and Lampe, 1992; Seifert, 2006). Finn and Lampe’s (1992) hypothesis 
supports Kaplan and Whitecotton’s (2001) conclusion that organizational culture and 
audit firm norms may influence the beliefs of the acceptability of whistle-blowing. This 
lends further support for the possible use of organizational support and group norms in 
future models. Furthermore, the issue-contingent variables that were found to have a 
significant impact on auditors’ ethical behaviour were social consensus, probability of 
effect, temporal immediacy and proximity (Finn and Lampe, 1992). Thus, this lends 
further support for the inclusion of moral intensity in future whistle-blowing models.   
Ponemon (1994) provided a model that identified the whistle-blower’s decision-
making process as consisting of several ethical components. He argued that three 
conditions are necessary for the performance of whistle-blowing. These conditions 
include ethical sensitivity, ethical competence and perseverance. Ethical sensitivity is 
the awareness by the individual that there is a wrongdoing. Ethical competence is 
where the individual develops the appropriate strategy to correct the wrongdoing. 
Perseverance relates to the follow through with an ethical course of action based on the 
strategy developed. The whistle-blower’s ethical reasoning, cognitive process and 
ethical framing influence the above three conditions (Rezaee, 2002).  
Hooks et al.’s (1994) model of whistle-blowing, an adaptation of Miceli and 
Near’s (1992b) model, entails the internal or external reporting of unethical behaviour 
to the relevant authority in the organization. They proposed, within the context of 
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auditing, a model of whistle-blowing which delineated the processes involved in 
reporting fraudulent activities. The model suggests that whistle-blowers must be 
cognizant of the act, determine the act to be unethical and serious, feel a sense of 
obligation to report, determine actions and consequences and finally report.  
Hooks et al.’s (1994) model is moderated by contextual variables related to the 
organization culture of reporting, the significance of the questionable act and the 
whistle-blower’s characteristics (See Figure 6). They proposed that the climate of any 
organization, which encourages the reporting of wrongdoing, should reduce the 
likelihood of a perpetrator engaging in fraudulent behaviour. Hooks et al.’s (1994) 
model proposed that whistle-blowing may be an internal control mechanism that can 
enhance the communication of wrongdoing internally or externally, thus preventing and 
detecting financial statement fraud.  Incorporating such factors as personal values, 
ethical principles, group norms, codes of conduct, education, organizational stature, and 
tenure status in their model, they argued that organizational culture was more 
influential on the decision to whistle-blow than characteristics of the wrongdoing, 
responsibilities and social influences and the personal characteristics of the observer.  
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Figure 6: Hooks et al.’s (1994) model of the whistle-blowing process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             Seen in Rezaee (2002, p. 108). Hooks et al.’s (1994) model was adapted from Miceli and Near (1992b). 
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Finn (1995) presented a five stage model of whistle-blowing, which was based 
on Rest’s (1986) and Miceli and Near’s (1992b) models, and at each stage, the observer 
assesses prior actions and reactions of organizational members. Near and Miceli’s 
(1995) model explored five factors influencing effective whistle-blowing, three factors 
at the individual level (characteristics of the whistle-blower, the recipient of the 
complaint or report and the wrongdoer), together with the characteristics of the 
wrongdoing and the organization (See Figures 7 and 8). They proposed that the 
characteristics of the wrongdoing and the organization will interact and significantly 
influence the whistle-blower’s utilisation of external reporting mechanisms. For 
example, the dependence of the organization on wrongdoing (like Enron) and the weak 
level of support for whistle-blowing in the organization can influence the individual’s 
intention to report externally. 
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Figure 7: Near & Miceli’s (1995, p. 682) model of individual variables that affect the 
outcome of whistle-blowing 
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Figure 8: Near & Miceli’s (1995, p. 683) model of situational variables that affect the 
outcome of whistle-blowing  
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3.5 Definitions of wrongdoing or questionable acts 
Near et al. (2004) argued that organizational wrongdoing includes unethical, illegal or 
harmful practices such as fraud and embezzlement. The literature highlights two 
categories of wrongdoing: occupational and organizational crime. Occupational crimes 
may include self-centered acts of wrongdoing such as financial fraud and falsifying 
records (Miceli and Near, 1992b; Miethe, 1999). Within an audit context, 
organizational wrongdoing can include fraudulent financial reporting, shredding of 
working papers and manipulation of accounting standards.  
The auditing profession requires the auditor to report any wrongdoing or 
questionable acts committed either by the client (auditee) or colleagues in the audit 
firm. Graham (1986) defined a questionable act as an action which “violates a standard 
of justice, honesty or economy” (p. 2). Schultz et al. (1993, p. 75) argued that Graham’s 
definition is consistent with various standards in the auditing literature involving illegal 
acts, wrongdoing and intentional errors in the financial statements. 
Whistle-blowing may be viewed as prosocial behaviour when the reporting of 
wrongdoing is consistent with acting in the public’s interest by doing what is perceived 
to be right (Holtzhausen, 2007). At times, whistle-blowing may be viewed as 
malevolent (anti-social), when the whistle-blower performs the disclosure for selfish 
reasons which may harm the organization.   
 
 
3.6 Internal and external reporting 
Whistle-blowers are more likely to report wrongdoing to parties who may be in an 
influential position to rectify the wrongdoing (Callahan and Dworkin, 1992; Kaplan 
and Schultz, 2007).  Employees have several options: either to remain silent, to blow 
the whistle internally, to blow the whistle externally or leave the organization (Mesmer-
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Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005). These options may be based on one’s perceptions of 
the level of personal responsibility to report the wrongdoing or simply from fear of 
retaliation (high personal cost).    
Whistle-blowers can report wrongdoing in the organization, specifically to 
relevant internal or external authorities (Near and Miceli, 1995; Chung et al., 2004). 
Internal whistle-blowing refers to the reporting of wrongdoing and unethical acts to 
appropriate persons in the firm’s hierarchy, who may be able to correct the misconduct.  
The complaint recipient may be managers, partners or ethics officer, the client’s audit 
committee or board of directors, or a designated authority within the firm or the hotline 
(Finn, 1995; Chung et al., 2004). External whistle-blowing refers to the reporting of 
wrongdoing to a complaint recipient outside of the organization, and may include the 
media, professional associations, regulatory bodies and interest groups (Miceli and 
Near, 1994; Near and Miceli, 1995; Chung et al., 2004; Holtzhausen, 2007). 
Internal whistle-blowing has been argued to be the preferred option for the 
observer and for the firm (Ponemon, 1994).  A significant body of research shows that 
most whistle-blowers prefer the use of internal channels to report questionable acts in 
an organization (Miceli and Near, 1992b).  Internal reporting permits the organization 
to privately and internally correct the wrongdoing before the issue escalates when it is 
publicized in the media and can become a possible scandal that could be detrimental 
and costly to the organization (Barnett, 1992). Internal reporting may be perceived as 
the employee showing allegiance to the organization (Somers and Casal, 1994). 
Internal whistle-blowers may be considered as prosocial employees who wish to protect 
the reputation of the organization (Miceli and Near, 1992b), and will only go externally 
or keep silent, if the wrongdoing was not satisfactorily resolved internally. However, 
whistle-blowing may not be often accepted within an organization because it is deemed 
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threatening and a form of organizational dissent (Miceli and Near, 2002). Thus, 
whistle-blower may be silenced or the reports may be buried or ignored (Miceli et al., 
1991; Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005).  
Callahan et al. (2002), citing from Bok (1989), argued that blowing the whistle 
internally may be considered as being more ethical than going externally. Management 
may perceive internal whistle-blowing in a favourable light and is likely to promote it 
(Holtzhausen, 2007). An ethical culture or climate in organizations should be 
established where employees are encouraged to report wrongdoing internally (King, 
1999). The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 strongly supports internal reporting of 
wrongdoing in organizations (Chung et al., 2004; Seifert, 2006; Kaplan and Schultz, 
2007). Chung et al. (2004) suggested that within the audit profession, there is likely to 
be more pressure to blow the whistle internally than going outside the firm.  
Research has shown that whistle-blowers who report externally are more likely 
to experience greater retaliation from organizational members than those who report 
internally (Dworkin and Baucus, 1998; Near and Miceli, 1986; Dworkin and Callahan, 
1991). Whistle-blowers who have failed in their attempts to remain anonymous have 
also faced greater retaliation (Miceli and Near, 1994). If an employee of an audit firm 
discovers wrongdoing committed by a colleague (e.g. partner) and is reluctant or unable 
to report the matter internally, the individual may opt to disclose externally or remain 
silent.  
External whistle-blowing can adversely or positively affect the reputation and 
integrity of the organization. For example, Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom discovered 
fraudulent accounting procedures at her company and chose to internally report the 
matter to the audit committee. Her internal report allowed the company to address the 
issue by firing the chief financial officer and publicly disclosing the matter (Near et al., 
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2004).  Specifically, Near et al. (2004) reported that Cynthia Cooper stated that “I feel 
like I did my job” (p. 219). 
 
3.7 Whistle-blower protection legislation 
The major hindrance to whistle-blowing is the fear of retaliation (e.g. loss of jobs and 
victimization) by the employer. To protect the employee from retaliation and encourage 
whistle-blowers to come forward, whistle-blower protection legislation has been 
enacted in the United Kingdom (UK) and USA.  In the UK, the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act (PIDA 1998) covers employees in organizations, and suggests that 
when an employee makes the decision to whistle-blow, he or she should first report 
internally (Groeneweg, 2001). Thus, the PIDA identifies the appropriate procedures for 
disclosures and emphasizes the need to act in good faith (Holtzhausen, 2007). Under 
the PIDA Act, disclosures should include the reporting of criminal offences, non-
compliance with legal requirements, harm to others, professional misconduct and any 
deliberate suppression of important information (Bowers, Mitchell and Lewis, 1999). 
The PIDA Act provides protection against retaliation for whistle-blowing on perceived 
wrongdoing in organizations. 
After the corporate scandals of Enron and WorldCom, the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
was established in 2002, which introduced corporate governance rules including 
whistle-blowing protection by making several provisions. Firstly, Section 301 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) encourages effective whistle-blowing by requiring that 
audit committees set up adequate reporting mechanisms to maintain confidentiality and 
anonymity relating to questionable accounting or auditing issues (Chung et al., 2004; 
Kaplan and Schultz, 2007).  
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Secondly, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) included more stringent requirements 
for auditor independence, especially restricting provision of auditing and non-audit 
services by the same audit firm and enhancing the independence of the audit committee 
(Baker, Bealing, Nelson and Staley, 2006). Thirdly, Section 806 of the Act protects any 
employee who whistle-blows from any form of retaliation by the organization. For 
example, Section 806 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) proposes that no employee in a 
publicly traded company should be harassed, fired, demoted, discriminated against or 
harassed by another member of the organization for performing a lawful act such as 
whistle-blowing.  
Under Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), an employee who wins a lawsuit against the 
employer for retaliation may claim costs of damages including reinstatement and legal 
fees.  The Act also imposes a term of imprisonment and a fine for persons who retaliate 
against whistle-blowers (Dworkin, 2007). The professional accounting bodies have also 
prescribed that disclosures be made in the public’s interest. For example, the AICPA’s 
(2007) Code of Professional Conduct requires members to act with integrity and in the 
public’s interest.  
 
3.8 Antecedents, correlates and consequences of whistle-blowing 
Prior research has focused on antecedents, correlates, and consequences of the whistle-
blowing decision, and sought to understand the dynamics and process of whistle-
blowing. Empirically, the literature has also looked at personal variables associated 
with the whistle-blower, contextual factors and their characteristics of the wrongdoing 
and wrongdoer (Miceli et al., 1991; King, 1997). Most of this research has been 
conducted using survey methods or using vignettes (scenarios) that asked the individual 
to assume the role of a potential whistle-blower. It is acknowledged that access to 
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actual whistle-blowers is quite difficult, and this has led researchers to carry out 
investigations on intended whistle-blowers (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005). 
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005, pp. 278-279), in their excellent 
review of the literature, have cited reasons for this to include: a) the inherent difficulty 
of researching actual unethical behaviour in the workplace; (b) the possibility that 
actual whistle-blowers’ identity may be revealed based on the information given to the 
researcher; (c) the inherent difficulty in sourcing actual whistle-blowers; and (d) the 
presence of social desirability bias, via self reports. This section reviews the literature 
of whistle-blowing under the headings of personal characteristics of whistle-blowers, 
situational (contextual) variables, characteristics of the wrongdoing and consequences 
of whistle-blowing, consistent with Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005). A table 
has been adapted from Seifert (2006) and updated to reflect the current and key 
literature on whistle-blowing that is pertinent to this current study. Thus, Table 2 
summarises these prior and relevant studies on whistle-blowing. 
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Table 2: Prior studies on whistle-blowing 
 
Authors Participants Factors Methodology Main findings 
Arnold & 
Ponemon 
(1991) 
106 internal 
auditors. 
Whistle-
blowing, 
retaliation and 
ethical 
reasoning. 
Experiment using 
ethical scenarios. 
Internal auditors with 
lower ethical 
reasoning levels 
exhibited lower 
tendencies to whistle-
blow on wrongdoing. 
It was more 
noticeable when there 
was a presence of 
retaliation. 
Finn & 
Lampe 
(1992) 
358 auditing 
students, staff 
auditors and 
audit managers. 
Measured 
whistle-
blowing 
decision, 
ethical 
judgment, 
issue-
contingent and 
situational 
variables. 
 
Experiment using 
four ethical 
vignettes. 
Ethical judgement is 
positively related to 
whistle-blowing 
decisions. Ethical 
decision-making was 
influenced by issue-
contingent, 
situational and 
individual variables. 
 
Schultz et al. 
(1993) 
145 managers 
and 
professional 
staff in 
companies. 
Examined the 
likelihood of 
reporting 
questionable 
acts across 
different 
cultures. 
Experiment -
Ethical scenarios 
among U.S., 
Norwegian and 
French subjects. 
Personal cost was 
negatively related to 
whistle-blowing. 
Seriousness of 
wrongdoing and 
personal 
responsibility were 
positively related to 
whistle-blowing. 
 
Hooks et al. 
(1994) 
Not applicable. Synthesised 
prior research 
on whistle-
blowing and 
internal 
control. 
 
Review literature 
and proposed a 
conceptual model. 
Proposed a model 
that identified 
individual, 
situational, and 
organizational factors 
influencing the 
decision to whistle-
blow. 
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Authors Participants Factors Methodology Main findings 
Ponemon 
(1994) 
Not applicable. Reviewed 
literature on the 
ethical factors 
influencing the 
decision to 
whistle-blow. 
Reviewed prior 
literature and 
proposed a 
conceptual model. 
Proposed a model 
that includes the 
individual’s ability to 
structure an ethical 
problem, ethical 
competence and 
perseverance to carry 
out the decision.  
 
Finn (1995) Not applicable. Developed a 
model to 
encourage 
whistle-
blowing based 
on Rest (1986) 
and Miceli and 
Near (1992b)’s 
models. 
 
Used theory and 
prior models to 
build a conceptual 
model. 
Proposed a five stage 
model which requires 
the individual to 
assess his or her 
actions based on 
responses of other 
organizational 
members. 
 
Kaplan 
(1995) 
57 audit seniors 
in a CPA firm. 
Investigated the 
likelihood of 
auditors to 
report on 
discovery of 
premature 
signed off 
procedures. 
Experiment using 
ethical scenarios. 
The need for the audit 
procedure and poor 
work history of the 
audit staff were 
positively related to 
the reporting 
intentions of audit 
seniors.  
  
Label & 
Meithe 
(1999) 
353 auditors. Examined the 
level of support 
for whistle-
blowing 
legislation. 
Survey of CPAs in 
the US. 
Majority of auditors 
opposed legislation 
and preferred internal 
reporting and 
perceived external 
whistle-blowing as 
violating the 
profession’s code of 
ethics. 
 
Kaplan & 
Whitecotton 
(2001) 
73 audit 
seniors. 
Investigated 
auditors’ 
intentions to 
report another 
audit staff 
member who is 
contemplating  
a job offer with 
the client. 
 
Experiment - using 
ethical scenarios. 
Personal 
responsibility was 
positively related to 
auditors’ intentions to 
report. Personal cost 
was negatively 
related to auditors’ 
intentions to report. 
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Authors Participants Factors Methodology Main findings 
Chiu (2002) 254 Chinese 
MBA 
students.  
  
Investigated the 
ethics of 
whistle-
blowing in 
Chinese 
society. 
 
 
 
Questionnaire Locus of control 
moderated the 
relationships 
between:  
a) ethical judgement 
and whistle-blowing 
intentions; and b) 
whistle-blowing 
judgement and 
whistle-blowing 
intentions.  
 
Chung et al. 
(2004) 
95 Auditors. Measured 
auditors’ 
intentions to 
report 
internally or 
externally. 
Also looked at 
rule-based and 
principles-
based climates.  
 
Experiment - 
using ethical 
scenarios 
In a principles-based 
climate, individuals 
were more likely to 
whistle-blow. 
However, they were 
less willing to report 
more powerful 
individuals. 
Ayers & 
Kaplan (2005)  
74 students.  Examined 
employees’ 
reporting 
intentions after 
discovering 
wrongdoing 
committed by a 
consultant.  
Experimental 
approach using 
cases and 
questionnaires to 
report the results 
of a study.   
Seriousness, personal 
costs and personal 
responsibility are 
significantly related 
to intentions to report 
wrongdoing. 
Seriousness and 
personal cost are 
significantly related 
to the choice of an 
anonymous channel. 
 
Mesmer-
Magnus & 
Viswesvaran 
(2005) 
26 samples 
covering  
18,781 
respondents. 
Reviewed 
literature on 
individual and 
contextual 
factors, 
characteristics 
of the 
wrongdoing 
and   
retaliation.  
Meta-analysis.  Personal, contextual, 
and wrongdoing 
characteristics are 
significantly related 
to whistle-blowing 
intentions rather than 
actual whistle-
blowing. 
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Authors Participants Factors Methodology Main findings 
Curtis (2006) 220 under-
graduate 
auditing 
students.  
Examined 
influence of 
mood, 
seriousness, 
personal 
responsibility 
and personal 
cost on the 
willingness to 
report 
unethical 
actions of a 
colleague. 
 
Use of a judgement 
case and a 
demographics 
survey. 
Higher individual 
intentions to report 
wrongdoing by a 
colleague are related 
to higher perceived 
seriousness, higher 
perceived personal 
responsibility, and 
lower perceived 
personal cost; 
negative mood 
related to decreased 
intentions to report. 
Brennan & 
Kelly (2007) 
100 final year 
students 
(trainee 
accountants 
and auditors)  
Willingness to 
challenge 
partner’s 
inappropriate  
decision and 
awareness of  
legislation.  
 
Questionnaire, 
including scenario 
sections on 
dilemmas in 
deciding the 
possible causes of 
action based on 
audit partner’s 
response. 
 
The existence of 
adequate structures 
for whistle-blowing 
in firms influenced 
trainee auditors to be 
more willing to report 
wrongdoing.  
 
Kaplan and 
Schultz (2007)  
90 MBA 
students. 
The likelihood 
of reporting, 
seriousness of 
treating 
anonymous 
reports, and 
the 
organization’s 
ability to 
follow up on 
reports.  
 
Utilised  
questionnaires and  
scenarios. 
Presence of an 
anonymous channel 
reduces the 
willingness to report 
to non-anonymous 
channels.   
Taylor & 
Curtis (2010)  
120 senior 
auditors. 
Investigated 
professional 
and 
organizational 
commitment, 
moral 
intensity and 
reporting 
intentions. 
 
Utilised  
questionnaires and  
vignettes. 
Moral intensity 
influences reporting 
intentions. 
Professional 
commitment and 
auditor commitment 
influence likelihood 
of reporting and 
perseverance in 
reporting, 
respectively.   
 
Adapted from Seifert (2006, pp. 6-10).
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3.8.1 Personal characteristics of whistle-blowers  
Research has shown personal characteristics that are likely to influence the decision to 
whistle-blow. Personal characteristics include age, gender, educational level, job 
position, locus of control, ethical reasoning, job performance, organizational 
commitment, professional commitment, tenure, personal responsibility to report and 
approval of whistle-blowing (Hooks et al., 1994; Near and Miceli, 1996; Sims and 
Keenan, 1998; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001; Mesmer-Magnus and Visweravan, 2005; 
Seifert, 2006; Taylor and Curtis, 2010). This has led Mesmer-Magnus and Visweravan 
(2005) to conclude that the literature showed that whistle-blowers tended to be 
excellent job performers, well educated, hold top positions in the organization’s 
hierarchy, possess high moral development and consider whistle-blowing as a means of 
correcting unethical behaviour. 
 Empirical research suggests that individuals whose responsibility is to report, 
will face less retaliation and possibly assist in curtailing the wrongdoing (Miceli and 
Near, 2002).  Parmerlee, Near and Jensen (1982) argued that employees who are highly 
valued by the organization may face greater retaliation than those who are regarded as 
being less valuable. This may be a result of the high positions that these valued 
employees occupy in the organization’s hierarchy, which suggests that loyalty is owed 
to the organization, given the level of trust and value that is bestowed on them.   
 Research has used theories from social psychology to explain whistle-blowing 
behaviour (Near and Miceli, 1995; Mesmer-Magnus and Visweravan, 2005). For 
example, Miceli et al. (1991, p. 115) argued that idiosyncrasy theory (Hollander, 1958) 
would explain that high performing staff will tend to have greater latitude in moving 
away from organizational norms, and as a result of their value and influence may 
possibly avoid major retaliation when reporting wrongdoing compared to poor 
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performers. French and Raven’s (1959) theory of power relationship suggests that 
employees can achieve significant power and influence because of their exceptional 
skills, excellent performance level, high position and status in the organization and 
perceived trustworthiness (Miceli and Near, 1994, p.776). Therefore, individuals or 
employees, with this significant power, may be in a better position to report 
wrongdoing.  
Arnold and Ponemon (1991) used the DIT (measuring moral reasoning) to 
examine the whistle-blowing perceptions of 106 internal auditors. They found that 
auditors who scored lower on moral development were unwilling to use whistle-
blowing as an avenue for reporting wrongdoing in the organization, especially when the 
whistle-blower was faced with the possibility of retaliation in the form of losing one’s 
job. They also found that the potential whistle-blower’s position in the organization 
may influence an auditor’s intention to whistle-blow.  
Finn and Lampe (1992) studied auditors’ reporting intentions of questionable 
acts among students, audit managers and audit staff, using vignettes. This study focused 
on the auditor’s likelihood to engage in questionable acts (i.e. unethical behaviour) and 
the propensity of the auditor to report their colleague’s unethical behaviour. The results 
indicated that the auditors would not perform the unethical behaviour in the scenarios. 
However, a minority indicated their willingness to whistle-blow on a colleague who 
performed the questionable act.  Finn and Lampe (1992) found that practising auditors 
were less supportive of whistle-blowing compared to auditing students. They also 
found that there was a significant and positive correlation between ethical judgement 
and the whistle-blowing decision, which was influenced by issue and situation-related 
factors.  
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Hooks et al. (1994) further identified from prior research that personal variables 
such as education, age, gender, personal values, job satisfaction and organizational 
tenure may significantly influence the likelihood of reporting. The identification of the 
factors from the literature seems to show that individual variables can influence 
whistle-blowing tendencies. For example, an individual with the ability to influence 
others, who is in a powerful position within the audit firm, has high personal values and 
commitment to the organization, and perceives low personal costs, may be more 
inclined to whistle-blow. 
Several studies report on the observer’s prescribed role responsibility to report 
wrongdoing. For example, Miceli and Near (1984) found that individuals whose roles 
and duties require them to observe and report (i.e. their prescribed role) are more likely 
to have opportunities to report. Schultz et al. (1993) found that perceived responsibility 
to report was the most influential variable affecting reporting frequency among 
managers and professionals. Individuals may perceive personal responsibility to report 
because of the possible negative effects to the organization that might arise from non-
reporting. An individual’s position in the organization and the fact that he or she may 
possess unique knowledge of the problem and committed to the organization can evoke 
feelings of personal responsibility. However, even if an observer of wrongdoing 
perceives some level of personal responsibility for reporting, the possibility still exists 
that the individual may remain silent (Miceli and Near, 1992b).  
Prior research has found support for the auditors’ role-prescribed responsibility 
for reporting wrongdoing and its justification as acting in the public interest (Miceli et 
al., 1991; Ponemon, 1994). For example, Miceli et al. (1991) found that internal 
auditors tended to report questionable acts, based on moral obligation and perceived 
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role responsibility. In addition, these authors found that internal auditors were more 
likely to report externally when there was potential harm to the public or colleagues.  
Kaplan (1995) investigated audit seniors’ intentions to report unethical acts such 
as procedures prematurely signed-off, which are subsequently discovered. Using 
vignettes, he found that the likelihood of audit seniors reporting a premature sign off 
was influenced positively by the need for a specific audit procedure and the auditor’s 
poor work history. In addition, Kaplan (1995) found no support for gender influencing 
audit seniors’ intentions to report wrongdoing.  
Several studies have explored the influence of attitudes and subjective norms on 
auditors’ behavioural intentions. For example, Gibson and Frakes (1997) used a survey 
approach and the theory of reasoned action to explore unethical decision-making 
among Certified Public Accountants (CPAs). Gibson and Frakes (1997) focused on 
violations of the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct and questionable audit 
behaviours such as premature sign-off of audit steps and underreporting of time. It was 
found that the CPAs were generally unwilling to report unethical behaviour. The study 
also found that the theory of reasoned action was useful in explaining accountants’ 
unethical behaviour. Thus, future research can look at using the theory of planned 
behaviour (the successor to the theory of reasoned action) in measuring whistle-
blowing intentions.   
Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) examined the influence of individual 
antecedents (perceptions of the seriousness of the act, personal cost of reporting, 
personal responsibility for reporting and level of commitment to the auditing 
profession) on reporting intentions among 73 audit seniors. These researchers used a 
scenario that depicted an ethical dilemma, which highlighted the discovery that another 
audit staff member is contemplating a job offer with the client, which is in violation of 
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the AICPA’s ethics rulings. Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) found that lower perceived 
personal cost of reporting and higher perceived personal responsibility influence higher 
auditors’ reporting intentions. There was no support found for the relationship between 
the two independent variables (professional commitment and perceived seriousness) 
and auditors’ reporting intentions.    
Ayers and Kaplan (2005) examined employees’ intentions to report wrongdoing 
committed by consultants in instances where there may be anonymous reporting or not. 
Support was found for the relationship between perceived seriousness of the act, 
personal responsibility, personal cost of reporting and moral equity dimensions and 
reporting wrongdoing in instances where there were non-anonymous reporting 
channels. In situations where the reporting channel was anonymous, support was found 
only for perceived seriousness and personal cost. 
Curtis (2006) investigated the impact of mood on individuals’ intentions to 
report colleagues’ unethical acts. Curtis (2006) also looked at the impact of moral 
intensity, as defined by seriousness and responsibility, on reporting intentions.  Curtis’ 
study found that more negative mood was significantly related to decreased reporting 
intentions. The author also found that greater individual reporting intentions were 
significantly influenced by perceptions of higher levels of seriousness and personal 
responsibility, and lower personal cost. The study further revealed that more negative 
mood reduces perceived seriousness of an act and one’s level of personal responsibility 
for reporting that act, and that any decrease in perceived seriousness and responsibility 
is likely to decrease one’s willingness to blow the whistle. Thus, Curtis (2006) found 
empirical support for the influence of perceived moral intensity on reporting intentions. 
Overall, these findings indicate that personal responsibility for reporting and 
personal costs of reporting are important factors within the audit profession and should 
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be incorporated in any proposed model on whistle-blowing among auditors. Kaplan and 
Whitecotton (2001, p. 62) suggested that Jones’ (1991) moral intensity could be 
incorporated into a model of reporting questionable acts.6  Indeed, Cohen and 
Martinov-Bennie (2006) and Jones et al. (2003) argued that research is needed on the 
impact of moral intensity on auditors’ likelihood of whistle-blowing, given the 
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.   
 
3.8.2 Situational (contextual) variables 
Situational (contextual) variables have been found to be quite influential in the decision 
by an individual to whistle-blow (Hooks et al., 1994; Finn, 1995; Near and Miceli, 
1996). These situational variables include organizational support, organizational culture 
or climate, the structure of the organization, power of the person receiving the report, 
retaliatory threats and the organization’s size (Miceli and Near, 1992a, 1992b; King, 
1999; Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005). Prior research has shown that the 
level of perceived support from the organization’s hierarchy may be influential in the 
decision to whistle-blowing and the choice of reporting channel (internal and external) 
that will be used (Hooks et al., 1994; Keenan, 2000).  For example, Miceli et al. (1991, 
p. 116) suggested that social exchange theory (e.g. Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Blau, 
1964) may explain that strong organizational support should encourage an individual to 
use internal channels to correct wrongdoing, before reporting externally. 
Hooks et al. (1994) argued that any potential harm to colleagues is likely to 
result in increased external reporting. In their review of the literature, Hooks et al. 
(1994) also found that other factors which are likely to increase whistle-blowing 
include situations when the job is role prescribed, the existence of high professional and 
                                                 
6 Jones’ moral intensity model has been discussed in chapter 2, and will be further discussed in chapter 4, 
when the proposed conceptual model is presented. 
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societal support, a supportive organizational climate, ‘tone at the top’, the establishment 
of adequate reporting channels, and low threat of retaliation. Empirical research has 
demonstrated that where the perceived threat of retaliation is greater, potential whistle-
blowers will be less inclined to report wrongdoing (Near and Miceli, 1996; King, 
1999). Perceived fear of retaliation is more likely to result in external reporting (Miceli 
et al., 1991).  
The organizational climate may influence an individual’s tendency to whistle-
blow (Miceli and Near, 1992b; Chung et al., 2004). If the organization is viewed as 
being supportive of and values whistle-blowing, then there is the likelihood that 
members will report wrongdoing. Miceli and Near (1992b) reported that the level of 
organizational responsiveness was positively and significantly associated with whistle-
blowing behaviour. Further research has shown that there was a positive and significant 
relationship between the existence of reporting policies and managers’ perceptions that 
an entity encourages or approves whistle-blowing (Keenan, 1990). Thus, Near and 
Miceli (1996) conclude that whistle-blowing is more likely to increase when there is a 
strong relationship between individual and organizational values, which seemingly 
correlates with the theory of value congruence, proposed by Enz (1988).   
Prior research on group behaviour has revealed that organizational members 
tend to respond more negatively to whistle-blowing by their colleagues (Trevino and 
Victor, 1992). Logically, group members may fear group retaliation or ostracism as 
being a disincentive to whistle-blow. Within ethics research, O’Leary and Pangemanan 
(2007), using vignettes, researched the impact of groups, compared to individuals, on 
ethical decision-making among 163 final year accounting students. These authors 
argued that there is limited evidence with respect to whether individual ethical 
reasoning is inferior to group ethical decision-making. The study found that groups 
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tended to be neutral (i.e. safer options), which is a compromised (consensus) position, 
as a result of conformity pressure, when deciding to act ethically or unethically. This 
has led O’Leary and Pangemanan (2007) to conclude that groups tended to reach 
consensus decisions rather than the best ethical decisions. To this author’s knowledge, 
there has been little research conducted on whistle-blowing among groups, and in 
particular with audit teams. Thus, more research is needed to determine the influence of 
groups on whistle-blowing. 
Label and Miethe (1999) examined whistle-blowing legislation and its level of 
acceptance among 353 auditors. These authors found that 75% of the sample preferred 
internal reporting compared to 25% who chose external whistle-blowing. A large 
proportion (73%) said they were against any legislation that puts greater responsibility 
on auditors to report misconduct externally. With respect to the reporting of fraud and 
other illegal acts to higher levels of management, auditors in the sample felt they 
should report them: to the audit client (99%),  to audit partners and seniors (96%), and 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (49%). Sixty three percent (63%) of 
the auditors in the sample perceived that external whistle-blowing was an ethical 
violation of the professional code of ethics on the grounds that it breaches auditor-client 
confidentiality.  In addition, the study found that majority of auditors (91%) perceived 
that whistle-blowing could result in losing clients. 
Brennan and Kelly (2007) surveyed 100 trainee auditors in Ireland. They 
examined the level of confidence that trainee auditors had in their firms’ internal and 
external reporting mechanisms, their willingness to question the audit partner’s 
unsatisfactory decision, and the impact of legal and regulatory protection on the 
likelihood of blowing the whistle. These researchers found that where audit firms had 
implemented adequate reporting mechanisms, respondents were more likely to whistle-
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blow and be less fearful of retaliation that could negatively affect their careers in the 
profession. Brennan and Kelly (2007) also found that trainee auditors seemed to be 
more willing to challenge the audit partner’s inappropriate decision or action on 
wrongdoing.  
Chung et al. (2004) researched auditors’ intentions to report wrongdoing 
internally (to the audit firm’s managing partner) or externally (to the board of 
directors). They found that auditors preferred to report internally rather than externally. 
These authors further found that auditors in a principle-based climate were more likely 
to report wrongdoing compared to their colleagues in a rule-based environment. Based 
on the apparent reluctance of auditors, and indeed, employees in other organizations, to 
whistle-blow, Ponemon (1994) recommended the implementation of a reward system 
(e.g. offering monetary rewards or the granting of long-term employment contracts) as 
part of an institution’s control system to promote the reporting of wrongdoing.  
There has also been research that explored the relationship between whistle-
blowing and culture (Schultz et al., 1993; Tavakoli et al., 2003; Patel, 2003). For 
example, Schultz et al. (1993) investigated whistle-blowing in an international context 
among American, French and Norwegian subjects. Schultz et al. (1993) adapted their 
model for reporting questionable acts from Graham (1986), by using perceived 
seriousness of the act, personal responsibility for reporting and the personal cost of 
reporting to predict whistle-blowing intentions. The study found support for a negative 
relationship between personal cost to report and the likelihood of reporting. Support 
was also found for positive relationships between the independent variables 
(perceptions of seriousness and personal responsibility for reporting) and the likelihood 
of reporting. Schultz et al. (1993) also found that American managers considered 
personal responsibility and personal costs as influential factors in the whistle-blowing 
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process. Patel (2003) found that practising accountants in Australia exhibited higher 
tendencies to blow the whistle, and showed greater acceptance of whistle-blowing as an 
internal control mechanism than their Indian and Chinese-Malaysian counterparts.  
 
3.8.3 Characteristics of the wrongdoing 
Prior research has found that severity and types of wrongdoing, as well as the 
characteristics of the wrongdoer, may influence whistle-blowing (Miceli and Near, 
1985; Near and Miceli, 1996; Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005). Dozier and 
Miceli (1985) asserted that potential whistle-blowers will ascertain evidence of 
wrongdoing, make an evaluation of the materiality of the questionable act, and at times, 
determine whether the wrongdoing personally affects them, before taking action. Thus, 
Dozier and Miceli’s (1985) assessment seemingly correlates with Latané and Darley’s 
(1970) research on “bystander effect,”  which may suggest that persons are less likely 
to report wrongdoing, due to the possible belief that others present in the organization 
will take action. This apparent inaction is termed ‘perceived diffusion of 
responsibility.’ 
Prior research indicates that when organizational support is perceived as being 
high, wrongdoing that threatens staff or the existence of the organization is more likely 
to be reported internally. However, organizational members are more likely to report 
externally, if it is perceived that there is a threat to a co-worker or that the organization 
thrives on wrongdoing (Miceli and Near, 1988; Miceli et al., 1991; Sims and Keenan, 
1998). Research further indicates that senior management who benefits significantly 
from continued wrongdoing and unethical behaviour in the organization may have the 
tendency to retaliate against whistle-blowers who stand in their way (e.g. Miceli et al., 
1991; Casal and Zalkind, 1995; Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005). Similarly, 
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Dworkin and Baucus (1998) found that management tended to threaten external 
whistle-blowers with retaliation or reprisals much more quickly than those who report 
internally.  
 
3.8.4 Consequences of whistle-blowing 
The literature has shown that there are many consequences (positive and negative) of 
blowing the whistle. When the complaint is made, management may ignore the report, 
take appropriate remedial action, reward or possibly threaten the complainant (Mesmer-
Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008).  Research has also shown that 
what may happen after whistle-blowing occurs, is likely to influence the willingness of 
others to blow the whistle (Miceli and Near, 1992b; Casal and Zalkind, 1995; Miceli et 
al., 2008). The potential whistle-blower will first assess the cost of reporting, and this 
assessment may determine whether the individual will whistle-blow or not. 
 Prior research has shown that retaliation may include the undermining of the 
reporting process, isolation, defamation, undue pressure, alienation, loss of job, 
harassment and other discriminatory acts (Parmerlee et al., 1982; Miceli and Near, 
1992b; Near and Miceli, 1995). Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) highlighted 
key motivations for retaliatory acts to include the need to silence and discredit the 
whistle-blower and prevent public disclosure of the wrongdoing.   
There are also positive and negative consequences to society, the organization 
(e.g. the audit firm) and the accounting profession as a result of whistle-blowing. To the 
audit firm and the profession, there are negative consequences associated with the 
discovery of wrongdoing, which has been reported internally, and was not satisfactorily 
resolved.  This may cause the public to lose confidence and respect for the firm and the 
profession. In addition, any resulting financial losses to the public can further harm the 
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credibility and confidence in the capital markets (e.g. the case of Enron and Arthur 
Andersen). However, whistle-blowing can also have positive social consequences, 
where the public is able to see that the profession and the audit firms have implemented 
adequate reporting mechanisms to regulate themselves. Thus, this could lead to greater 
transparency, accountability and trust in the profession. 
 
3.9 Summary  
The study of whistle-blowing intentions is central to understanding the ethical decision-
making process of auditors. Intentions have been argued to be a very good predictor of 
actual behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Furthermore, previous 
studies have examined ethical intentions as the dependent variable in most ethical 
decision-making models. For example, Goles, White, Beebe, Dorantes and Hewitt 
(2006) examined the effects of perceived moral intensity and perceptions of an ethical 
problem on ethical intentions. Singhapakdi, Vitell and Franke (1999) also investigated 
the influence of several contextual (organization-based factors and moral intensity) and 
individual (demographics and moral philosophy) variables on behavioural (ethical) 
intentions.  Given this focus, this thesis will examine external auditors’ whistle-blowing 
intentions (i.e. the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing committed by audit staff). 
 The above review of the literature shows that the concept of whistle-blowing is 
important to the external auditor. More importantly, prior studies of whistle-blowing 
have highlighted some important findings for the auditing profession. Specifically, the 
literature shows that auditors seem to demonstrate low whistle-blowing intentions and a 
general reluctance to report to external channels (Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). The 
above review also highlighted that there are many factors that can influence an external 
auditor’s whistle-blowing intentions. 
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There has been a paucity of research that seeks to utilise an integrated approach 
to study whistle-blowing among external auditors. This study examines the influence of 
team, contextual and individual factors on auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions. Group 
dynamics (e.g. team norms and group cohesion) seem to have been ignored in the 
whistle-blowing literature. There is also a scant body of research concerning the 
combined and separate effects of team and individual factors on the intentions to 
behave ethically. In addition, limited research has been conducted to determine the 
importance of team or individual factors (or both) in understanding whistle-blowing 
among external auditors.  Finally, the effects of moral approval (i.e. desired moral 
approbation) have not been fully recognized as a determinant of ethical intentions 
(whistle-blowing) among auditors.  Thus, the thesis now moves on to the next chapter 
(chapter 4), which presents the conceptual model. Limited research has been done on 
investigating whistle-blowing among practising external auditors. As previously 
mentioned, this model will seek to explain whistle-blowing intentions (rather than 
actual behaviour). 
 105
CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND 
HYPOTHESES FORMULATION7 
 
4.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents a conceptual model of whistle-blowing intentions among external 
auditors in audit firms and draws together the themes from chapters 2 and 3. The 
proposed model was derived, in part, from existing models of ethical decision-making 
and whistle-blowing. The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section 
explains the background to the study. Section two highlights the importance of whistle-
blowing to auditing. Section three briefly reviews existing whistle-blowing models, 
while section four provides the theoretical underpinnings that influence whistle-
blowing intentions in the context of auditing based on moral, social justice and 
institutional theories. Section five discusses the proposed conceptual model of whistle-
blowing among audit practitioners and the hypothesized relationships depicted in the 
current model and offers theoretical and empirical justification for the inclusion of the 
variables and the relationships established in the model. The final section concludes the 
chapter. 
 
4.1 Background 
Whistle-blowing has become an important monitoring mechanism in the wake of many 
corporate scandals involving accounting firms. The accounting profession and other 
interested regulatory bodies are now calling for whistle-blowing to be a prominent part 
of the organizational culture (Sarbanes and Oxley, 2002). Although the professional 
codes of ethics stated the need for audit members to approach their work with integrity 
                                                 
7 A paper was drawn from this chapter, which presents the conceptual model. The paper was presented at 
the Critical Perspectives on Accounting 2008 Conference held at Baruch College, City University of 
New York, USA. 
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and to report any wrongdoing, both actual and suspicious, the recent corporate scandals 
have questioned the soundness of the professional codes of conducts in preventing such 
scandals and protecting public interest. Hence, the apparent failure to serve public 
interest might be due to the widespread reluctance by audit staff to report on colleagues 
who commit wrongdoing or questionable acts (see Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001; Finn 
and Lampe, 1992). This is partly due to the shortcomings of the current codes of ethics, 
which neither encourage nor guide audit practitioners on how to blow the whistle in 
situations where they have reported to more senior levels within the audit firm and/or 
the client’s audit committee, but where no action is taken to rectify the reported 
wrongdoing.  
Due to the uniqueness of auditor-client relationships where audit staff have 
statutory access and accumulated knowledge of the client’s financial and business 
affairs and the importance placed by the code to address such auditor-client 
relationships, it is desirable that the code clearly dictates what should be done in such 
cases, if the profession is to render its obligations towards both its members and to the 
wider public.8  Arguably, no code can dictate what should be done in each case 
(Cowton, 2009).  Thus, there is a need to move beyond the code and look at other 
measures, such as whistle-blowing, to prevent further scandals and protect public 
interest. 
The importance for whistle-blowing becomes paramount when there is 
collusion between the client management and the audit senior partner, such as in the 
                                                 
8 Freidson (1986) argues that due to the limitations of a well-developed body of theoretical knowledge of 
auditing practice, the profession becomes vulnerable to political and social interference. In other words, 
auditing practice is very much influenced by the factors in the environment. Hence, the existence, 
enforcement and regular assessment and updates of the professional code of conducts are deemed very 
important to guide and govern members’ behaviour in maintaining an independent attitude of mind and 
avoiding situations which would lead to impairment of objectivity. However, the code stops short from 
addressing situations that may cause audit practitioners to have personal biases towards others during 
their professional work and, as a result, he or she may become reluctant to form an independent opinion 
about any particular situation, he or she is involved in and may not act with due care and diligence. 
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case of Enron where there was reluctance to blow the whistle by the audit staff, despite 
their knowledge about the client’s business, its obligations and its financial affairs.  
Audit staff should have a moral obligation to protect the public’s interest in the face of 
perceived justice violations.9  The external audit promotes the view that public interest 
is protected by making corporate managers and their companies accountable.  Some 
have argued that, de facto, since accounting firms are in constant pursuit of profit 
making, audit staff are indoctrinated to satisfy and yield to clients and ignore the 
public’s interests (Hanlon, 1994).  Moreover, significant time budget pressures may be 
exerted on audit staff, and as a result, some firms have used improper auditing 
practices, including falsifying audit working papers (Willett and Page, 1996; Sikka, 
2008).  
Sikka (2008) argues that accounting firms have shown greater tendencies to 
break audit standards and other regulations, and support their clients in issuing 
fraudulent financial statements. This raises the need for reluctant audit staff to blow the 
whistle on colleagues who commit wrongdoing for the interests of both public as well 
as the profession. The subsequent public disclosure of an issue that ought to have been 
reported and rectified then, could be potentially damaging later to the audit firm and the 
profession as a whole, where public confidence needs to be restored, as was seen in the 
demise of Arthur Andersen. 
To enhance the public interest role, the whistle-blowing mechanism has been 
argued to be particularly important in the auditing profession (Arnold and Ponemon, 
1991). Some researchers (Hooks et al., 1994; Finn, 1995) have responded and proposed 
                                                 
9 The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and the PIDA in the UK, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA 
and most of other regulations are intended to serve the public’s interest and can be viewed as regulatory 
responses to the major incidents (like Enron), in recent times, that have undermined public interest 
(Helliar and Bebbington, 2004). The current codes of professional conduct also cover this issue and 
require accountants to disclose confidential (privileged) information to third parties, when not legally 
obliged to do so, if the disclosure can be justified as acting in the public’s interest. 
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whistle-blowing models, but these models failed to capture all of the important factors 
critical to the context of external auditing.  In addition, these models were developed 
prior to the Enron debacle. Given that the world is dynamic, with practices and 
processes constantly evolving and the emergence of a significant body of research 
subsequent to the development of these models, it suggests that prior models need to be 
revised and extended for a post-Enron era.  
Previous studies identified individual factors, contextual variables and the 
severity, type of wrongdoing and potential retaliation (Miceli and Near, 1988; Hooks et 
al., 1994; Finn, 1995; King, 1997; Sims and Keenan, 1998; Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran, 2005) as factors associated with whistle-blowing intention, but neglected 
to consider perceived organizational support, moral intensity and team-based factors, 
the latter being important since audit practitioners often work in teams within the 
constructs of their organizations. Indeed, Louwers, Ponemon and Radtke (1997) 
suggest that future accounting ethics research should focus on “the development of a 
model specific to the accounting profession” (p. 209). Hence, the proposed model takes 
into account those factors guided by Kant’s and Rawls’s autonomous and equal liberty 
theories that are based on moral duty to act in the public’s interest and prevent harm, 
which is the cornerstone of the audit profession. In addition, the thesis considers the 
literature on behavioural psychology (Ajzen, 1991; Graham, 1986), isomorphic notions 
of institutional theory and auditing to construct the model.  
The proposed model consists of key individual-level antecedents (attitudes 
toward whistle-blowing, perceived behavioural control, desired moral approbation, 
independence commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost of 
reporting) that may influence whistle-blowing intentions among audit practitioners, 
with perceived organizational support, team norms, group cohesion and perceived 
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moral intensity components, being proposed to have moderating effects on the 
propensity to whistle-blow (See Figure 9). Therefore, this thesis not only contributes to 
the general literature on whistle-blowing but also to the auditing and ethics literature by 
presenting a model explaining how several factors (individual, team, issue-contingent 
and organizational) may influence the behaviour of external auditors.  
 
4.2 Importance of whistle-blowing to auditing 
This section draws together the key issues on whistle-blowing within the external audit 
environment. Audit practitioners who have exhausted the normal professional 
procedures to correct wrongdoing are often faced with the moral dilemma on whether 
or not to report the observed questionable act performed by other audit staff.  These can 
include acts such as covering up irregularities in a client’s financial statements, false 
sign off and yielding to client pressure. As previously mentioned in chapter 3, the 
auditing profession is considered unique, with its legal, ethical and professional 
restrictions and loyalties to the client and public (e.g. Mitschow and Langford, 2000; 
Brennan and Kelly, 2007).  
It can be argued that whistle-blowing for audit practitioners can include the 
reporting of unethical acts committed by others to any reporting channels (internal or 
external), anonymous or otherwise. Thus, whistle-blowing in an audit context is defined 
as the audit practitioner’s voluntary act, over and above the profession’s standard 
requirements, to report any discovered unethical acts committed by other staff within 
the organization to any party (internal or external) having the potential to correct the 
wrongdoing.10 Whistle-blowing may be influenced by personal, team, situational and 
organizational factors (Hooks et al., 1994; Brennan and Kelly, 2007). Prior research has 
                                                 
10 The literature on whistle-blowing was reviewed in Chapter 3, where a definition of whistle-blowing is 
proposed. This definition, which has been adopted throughout this thesis, has again been revisited in this 
chapter to show a link with the conceptual model. 
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found that audit staff tended to be reluctant to whistle-blow on colleagues (Finn and 
Lampe, 1992; Kaplan, 1995; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). This has led Chung et al. 
(2004, p.3) to argue that that there is limited research that identified the factors that are 
likely to encourage whistle-blowing in an auditing context. 
 
4.3 Existing whistle-blowing models 
This section briefly reviews prior relevant whistle-blowing models (as explained fully 
in chapter 3) and their importance to the proposed model. Finn and Lampe (1992) 
hypothesized that individual and situational factors (organizational pressure and 
referent others) influence the whistle-blowing decision. Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) 
concluded that organizational culture and audit firm norms may influence the beliefs of 
the acceptability of whistle-blowing. This lends further support for the possible use of 
organizational support and group norms in future models. 
Prior research has shown that individual, situational and organization factors 
influence whistle-blowing (e.g. Graham, 1986; Miceli and Near, 1992a; Hooks et al., 
1994; Finn, 1995; Near and Miceli, 1995).  Schultz et al.’s (1993) model proposed that 
an individual’s reporting intention is influenced by perceived seriousness of the act, 
perceived personal responsibility to report and personal cost of report. Miceli and Near 
(1992b) proposed a model that looked at the influence of personal and situational 
variables, cognitive assessments of reactions from members of the organization on the 
whistle-blowing decision-making process. They concluded that the interactions of 
individual, situational and organizational variables can encourage whistle-blowing. 
Hooks et al. (1994) proposed a model of whistle-blowing that incorporated 
factors such as personal values, education, ethical principles, group norms, codes of 
conduct, organizational tenure and position. Finn (1995) proposed a model of whistle-
blowing, which highlights the prior actions and reactions that are considered by the 
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whistle-blower. Near and Miceli’s (1995) model proposed that effective whistle-
blowing may be influenced by individual and organizational factors as well as 
characteristics of the wrongdoing.  Table 3 presents a summary of prior studies 
discussed in both chapters 3 and 4, including their limitations (see Panel A), 
suggestions to overcome those limitations (see Panel B) and the proposed model (see 
Panel C). 
In short, studies on whistle-blowing intentions have indeed received much 
empirical attention in organizations. Chiu (2002) acknowledged that although 
individual-level variables have been found to be important determinants of whistle-
blowing intentions, situational variables have a central place in this area of study and 
“more research is needed to determine the relative influence of individual versus 
situational factors on whistle-blowing” (p. 586). Most studies that have explored 
whistle-blowing within the audit environment have failed to research the likely 
influence of both team-based and perceived organizational support variables on 
whistle-blowing intentions.   
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Table 3:  Summary of prior studies on whistle-blowing, shortcomings and suggestions for 
improvement 
 
Panel A: Review of the studies  
Study Findings Limitations/recommendations 
Graham 
(1986) 
Focus on individuals within 
organization. Theoretical essay: 
Proposed that an individual’s intention 
to report will be influenced by the 
perceived seriousness of the issue, 
personal responsibility to report and 
assessment of personal costs of 
reporting.  
View whistle-blowing as principled 
organizational dissent, i.e. is 
potentially dysfunctional for the 
organization. Consequently neglected 
other factors such as moral intensity 
and team (e.g. cohesion and norms). 
 
Finn & 
Lampe (1992)  
Focus: individual level within 
organizations. 
Examined whistle-blowing, the 
individual’s ethical judgment and 
issue-contingent and situational 
factors. 
Findings: A positive relationship 
exists between moral judgment and 
whistle-blowing, but moderated by 
issue-contingent and situational factors 
in the workplace; practising auditors 
were less supportive of whistle-
blowing behaviour than auditing 
students. 
Did not consider perceived 
organizational support as well as the 
team factors: cohesion and norms.  
Partially considered moral intensity 
constructs.  Independence 
commitment and personal cost were 
not considered. 
Miceli & 
Near (1992b) 
Proposed that the inclusion of 
interaction effects of individual, 
situational and organizational factors 
can encourage whistle-blowing 
behaviour. 
It is a general process model, designed 
for organizations; it does not include 
audit firms’ specifics. 
Schultz et al. 
(1993) 
Cross cultural study: measuring the 
likelihood of Norwegian, French and 
US managers and professionals 
reporting questionable acts: Focused 
on individuals within organization. 
Findings: Reporting intentions may be 
influenced by individual’s assessment 
of perceived seriousness, personal cost 
of reporting and attribution of personal 
responsibility of reporting. 
Did not consider perceived 
organizational support as well as the 
team factors: cohesion and norms.  
Partially considered moral intensity 
constructs. 
Also did not consider independence 
commitment and perceived 
behavioural control. 
Hooks et al. 
(1994) 
Proposed a whistle-blowing model 
that incorporates factors such as 
personal values, ethical principles, 
group norms, codes of conduct, 
education, organizational stature, and 
tenure status. Argued that whistle-
blowing is an important internal 
control for improving internal control 
systems and assisting management and 
the external auditors to evaluate the 
control environment. 
Incorporated group and other 
organizational factors but neglected 
the moral intensity factor. Model 
focused on internal control and 
external audit to prevent and detect 
financial statement fraud.  
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Study Findings Limitations/recommendations 
Finn (1995) Presented a five stage model of 
whistle-blowing, which was based on 
Rest’s (1986) and Miceli and Near’s 
(1992b) models, where at each stage, 
the observer assesses prior actions and 
reactions of organizational members. 
Findings: seriousness of the issue 
influences willingness to whistle-
blow, thus suggesting that materiality 
is important.  
Did not consider perceived 
organizational support as well as the 
team factors: cohesion and norms.  
Partially considered moral intensity 
constructs. 
Also did not consider independence 
commitment, personal responsibility 
for reporting and personal cost of 
reporting. 
 
Near & 
Miceli (1995)  
 
Focus: individuals within 
organizations  
Suggest that whistle-blowing is 
influenced by personal factor via (the 
individual characteristics of the 
whistle-blower, complaint recipient 
and wrongdoer) and the characteristics 
of the wrongdoing and the 
organization. 
Did not consider team-based and 
moral intensity factors. 
Kaplan & 
Whitecotton 
(2001) 
Findings: strong support for the 
influence of personal costs and 
personal responsibility to report on 
auditors’ intentions to report. 
Given that support was not found for 
perceived seriousness, the authors 
recommended the incorporation of 
moral intensity. 
Curtis (2006) Focus: individuals within 
organizations, using students. 
Findings: Individual’s intentions to 
report questionable behaviour are 
related to higher perceived seriousness 
and personal responsibility, and lower 
personal cost. 
Non-consideration of moral intensity 
and team-based variables. Also 
supports the use of personal 
responsibility and personal costs of 
reporting as important factors within 
the audit profession. 
Taylor & 
Curtis (2007) 
Measured whistle-blowing intentions, 
commitment (via professional, firm and 
colleague) and moral intensity among a 
Big 4 firm’s audit seniors. Found 
support for professional commitment, 
moral intensity and reporting intentions. 
Supports the use of moral intensity and 
a form of commitment (maybe in the 
form of independence) in future models. 
Brennan & 
Kelly (2007) 
Surveyed 100 final year students 
(trainee audit practitioners) on their 
confidence in the internal and external 
reporting mechanisms in their firms and 
the likelihood of challenging an audit 
partner’s inappropriate decision, and the 
impact of legal protection on their 
willingness to whistle-blow.  
Finding: trainee auditors will be more 
likely to whistle blow and were more 
confident when there are adequate 
structures for reporting wrongdoing and 
that their career prospects will not be 
negatively affected; Also the trainees are 
more likely to challenge the audit 
partner’s inappropriate response to 
wrongdoing. 
Did not consider team-based and moral 
intensity factors. 
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Panel B: Suggestions from literature to remedy limitations in prior studies 
 Remedies  Limitations 
Kaplan & Whitecotton 
(2001) 
 
Cohen & Martinov-Bennie 
(2006) and Jones et al. 
(2003) 
Suggested that the inclusion of 
moral intensity variables (i.e. 
Jones’ 1991) in the current 
whistle-blowing model will help 
enhance the model. 
These studies recognize the 
importance of moral intensity in 
addition to individual factors. 
However, they did not consider 
other organizational factor such 
as organizational support as 
well as it did not consider the 
team-based factor. 
Arnold & Ponemon (1991) Suggest that whistle-blowing 
intentions are particularly 
important in the auditing 
profession. 
This study recognizes the 
importance of whistle-blowing 
to the auditing profession, but 
stopped short of proposing any 
model. Specifically considers 
the main factors influencing 
whistle-blowing intentions such 
as audit-team-based. 
 
Chiu (2002) Posits that in addition to 
individual-level variables as 
important determinant of whistle-
blowing intentions, situational 
variables also have a central place 
in this area of study. 
Did not propose a model that 
captures team-based, perceived 
organizational support and 
moral intensity variables. 
 
 
 
Panel C: The Current Study 
Current Study Proposes a synthesised  model drawn upon behavioural psychology 
that examines the impact of several individual-level (attitudes 
toward whistle-blowing, perceived behavioural control, desired 
moral approbation, personal responsibility for reporting 
independence commitment and personal cost of reporting) variables 
on whistle-blowing intentions) moderated by isomorphic factors 
(perceived organizational support and team norms and group 
cohesion) and issue-specific (moral intensity). 
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Since actual whistle-blowing is difficult to predict, the literature tends to use 
whistle-blowing intentions, defined as “the individual’s probability of actually 
engaging in whistle-blowing behaviour” (Chiu, 2002, p. 582), as a proxy for the actual 
act. This is based on the perspective of the theory of planned behaviour (TPB)11 
whereby an individual’s intention is influenced by his or her attitudes, subjective norms 
and perceived behavioural control, and intention is considered to be a strong predictor 
of actual behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Since the actual behaviour of whistle-blowing may 
be difficult to observe at the time of occurrence, researchers have no alternatives but to 
draw conclusions on the phenomenon using reporting intentions (Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran, 2005). The following section discusses the theoretical framework, which 
is adopted in building the conceptual model of whistle-blowing intentions. 
 
4.4  Theoretical framework 
4.4.1 Theoretical underpinnings of the model 
Researchers in whistle-blowing have used power theories such as resource dependency, 
value congruence and minority influence to explain power shifts in the relationship 
between the whistle-blower and the organization. For example, Miceli and Near 
(1992b) argued that “the criticality of the member’s dependence on the organization 
and the availability of alternative sources of support are determinants of the extent to 
which dependence exists and will influence the member’s action” (p. 67).  They further 
argue that the dependency dimension of power theory may limit organizational 
                                                 
11 In the accounting literature, one can find similar arguments to the behavioural intentions view.  For 
example, in defining auditor independence, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) regard independence as the 
probability or likelihood expected by the market for the auditor to report honestly in the event of any 
observed breaches of contract. DeAngelo (1981a) defines it as the probability of an auditor reporting a 
breach in the financial statements when discovered. Similarly, Moizer (1985) views auditor 
independence from both the perspective of a rational economic person and the perceptions of users 
regarding auditor objectivity as: “…an individual who will (and is expected to) disclose all the errors 
and omissions that have been discovered and which affect the view presented by the accounts” (p. 33). 
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members’ opportunities (i.e. current rewards and future employment) if they go against 
the organization, but observed mixed empirical support for the theory in the prior 
literature. Hence, it is argued that there may not be a single theory that can serve to 
explain the whistle-blowing phenomenon among auditors, who must be objective to 
fulfil their societal duty by holding corporate management accountable for the 
resources entrusted to them.  
Thus, a more comprehensive whistle-blowing theoretical framework is needed 
to incorporate the specific nature of audit practitioners’ work, involving a duty towards 
the public, typically working within teams in an organizational setting. Since audit 
practitioners are expected to act as society’s watchdogs (Cullen, 1978; Porter, 1992), 
and should put public interest over self-interest (Sikka et al., 1989; Perks, 1993), their 
role go beyond the judicial duties and obligations that society expects them to perform 
(Hudaib, 2003).  Thus, it is argued that social justice and institutional theories should 
be considered in developing the whistle-blowing intentions model for audit 
practitioners, since they operate within a set of specific rules and codes that may limit 
their intentions to blow the whistle on wrongdoing. With this in mind, the chapter 
explores moral and justice theories (Kant, 1964; Rawls, 1971), and institutional theory 
informed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) to help explain whistle-blowing intentions at 
the individual, organizational and societal levels. The next subsections discuss social 
justice and institutional theories. 
 
4.4.2 Moral and justice theories 
Kant (1964) argued that ethics and morals are duty based, whereby one has a duty to 
engage or not engage in the behaviour because it is either inherently right or wrong.  
Kant (1964) advanced this deontological perspective as guiding the socially acceptable 
moral norms of society. Persons are autonomous, equally free in participating in moral 
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actions and rationally capable of acting on the basis of principles that could be 
impartially endorsed by all other persons regardless of their inclinations and feelings. 
For example, Kant’s theory assumes that it is a moral duty to tell the truth and report 
any wrongdoing by virtue of being rational and capable of distinguishing duty and 
obligation from inclination and desire. However, some researchers argued that whistle-
blowing on illegal and questionable acts is voluntary and not duty based (Jubb, 1999).  
In contrast, De George (2006) perceived whistle-blowing as being morally driven.  
However, Jubb (2000) argued that “a (good) motive is not a condition for whistle-
blowing, though it is highly pertinent to its justification” (p. 158).  
Based on both arguments, it would appear that audit practitioners have a duty to 
act in the public interest and prevent harm, as prescribed in their codes of conducts (see 
AICPA’s 2007 Code of Professional Conduct). It must be recognised that the decision 
to act ethically may also take into consideration the potential personal costs of whistle-
blowing such as the loss of one’s licence or income due to the retaliation of a superior 
or audit client for reporting his or her actions.  Hence, according to this theory, it seems 
that any ethical decision such as whistle-blowing on wrongdoing should not only 
consider the potential harm incurred from reporting versus the potential harm incurred 
from not reporting, but also the extent of serving public interest and honouring public 
trust by demonstrating a commitment to professionalism. Thus, this ethical decision 
must not only be based on the consequences of the action, but also on the basis of the 
inherent right and wrong of the behaviour. 
Besides moral duty as a basis for whistle-blowing, the principles of equal liberty 
and social justice should also be considered. Rawls (1971) argued that justice is seen as 
fairness.  Following Kant’s theory, Rawls argues that human beings have the ability to 
choose their own ends. Thus, the state should respect the citizen’s autonomy and allow 
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them to live as they choose. Rawls (1971) argues against utilitarianism, whereby he felt 
that the safeguarding of the individual’s liberties should never be given up for the 
greater ‘good’ of others. Rawls (1971) offers two concepts that the individual must 
have to create impartiality to provide fairness: ‘original position’ and ‘veil of 
ignorance’.  Under the original position viewpoint, people imagine themselves as being 
free and equal individuals who jointly agree upon and commit to principles of social 
and political justice. The veil of ignorance would cause the individual to develop a 
sense of ethics that would be fair to everyone due to lack of knowledge of social 
systems, religious beliefs or conception of the good life.   
Thus, the individual actor will have two basic principles of justice: the first 
principle is where the individual grants everyone the same level of liberty; and the 
second principle is where the individual arranges social and economic opportunities to 
all (the advantaged and the least advantaged). Rawls identifies these principles as the 
principle of equal liberty, the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference 
principle. Following Rawls (1971) notion of justice, decision makers are expected to 
act with fairness, equity and impartiality and, in turn, the organization should 
administer its rules in the same vein. Therefore, this researcher argues that whistle-
blowing in the audit context should be a voluntary act within the realm of free speech 
and the individual’s perception of justice and fairness in society. For example, Sherron 
Watkins of Enron disclosed the accounting irregularity with a justice perception about 
what is fair to stakeholders such as shareholders and employees, i.e. principle of equal 
liberty in and for society (Lucas and Koerwer, 2004).  
 
4.4.3 Institutional theory 
Although moral and social justice may positively influence audit practitioners’ whistle-
blowing intentions, an institutionalised process towards profit orientation may hinder 
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practitioners’ moral obligations towards society. Institutional theory proposes that an 
organization is shaped by wider cultural, social and symbolic elements that comprise its 
environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). To gain legitimacy, organizations 
implement mechanisms and structures to signal to all what is the expected and 
acceptable behaviour.  Organizations operate within a framework of norms, values and 
acceptable economic behaviour. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that conformity to 
socially acceptable norms will contribute positively to the organization’s survival. 
Thus, institutional theory can be used to justify compliant behaviour. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest three isomorphisms12 that affect 
organizations.  The first, coercive isomorphism is the regulatory institution (e.g. the 
State) that imposes patterns on the organization. For example, governments require 
institutions to have mechanisms such as effective corporate governance (CG) systems 
and audit committees (AC) in place to ensure that organizations operate in an 
acceptable manner and are properly audited by audit firms in the public interest.  
Secondly, mimetic isomorphism is where organizations adopt the prescribed acceptable 
behaviour adopted by similar organizations.  Thirdly, normative isomorphism is where 
organizations are professionalised by prescribed patterns such as norms established by 
training and career paths. The institutionalised activities could include management’s 
norms, corporate culture, and societal expectations. In organizations, the audit 
committee is an example of the structure as well as institutionalised activities i.e. CG 
quality and AC effectiveness. Specifically, audit firms have set up ethics committees to 
signal and legitimise certain ethical behaviours. 
The argument here is that the contribution of moral, justice and institutional 
theories are important to the understanding of whistle-blowing behaviour among 
                                                 
12 Isomorphism refers to “the constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other 
units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.149). 
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auditors.  It may be argued that individual practitioner’s perception of free speech may 
also be affected by coercive institutions where the audit firm implements rules and 
procedures to create compliance, hierarchy, routines and some form of loyalty to the 
organization. However, De George (2006) argued that there is no duty of loyalty that 
should restrict whistle-blowing. Whistle-blowing is about bringing change and acting in 
the public interest where unfair practices are identified. In the audit profession, there 
are still standards and rules that restrict client disclosure on wrongdoing. Further, it is 
widely held that the reporting on an audit staff’s violation may be at odds with the goals 
of the firm to be more profit oriented and to retain the client. Thus, this rational act of 
reporting wrongdoing in the public interest is within the remit of all auditors, as 
informed by Rawls’ principles of liberty and accountability towards society. 
 
4.5 Propositions (hypotheses) based on the model  
4.5.1 Background to the model 
Although the motivation to blow the whistle might be contingent on audit practitioners’ 
personal goals and diverse personality traits, several other individual factors might 
encourage and promote whistle-blowing intentions. Previous models of ethical 
decision-making or whistle-blowing have used individual characteristics as antecedents 
(Trevino, 1986; Ajzen, 1991; Graham, 1986; Schultz et al., 1993; Kaplan, 1995; Near 
and Miceli, 1995; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001) and potential moderators (Hooks et 
al., 1994; Lampe and Finn, 1992). For example, Trevino’s (1986) model proposed that 
individual characteristics such as moral reasoning, locus of control, ego strength, field 
dependence and education, influence the ethical decision-making process. Park and 
Blenkinsopp (2009) argue that the determination of the factors that are likely to 
motivate an individual’s behavioural intentions will assist organizational leaders to find 
ways of improving ethical behaviour.   
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Based on this researcher’s understanding of both ethical arguments by Kant and 
Rawls, Figure 9 highlights six components of individual factors (viz. attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing, perceived behavioural control, desired moral approbation, 
independence commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost of 
reporting), that serve as antecedents to whistle-blowing intentions. These six 
antecedents would achieve Kant and Rawls’ views on ethical actors as being rational 
and autonomous and enjoying equal freedom within the context of audit staff’s whistle-
blowing intentions. Furthermore, the first two adopted factors (attitudes toward whistle-
blowing and perceived behavioural control) are drawn from Ajzen (1991)’s theory of 
planned behaviour which evolved from the theory of reasoned action, developed by 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), where behavioural intentions are based on two concepts: 
the individual’s attitudes toward behaviour and subjective norms.13 Later, Ajzen (1991) 
added a third concept, perceived behavioural control, to the model (Figure 10, 
Illustration A). However, for the purposes of this research, the theory of planned 
behaviour is modified to fit the arguments for whistle-blowing in an audit context. 
Figure 10 (Illustration B) depicts this researcher’s view on how the intention to engage 
in the behaviour is influenced by the six considerations. 
Figure 9 also identifies team-based, perceived organizational support and issue-
specific variables that may create significant pressures on individual characteristics and 
are likely to actually encourage individuals to blow the whistle. Even though these six 
individual-led antecedents and four moderators (team norms, group cohesion, perceived 
organizational support and issue-specific – moral intensity variables) have often been 
                                                 
13 Subjective norms refer to the individual’s belief as to how important others such as peers and family 
are likely to support the behaviour, directly influencing behavioural intentions. They are the product of 
the individual’s normative beliefs and motivations to meet the expectations of important others (Ajzen, 
1991). However, this construct was replaced with another relevant component such as desired moral 
approbation. 
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recognised in the literature, they have not been synthesised as interrelated blocks. The 
review, therefore, aims to clarify the potential impact of these factors on whistle-
blowing intentions in the audit profession. Figure 9 illustrates the building blocks of the 
review and the following subsections discuss the proposed relationships as depicted in 
the conceptual model. 
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Figure 9: Conceptual model of whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors14 
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14  This thesis seeks only to quantitatively measure up to the stage of whistle-blowing intentions in the model, given the difficulties cited in the 
literature to observe actual behaviour.    
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a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
adopted from Ajzen (1991);  
adopted from Jones and Ryan (1997); 
adopted from Gendron et al. (2006); 
adopted from Graham (1986) and Schultz et al. (1993); 
adopted from De Jong et al. (2005); 
adopted from Price and Mueller (1986) and Schminke and Wells (1999); 
adopted from Jones (1991) moral intensity; 
adopted from Eisenberger et al. (1990); 
adopted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) 
The rest of the model is based on the review and understanding of how the external audit 
works. 
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Figure 10: The theory of planned behaviour (TPB) and the modified model 
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4.5.1.1 Attitudes toward whistle-blowing and whistle-blowing intentions 
Previous studies using social psychological theories of decision-making have indicate 
that an individual’s decision to perform a given behavioural action may be influenced 
heavily by his or her attitude toward the behaviour (e.g. Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; 
Turrisi and Jaccard, 1992). The theory of planned behaviour posits that an individual’s 
behaviour is influenced by his or her personal motivation towards the adoption of the 
behaviour (i.e. intention to behave). An attitude is an individual’s assessment of the 
extent of approval or disapproval of a specific behaviour. Attitudes toward the 
behaviour are the sum of the individual’s beliefs of the behavioural consequences and 
their evaluation of those consequences. Attitudes will have an independent and direct 
effect on whistle-blowing intentions, by assessing how favourable or unfavourable an 
individual will be to whistle-blowing. 
Within the ethical decision-making literature, attitudes toward ethical behaviour 
have emerged as a significant predictor of ethical intentions and actual behaviour. 
Flannery and May (2000) found that a manager’s environmental ethical decision 
intention regarding wastewater treatment was largely dependent on his or her attitudes 
towards the environmental behaviour.  Flannery and May (2000) suggest that this 
finding is consistent with numerous and related studies which found that “attitudes 
consistently contributed to explained variance in ethical intentions and/or behaviors” 
(p. 656). Moreover, Fang (2006) found that Taiwanese employees’ attitudes toward 
ethical behaviour strongly predicted their intentions to behave ethically in the face of 
ethical dilemmas.  Bobek and Hatfield (2003) found that attitudes significantly 
predicted ethical behaviour regarding tax compliance. Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) 
found that attitudes had significant positive main effects on whistle-blowing intentions 
among South Korean police officers. 
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In the accounting and auditing ethics domain, very few studies have used the 
theory of planned behaviour to explain ethical behaviour. Gibson and Frakes (1997) 
applied the theory of reasoned action to examine unethical decision-making among 
CPAs, and found that members were unwilling to report unethical action. With regards 
to whistle-blowing in the audit context, attitudes may be linked to the individual’s 
personal traits, ethical values and thinking which are required by the profession’s 
codes. Gibson and Frakes (1997, p.169) argued that: 
Accountants appear to be unwilling to accurately report either unethical 
behaviour or intention, particularly in situations where there is no question as to 
the unacceptability of the action or the potential penalty as presented in the 
AICPA code of professional conduct. (p. 169)   
 
This may be due to the limitation of the professional code of conduct which does not 
consider whistle-blowing as being part of audit practitioners’ professional duty of care.  
 Buchan (2005) further extended Gibson and Frakes’ (1997) work by including 
several other variables such as moral sensitivity and ethical climate to investigate 
ethical intentions by the accounting profession in the US.  Buchan (2005) found support 
for attitudes influencing ethical intentions among accountants, but no support was 
found for moral sensitivity and ethical climate.  Empirically, the concept of attitudes 
toward the behaviour has been shown to have a positive relationship with ethical and 
whistle-blowing intentions (e.g. Carpenter and Reimers, 2005; Park and Blenkinsopp, 
2009).  Hence, the first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a:  Attitudes toward whistle-blowing will have a positive, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
 
4.5.1.2 Desired moral approbation and whistle-blowing intentions 
Prior research suggests found that social influences (such as subjective norms and 
social consensus) predict behavioural intentions (e.g. Ajzen, 1991; Jones, 1991; Gibson 
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and Frakes, 1997; Buchan, 2005, Park and Blenkinsopp, 2009). Within the audit 
literature, other models propose social influences as affecting the reporting intentions of 
auditors (Finn and Lampe, 1992; Hooks et al., 1994). 
A significant contribution of the model of whistle-blowing that is being 
proposed, is the inclusion of a relatively new and under-researched construct in the 
ethical decision making literature – desired moral approbation. Desired moral 
approbation refers to “the amount of approval that individuals require from themselves 
or others (emphasis added) in order to proceed with moral actions without discomfort” 
(Ryan and Riordan, 2000, p. 449; Jones and Ryan, 1997). In theory, desired moral 
approbation has two dimensions: moral approval from oneself and moral approval from 
others. Moral approval from oneself is concerned with self approval without 
considering others’ opinions when engaging in ethical or unethical behaviour, whereas 
moral approval from others is concerned with the desire to obtain approval from others.  
Ryan and Ciavarella (2002) argued that individuals experience varied levels of desired 
moral approbation, which may be high for some persons and low for others, and may 
require self-approval, approval from others, or both.  Ryan and Riordan (2000) have 
found support for the existence of this individual difference variable (desired moral 
approbation), which may help to explain an individual’s inconsistency in making moral 
judgements. 
It is important to understand how moral approbation from others relates to the 
auditing and accounting profession. Aristotle (see Rackam, 1934) contended that agents 
actively seek the approval (or disapproval) of members of their community as a means 
of understanding ethical behaviour. In developmental psychology, the development of a 
‘moral self’ is dependent on the need to obtain approval from one’s significant others 
(or the need to avoid disapproval from these referent others) (Epstein, 1973).  May 
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(1992) argues that individuals’ attitudes and moral values are influenced and shaped by 
their referent groups. Williams (2004) added that professionals such as accountants are 
responsible for their behaviour and that of their co-members because “every member of 
a profession must be sensitive to the potential harms that might result from the group 
adopting certain values and attitudes” (p. 1000).  Consequently, it is logical to assume 
that auditors are likely to make judgements and decisions that are subject to the 
approval of referent others, especially those in their profession or organization. 
Desired moral approbation from others is important as it concerns the notion 
that auditors and accountants operate within a profession and an organization. This 
group of “agents” are likely to make their decisions regarding an ethical action on the 
basis of referent others (i.e. those with whom they work either in the profession or 
organization). Prior studies (Jones and Ryan, 1997) have highlighted the possible link 
between level of moral approbation and ethical intentions and behaviour, and the need 
to empirically test such a link. 
The moral approbation construct has received limited empirical attention to date 
in terms of its empirical form (i.e. measurement structure) and its ability to influence 
moral judgements or intentions (Ryan and Riordan, 2000). To the best of this 
researcher’s knowledge, no published study has examined the influence of desired 
moral approbation from others and self on whistle-blowing intentions of auditors. 
Hence, this construct is incorporated in the proposed conceptual model and the next 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1b:  Desired moral approbation from others and from self will have a 
positive, direct effect on whistle-blowing intentions among external 
auditors. 
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4.5.1.3 Perceived behavioural control and whistle-blowing intentions 
A relevant factor in Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviour is perceived behavioural 
control. Perceived behavioural control is the individual’s perception of the level of ease 
or difficulty it would take to perform a specific behaviour (e.g. whistle-blowing on a 
colleague who signed off a clean audit report on misleading financial statements). 
Specifically, an individual’s control beliefs are contingent on the presence or absence 
of opportunities and obstacles. According to the theory of planned behaviour, the 
greater the individual’s perceived behavioural control, the more likely will be his or her 
intention to perform the behaviour in question (Ajzen, 1991). 
Ajzen (1991) argued that perceived behavioural control is conceptually similar 
to Bandura’s (1977) concept of self-efficacy. Bandura (1997) argued that self-efficacy 
refers to a person’s expectation of whether the specific behaviour can be successfully 
performed. In the context of ethical decision-making, Beu et al. (2003) hypothesized 
the influence of perceived self-efficacy on ethical intentions among students. They 
argue that persons who have high self-efficacy tend to display high self-esteem and 
competence when faced with challenging situations (e.g. ethical dilemmas). Such 
persons are more likely to make a sound judgment and engage in correct ethical 
behaviour. As stated by Beu et al. (2003), “cognitive consistency theory suggests that 
ethical behaviour is more consistent with a self-perception of high worth… the 
confidence in personal competence exhibited by high self-efficacy individuals should 
allow them to believe they can succeed without unethical means” (p. 93). 
Flannery and May (2000), in a study examining ethical intentions of managers, 
used self-efficacy as a proxy measure of internal perceived behavioural control, but did 
not find support for this internal measure as having an influence on intentions. 
However, these authors suggest that since their research was the first to use self 
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efficacy as a control factor, future empirical attempts should be made to examine it in 
different organizational settings. Other studies have found that self-efficacy was the 
strongest predictor of intentions to follow rules (e.g. Broadhead-Fearn and White, 
2006). Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) found that perceived behavioural control was 
significantly and positively related to internal whistle-blowing intentions. Since 
previous studies indicated mixed results concerning perceived behavioural control, this 
aspect is incorporated into the conceptual model, and the next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1c:  Perceived behavioural control will have a positive, direct effect on  
                          whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
 
 
4.5.1.4 Independence commitment and whistle-blowing intentions 
Accountability theory argues that accountability should improve decision-making by 
reducing bias (Tetlock, 1985). Accountability is about being answerable for one’s 
decision and behaviour. Thus, accountability may be linked to independence, which is 
critical to all agents in an organization, based on perceived fairness and justice. In order 
to appreciate the nature of independence commitment within the context of whistle-
blowing intentions, one must have an understanding of related constructs such as 
ethical commitment and professional commitment. Ethical commitment is defined as 
“the extent to which the individual adheres to ideal moral values and their regulatory 
enforcement within her/his professional community” (Gendron et al., 2006, p. 170). 
Gendron et al. (2006) suggest that ethical commitment within a professional 
community is akin to professional commitment. Professional commitment, in an 
accounting context, can be described as a professional accountant’s identification with 
the norms, codes and practices inherent in the profession. Jeffrey and Weatherholt 
(1996) argue that this concept speaks to the accountant’s willingness to accept and 
behave in accordance with the profession’s goals and values. 
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The concept of auditor independence is considered as a salient feature of the 
audit profession as well as an important part of accounting ethics governing the 
accounting profession. DeAngelo (1981a) describes auditor independence as the 
likelihood that an auditor will highlight any breaches and misstatements in the financial 
statements when discovered. Hence, an important feature of professional and ethical 
commitment in accounting and auditing is referred to as independence commitment. 
According to Gendron et al. (2006),  
independence commitment is defined as the extent to which the individual 
accountant considers auditor independence as a key attribute of the profession, 
and believes that regulatory standards of auditor independence (issued by the 
profession and/or external regulatory agencies) should be rigorously binding 
and enforced in the public accounting domain. (p. 170)  
 
Despite the wealth of research on the link between ethical commitment and ethical 
behaviour, there is relatively little empirical knowledge about the effects of 
independence commitment on ethical intentions and, more specifically, whistle-
blowing intentions among auditors.  
Gendron et al. (2006) introduced the independence commitment concept. They 
found that non-public accountants had higher levels of independence commitment 
compared with public accountants and that accountants in Big five firms had 
significantly lower independence commitment, compared with those employed in 
medium and small size firms. The study, however, did not examine the important 
outcomes of independence commitment. Gendron et al. (2006), however, pointed out 
the need for future research to examine the effects of independence commitment on 
“auditors’ decision-making processes in which auditor independence is supposed to 
play a key role” (p. 187). 
Hall, Smith and Langfield-Smith (2005) argue that accountants with a strong 
commitment to their profession are likely to experience high “moral obligation to 
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engage in behaviours that are beneficial to the profession, such as reporting the 
questionable acts of others (discretionary behaviours)” (p. 103). Hence, it is logical to 
assume that whistle-blowing intentions are likely to be influenced by the degree of 
independence commitment an auditor possesses.  The next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1d: Independence commitment will have a positive, direct effect on whistle-
blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
 
 
4.5.1.5 Personal responsibility for reporting and whistle-blowing intentions 
When whistle-blowing is perceived as prosocial behaviour in an organization, personal 
responsibility for reporting may influence an individual’s decision making. Curtis 
(2006) argues that responsibility for reporting can be “influenced by feelings of social 
responsibility to one’s colleagues and employer, attitudes toward one’s profession, the 
number of other observers and personal ethical values” (p. 193). Logically, individuals 
may feel obligated to report questionable acts by their moral sense of right and wrong 
(which is moral obligation or social responsibility), or sense of commitment and loyalty 
to the organization and job description (role responsibility). Curtis (2006) further 
argued that the diffusion of personal responsibility may occur when many individuals 
observe the wrongdoing and remain silent, thus reducing personal responsibility to 
prevent harm to the organization or society (the bystander effect). Drawing on the work 
of Graham (1986), Schultz et al. (1993) propose this variable in their model of 
reporting questionable acts. 
In the audit profession, auditors’ professional rights and responsibilities to 
report wrongdoing are set out in their professional codes of conduct. Given their 
strategic position to observe wrongdoing such as fraud, it is perceived that their role 
responsibility is to report such wrongdoing. Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) suggest 
that audit firms could implement mechanisms for improving the audit staff’s personal 
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responsibility to report unethical acts of their colleagues.  The issue is that the reporting 
of a violation or wrongdoing committed by their peers should be a perceived, morally-
derived, responsibility to whistle-blow, given that non-disclosure may result in the loss 
of reputation and income by the audit firm. Miceli et al. (1991) found that internal 
auditors were more likely to whistle-blow, when the act was viewed as being an 
important part of their role or job responsibility (i.e. role-prescribed). Kaplan and 
Whitecotton (2001) and Schultz et al. (1993) found strong positive support for personal 
responsibility and the likelihood of reporting questionable acts.  This variable becomes 
very important to the external auditing profession. The codes of professional conduct 
(e.g. AICPA and ICAEW) have stipulated that their membership have responsibilities 
to the public, clients and colleagues, which are beyond the legal and regulatory 
responsibilities. Hence, the next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1e:  Personal responsibility for reporting will have a positive, direct effect 
on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
 
4.5.1.6 Personal cost of reporting and whistle-blowing intentions 
Another important antecedent is the auditor’s assessment of the personal cost of 
reporting. Drawing on Graham’s (1986) work, Schultz et al. (1993) proposed this 
variable by arguing that it is the individual’s perception of the risk of retaliation from 
the members in the organization that could effect one’s willingness to report 
wrongdoing. Ponemon (1994) suggests that “the nature of and extent of the retaliations 
or sanctions imposed by management or co-workers against the whistle-blower is 
perhaps the most significant determinant to the prospective whistle-blower’s decision in 
the communication of organizational wrongdoing” (p. 123). 
Prior research finds support for a negative relationship between the perceived 
personal cost of reporting and reporting intentions (Arnold and Ponemon, 1991; Schultz 
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et al., 1993; Hooks et al., 1994; Kaplan, 1995; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). Curtis 
(2006) argues that retaliation may come in the form of refusal of pay increases, unfair 
performance reviews, lack of peer support (e.g. ostracism), transfers to undesirable 
posts or jobs and possible firing. Curtis (2006) further argues that high personal cost 
may be reduced by “belief in the existence of support and protection for dissidents such 
as the belief that professionalism demands reporting behaviour” (p. 194). 
Hence, the next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1f:  Personal cost of reporting will have a negative, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
 
 
4.5.2 Moderating variables 
Four moderating variables are included in the model: perceived organizational support, 
team norms, cohesion and perceived moral intensity (Figure 9). The inclusion of these 
variables is based on the understanding of how isomorphisms affect organizations 
including the audit firms.  These moderating variables are discussed below. 
 
4.5.2.1 Isomorphic factors 
4.5.2.1.1 Perceived organizational support  
Normative isomorphism is primarily aimed at enhancing the professionalism of staff 
towards a common goal by setting the most appropriate structure, and perceived 
organizational support is seen as one of these designs. Perceived organizational support 
encourages staff’s recognition and the level of support for organizational and other 
goals that may extend over and above normal duty (Wayne, Shore and Liden, 1997; 
Adebayo, 2005). Eisenberger, Fasolo and Davis-LaMastro (1990) describe perceived 
organizational support as workers’ perceptions of “the extent to which the organization 
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values their contributions and cares about their well-being” (p. 51). Adebayo (2005, p. 
688) argued that the concept of perceived organizational support is consistent with the 
norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) and social exchange theory (Blau, 1964). Based 
on social exchange theory, the higher the perceived level of support from the 
organization, the more likely employees will feel obligated to be committed to the 
organization (Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchinson and Sowa, 1986). Thus, employees 
will feel comfortable making decisions such as reporting unethical acts, when it is 
perceived that the organization will support him or her.  
If an individual perceives that the organization is supportive of him or her, the 
individual would give in return by adopting positive attitudes to the professional and 
ethical environment of the organization, and demonstrate prosocial behaviour within 
the organization. Perceived organizational support has been claimed to be valued by 
staff since it may address their socio-emotional needs and serves as an indicator that the 
organization is willing to support the individual and reward effort (Eisenberger et al., 
1986). The literature offers three main work-related antecedents of perceived 
organizational support: organizational rewards, working conditions and procedural 
justice (Rhodes and Eisenberger 2002; Kottke and Sharafinski, 1988). Shore and 
Tetrick (1991) argue that an employee’s perception of an organization’s level of 
support may lead to the employee’s degree of commitment to the organization.  
An individual will not report unethical acts unless he or she perceives that the 
organization will be supportive. The auditor must assess the degree of expected support 
when deciding whether to report any wrongdoing, thereby reducing the personal cost of 
reporting. Thus, the culture of care and support in the firm (normative isomorphism) 
should be highly ethical with the right set of core values to promote integrity. This is 
critical in an audit firm where lower level staff members need to be able to trust senior 
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staff, especially where the wrongdoing may be perpetrated by a powerful individual 
such as a partner. Eisenberger et al. (1986) argued that perceived organizational support 
can meet staff’s socio-emotional needs, and as a result, can increase commitment and 
loyalty to the organization. These authors further argued that perceived organizational 
support highlights the organization’s willingness to recognise and reward staff’s efforts 
for assisting the organization to be successful. In sum, they concluded that perceived 
organizational support could positively influence staff’s behaviours that may benefit the 
organization. Adebayo (2005) found that the relationship between attitudes and 
prosocial behaviour among the police was moderated by perceived organizational 
support.  
 Prior research (e.g. Hooks et al., 1994; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001) suggests 
that a relationship exists between the level of organizational support and acceptability 
of whistle-blowing. This is important since auditors may perceive high personal costs 
of reporting which may be mitigated by their perceptions of whether the firm will 
support them. Thus, it can be argued that perceived organizational support is a 
deterministic component for the isomorphic element of institutional theory, whereby 
effective corporate governance mechanisms positively influences prosocial behaviour. 
This variable is important to explaining whistle-blowing intentions among external 
auditors, given that many firms have implemented internal mechanisms such as ethics 
hotlines, ethics committee, and ethics training to facilitate a sound ethics and whistle-
blowing culture. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Perceived organizational support will moderate the relationships 
between individual-level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral 
approbation, perceived behavioural control, independence 
commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost of 
reporting), and whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.  
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4.5.2.1.2 Team-based variables 
Previous studies (e.g., Nichols and Day 1982; Abdolmohammadi et al., 1997; 
Abdolmohammadi and Reeves, 2003) suggest that group decisions are superior to 
individual decisions. Nichols and Day (1982) found that team decisions reflected higher 
moral reasoning scores than the average ethical reasoning level of their individual 
members’ decisions. Abdolmohammadi et al. (1997) found that the most capable and 
dominant members of the group significantly influenced the decisions of interacting 
groups. Abdolmohammadi and Reeves (2003) concluded that there was superior ethical 
decision-making by groups when compared with individual decision-making. However, 
not all groups are effective, since they are made up of different individuals who interact 
and undergo groupthink in order to make decisions (Janis 1972).  
Dowling (2009) defined an “audit team as the social clan of auditors an auditor 
works with across several audit engagements” (p. 778). Thus, it is necessary to 
incorporate factors of group or team dynamics into whistle-blowing models. Under this 
factor, two components are deemed necessary for the whistle-blowing model: group 
cohesion and team norms. Why did no one within the audit firm of Arthur Andersen 
blow the whistle on the audit partner’s collusion with Enron’s management and 
subsequent decision to obstruct justice by shredding documents? Might team norms and 
group cohesion have created a tightly knit group that made it more difficult for 
individuals to ‘break out’ and report unethical behaviour? 
 
4.5.2.1.2.1 Group cohesion 
Cohesion may be defined as the extent that individuals value their membership in a 
group and wish to stay in the group (Narayanan, Ronson and Pillutla, 2006). The 
cohesiveness of a group or team will have a positive effect on the group’s members 
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who want to stay part of the group, assist in conforming to the norms and values of the 
group regarding appropriate attitudes, and normally putting the group’s interest first 
(Sanders, 2004). Based on empirical research in the management literature, team 
members will show more cooperative behaviour and be more sensitive to others in 
cohesive groups (Kidwell, Mossholder and Bennett, 1997).  There is also an association 
between norms and cohesiveness and performance. The group norms should be 
stronger in high cohesive groups. Stogdill (1972) posited that where low performance 
norms are present, greater cohesiveness can negatively impact performance.  
Narayanan et al. (2006) suggested that cohesion facilitates and influences 
individuals’ beliefs and propensity to perform acts (unethical or not) that benefits the 
group by clouding ethical judgments. This is because others may accept their actions or 
responsibility for their action in the group, without consideration for the ethicality of 
the act. Schminke and Wells (1999) argued that group cohesiveness can influence 
ethical decision-making by significant interaction and discussion of the ethical issues in 
an effort to achieve ethical framework conformity. Using Price and Mueller (1986)’s 
Work Group Cohesion Index, Schminke and Wells (1999) found that individuals 
experienced greater levels of utilitarianism (acting for the greatest good or least harm) 
in more cohesive groups in ethical decision-making. While high cohesiveness may be a 
requirement for promoting increased performance in the management literature 
(Kidwell et al., 1997), it may be an enabler of unethical behaviour (Narayanan et al., 
2006). It may be argued that in high cohesive audit teams, members may not want to go 
against the group, and as such may not report unethical acts that benefits or harms the 
team. It is possible that in less cohesive groups, members are more likely to step out 
and report. 
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The influence of individual factors on ethical intentions has been argued to be 
dependent on or moderated by factors that are outside of the individual’s control (Jones, 
1991). Group cohesion is one such factor. Group cohesion has not been researched 
sufficiently in the context of ethical decision-making and whistle-blowing among audit 
staff, but its inclusion is warranted, given the impact of teams as an important variable 
in ethical decision-making research. For this reason, this variable is incorporated into 
the model, and the next hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis 3:  Group cohesion will moderate the relationships between individual-
level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.  
 
 
4.5.2.1.2.2 Team norms  
The extent to which an individual engages in a particular behaviour is largely due to the 
norms attached to a group of which he or she is a member. The concept of norms in the 
context of ethical decision-making has received a great deal of attention in the 
literature, where perceived social pressure has been proposed to influence ethical 
intentions (Ajzen, 1991). 
However, this study’s particular interest is on team norms as a moderating 
variable. Team norms can be defined as “legitimate, socially shared standards against 
which the appropriateness of behaviour can be evaluated” (Chatman and Flynn, 2001, 
p. 956). Norms regulate team behaviour by providing ‘implicit guidelines’ for 
members. According to De Jong et al. (2005), team norms are strong “when there is 
strong consensus among individual members about the dominant appropriate 
behaviour” (p. 1598).  Norms set out what may be done in situations (i.e. expected 
behaviour) based on the interactions of group members. Bettenhausen and Murnighan 
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(1991) argued that norms may be considered as those standard and normal behaviours 
that are expected and required by other members of the group. 
Narayanan et al. (2006) posit that cohesion has a positive impact on the 
individual’s conformity to group norms. If the norms of the group support ethical 
behaviour, individuals would be more likely to be ethical in cohesive groups. Thus, 
they argue that group norms would moderate the effect of cohesion on unethical 
behaviour.15  Hence, norms in an audit team can have a positive effect on an individual 
member’s behaviour regarding appropriate organizational practice. Hooks et al. (1994) 
argued that social influences, like team norms, may colour one’s perception of the 
seriousness of the wrongdoing. By transferring this logic into the realm of ethical 
intentions and whistle-blowing, the extent to which the team expresses similar and 
strong team norms regarding ethical practices in an organization may affect how an 
individual member is likely to engage in ethical behaviour.  Hence, the next hypothesis 
is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Team norms will moderate the relationships between individual-level 
antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.  
 
 
4.5.2.2 Issue-specific factor 
4.5.2.2.1 Perceived moral intensity 
Jones (1991) criticised previous ethical decision-making models for their failure to 
account for the effects of issue-specific variables and introduced the important 
construct of moral intensity in the study of ethical decision-making. People act 
differently, based on the nature of the issue itself.  Hence, ethical decision-making is 
                                                 
15 To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, Narayanan et al.’s (2006) model has not been empirically 
tested.   
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issue-contingent. Within the context of the proposed model, intentions to blow the 
whistle are contingent and dependent on the context or the nature of the issue. The 
concept of moral intensity consists of six components. Table 4 provides definitions of 
these six components, as they represent the main characteristics of an ethical issue and 
how they may affect whistle-blowing intentions. 
 
Table 4: Jones’ (1991) perceived moral intensity constructs 
 
MI construct Definitions 
Magnitude of 
consequences 
– The total harm or benefit likely to result from undertaking 
a moral decision. 
Social consensus – The degree of social agreement that other persons are 
likely to perceive an act or decision as being good 
(ethical) or (bad) unethical. 
Probability of effect – The likelihood that the moral decision or act will actually 
occur and result in harmful or beneficial consequences.  
Temporal immediacy – The amount of time between the occurrence of the ethical 
act and the onset of its consequences (i.e. negative or 
positive).  
Proximity – The closeness of the relationship between the moral agent 
and the victims or beneficiaries of the decision.  
Concentration of 
effect 
– The inverse relationship between a moral act of a given 
magnitude and the number of persons that are likely to be 
affected by the act.  
Source: Jones (1991, pp. 374-377). 
 
 
Paolillo and Vitell (2002) found that moral intensity significantly influenced 
ethical intentions.  Singhapakdi et al. (1996) found ethical intentions were significantly 
influenced by five moral intensity dimensions, with the sixth dimension (proximity) 
having a significant effect only in one scenario. Shafer et al. (2001) investigated the 
impact of moral intensity on auditors’ ethical judgments on the issue of pressure from 
the client to alter the financial statements, which could influence aggressive financial 
reporting. Based on a survey of 323 CPAs in the USA, Shafer et al. (2001) used an 
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experiment manipulating moral intensity (low vs. high) by varying the monetary value 
of the potential misstatement. They only used two components of the moral intensity 
construct, magnitude of consequences and probability of effect (harm). Shafer et al. 
(2001) found that magnitude of consequences and probability of effect influenced the 
auditor’s support of aggressive financial reporting, which implied that economic or 
utilitarian factors influence an auditor’s ethical decision-making. Magnitude of 
consequences is similar in many respects to materiality (i.e. monetary terms or the 
degree of seriousness), a term that is used extensively by external auditors in 
judgements, testing and reporting (Shafer et al., 2001; Brennan and Kelly, 2007).   
Moral intensity has been used in previous research as a moderator in the context 
of ethical intentions. For example, Flannery and May (2000) investigated the 
moderating effect of perceived moral intensity on the relationship between the factors 
derived from the theory of planned behaviour (attitudes, perceived behavioural control 
and subjective norms) and intentions to act ethically. Flannery and May (2000) 
contested that moral intensity is a function of the ethical issue and it included “neither 
characteristics of a decision maker nor influences exerted by an organization” (p. 648). 
Moral intensity was hypothesised to moderate such relationships. They used only one 
component of moral intensity – magnitude of consequences – in their study.  Flannery 
and May (2000) found that this variable played a significant moderating role in the 
relationships between the independent variables and ethical intentions.   
To date, to the best of this researcher’s knowledge, no study has examined 
moral intensity as a moderating role within the context of whistle-blowing intentions 
among auditors. Indeed, it is logical to argue that the effect of the determinants 
described above on whistle-blowing intentions may be dependent on the nature of the 
issue itself.  Individuals may be more likely to blow the whistle in circumstances where 
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moral intensity is perceived to be high, given the severity or seriousness of the act in 
question. To control for this possible effect, moral intensity was incorporated in the 
model and leads to the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5:  Perceived moral intensity will moderate the relationships between 
individual-level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, 
perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.  
 
 
4.5.3 Individual, firm and societal effects 
The decision to blow the whistle is based on the equality principle, the inherent wrong 
and right of the behaviour and the influence of codes and regulations that are coercively 
exerted, hierarchical, routinised and rigid on the intentions.  According to the model in 
Figure 9, when an audit practitioner blows the whistle, there are positive and negative 
consequences to society, the individual whistle-blower and his/her audit firm.  Positive 
societal effects could include the reduction of the cost to society, resulting from loss of 
shareholders’ confidence and undermining of the capital markets, reduction of loss of 
jobs as a result of a closure similar to Enron, and also ensuring potential tax revenues to 
the government. In addition, the image of the profession will be highly regarded by 
society when the auditor acts in the public interest (Kant’s and Rawls’ theories).  The 
case of Enron shows how society responded negatively to the audit profession, when 
none of Arthur Andersen’s staff blew the whistle on the unethical acts and other 
wrongdoing committed by other audit staff members and the client. As a result, the 
audit firm was perceived as being dishonest and unethical. 
For the individual practitioner, whistle-blowing may still have negative effects.  
The whistle-blower’s reputation can be tarnished for being a snitch and being disloyal.  
The retaliation from the organization and other employees can be unbearable.  The 
cases of David Kelly and Jeffrey Wigand aptly illustrate the ostracism. David Kelly, a 
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biological weapons inspector for the British Government, disclosed information that 
Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. The British Government publicly 
dismissed Kelly’s claims and soon after he committed suicide.   
Another example is the case of Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, a researcher at Brown and 
Williamson Tobacco Corporation, who in the 1990s disclosed that the US tobacco 
authorities were not honest about the lethalness and addictiveness of tobacco, as they 
manipulated nicotine levels to keep smokers hooked to cigarettes. Wigand suffered 
significant emotional stress including a lawsuit for breach of confidentiality, loss of 
income and personal threats as a result of the incident. However, there can be positive 
effects whereby the whistle-blower can be perceived in a favourable light if the 
organizational culture and societal norms encourage whistle-blowing. Wigand’s 
disclosure to the media vindicated him as many victims of cigarette related illnesses 
successfully sued the tobacco companies. 
Brennan and Kelly’s (2007) study of trainee auditors’ confidence in whistle-
blowing mechanisms in their audit firms and the likelihood of whistle-blowing 
affecting their careers highlighted the possible consequences that are considered by the 
potential whistle-blower. They found that where audit firms had adequate mechanisms 
for reporting wrongdoing, the sample of auditors were more likely to whistle-blow and 
perceived that the act of whistle-blowing would not negatively affect their career 
prospects. In addition, Brennan and Kelly (2007) suggests that future research could 
investigate “auditors’ belief that reporting wrongdoing would result in positive 
outcomes (such as exposing the wrongdoing) and would lead to positive outcomes for 
the auditor” (p. 83). Thus, given the above arguments, the model shows the impact of 
whistle-blowing on society, the audit firm and the individual (Figure 9). 
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4.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, this researcher proposes a conceptual model for whistle-blowing 
intentions among external audit practitioners. It is proposed that team, organizational 
and issue-specific factors will moderate the relationship between key individual-level 
antecedents and auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions. The proposed model is positively 
influenced by the propensity to blow the whistle, and the moral, organizational and 
social commitment for protecting public interest (Kant’s and Rawls’ theorems, 
effective organizational support, group cohesion and team norms), and negatively 
influenced by the prevailing organization milieu and high personal cost of reporting. 
Audit practitioners need to be independent from parties as well as situations that 
may impair their objectivity, because without independence, their social role of 
ensuring corporate management are held accountable will be insignificant or of no 
value to users of their reports. This includes audit practitioners being prepared to take 
an ethical stance which may be incongruent with that of the audit firm.  In other words, 
the ‘safeguarding’ role expected by the profession would be compromised, if 
practitioners fail to act through mechanisms such as whistle-blowing in situations 
perceived as illegal, immoral or illegitimate activities.  
 This chapter also presents the hypotheses for the conceptual model. The model 
represents an attempt to formulate an integrated explanation for whistle-blowing 
(reporting) intentions among auditors. Theoretical and empirically-based arguments 
were provided to justify the conceptual framework of the model. The review has 
captured much of the current knowledge landscape regarding whistle-blowing. It 
contributes to the literature by including factors relevant to the audit profession. It is 
acknowledged that the model is not comprehensive, but attempts to synthesise factors 
that are considered to be important to the audit profession. Given the inherent difficulty 
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of measuring ethical action or behaviour, the study of whistle-blowing intentions is 
central to understanding ethical decision making process.  Intentions have been argued 
to be a very good predictor of behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). The 
above discussion utilizes justice, moral, institutional and behavioural psychology 
theories to inform the construction of the model.   
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter explains the research methods used and presents the strategies utilized to 
maintain the reliability and validity of the findings of the research. Chapter 4 dealt with 
hypotheses formulation for the conceptual model. Chapter 5 deals with the data 
collection procedures. Firstly, the chapter presents a critical analysis of qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies and the associated methods in research, followed by an 
examination of the research design and its related methods, and the justification and 
limitation of the design. Secondly, the chapter examines positivism, as a suitable 
methodological stance, and its relevance to the current research. In addition, there is an 
examination of the link between central themes in the current research such as 
positivism, morality and psychology. Thirdly, relevant information concerning the 
selection of the participants, a description of the data collection instrument and 
operationalisation of constructs used, the research design, the procedures of data 
collection, data analysis strategies and ethical guidelines will be presented. Fourthly, 
the interview phase of the research is explained. The final section concludes the 
chapter. 
 
5.1 Critique of research methodologies 
Methodology may be described as “the science of finding out” (Babbie, 2004, p. 6) and 
can comprise qualitative and quantitative approaches which are popular research 
methodologies. Quantitative research relies on hypothesis-testing (theory testing) using 
various statistical tools (Babbie, 2004). This type of research is essentially based on 
numerical measurements and its main goal is generating predictive conclusions 
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concerning a particular theory and its implications.  Quantitative research is primarily 
concerned with deductive logic and seeks to predict and explain some phenomenon. On 
the other hand, qualitative research is based on non-numerical information (Babbie, 
2004; Neuman, 2003).  This type of research assumes that multiple realities exist in a 
particular situation, and that research (or truth) is context-bound. Qualitative research 
essentially follows inductive logic, and has the main goal of understanding or 
uncovering the underlying patterns outlined by an established theory.  The research 
framework for this thesis is shown in Figure 11.  
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Figure 11: Research framework 
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5.2 Methodological orientation and research design 
5.2.1 The philosophy and principles of positivism and objectivity 
Positivism is based on an objectivist epistemology. For example, positivists agree that 
science is free from values, beliefs and opinions; in other words, true science is 
objective. Objectivity in research is important for positivistic researchers because 
reality is independent of personal values and beliefs. Consequently, positivist 
researchers are expected to remain detached from their research – they are observers, 
and not participants in the research process. In essence, the positivists assert their 
objectivity based on the view that their findings should not be influenced by their 
personal beliefs and experiences. 
Positivism involves a number of assumptions and tenets that inform its 
approach in all dimensions of social research. One major assumption of positivism is 
that the main goal of research is scientific explanation (Babbie, 2004; Neuman, 2003). 
Scientific explanation refers to the discovery and documentation of universal rules of 
social behaviour. The discovery of these universal laws is important because, according 
to the positivists, these laws would allow social researchers to predict and hopefully 
change certain phenomena (or behaviour). The existence of universal laws rests on the 
view that reality is external to the researcher, that is, it [reality] exists independent of 
the researcher’s values, beliefs and subjective perceptions. Social reality is not chaotic 
or random but is ordered and logical (without these characteristics, prediction and 
explanation would be impossible). According to positivism, science permits the 
discovery of natural and social laws. Positivism concerns the discovery of truth and 
knowledge. The doctrine arose as an apparent reaction to the skepticism of 
philosophers who questioned the ability of humans to truly “know” their own world 
and ultimately the nature of their existence. The positivists argued that they could 
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establish “knowledge” by the systematic observation and quantitative measurement of 
variables.  
Logical positivists argued that knowledge could be obtained through “a rigorous 
methodology of scientific verification” (Indick, 2002, p.23), and they emphasised the 
importance of scientific rigour, while rejecting non-scientific approaches. Popper 
(1958, 1963) supplemented this philosophy of scientific rigour with his theory of 
falsifiability. This Popperian assumption posits that theory that is not falsifiable is 
unscientific and “no hypothesis could be accepted as true unless every other possible 
attempt to falsify this hypothesis failed” (Indick, 2002, p. 23).  Positivism, according to 
Indick (2002), has been trivialized to purely represent the power of the r or p value. For 
example, statistical significance (p < .05) equates to a major discovery of truth and a 
high correlation (r) indicates that some relationship exists systematically in the real 
world.  In short, positivist studies are primarily quantitative in nature. Empirical science 
embodies the positivist method - hypotheses are developed and empirically tested. 
Findings are validated when experiments are replicated and yield consistent results. 
 
5.2.2 Positivism and psychology 
At this point, the chapter attempts to establish a link between positivism, psychology 
and morality, which are central issues drawn from the proposed research. This section 
also examines the “measurability” of morality (i.e., whistle-blowing) as an object of 
research. 
Indick (2002) argued that if positivism is based on measurable observations, 
then morality must be a measurable concept. However, moral values, which focus on 
right and wrong, are not measurable because they are not defined in objective terms. 
Frankena (1973) has argued that right and wrong cannot be measured empirically, 
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whereas the concepts of good and bad may be measured in empirical terms. If right and 
wrong is akin to good and bad, respectively, the positivist can objectively measure 
moral behaviour. This argument would seem to support the utilitarian concept, whereby 
the “rightness” of the act is measured in terms of the amount of goodness it produces. 
Utilitarianism argues that an act can be ethically correct, if the act is for the ‘greater 
good’ of others (Mill, 1975).  
However, there are some limitations to the utilitarian doctrine. Firstly, it 
examines the consequences of an act in order to determine its morality. Secondly, 
although the positivist may equate an ethical act with a good outcome, the researcher 
still needs to determine what is meant by the concept of “good” (Indick, 2002). Indick 
(2002) argued that because there is no consensus on the conceptual definition of 
“good”, the positivist cannot assert that there is a relationship between a good outcome 
and right moral behaviour. Given the above stance, the current study employs a 
quantitative-positivistic approach as its methodological orientation.  
 
5.2.3 Critique of quantitative research methodology 
Quantitative research rests on the assumptions of positivist science. A major strength is 
its ability to develop and test theories regarding ethical behaviour in organizations. The 
majority of the research on ethical behaviour in organizations is concerned with theory 
development and has relied on the quantitative methodology. For example, Flannery 
and May (2000) tested Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behaviour and Jones’ (1991) 
moral intensity construct within the context of ethical decision-making in 
organizations. Their study was based on a hypothesis-testing orientation and adopted a 
quantitative methodology. This quantitative methodology was based on statistical 
testing of the effects of several variables on ethical intentions.  
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Qualitative research does not permit this kind of theory-testing or explanation. 
Another strength of quantitative research is its focus on generalisability. The reliance 
on large and representative samples makes inferences to the larger population much 
more feasible. Studies on ethical behaviour and whistle-blowing have obtained data 
from samples of at least 100 or more participants (Label and Miethe, 1999; Curtis, 
2006; Brennan and Kelly, 2007). The findings of these studies have stronger 
generalisability than those derived from qualitative studies. For example, Neuman 
(2003) argued that qualitative research is not concerned with large sample sizes as well 
as generalisability or external validity.   
It is important to note here that quantitative research can be expressed in two 
major designs such as the survey and experimental research designs. These designs 
have been mainly used in current auditing literature regarding whistle-blowing and 
ethical intentions. The former relies on the use of structured (or semi-structured) 
questionnaires which can be administered to a large sample of respondents. This design 
can also be conducted using longitudinal and cross-sectional designs. The latter focuses 
on surveying a cross-section of participants at one point of time, whereas the former is 
based on surveying a sample of participants on more than one occasion. Although 
cross-sectional designs have been the more popular approach in the whistle-blowing 
literature (e.g. Chiu, 2002; Chiu, 2003), the longitudinal approach has been argued to 
have important advantages over that offered by cross-sectional studies (Chiu, 2003).  
For example, longitudinal designs provide a stronger means to explore causal 
relationships between variables.    
 Overall, the survey research design has its strengths and weaknesses, especially 
in terms of whistle-blowing.  The benefits and shortcomings in survey research lie in its 
varying forms in the research process. For example, different types of surveys can 
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collect data from respondents at a much faster rate and are less expensive than other 
techniques and methods. Particular forms of surveys, such as face-to-face, telephone 
and online surveys are “quick” data-collection techniques used to obtain data on the 
spot. Moreover, as Zikmund (2000) argued, these forms of surveys provide enough 
social interaction between interviewer and respondent which “increases the likelihood 
that a response will be given to all items on the questionnaire” (p.192). Hence, these 
forms of surveys are not only faster data collection tools but also ensure that the 
researcher obtains a fully-completed survey (i.e. the response rate is higher).   
However, it is important to recognise that investigating sensitive research topics 
and areas (similar to the one used here – whistle-blowing intentions) may not be an 
easy exercise, using face-to-face or telephone-based surveys (Schultz et al., 1993). 
Zikmund (2000) argued that, in a face-to-face survey interview, a respondent is not 
anonymous, and as a result, may be unlikely to provide sensitive information in the 
presence of the interviewer.  Alternatively, respondents may be more likely to ‘colour’ 
their responses in their favour, resulting in social desirability bias. This problem will 
also present itself in telephone-based interviews.   
Neuman (2003) argued that face-to-face surveys are more expensive than other 
types of survey methods. With respect to telephone interviews, Zikmund (2000) argued 
that the length of interview time is limited. Hence, the use of long and detailed 
questionnaires would be inappropriate for telephone surveys. The internet can be used 
to conduct meaningful surveys. Online surveys are likely to be substantially cheaper, 
once the required software has been developed (Babbie, 2004). Babbie (2004) argued 
that “a weakness, however, lies in the difficulty of assuring that respondents to an 
online survey will be representative of some more general population” (p. 274). 
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Mailed surveys are another technique under the survey methodology.  This form 
of survey involves sending respondents via the mail. These types of surveys also have 
their advantages and disadvantages. One advantage of the mail survey is its ability to 
reach respondents in distant geographical regions or other countries. Zikmund (2000) 
referred to this advantage as geographical flexibility. Flannery and May (2000) 
investigated ethical intentions among business managers operating in various areas 
across the United States of America.  These authors relied on the mailed survey method 
as a means of collecting information from respondents who were otherwise 
inaccessible. Another important advantage of the mail survey approach is the low cost 
attached. Mail surveys do not rely on heavy labour costs, compared with face-to-face 
surveys.     
Another related advantage is that it does not require the presence of a survey 
interviewer during the administration phase and respondents may reveal sensitive and 
confidential information much more easily and readily. The respondent can also 
complete the questionnaire at his or her convenience without the intrusion of an 
interviewer.  These last two advantages are common to a more global form of survey 
types (of which mail survey is a part) referred to as “the self-administered survey.”  
Self-administered surveys are those surveys that respondents complete themselves 
without the presence of interviewer. Social desirability bias is reduced because 
respondents do not feel threatened by the presence of an interviewer and are less likely 
to ‘fake’ when completing the survey instrument (Zikmund, 2000; Neuman, 2003).  It 
is important to note here that all self-administered surveys do not have to be mailed. 
The researcher can leave the questionnaire with the respondents to complete and return 
at their convenience.  
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A major disadvantage of mailed surveys is that it is has extremely low response 
rates, compared with other survey methods. Flannery and May (2000) obtained only a 
20 percent response rate based on the use of mailed survey and in spite of a mailed 
follow-up reminder card which was sent to the respondents. In fact, self-administered 
surveys generally have lower response rates, compared with interviewer-administered 
surveys. Furthermore, since a self-administered survey does not rely on interviewers 
being present to clarify issues surrounding the questionnaire, the response error rate 
increases.    
Further concerns associated with the survey research include self-report bias, 
common method variance, and the inability to infer causality (due to the correlational 
nature). Chiu (2003), in a study on whistle-blowing, relied on a self-report survey 
methodology and experienced limitations regarding the potential influence of common 
method variance and self-report bias. Research on whistle-blowing has also relied on 
the experimental method. For example, Schultz et al. (1993) and Kaplan and 
Whitecotton (2001) used experimental methods to investigate intentions to whistle-
blow in organizations. The experimental research design is used to establish causality 
between or among variables in a controlled setting. This quantitative design is stronger 
(more rigorous) than the survey design for a number of reasons. In experiments, 
researchers can control for extraneous variables while manipulating the independent 
variable in order to note its effects on the dependent variable.   
Surveys cannot control for extraneous variables in the research process, and 
variables cannot be manipulated in survey research.  Hence, the survey research design 
is not suitable for establishing causal links between variables. Other techniques in 
experimental design that reinforce its value in quantitative research are randomisation, 
matching and counterbalancing. Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) argued that the 
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experimental method provides a means of testing models that are not otherwise 
possible. Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) further argued against the survey research 
design by stating that “surveys of individuals who have reported questionable 
behaviour are subject to retrospective interpretation and self-selection bias” (p. 60). 
 However, the experimental research methodology has several limitations.  
These limitations together may have serious effects on an experiment’s ability to 
establish causality. They include experimenter bias, testing, instrumentation and 
selection effects. Furthermore, experiments are conducted in artificial settings, and 
may not reveal much about actual life experiences outside the experimental setting 
(Babbie, 2004). Much of the research on whistle-blowing and ethical intentions is 
based on survey designs rather than on experimental research designs (e.g. Chiu, 
2003). Whistle-blowing is a phenomenon that exists within a natural setting and 
empirical attempts to explain this behaviour should be based in a ‘real life’ setting. 
Thus, the survey design is deemed to be the more appropriate of the two research 
designs for this current study.   
 
5.3 Description of Barbados  
The sample was drawn from Barbados, a former British colony, located in the 
Caribbean. It has a population of approximately a quarter of a million, a size of 166 
square miles and a high literacy level. Barbados is a democratic country, with a small 
open economy that includes thriving industries of manufacturing, tourism, offshore 
financial services and agriculture (Alleyne et al., 2006). Many of these businesses 
depend on audit practitioners to provide expert opinions (Alleyne, 2002, p. 63). The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Barbados (ICAB), established in 1974, regulates 
the accounting profession (Alleyne et al., 2006).  ICAB is a member of the 
 159
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), and its membership is affiliated with 
other recognized accountancy bodies (e.g. AICPA (CPA), ACCA, ACA, CGA and 
CMA) in the USA, UK and Canada.16  As of March 31, 2009, 186 persons held 
practising certificates to audit, out of ICAB’s total membership of over 600 qualified 
accountants. In Barbados, audit firms include the major international accounting firms 
of Ernst and Young, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte and Touche. In 
addition, there are several smaller firms of varying sizes (e.g. Pannell Kerr Forster and 
Porter Hetu International), as well as many sole practitioners (Alleyne et al., 2006).  
 The Barbados Companies Act regulates Barbadian companies (Government of 
Barbados, 2001). The Act stipulates that the directors of a company should manage the 
affairs of the company (see section 58 (1b)) and act honestly and in good faith in the 
best interests of the company (see section 95 (1)). Barbados has always been influenced 
by the practices of the developed countries (Alleyne, 2002). This influence has also 
been culturally transmitted through the structures of professional accounting 
associations. While there is no legislation similar to Sarbanes-Oxley Act in place, it has 
been widely accepted by the local accounting body (ICAB) and other local regulators 
(e.g. Barbados Stock Exchange) that adoption of legislation such as the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act is critical to Barbados, given the significant amount of trade with the USA, and 
more importantly, the thriving offshore business sector.  
 
5.4 The overall research design     
In light of the above, the research design adopted a triangulated approach to achieve the 
research objectives by utilizing quantitative (survey) and qualitative (interviews and 
focus groups) methods conducted in two phases. This approach is most effective as 
                                                 
16 CPA means Certified Public Accountant (AICPA). The Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA) and ACA (Chartered Accountant of ICAEW) are UK designations. Certified 
General Accountant (CGA) and CMA (Certified Management Accountant) are Canadian designations. 
 160
different methods can be utilised in a single study, hence the term, triangulation. These 
combined methods can serve to complement each other, improve reliability and provide 
a deeper understanding of the phenomenon under study (Brewerton and Millward, 
2001). The advantages of using combined quantitative and qualitative approaches are 
further corroborated by Patton (1990) and Neuman (2003). The research design is 
shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Research design  
 
Stages of the Research 
Phase 1 - Survey 
1.  Formulate questions 
2.  Seek approval from Ethics Committee 
3.  Pilot study 
4.  Finalise questionnaire 
5.  Distribute questionnaire 
6.  Enter data into SPSS 
7.  Analyse data 
8.  Present results 
9.  Draw conclusions 
 
Phase 2 – Semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
1.   Formulate questions 
2.   Ethics committee approval 
3.   Pilot study 
4.   Finalise Interview Guide 
5.   Schedule meetings 
6.   Conduct interviews 
7.   Transcribe data 
7.   Data placed in themes and codes 
8.   Analyse data 
9.   Present results  
10. Draw conclusions 
 
 
5.5 First phase - The survey questionnaire  
The purpose of this section is to present the hypotheses, the selection of a survey 
questionnaire used to collect data to test the hypotheses, the sample chosen, the data 
collection procedures and outline the design of the survey questionnaire.  
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5.5.1 Research hypotheses 
The research will test the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Attitudes toward whistle-blowing will have a positive, direct effect 
on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Desired moral approbation from others and from self will have a 
positive, direct effect on whistle-blowing intentions among external 
auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1c:  Perceived behavioural control will have a positive, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1d:  Independence commitment will have a positive, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1e:  Personal responsibility for reporting will have a positive, direct 
effect on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1f:  Personal cost of reporting will have a negative, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Perceived organizational support will moderate the relationships 
between individual-level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral 
approbation, perceived behavioural control, independence 
commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost 
of reporting) and whistle-blowing intentions among external 
auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Group cohesion will moderate the relationships between individual-
level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Team norms will moderate the relationships between individual-
level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among auditors among external auditors.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Perceived moral intensity will moderate the relationships between 
individual-level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, 
perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.  
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5.5.2 Participants in the survey phase 
5.5.2.1 Selection of the sample 
The study sampled auditors within audit firms in Barbados, using a self-administered 
survey, which could be completed at the participants’ convenience. The study sought to 
focus on two levels of analysis: the individual and the team. It is important to examine 
team dynamics when researching group members’ behaviours and attitudes (Hackman, 
1992). Acceptable behaviour is regulated by each team’s shared values, standards and 
norms, which may vary from team to team (Mathieu and Kohler, 1990). Through social 
learning or groupthink, individuals tend to conform to the norms of the team or group 
(Bandura, 1986). Prior research has shown that group-level experiences can be assessed 
by aggregating perceptual measures at the individual level to examine relationships 
between individual-level and group-level variables (De Jong et al., 2005). Pentland 
(1993) argued that audit staff usually work in teams and “are situated in the context of 
intensive on-going interactions with other members of their engagement team, their 
firm, their client’s organization and their profession” (p. 605). 
To gain access to selected participants, a letter together with a copy of the 
questionnaire was sent to each accounting firm and ICAB to inform them about the 
nature of the research, the reasons for doing it and why it will be of value to the 
profession (see Appendices B and C for copies of the letters).  In addition, the firms 
were informed about what the possible outcomes might be and were promised 
feedback. Co-operation was requested and all fears concerning harm to subjects were 
allayed by assurances given by this researcher. Given that human subjects are being 
used, guidance and permission from the ethics research committee was sought and 
obtained.  
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5.5.2.2 Characteristics of the sample for the survey phase 
Demographic information from the sample was sought on gender, age, highest 
academic qualification, years of professional working experience, length of time in 
current team, team size, tenure in the company, and their organizational position. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their organizational position (junior, senior, 
manager, partner, other). Highest educational level was measured by asking 
respondents to select the appropriate level from primary, secondary, diploma, 
bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, PhD, or other, as well as their professional 
qualification (ACCA, ACA, CGA, CPA, CMA, and other). Age, number of years 
employed in the organization, experience in number of years, the number of months 
spent working in a current and the number of persons within the current team measured 
as continuous variables.  
The data for this sample were collected from external auditors from small, 
medium and large audit firms in Barbados. Tables 6 and 7 summarise the demographic 
data for the respondents. Table 6 shows that of the sample of 226 respondents, 54.9% 
were female, and the mean age was 30.80 (standard deviation (SD) = 9.69) years. Table 
6 also illustrates that 74.3% of the sample comprised audit seniors and junior audit 
staff. Table 7 shows that 78.3% held Bachelor’s degrees, while 74.3% of the sample 
had professional qualifications, with 50% of the sample completing the ACCA’s 
professional qualification. This may suggest that the auditing practitioners in Barbados 
are significantly influenced by UK standards. Finally, Table 8 illustrates that there were 
54 groups, with the majority of the groups comprising 3 to 5 members. 
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Table 6: Sample characteristics of survey respondents – Age, gender, working experience 
and organizational position 
 
Variables   
Panel A: Continuous variables Mean Standard deviation 
Age 30.80 years 9.69 years 
Years of working experience 7.84 years 4.93 years 
   
Panel B: Other variables Frequency Percentage (%) 
Gender   
Male 102 45.1 
Female 124 54.9 
Total 226 100.0 
   
Organizational position   
Partners 9 4.0 
Audit Managers 49 21.7 
Audit Seniors 61 27.0 
Junior Staff 107 47.3 
Total 226 100.0 
 
 
Table 7: Qualifications of survey respondents 
 
Variables Frequency Percentage (%) 
Academic qualifications (education) *   
Secondary 18 8.0 
Diploma 12 5.3 
Bachelor’s degree 177 78.3 
Master’s degree 7 3.1 
Other 12 5.3 
Total  226 100.0 
   
Professional qualifications   
ACCA 113 50.0 
ACA 3 1.3 
CGA 32 14.2 
CPA 11 4.9 
CMA 1 0.4 
Other 8 3.5 
Unqualified ** 58 25.7 
Total 226 100.0 
Notes: * Highest qualification attained; ** Currently pursuing professional exams 
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Table 8: Composition of groups in the survey 
 
Group Size (Members) No. of Groups Total 
3 14 42 
4 20 80 
5 17 85 
6 2 12 
7 1 7 
Total 54 226 
 
 
5.6 Procedures 
5.6.1 Piloting the study 
This study was piloted through several stages. The first stage involved interviewing 
four audit practitioners in accounting firms to explore the factors and audit judgment 
issues that are likely to influence whistle-blowing intentions. These factors were then 
extracted and compared to factors arising out of the literature. As a result, a preliminary 
questionnaire was developed. In the second stage, four students of auditing at an 
undergraduate university were asked to look at the questionnaire and give their 
comments on its appropriateness, the general reading and interpretation of questions, 
and relevance of scenarios. The feedback from this second stage effected significant 
changes to the questionnaire. In the third stage, the amended questionnaire was then 
given to the same four practising auditors, who suggested further refinement including 
minor amendments to scenarios as well as layout and presentation of the questionnaire. 
The fourth stage involved gaining feedback from three academics including the two 
supervisors of this study, who suggested minor changes that were incorporated in the 
questionnaire.  
This pretest assisted in enhancing the face validity of the instrument. Along 
with establishing face validity, the internal consistency reliability of the instrument was 
tested using Cronbach’s alphas. Alphas above .70 indicate acceptable internal 
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consistency (Nunnally, 1978). Pilot testing is an important exercise in improving 
validity and reliability of survey instruments (Brewerton and Millward, 2001). 
 
5.6.2 Distribution and collection of the questionnaires 
The research plan was subjected to review and approved by the University’s Ethics 
Committee to ensure that it met with the ethical standards for research procedures (see 
Appendix A for ethics approval letter). After permission to access participants in the 
audit firms was obtained, a package was given to participants, which consisted of the 
general instructions letter (Appendix B), a cover letter and attached survey 
questionnaire (Appendix C), an informed consent form (Appendix E) and a self-
addressed envelope for returning the questionnaires. The instruction and cover letters 
provided general guidelines for team leaders on how to develop a unique survey team 
code, where individuals in the team would use that code to put on the completed 
questionnaire. This guarantees anonymity and assists in matching individual and team 
responses in the data analysis stages.  
Given the sensitive nature of the research and the need to obtain full co-
operation from participants, the cover letter also outlined 1) the purpose for the study, 
2) the importance of the research for the respondent and the profession, 3) instructions 
for its administration, 4) the assurance that auditors’ anonymity will be maintained, 5) 
that participation will be completely voluntary, 6) that they have been randomly 
selected, and 7) that their responses would be kept completely confidential.  
In an attempt to promote the credibility of the researcher and the principle of 
voluntary participation, informed consent forms, detailing the nature and purpose of the 
research, were given to participants as a means for encouraging high levels of 
participation. As a result, deception was not used in this research because information 
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on the nature of instrument and the study was provided to each participant to ensure 
that they had a conscious awareness of what the study was seeking to accomplish. 
Since the instrument reflects the extent to which an auditor will engage in reporting 
illegal acts or questionable behaviour, auditors may be at risk of psychological harm or 
disbarment from the profession, if presented with disturbing or negative results. The 
onus is on the researcher to ensure that such an occurrence does not manifest because 
of the potential risk it poses for the participants.  
 The partners in the audit firms and ICAB were contacted to obtain permission to 
distribute the questionnaires. Given that access to auditors is normally restricted, 
convenient samples (non-probabilistic) are sometimes the best means to gain 
participation (Buchan, 2005, p. 170). As a result, the partners arranged a convenient 
time for the researcher to come in, when all relevant team members were present in the 
office (and not in the field). The respondents placed the completed questionnaires into 
sealed envelopes, which were personally collected by the researcher. This researcher 
distributed 500 questionnaires to the audit firms in the sample. These questionnaires 
were initially distributed to the population of audit firms, which included the four large 
accounting firms (with 295 audit staff) and 14 small and medium size firms (with 89 
audit staff), as well as 117 other sole practitioners drawn from a list provided by ICAB. 
Responses from individual auditors (sole practitioners) who had less than 3 staff 
members in their offices were later excluded from the sample based on the need 
to measure the impact of team factors.  The questionnaires were administered by the 
researcher when the majority of each team was present. As a result, the researcher had 
to visit most of the audit firms on several occasions. 
A total of 268 completed questionnaires were received. An examination of the 
completed questionnaires led to 42 questionnaires being dropped as unusable, thus 
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resulting in a final usable 226 responses for analysis. Of the 226 completed responses, 
179 out of 295 were received from the large firms, representing an actual response rate 
of 60.7%, and 47 out of 89 were received from the small firms, representing an actual 
response rate of 52.8%. Thus, the sample is approximately representative of the size 
and distribution of audit firms in Barbados. Statistical tests showed that there were no 
significant differences between responses of audit staff from the large and small firms. 
The possibility of non-response bias was checked by comparing early and late 
respondents, using Armstrong and Overton's (1977) approach, which assumes that late 
respondents share similar characteristics to non-respondents. Independent samples t-
tests highlighted that there were no statistically significant differences between early (n 
= 161) and late respondents (n = 65) on any of the independent and dependent 
variables. This result and the relatively high response rate achieved suggest that non-
response bias is not likely to influence the survey results. Thus, these results are 
generalisable to the population of interest. 
 
5.7 Questionnaire and scenario design  
The first part of the study is of a cross-sectional nature, and used a survey 
questionnaire. This selection was informed by the flexibility and popularity of survey 
methodology in the relevant literature (Flannery and May, 2000; Chiu, 2002). The 
proposed research has a hypothesis-testing orientation which involves examining the 
effects of several variables on auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions. Surveys provide a 
useful means of capturing a large number of variables from a large sample or group of 
participants (Babbie, 2004).  The study also required a large representative sample size, 
and surveys are usually applied in situations where random sampling is employed. 
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Given the heavy reliance on parametric statistical techniques to test the research 
hypotheses, large samples derived from cross-sectional surveys are important.  
The questionnaire presented to respondents was accompanied by a cover letter 
which sought their consent and assistance in completing the attached instrument. The 
letter clearly stipulated the purpose and procedure of the study. Respondents were 
assured that confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained as information 
provided will have no identifying details. Respondents were allowed to make informed 
decisions about their participation and about their right to withdraw at any time. 
Information with regards to data collection was also provided to further reassure 
respondents that every effort was being conducted to maintain anonymity and 
confidentiality. 
 The instrument was divided into six sections and each section was further 
broken down into subsections addressing various issues (see Appendix C). The first 
section of the questionnaire measured desired moral approbation from others and from 
oneself (12 items). Section two of the questionnaire measured independence 
commitment (4 items), perceived organizational support (9 items), team norms (5 
items) and group cohesion (5 items). Sections 3 and 6 presented three ethical scenarios 
which depicted distinct situations of ethical breaches where an auditor was reported to 
commit a particular unethical action within an organizational setting, i.e. the audit firm. 
Participants were asked to rate actions depicted in each of the three scenarios based on 
the following variables: 1) perceptions of moral intensity: probability of effect to 
financial statement users, probability of discovery, level of disciplinary action and 
seriousness, 2) personal cost of reporting, 3) personal responsibility for reporting, 4) 
attitudes toward whistle-blowing, 5) perceived behavioural control and 6) whistle-
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blowing (reporting) intentions.17  Section 4 measured social desirability bias and 
section 5 required demographic data on respondents.  
 
5.7.1 Auditing scenarios 
Alexander and Becker (1978) argued that the use of scenarios “helps to standardize the 
social stimulus across respondents and at the same time makes the decision-making 
situation more real” (p. 103).  According to Ferris, Dulebohn, Frink, George-Falvy, 
Mitchell and Matthews (1997), the scenario approach involves a description of a 
hypothetical situation, and the subject is required to respond by placing himself or 
herself as an actor in the situation. Given the difficulties of gaining access to subjects 
and observing actual ethical or unethical behaviours, ethics research has shown that 
scenarios are commonly used, especially in the areas of accounting and marketing 
research (Silver and Valentine, 2000; Sweeney and Roberts, 1997). The study utilized 
three scenarios, which were specifically related to auditing and accounting issues (see 
instrument). The scenarios (vignettes) used in this study were selected from previous 
accounting and auditing research with dilemmas most likely to be faced by the 
accounting profession. Scenarios one, two and three were adapted from Rau and Weber 
(2004), Shafer, Morris and Ketchand (1999) and Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) and 
Curtis (2006) respectively.  
Based on Kaplan and Whitecotton’s (2001) and Schultz et al.’s (1993) 
arguments, respondents must be aware or cognizant that some questionable or unethical 
act has occurred for the reporting intention to be triggered. Schultz et al. (1993) argued 
that “awareness obviously must precede any behavioural response” (p. 78). Thus, the 
scenarios have been adapted to give respondents this level of awareness. The scenarios 
                                                 
17 Subjective norms and ethical intentions were introduced in the questionnaire, but were not tested in the 
current study.  These variables will be considered in future research. 
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were varied, based on the nature of the issue as well as the person who is being reported 
on (i.e. partner or manager). In addition, these scenarios have been used in prior studies 
which support their construct validity. These scenarios captured the factors that are 
likely to influence the reporting of wrongdoing. Each scenario investigated variables 
which were categorized as perceived moral intensity, attitudes toward whistle-blowing, 
perceived behavioural control, personal cost of reporting and personal responsibility for 
reporting and whistle-blowing (reporting) intentions. 
Scenario 1, which was adapted from Rau and Weber (2004), highlighted a 
violation of the principle “Integrity” of the IFAC’s Code of Ethics. The case depicted 
the actions of a junior auditor, who discovered perceived illegal activities being 
undertaken by a manufacturing company, and subsequently approached the engagement 
partner (Tom) of the company with his concerns and presented documentation in 
support. It was later discovered that the papers had been shredded and no further action 
was taken.18 
 Scenario 2, which was adapted from Shafer et al. (1999) highlighted a direct 
violation of IFAC’s principles of objectivity and integrity. In this scene, Paul Smith, the 
audit senior, is aware of a disagreement between an important client of the firm 
(Simpson), and a partner of the firm (Ellis), concerning the sufficiency of the allowance 
for doubtful accounts. Due to the client’s perceived worth to the audit firm, it was 
discovered that Ellis accepted the recorded allowance of $100,000 rather than the best 
estimate of $300,000, and provided an unqualified (clean) audit opinion on the financial 
statements. 
                                                 
18 Scenario 1 was utilised in the quantitative data analysis phase of this thesis, based on preliminary 
testing and comparison with the other scenarios on the research instrument. Preliminary testing revealed 
that there was no significant variability in the responses to the three scenarios. The possibility exists that 
the act of whistle-blowing overshadows the wrongdoing. 
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 Scenario 3 entitled “Modern Appliances”, which was adapted from Kaplan and 
Whitecotton (2001) and Curtis (2006, pp.198-199) addressed the issue of impairment of 
independence. In this scenario, a senior assigned to an audit engagement with the 
company, Modern Appliances, was provided information by the assistant financial 
controller, that the audit manager (Michael Jenkins) was offered the position of 
financial controller of the said company. It was disclosed that Mr. Jenkins is still in the 
process of contemplating whether he will accept or decline the offer, and in the 
meantime, continued in his capacity as audit manager.19   
 
5.7.2 Measurement of dependent variables 
5.7.2.1 Dependent variables - Whistle-blowing (reporting) intentions 
Whistle-blowing intentions refer to the likelihood that a respondent will disclose 
unethical organizational practices of a member of his or her organization.  In the 
current study, whistle-blowing intentions was measured by asking respondents to 
indicate how likely they would be to report actions depicted in the three 
abovementioned scenarios to internal and external targets. The study adapted a scale 
used by Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) to measure internal and external whistle-blowing 
intentions. Each whistle-blowing target (internal or external) was measured using four 
statements, which required the respondent to state whether they would report the 
questionable acts. A sample statement for the internal targets was “I would report 
Tom’s act to the appropriate persons within the audit firm.” A sample statement for the 
external targets was “I would report Tom’s act to the appropriate authorities outside of 
the audit firm”.   These statements were rated using a 7-point Likert scale, which 
                                                 
19  Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Curtis, 2006), respondents in this study were aware that the ethics 
rulings (similar to Rule 101 of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct on Auditor Independence) 
requires that the auditor should not be involved in the audit engagement, until the job offer has been 
declined or is not being considered to avoid impairing objectivity and integrity (AICPA, 1988). 
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ranged from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much. Higher scores indicate higher intentions to 
report the wrongdoing within a particular scenario. The Cronbach’s alphas for internal 
and external whistle-blowing measures were .91 and .88, respectively. 
 
5.7.3 Measurement of independent variables 
5.7.3.1 Attitudes toward whistle-blowing 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) defined attitude as an assessment of the degree of 
favourableness of an object, i.e. a behaviour. Using Park and Blenkinsopp’s (2009, pp. 
549-550) scale, attitudes toward whistle-blowing were measured by asking the 
respondent “how true do you think that the following statements are with regard to you 
reporting Tom’s act of shredding the papers in audit firm” with respect to five 
statements that covered the salient consequences of an auditor’s reporting of 
wrongdoing or questionable acts in an audit firm. The five salient consequences of an 
auditor’s whistle-blowing were: a) preventing harm to the audit firm, b) controlling 
unethical behaviour, c) enhancing the interest of the public, d) performing an 
employee’s duty, and e) moral satisfaction (Park and Blenkinsopp, 2009, p. 550).  
Respondents were also required to evaluate the importance of each of the five 
consequences, by responding to the question, “If you reported Tom’s action, how 
important do you think the following consequences would be to you?” The salient 
consequences of reporting and the importance of those consequences were measured 
using a seven-point Likert-type scale. To measure the consequences of reporting, the 
scale ranged from 1 = not very true to 7 = very true, and to measure the importance 
attached to these consequences, the scale ranged from 1 = not very important to 7 = 
very important. Thus, attitudes toward whistle-blowing was derived by multiplying 
each salient consequence by its related importance, and then summed to obtain an 
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overall attitude score, in which higher scores indicate more positive attitudes. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .82.  
  
5.7.3.2 Perceived behavioural control 
Using Park and Blenkinsopp’s (2009, pp. 550-551) scale, perceived behavioural control 
was measured by testing the control factors and perceived power. Control factors 
contained four statements that tapped into the perceived difficulties that the individual 
is likely to encounter in reporting. The four control factors were measured as follows: 
a) the audit firm’s hindering or ignoring the reporting, b) difficulties likely to be faced 
when reporting, c) reporting would not make a difference, and d) retaliation from the 
audit firm. The perceived power of the above control factors (4 items) was measured by 
asking the respondents to rate the importance of the four control factors. Consistent 
with Park and Blenkinsopp’s (2009) approach, the control factors were rated on a 
seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = not likely to 7 = very likely, and the 
perceived power items by a scale which ranged from 1 = not very important to 7 = very 
important. Thus, perceived behavioural control was derived by multiplying each 
perceived control factor by its related perceived power. The resulting product scores for 
each of the four factors were summed to form a composite score.  
Respondents were asked to determine the difficulties in whistle-blowing, with 
lower responses indicating higher perceived behavioural control. Similar to Park and 
Blenkinsopp (2009), the survey was designed in such a way since respondents seem “to 
find it easier to gauge difficulty rather than ease of reporting” (p. 551). For data 
analysis, responses were recoded so that higher scores indicate higher perceived 
behavioural control. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .81.    
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5.7.3.3 Desired moral approbation 
Two scales adapted from Ryan and Riordan (2000) were used, one measuring moral 
approbation from others (DMA-O) and one measuring moral approbation from self 
(DMA-S). To measure desired moral approbation, respondents were asked to indicate 
the extent of their agreement with each item on a 7-point Likert type scale (1 = 
completely disagree to 7 = completely agree). The DMA-O has been found to comprise 
two dimensions: Praise and Blame. The Desired Moral Approbation from Others-Praise 
subscale of this measure indicates the level of desired praise from others regarding 
moral actions, and the Blame subscale indicates the extent to which individuals desire 
to avoid blame from others regarding immoral actions.   
To capture the desire for moral praise from others, 5 items from the original 9-
item scale were selected, given that they loaded highly in the original study by Ryan 
and Riordan (2000). The amended five-item subscale contains sample questions such as 
“I want others to think that my decisions are ethical.” In this current study, the subscale 
had a Cronbach’s alpha of .86. The desire to avoid blame was captured using 3 of the 8 
original items for the blame subscale, that were found to load highly on the main factor 
in the study by Ryan and Riordan (2000).  A sample item was “I do not want to be 
criticized when I do not do the right thing.” In this current study, the Cronbach’s alpha 
for the subscale was .83.  
The DMA-S scale measures the degree of approval desired from oneself.  The 
original scale contained 8 items. Again, 4 of the 8 items that loaded highly in Ryan and 
Riordan (2000) study, were selected.  A sample item was “I do what is right, no matter 
what anyone else thinks.”  In this current study, the Cronbach’s alpha for this subscale 
was .85.  The Cronbach’s alpha for the overall scale was .80.  
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5.7.3.4 Independence commitment 
Independence commitment was measured using four items derived from a measure 
from Gendron et al. (2006). The responses for individual items used a 7-point Likert 
type scale to rate each statement from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
The items for this construct were refined, based on comments in the pilot stages. A 
sample item for this scale was “I believe that independence is one of the main 
foundations of the accounting and auditing profession.” Scores on individual items 
were summed to form an overall score, in which higher scores indicate higher levels of 
independence commitment. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .91. 
 
 
5.7.3.5 Personal responsibility for reporting 
Personal responsibility for reporting was measured using Schultz et al.’s (1993) single 
item scale. This scale uses a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = very low to 7 = very 
high. For example, a sample item used was “please assess your personal responsibility 
(i.e. duty or obligation) for reporting Tom’s act of shredding paper.” 
 
 
5.7.3.6 Personal cost of reporting 
Schultz et al.’s (1993) single-item scale was used to measure the personal cost of 
reporting (Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). This scale uses a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 = very low to 7 = very high. The item was “please assess the personal 
costs to you as an audit staff person (i.e., trouble, risk, discomfort) of reporting Tom’s 
act of shredding papers.” 
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5.7.4 Measurement of moderating variables 
5.7.4.1 Perceived moral intensity  
This study utilized two of Jones’ (1991) dimensions of magnitude of consequences and 
probability of effect, and Schultz et al.’s (1993) single-item scale for perceived 
seriousness. Taylor and Curtis (2010) used the perceived seriousness scale to measure 
moral intensity in their study. Coram et al. (2008) operationalised moral intensity using 
probability of effect and magnitude of consequences with three questions, which were 
used in this study. For probability of effect to users of financial statements, respondents 
were asked to assess the likelihood of the performance of each unethical act leading to 
an incorrect audit opinion. To test for probability of effect on auditors (the probability 
of detection), respondents were again asked to assess the likelihood (probability) that 
the unethical act will be discovered by higher management.  
To measure potential magnitude of consequences to the auditor, Coram et al. 
(2008) operationalised it as the penalty associated with the act being discovered. Thus, 
using Coram et al.’s (2008) scale, magnitude of consequences was measured by asking 
respondents to rate the statement “if the act was discovered, what level of disciplinary 
action an auditor would face for committing the same act?”  Finally, respondents were 
asked to assess the seriousness of the act. These four questions were measured using a 
7-point Likert type scale which ranged from 1 = very low to 7 = very high. Thus, 
perceived moral intensity was derived from averaging the four items to develop a 
composite score, where higher scores indicated higher levels of perceived moral 
intensity. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .92.  
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5.7.4.2 Perceived organizational support  
Perceived organizational support was measured using Eisenberger, Cummings, Armeli 
and Lynch’s (1997) 8-item short version of Eisenberger et al.’s (1990) scale.  
Eisenberger et al. (1997) had selected 8 of the original 36 items, which loaded highly 
on the main factor. Eisenberger et al. (1997) reported high internal reliability (Cronbach 
alpha = .90). Based on comments arising from the pilot stage, an additional question 
was introduced to test the perceived level of ethical support that is valued by the 
organization. This item is “my organization values my integrity.” Thus, a revised 9-
item scale was used.  Other sample items on this scale were “my organization really 
cares about my well being” and “help is available from my organization when I have a 
problem.”  Respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement on each of 
the eight items on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = completely disagree and 7 = 
completely agree). Negatively worded questions were reverse coded. Each respondent’s 
scores across the nine items were summed and averaged to form one composite 
perceived organizational support score.  In this study, the Cronbach’s alpha for this 
scale was .87.                   
 
 
5.7.4.3 Group constructs 
5.7.4.3.1 Team norms 
Team norms were measured and adapted from a scale developed by De Jong et al. 
(2005).  The original scale consists of four items scored on a 7-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Each item was adapted to 
the auditing context by using the term “audit team.” A sample item was “our audit team 
members share common expectations about the behaviour of all work group members.”  
To test the ethical norms of the audit team and to ensure that the construct is pertinent 
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to the study, an additional item was introduced. This item was “our audit team members 
share common expectations that the behaviour of the group will be ethical.” Scores 
were aggregated and averaged across the five items in the scale to form an overall 
measure of team norms. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .88.  
  
5.7.4.3.2 Group cohesion 
Group cohesion was measured using a 5-item Work Group Cohesion Index developed 
by Price and Muller (1986). Price and Mueller’s (1986) index required the respondent 
to assess the degree to which team members are trustworthy, helpful, friendly, 
personally interested in one another, and look forward to being with other group 
members. Each item was measured by a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 = not 
at all to 7 = very. Each item in the scale was adapted to the auditing context by using 
the term “audit team.” A sample item was “to what extent are people in your audit team 
friendly?”  Scores were aggregated across these five items to form an overall measure 
of each respondent’s perceptions of the level of cohesiveness, on which higher scores 
demonstrate higher levels of group cohesion. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 
.92.     
 
5.7.4.3.3 Measuring group responses at the individual level 
This study sought to look at the impact of groups on whistle-blowing intentions. Han 
(2003) critically looked at different approaches and provided arguments for and against 
the measurement of the group construct. There are several approaches to measuring 
group level constructs that have inherent weaknesses. For example, there is the simple 
aggregation of responses within a group to justify the aggregation of individual 
perceptions (Guzzo, Yost, Campbell and Shea, 1993). Another approach can involve 
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obtaining a team consensus rating, after the team discussed the items using one 
questionnaire. This approach has been argued to be problematic for groups to discuss 
norms and values collectively (Gibson, Randel and Earley, 2000). Earley (1993) 
suggested another method which requires each team member to rate the collective 
belief of other members of the team.  
Given these arguments, this study uses Guzzo et al.’s (1993) method, where 
individual team members rate their perceptions of the level of their team’s norms and 
cohesiveness, and the team score is calculated by averaging the responses of individual 
team members. This approach also assumes that other team members are fully aware of 
the team’s norms and values, and may be considered appropriate for measuring group 
level constructs (Han, 2003).  
 
5.7.5 Social desirability bias 
Jones et al. (2003) raised a concern of social desirability bias in researching ethics.  
Given that this research utilised self-report data, it is possible “that such reports may be 
biased by tendencies to furnish socially desirable responses and to deny holding 
socially undesirable attitude or performing socially undesirable behaviour” (Beck and 
Ajzen, 1991, p. 291). It is recognized that some respondents may tend to underreport 
undesirable (unethical) behaviours and overreport desirable (ethical) behaviours. 
Paulhus’ (1984, 1989) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) 
was used to measure the tendency for social desirability response bias. Paulhus’ scale 
comprised two dimensions: impression management (IM) and self-deception. Prior 
research has used the IM scale to measure social desirability response bias (Trevino, 
Butterfield and McCabe, 1998; Shafer, 2008). This current study utilised Paulhus’ 
(1989) IM scale to control for the influence of social desirable response bias, which 
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may exist in research on ethical and whistle-blowing behaviour (Paulhus, 1984; Shafer, 
2008). The impression management scale portrays the individual’s attempt to present 
the most positive social image of himself or herself.  
The 20-item scale included 10 reverse-scored items. Sample items included “I 
sometimes tell lies if I have to” and “I never cover up my mistakes.” Firstly, the 
negatively keyed items were reversed. Then, one point was recorded for each extreme 
answer (either 6 or 7) to an item on the IM scale. The IM scale can have total scores 
ranging from a low score of 0 to a high score of 20, where high scores are reflective of 
those respondents who are prone to exaggerate responses. Thus, higher scores represent 
higher social desirability. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .75. 
 
5.7.6 Measurement of demographic variables 
The study required demographic data such as gender, organizational position, highest 
level of education attained and professional qualifications. Respondents were further 
asked to provide information on age, years employed in the organization, work 
experience, length of time in current team and numbers of persons in the team, 
measured as continuous variables.  
 
5.8 Quantitative data analysis strategies 
This section deals with the statistical data analysis techniques used in testing the 
hypotheses. 
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5.8.1 Descriptive statistics 
The data was analyzed using SPSS to explore the descriptives (means and standard 
deviations) and correlations (using Pearson’s bivariate correlations) among the 
variables in the study. 
 
5.8.2 Individual and group analysis  
This study implemented a cross-level design, which focussed specifically on the 
moderating effect of perceived organizational support, team norms, group cohesion, 
moral intensity on the relationships between individual-level factors (attitudes, desired 
moral approbation, perceived behavioural control, personal responsibility for reporting, 
personal cost of reporting and independence commitment) and external auditors’ 
whistle-blowing intentions. Moderators such as perceived organizational support and 
perceived moral intensity are tested at the individual level (see hypotheses 2 and 5). 
Group level moderators such as group cohesion and team norms were measured, by 
using auditors’ self-reports (from the individual’s perspective) about their perceptions 
of the level of cohesiveness and norms in their audit teams. The individual responses 
for each audit team were aggregated to form a composite score for the team (see 
hypotheses 3 and 4). Aggregation of employee perceptions is a justifiable way to assess 
contextual variables (Rousseau, 1985; Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). 
 This study utilised appropriate analytical strategies, given the fact that some of 
the hypotheses were cross-level in nature. Hypotheses 3 and 4 relate to multilevel data 
where individuals were nested in groups or teams. These hypotheses sought to test the 
moderating effect of higher level variables (i.e., the team) on the relationship of 
individual level variables. Prior research has assigned group scores to individual 
members within the specific group, and utilised ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
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at the individual level to test the hypothesised relationship (Mossholder and Bedeian, 
1983; Bedeian, Kemery and Mossholder, 1989; James and Williams, 2000).  
The use of OLS creates aggregation and disaggregation biases. For example, the 
disaggregation approach assigns the same group score to each group member and the 
analysis is conducted at the lower individual level. This violates an OLS assumption of 
the independence of random errors. The aggregation approach involves aggregating 
individual scores to form group level measures and performing analyses at the group 
level. This approach suffers from drawing inferences on relationships among 
aggregated data. Several authors have argued that hierarchical linear modelling (also 
known as HLM or random coefficient modelling) is more appropriate for analysing 
multilevel data (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Bryk, Raudenbush and Congdon, 1996; 
Hofmann, 1997; Hofmann, Griffin and Gavin, 2000). HLM allows the investigation of 
both lower and higher level units’ variance of the dependent variable, while performing 
the appropriate analysis of the independent variables at the required level of analysis.  
However, there are certain conditions that need to be satisfied in order to run 
HLM. Firstly, one should conduct a one-way ANOVA to test the null model on the 
dependent variables to assess whether there was significant between-group variance 
(τ00) in these measures (Hofmann, 1997). Furthermore, Bliese (2002) suggests that in 
testing HLM models, one should first determine if the variability in the intercepts 
across groups is significant. This current study found that the dependent variables did 
not present significant between-group variance. Thus, Bliese (2002) argues that “If τ00 
does not significantly vary, there may be little reason to use random coefficient 
modelling since simpler OLS modelling will be adequate” (p. 419). Gavin and 
Hofmann (2002) argued that HLM and the traditional approach (i.e., OLS) to cross-
level analysis are conceptually somewhat similar.  
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Similar to arguments made by Hofmann, Morgeson and Gerras (2003), it was 
felt that the estimation of HLM models might be problematic, given that the teams in 
the current study were relatively small (averaging 3 to 5 audit team members).  James 
and Williams (2000) argued that the use of HLM can be a complex process and 
“simpler is sometimes better” (p. 423). James and Williams (2000) further suggested 
that cross-level regression (OLS) is more appropriate for small sample nested designs. 
As a result, Gonzalez and Denisi (2009) utilised ordinary least squares regression to test 
their cross-level hypotheses. Thus, moderated multiple regression (OLS) was used to 
test the hypotheses in this thesis. 20 
  
5.8.3 Moderating multiple regression analysis 
Moderated multiple regression (MMR) has been used for detecting the moderating 
effects of variables (Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Baron and Kenny, 1986). MMR seeks to 
examine how the relationship between two variables (e.g., A, the independent and B, 
the dependent) varies, depending on the value of a third variable C (e.g., a moderator).  
The independent, dependent and moderating variables were found to be normally 
distributed and linear. To test hypotheses H1a to H1f, the main effects of hierarchical 
multiple regression were used. Based on Cohen and Cohen’s (1983) recommendation 
for testing the interaction effects of the moderators (H2, H3, H4 and H5), this study 
used hierarchical multiple regression analysis to separately test the moderating effects 
of perceived organizational support, perceived moral intensity, group cohesion and 
                                                 
20 Following the approaches of Hofmann et al. (2003) and Gonzalez and Denisi (2009), HLM analysis 
was also conducted using HLM6 (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong and Congdon, 2004), to compare with 
OLS regression results used in this study. Twenty-four models, similar to OLS regression models, were 
run. To test the moderating effects of  group cohesion and team norms on the relationship of the 
individual level variables, ‘slopes-as-outcomes’ analysis was performed using the group level constructs 
as level 2 variables. For example, a level I model was in the form of:  INTWB = ß0 +  ß1 (ATTITUDES) 
+ r. Level 2 models were in two forms: ‘Intercepts as outcomes’ - ß0 =  γ00 + γ01 (COHESION) + u0 and 
‘slopes-as-outcomes’ - ß1  =  γ10 + γ11 (COHESION) + u1. Thus, using ‘slopes-as-outcomes’ analyses, 
HLM results for fixed parameter estimates indicated significant moderating effects for the same variables 
as the moderated multiple (OLS) regression analyses. 
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team norms on the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent 
variables. Before the regression analysis was performed, the predictor variables (both 
independents and the moderators) were zero-centered, based on the recommendation of 
Aiken and West (1991). The mean-centering of these variables will minimize 
multicollinearity problems and assist in making meaningful interpretation of the results 
(Aiken and West, 1991). Given that several independent variables were highly 
correlated, variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for all models were assessed and 
found not to exceed 2, thus indicating that the coefficients were not significantly biased 
by multicollinearity.   
  
5.8.4 Power analysis 
Given that hierarchical multiple regression was being used as the analysis technique, it 
was important to determine the required sample size. The literature has provided 
several rules of thumb in determining the adequate sample size required for regression 
analysis (Field, 2009; Green, 1991).  For example, Green (1991) suggested that to test 
the overall fit of the regression model, the minimum sample size requirements may be 
calculated by the formula 50 + 8m, where m is the number of predictors (e.g. in this 
study, there are 10 predictors), thus yielding a sample size of 130. Green (1991) also 
suggested that to test individual predictors, one should use the formula 104 + m, where 
m is the number of predictors, resulting in a sample size of 114. Field (2009) have 
argued for benchmarks of 10 and 15 cases of data per predictor in the model, which 
would result in a range of 100 to 150 cases.  An a-priori power analysis was done, 
using G*Power (Faul and Erdfelder, 1992), which highlighted a required sample size of 
102 subjects. Another a-priori calculation of required sample size was performed by 
setting alpha level (.05), number of predictors (10), effect size (0.15), and desired 
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statistical power level (0.80). This test provided a minimum sample size requirement of 
118. Therefore, based on the above number of sample size calculations, the actual total 
sample size of 226 obtained in this study was more than sufficient.  
 
5.9 Second phase – Interviews with auditors 
In the first phase of data collection, positivism was used to test the hypotheses. 
However, positivism might not be able to capture all underlying factors affecting 
whistle-blowing. Thus, an interpretivist approach was used to contextualize the findings 
from the quantitative phase. Interpretivism focuses on the researcher’s attempt to gain 
knowledge through the eyes of the individual who observes the phenomenon and seeks 
to understand how meaning is constructed to the individual’s social life (Neuman, 
2003). In essence, the researcher observes and interacts with the individual to 
understand and share his or her experiences. The researcher describes and interprets the 
individual’s experiences. However, these findings are not generalisable. 
 Ontologically, interpretivists see reality as being integrally linked to the 
individual observer since individuals experience different realities. Epistemologically, 
interpretivists argue that knowledge is gained through experiences, culture and specific 
goals (Weber, 2004, p. vi) and is best viewed in its context. Interpretivists view that 
individuals will react based on their interpretation of the situation, and will not be value 
free. 
 
5.9.1 Critique of qualitative research methodology 
Qualitative research has its advantages over quantitative research.  Qualitative research 
provides the researcher with a more in-depth and richer understanding of some 
phenomenon. Quantitative research restricts empirical phenomena to numerical 
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properties, and, as a result, essential information regarding the phenomena is lost in this 
‘number-crunching’ exercise, whereas quantitative research establishes explanations for 
behaviour, qualitative research reveals the major dynamics and dimensions underlying 
the behaviour. Another value of qualitative research is based on its flexibility and 
emphasis on understanding rather than explanation. Brewerton and Millward (2001) 
argued that qualitative research offers an advantage to the researcher, who wants to 
understand factors specific to the individual and context and not the general picture. 
These authors further agreed that by focusing only on the general, quantitative 
researchers usually miss the essence of the phenomena. Thus, this study used a 
qualitative approach to investigate the whistle-blowing phenomenon in the auditing 
context.   
 
5.9.2 Qualitative research design 
A unique feature of the current research was its use of a qualitative method to 
contextualize the findings from the quantitative phase of the research. In order to 
provide richer analysis to understanding the whistle-blowing phenomenon among 
auditors, the current study was extended to include interviews among auditors. The 
study utilized a semi-structured interview schedule, with open-ended questions 
designed to facilitate or encourage discussions with 18 interviewees and 2 focus 
groups. 
Semi-standardized and focused group discussions were implemented to meet 
the research objectives. They were instrumental in the exploration of a range of issues 
concerning the attitudes and experiences of all participants. Semi-structured interviews 
are appropriate methods used for fully exploring sensitive topics and clarifying queries 
raised during the actual interview (Babbie, 2004). 
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5.9.3 Research questions 
The research questions to be addressed by this study are: 
Research Question 1: How willing are external auditors to whistle-blow on 
wrongdoing committed by colleagues in the audit firm?  
 
Research Question 2: What are the preferred channels of reporting wrongdoing 
among external auditors? 
 
Research Question 3:  What is the role of individual factors on external auditors’ 
ability to whistle-blow? 
 
Research Question 4:  What is the role of team and contextual factors on external 
auditors’ ability to whistle-blow? 
 
Research Question 5:  What are the perceived consequences of whistle-blowing 
among external auditors?  
 
Research Question 6:  How can whistle-blowing be increased among external 
auditors?  
 
 
5.9.4 The whistle-blowing interview schedule  
The interview schedule is shown as Appendix D. The first part of the schedule dealt 
with demographics such as gender, age, professional experience, qualifications and 
position held. The second part of the schedule focused on general information about 
participants’ understanding of the term “whistle-blowing”, its importance to the audit 
profession and the perceptions of the whistle-blower (hero or traitor). The third section 
of the interview schedule sought to explore the factors likely to influence whistle-
blowing among external auditors. Specifically, this section looked at key components 
of the conceptual model. Interviewees were asked about their willingness to report 
wrongdoing and the influence of individual-level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral 
approbation, perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility to report and personal cost of reporting) on whistle-blowing. In addition, 
individuals were asked about their opinions on the influence of moderators such as 
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perceived moral intensity, perceived organizational support, group cohesion and team 
norms on whistle-blowing. Further questions were posed to explore the factors likely to 
encourage and discourage whistle-blowing, and the preferred reporting channels. 
Participants were asked if they had ever observed or reported any wrongdoing, 
and what were the outcomes. Finally, respondents were asked to state the perceived 
consequences of whistle-blowing on the audit firm, profession and society, and what 
recommendations could be made to encourage whistle-blowing. The semi-structured 
interview schedule was given to the participants, prior to the interviews to provide them 
with the opportunity to reflect on the issues and to make notes. 
 
5.9.4.1 Piloting the interview schedule 
The interview schedule was piloted first among 4 practicing auditors and 2 academics 
to get their views on the content and layout. After receiving feedback, the interview 
guide was amended. Then, it was subjected to further queries from the supervisors of 
this study. The comments were then incorporated into the final schedule.  
 
5.9.5 Selection of sample of interviewees 
Due to the ethical sensitivity of the research topic, respondents were recruited by 
purposive sampling method on a voluntary basis. The inclusion criterion stipulated that 
the sample was willing to be interviewed, worked in an audit firm, and in audit team(s). 
It was intended to select a wide cross section of respondents from the different levels of 
the audit firm’s hierarchy, as well as specific interest groups such as regulators to gain 
varying perspectives on whistle-blowing. Thus, purposive sampling was appropriate to 
select members from these groups (Neuman, 2003).  Except for the two regulators, the 
qualitative sample was drawn from respondents in the quantitative phase who were 
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willing to be interviewed. As a result, twenty-four interviews of auditors in the form of 
16 individual interviews and 2 focus groups were obtained, representing 10.6% of the 
quantitative sample.  
 
5.9.6 Conduct of the interviews 
Interviews were conducted by face to face meetings at the offices of some of the 
participants and the interviewer’s office, at times convenient to the participants. This 
approach was necessary not only as a matter of convenience, but to ensure that 
participants felt comfortable sharing personal information with the researcher.  
 
Trustworthiness 
Qualitative research requires an element of trustworthiness from all concerned. To 
maximize trustworthiness and credibility of data collected and reduce researcher’s bias, 
counselling skills such as probing, reflecting and clarifying were utilised to ensure that 
the findings were reasonable interpretations of the auditors’ experiences (Parahoo, 
1997). Mayes and Pope (1995) suggested that reliability is strengthened, when two or 
more skilled researchers are involved in the analysis process where comparisons can be 
made of emerging themes and codes and categories.   
 Moreover, a study’s validity may be enhanced when evidence is sought that 
refutes and supports the study’s objectives and research questions (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1995; Silverman, 2000). In addition, data collected will be held in the 
possession of the researcher for at least three years. After three years, the field notes 
will be shredded by the researcher.  
Participants were reassured that the highest level of confidentiality would be 
maintained and reminded about their right to terminate the interview should they 
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experience any feelings of discomfort. In addition, participants were informed that the 
research assistant, accompanying this researcher, was a trained psychologist who was 
competent to handle any situation that may arise. This precautionary measure was not 
needed, as none of the participants experienced any psychological distress. To guard 
against harming or infringing on the rights of participants, the issues of confidentiality 
and consent were discussed, since research ethics require the researcher to obtain 
informed consent and adequately inform the participants on the purpose and nature of 
the study (Polit and Hungler, 1991). All participants opted for confidentiality of their 
identities to be maintained and waived the signing of consent forms.  
The respondents consented to have their information audio taped. Notes were 
also taken during the interviews. Two focus groups were also conducted. The 
interviews and focus group sessions typically lasted between 75 to 90 minutes. The 
preferred choice of locations for where interviews were to be conducted for most 
participants was away from their offices. This informal approach was intended to 
encourage participants to speak freely and completely about their behaviour, 
experiences and attitudes. Each interview was conducted and recorded by the 
researcher and the research assistant to reduce potential biases, and to record the 
relevant information from participants during the sessions. 
 
5.9.7 Characteristics of the sample of interviewees  
The data for this sample were collected from various external auditors at different 
levels (regulators, practitioners, partner, audit managers, audit seniors, junior staff and 
staff accountant) drawn from small to large firms, as well as the legal fraternity and 
accounting body within Barbados. The sample comprised 18 individual interviews and 
2 focus groups, resulting in a total sample of 13 males and 13 females, who shared their 
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experiences and perceptions toward whistle-blowing in Barbados. The age of the 
sample ranged from 20 to 59 years. The respondents were all qualified and holders of 
bachelors’ degrees and professional certificates (LLB, ACCA, CGA, FCCA, CA, CIA, 
ACIS, CFSA, CMA) with years of professional working experience, ranging from 2 to 
15 years. The demographic characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 9.  Each 
participant was identified by a unique code, BDWBXX, where BD means Barbados, 
WB stands for Whistle-blowing, and XX represents a two-digit sequential number for 
each interviewee. The sequential numbers correspond with the chronological order of 
the interviews (i.e., BDWB01 occurred first, followed by BDWB02, BDWB03 etc.).  
 
5.10 Qualitative data analysis strategies 
In Phase 2 of this research, 18 auditors and 2 focus groups were interviewed using 
semi-structured, open-ended and probing in-depth questions. The data were coded, and 
subsequently analyzed using narrative analysis techniques that included recurring 
themes and patterns, key words and phrases, relationships between groups, 
commonalities and differences (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
The exploration of participants’ attitudes and experiences were subjected to 
thematic analysis and coding strategy (Strauss, 1987). Data analysis was done at the 
same time as data collection to enable further exploration of emerging themes in 
subsequent interviews. Coding is the key process in qualitative analysis, which involves 
classifying or categorizing individual pieces of data coupled with a retrieval system 
(Neuman, 2003). This makes easier and faster retrieval of material at a later date. Codes 
were amended as new themes emerged.  
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Table 9: Participants’ demographic data – Interviews and focus groups 
 
Participants’ 
Codes Gender 
Age 
group Current Position Qualifications 
Years 
Exp. Firm size/type 
Regulators  
BDWB01 
 
BDWB02 
 
Male 
 
Male 
 
40-49 
 
40-49 
 
Regulator/Attorney-at-
Law 
Accounting Regulator 
 
LLB 
 
CGA 
 
15 
 
16 
 
Legal/Regulatory  
 
Accounting Body 
Practitioners 
BDWB03 
BDWB04 
 
Male 
Male 
 
40-49 
40-49 
 
Practitioner/Auditor 
Practitioner/Manager 
 
FCCA 
CGA 
 
20 
20 
 
Small Firm 
Small Firm 
Partner 
BDWB05 
 
Male 
 
30-39 
 
Partner 
 
CA 
 
18 
 
Large Firm 
Audit Managers 
BDWB06 
BDWB07 
BDWB08 
 
BDWB09 
 
Female 
Female 
Female 
 
Male 
 
30-39 
40-49 
20-29 
 
20-29 
 
Audit Manager 
Audit Director 
Senior Audit Manager 
 
Audit Manager 
 
BSc, CGA,CIA  
BSc., FCCA 
BSc, ACIS, 
ACCA 
BSc, ACCA 
 
10 
20 
8 
 
7 
 
Large Firm 
Large Firm 
Large Firm 
 
Large Firm 
Audit Seniors 
BDWB10 
 
BDWB11 
BDWB12 
 
BDWB13 
 
Male 
 
Female 
Female 
 
Female 
 
40-49 
 
20-29 
20-29 
 
20-29 
 
Audit Senior 
 
Audit Senior 
Audit Senior 
 
Audit Senior 
 
BSc., ACCA 
CMA 
BSc, ACCA 
BSc, ACCA, 
CFSA 
BSc, CGA 
 
14 
 
3 
4 
 
4 
 
Medium Size Firm 
 
Large Firm 
Large Firm 
 
Large Firm 
Junior staff 
BDWB14 
BDWB15 
BDWB16 
BDWB17 
BDWB18 
 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Male 
Female 
 
20-29 
20-29 
20-29 
20-29 
20-29 
 
Staff Accountant 
Staff Accountant 
Staff Accountant 
Staff Accountant 
Staff Assistant 
 
BSc 
BSc 
BSc 
BSc, ACCA 
BSc 
 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
 
Large Firm 
Large Firm 
Large Firm 
Large Firm 
Large Firm 
Focus Group 1 Female 
Male 
Male 
Male 
20-29 
30-39 
40–49 
50-59 
Staff Accountant 
Audit Senior 
Audit Senior 
Audit Manager 
BSc 
ACCA 
CGA 
CGA 
3 
7 
6 
24 
Large Firm 
 
 
Focus Group 2 Female 
Female 
Male 
Male 
20-29 
20-29 
30-39 
30-39 
Staff Accountant 
Staff Accountant 
Audit Senior 
Audit Manager 
BSc 
BSc 
CGA 
ACCA 
3 
2 
6 
13 
Medium Size  
Firm 
 
 
 
Note: All references to interview data will use participants’ codes stated above; Years Exp = Years of 
working experience. 
 
 
 
Data garnered from participants were partially summarized and key quotes 
recorded verbatim and in Barbadian dialect. Topics identified were clustered into sets 
of manageable emerging themes and sub-themes, after reading the data (Neuman, 2003; 
Babbie, 2004). The above exploratory methodological approach, utilizing thematic 
analysis and specific coding strategies, allowed for the researcher to gain a better 
understanding of the phenomenon (i.e. whistle-blowing) under study.  
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5.11 Conclusion 
The current research adopted a triangulated method approach to examine whistle-
blowing intentions among auditors. Given that the quantitative-positivistic 
methodological orientation has been predominantly used in ethics studies, this study 
used a quantitative survey approach in the first phase. Furthermore, in the second 
phase, the use of a qualitative approach such as interviews and focus groups, helps to 
contextualize the findings, and supports the call for more rigorous qualitative methods 
to be used in behavioural ethics research (Trevino, Weaver and Reynolds, 2006). The 
proposed research, however, has to be cleverly designed to ensure that the data is 
captured to fully understand the behaviour under study.   
The quantitative research methodology is important since the proposed research 
focuses on testing various hypotheses on whistle-blowing derived from several theories 
and models of human behaviour. Quantitative research methodology, compared with 
qualitative research, is more focused on theory-testing and explanation, which is 
consistent with the main objectives of the proposed study.   
As mentioned before, the appropriateness of the survey research design to the 
study of whistle-blowing is based on its ability to capture (measure) auditors’ 
behaviours in a natural setting (and not in an artificial setting as in the experimental 
research design) and its ability to capture numerous variables within a larger sample 
group to satisfy the hypothesis-testing orientation of the study. Furthermore, it was 
mentioned that this design is more popular in the ethics and whistle-blowing literature, 
compared with the experimental research design (e.g. Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001).   
 Finally, it was mentioned previously that the proposed design will adopt a 
qualitative-based method to supplement the quantitative findings. This is important 
because it has been argued that the combined approach provides a better capture of the 
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phenomenon under study than a single method (Brewerton and Millward, 2001).  This 
approach is consistent with the concept of triangulation, which is based on the 
assumption that the use of different sources or methods (questionnaires, interviews and 
focus groups) provides a more comprehensive picture or assessment of an issue. 
Indeed, this concern has been echoed in recent whistle-blowing literature (Mesmer-
Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005), where there has been a call for triangulation of 
research methods in the area of whistle-blowing. The next chapter will present the main 
results of the study as they relate to the principal hypotheses of the study. 
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CHAPTER 6: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This thesis presents a model on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors in 
Barbados. The study used a survey questionnaire to collect the data to test the 
hypotheses. This chapter presents the results of the findings obtained through the 
survey instrument and reports the tests of the hypotheses of the proposed conceptual 
model from Chapter 4.  The chapter is organized as follows: firstly, an analysis of the 
descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables is presented. This 
section provides the means, standard deviations and correlations of the key variables 
under study. The next section presents the tests of the main effects, as well as the 
moderating effects of perceived organizational support, group cohesion, team norms 
and perceived moral intensity on the relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables. The final section summarizes the key findings on the hypotheses.  
 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
This section presents the descriptive statistics on the independent, moderating and 
dependent variables in the current study. The dependent variables are internal and 
external whistle-blowing intentions. The independent variables are attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing, desired moral approbation, perceived behavioural control, 
independence commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost of 
reporting. The moderating variables are perceived organizational support, perceived 
moral intensity, group cohesion and team norms. 
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6.1.1 Dependent variables - Whistle-blowing (reporting) intentions 
Table 10 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent measures of whistle-
blowing intentions to internal and external targets. With respect to internal reporting in 
scenario one, the mean was 4.96, while the mean was 3.45 for external reporting. 21  
Overall, the means indicate that auditors were more likely to report internally with 
mean responses above the scale midpoints. For internal reporting, the means in this 
current study are higher than the mean reporting intentions of Kaplan and Whitecotton 
(2001), who reported means slightly below their 7-point scale (i.e. a mean of 3.8 for the 
self-reporting measure and a mean of 4.2 for the other auditors reporting measure). 
However, the respondents in this sample reported means slightly below the scale 
midpoints when asked whether they would report externally. These results suggest that 
respondents were more likely to report internally rather than externally. The high 
internal reporting intentions may suggest that the subjects believe in the internal 
channel as the preferred option, since there appears to be a general reluctance to report 
externally. These findings are consistent with Park and Blenkinsopp (2009). However, 
these low external reporting intentions may raise concerns where there may be serious 
wrongdoing in the audit firm that may not be satisfactorily resolved internally.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 As previously mentioned in section 5.7.1, this study used scenario 1, which referred to the act of the 
partner shredding important documents. Due to the lack of significant variability on the scores for the 
three scenarios in the study, any scenario could have been chosen. However, it was felt that the facts in 
this scenario closely mirror the Enron case. 
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables - whistle-blowing (reporting) 
intentions 
 
Dependent Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Scenario 1   
Internal whistle-blowing (IWB)   
Report it to the appropriate persons within the firm 5.06 1.64 
Use the reporting channels inside of the firm 5.08 1.57 
Let upper level of management know about it 4.79 1.67 
Tell my supervisor about it 4.90 1.70 
Overall average 4.96 1.47 
Summed score 19.84 5.88 
Cronbach alpha =  .91   
   
External whistle-blowing (EWB)   
Report it to the appropriate authorities outside of the firm 3.87 1.43 
Use the reporting channels outside of the firm 3.70 1.40 
Provide information to outside agencies 3.26 1.38 
Inform the public about it 2.98 1.46 
Overall average 3.45 1.22 
Summed score 13.80 4.86 
Cronbach alpha =  .88   
 
 
 
6.2. Independent variables 
6.2.1 Attitudes toward whistle-blowing 
Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics for the independent measure of attitudes 
toward whistle-blowing. The table shows the means of the individual items in the scale 
as well as overall means for outcomes and their evaluation of the scenario.  Table 11 
shows that the overall means for outcomes and evaluation were on average higher than 
5. This may suggest that respondents perceived whistle-blowing as being very 
important and having positive consequences.  
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Table 11: Scale items and means for attitudes toward whistle-blowing  
 
Items Beliefs about the 
consequences 
(b)a  
Mean (SD) 
Evaluation of 
the 
consequences (e) 
Mean (SD) 
(b x e) 
Mean 
Scenario 1    
Prevention of harm to the firm 5.77 (1.46) 6.02 (1.00) 35.17  
Control of unethical behaviour 6.19 (0.97) 6.08 (0.97) 38.01  
Enhances public interest  5.61 (1.34) 5.47 (1.38) 31.61  
One’s duty as an employee 5.65 (1.25) 5.84 (1.19) 33.82  
Morally appropriate 6.41 (0.97) 6.01 (1.25) 39.06  
Average  5.92 (0.80) 5.88 (0.856) 35.30  
Overall average   5.04 (1.22) 
a Cronbach alpha =  .82    
A: Sum of (b x e) =177.49    
Note: SD = Standard Deviation 
 
 
 
6.2.2 Desired moral approbation 
Table 12 presents the means and standard deviations for the desired moral approbation 
scale. Desired moral approbation from others – praise (DMA - OP) and from self 
(DMA - S) show means of 5.81 and 5.28 respectively, which were much higher than 
the scale mid-points of 4. However, for the scale of desired moral approbation from 
others – blame (DMA - OB), the mean was 3.86, which was slightly below the scale 
midpoint. 
To test for dimensionality, exploratory factor analysis was done on the 
shortened scale, using principal component analysis, iteration and extraction methods. 
Table 13 presents the results of the exploratory factor analysis. It was found that items 
loaded highly on their expected factors and were consistent with Ryan and Riordan’s 
(2000) longer version of the scale. 
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics for desired moral approbation 
 
Items  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Desired moral approbation from others – praise (DMA - OP)   
I want others to think that my decisions are ethical. 6.18 1.38 
I want others to view me as a moral person.  6.29 1.26 
I hope others view my behaviours as ethical 6.16 1.26 
I want others to support my decisions on moral issues.  5.59 1.39 
I want others to praise my choices in ethical situations. 4.82 1.64 
Overall DMA - OP 5.81 1.12 
Cronbach alpha = .86   
   
Desired moral approbation from others – blame (DMA - OB)   
I do not want to be criticized when I do not do the right thing. 4.04 1.94 
I do not like others to blame me even when I am in the wrong. 3.57 1.95 
I do not like to be criticized for doing something wrong 3.98 1.95 
Overall DMA - OB 3.86 1.68 
Cronbach alpha = .83   
   
Desired moral approbation from self (DMA - S)   
I do not care what other people think as long as I know that I have 
done the right thing 
5.38 1.46 
I do what I think is right, no matter what anyone else thinks 5.04 1.71 
I do not worry about what other people think when I do something 
that I know is right  
5.28 1.58 
I do not worry about others’ opinions as long as I feel confident 
about the ethical decisions that I make. 
5.42 1.39 
Overall DMA - S 5.28 1.28 
Cronbach alpha = .85   
   
Overall average desired moral approbation 5.15 .89 
Overall Cronbach alpha = .80   
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Table 13: Exploratory factor analysis for desired moral approbation 
 
Factors Items 1 2 3 
I want others to view me as a moral person. .887   
I want others to think that my decisions are ethical. .862   
I hope others view my behaviours as ethical. .853   
 I want others to support my decisions on moral issues. .790   
I want others to praise my choices in ethical decisions. .639   
I do not worry about what other people think when I do 
something that I know is right. 
 .874  
I do what I think is right, no matter what anyone else thinks.  .832  
I do not care what other people think as long as I know that I 
have done the right thing. 
 .797  
I do not worry about others’ opinions as long as I feel 
confident about the ethical decisions that I make. 
 .780  
I do not like others to blame me even when I am in the 
wrong. 
  .906 
I do not like to be criticised for doing something wrong.   .842 
I do not want to be criticised when I do not do the right 
thing. 
  .820 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3  Perceived behavioural control 
Table 14 shows the range of values for perceived behavioural control. These values 
ranged from 5.91 to 6.21 in respondents’ beliefs in their degree of control. 
Respondents’ evaluation of these controls was slightly lower than their beliefs. Overall, 
respondents felt that they had a moderately high level of control over their behaviour 
(M = 4.57). 
 
 202
Table 14: Scale items and means for perceived behavioural control  
 
 
Items 
Belief in 
control 
factors 
(bcf) a 
Mean (SD) 
Evaluation 
of control 
factors 
(ecf) 
Mean (SD) 
 
(bcf  x ecf) 
 
 
 
Mean 
Scenario 1    
The audit firm’s hindering reporting (or ignoring 
it) 
6.21 (1.01) 5.13 (1.66) 32.11  
Difficulties to be faced in the process of 
reporting 
5.99 (1.04) 4.85 (1.81) 29.31  
Reporting likely to be ineffective in ending  
the wrongdoing 
6.02 (1.06) 5.56 (1.69) 33.90  
Retaliation by the audit firm 5.91 (1.09) 5.47 (1.51) 32.58  
Average  6.03 (0.79) 5.25 (1.40) 32.03  
Overall average   4.57 (1.43) 
a Cronbach alpha = .81    
PBC: Sum of (bcf  x  ecf) =  127.90    
Note: SD = Standard Deviation 
 
 
6.2.4 Independence commitment 
Table 15 reports the descriptive statistics for independence commitment. The overall 
mean for independence commitment is 4.93, which is higher than the scale midpoint of 
4, and indicates that auditors in the sample perceived themselves as being highly 
independent. This finding was similar to Gendron et al.’s (2006) study. 
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics for independence commitment  
 
Items Mean Standard Deviation 
I believe that independence is one of the main foundations of the 
accounting and auditing profession. 
 
5.08 1.49 
I believe that the profession’s independence requirements need to 
be strictly enforced in every sphere of activities in which public 
accounting firms are involved. 
 
4.97 1.42 
I think the profession would be more highly regarded if the 
profession’s independence requirements for auditors in public 
practice were more rigorous. 
 
4.83 1.414 
I think that stakeholders in general (e.g., business community) 
would benefit if the profession’s independence requirements in 
public practice were more rigorous. 
 
4.86 1.474 
Overall average independence commitment  
 
4.93 1.29 
Summed independence commitment score 
 
19.74 5.15 
Cronbach alpha =  .91   
 
 
 
6.2.5 Descriptive statistics for personal cost of reporting and personal 
responsibility for reporting 
Table 16 shows the means and standard deviations for personal cost of reporting and 
personal responsibility for reporting. It was found that respondents perceived a mean 
below the scale midpoint (M = 3.26) for personal cost of reporting and an above 
average mean (M = 4.76) for personal responsibility for reporting.  
 
 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics for personal cost of reporting and personal responsibility 
for reporting 
 
Items Mean Standard Deviation 
Scenario 1   
Personal cost of reporting 3.26 1.61 
Personal responsibility for reporting   4.76 1.44 
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6.3 Moderators 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for the four moderators: team norms, 
group cohesion, perceived organization support and moral intensity. Specifically, it 
highlights the means, standard deviations, scale items and Cronbach's alphas of the 
moderating variables.   
 
 
6.3.1 Team norms 
Table 17 provides an overall analysis of the descriptive statistics for the moderating 
variable (team norms). The mean for team norms (M = 4.77) is above the midpoint 
scale. The results may imply that respondents rated the standards (i.e., the acceptable 
work habits and behaviours) that govern the groups as being moderately high. One of 
the items that tested the ethical norms had the second highest mean of 4.86.  
 
 
Table 17: Descriptive statistics for team norms 
 
Items Mean Standard Deviation 
Our audit team develops standards over and above those 
specified by the firm to judge our performance by. 
 
4.84 1.05 
Our audit team members share common expectations about the 
behaviour of all work group members. 
 
4.71 0.98 
Our audit team members have identified the strengths and 
weaknesses of individual work group members. 
 
4.61 1.05 
Our audit team members share common expectations about the 
behaviour of particular work group members with specific 
responsibilities. 
 
4.88 0.97 
Our audit team members share common expectations that the 
behaviour of the group will be ethical. 
4.86 0.98 
   
Overall team norms  4.77 0.78 
   
Cronbach alpha = .88   
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6.3.2 Group cohesion 
Table 18 details the descriptive statistics for the independent measure (group cohesion). 
The overall mean (3.15) for group cohesion is slightly below the midpoint scale. The 
results may suggest that respondents perceived that there is a relatively low level of 
cohesiveness within the audit teams in the sample.  This may be a direct result of teams 
constantly changing for different audit engagements.  
 
 
Table 18: Descriptive statistics for group cohesion 
 
Items Mean Standard Deviation 
To what extent do you trust the members of your audit team? 
 
3.23 1.01 
To what extent are the people in your audit team helpful to 
you in getting your job done? 
 
3.14 1.07 
To what extent are people in your audit team friendly? 
 
3.12 0.99 
To what extent do people in your audit team take a personal 
interest in you? 
 
3.08 1.01 
To what extent do you look forward to being with the 
members of your audit team each day? 
 
3.18 1.05 
Overall group cohesion  
 
3.15 0.61 
Cronbach alpha =  .92   
 
 
6.3.3 Group aggregation 
James, Demaree and Wolf (1984, 1993) developed the rwg(j) index of agreement to 
measure the degree of consensus within groups. In this current study, the rwg(j) was 
used to determine the appropriateness and validity of team level constructs, based on 
the individuals’ perceptions of the level of team norms and group cohesion. The rwg(j) 
has values, ranging from 0 to 1. The mean rwg(j) was .95 for group cohesion and .93 
for team norms.   
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 Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) were used to measure between group 
variance, ICC(1), and reliability of group means, ICC(2) (Bliese, 2000). This study 
found that ICC (1) was .19, F(53, 172) = 2.66, p <.001, indicating that 19% of the 
variability in individual ratings of group cohesion was related to group membership. 
The ICC(1) for team norms was .28, F(53, 172) = 3.475, p < .01, indicating that 28% of 
the variability of team norms was related to group membership. The reliability of the 
group means ICC(2) was .73 for group cohesion and .71 for team norms. Both ICC 
values were comparable to those obtained in prior research (e.g. Bliese, 2000; Liao and 
Rupp, 2005). ICC(2) values of .70 or higher are more favourable (Bliese, 2000). Thus, 
these preliminary results justify the aggregation of individual auditors’ responses to 
form single scores for group cohesion and team norms for each audit team.  
 
6.3.4 Perceived organizational support 
Table 19 presents the means, standard deviation and Cronbach's alpha for the perceived 
organizational support scale. It shows that the respondents perceived relatively high 
levels of organizational support (M = 5.03, SD = 1.08).  It was also noticeable that the 
new item “my organization values my integrity” which was added to the original scale, 
had the highest mean score (M = 5.81, SD = 1.25). 
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Table 19: Descriptive statistics for perceived organizational support 
 
Items Mean Standard Deviation 
My organization cares about my opinions. 
 
5.01 1.60 
My organization really cares about my well-being. 
 
4.95 1.56 
My organization strongly considers my goals and values. 
 
5.02 1.52 
Help is available from my organization when I have a 
problem. 
 
5.30 1.49 
My organization would forgive an honest mistake on my 
part. 
 
5.03 1.42 
 If given the opportunity, my organization would take 
advantage of me. * 
 
4.29 1.80 
My organization shows very little concern for me. * 
 
5.23 1.67 
My organization is willing to help me if I need a special 
favour. 
 
4.66 1.45 
My organization values my integrity ** 
 
5.81 1.25 
Overall average perceived organizational support 
 
5.03 1.08 
Summed perceived organizational support 
 
45.29 9.69 
Cronbach alpha =  .87   
* Items reverse-scored 
** Additional item put into the original scale 
 
 
 
6.3.5 Perceived moral intensity 
Table 20 shows the means, standard deviations and Cronbach’s alpha for the moral 
intensity scale. The mean for this scale was 4.88, which implies that respondents had 
moderately high perceptions of the moral intensity of the issue under study. 
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Table 20: Scale items and means for perceived moral intensity  
  
Items Mean Standard Deviation 
Scenario 1   
Probability of effect on financial statements 4.78 1.09 
Discovery by management  4.80 1.00 
Disciplinary action  4.91 0.99 
Seriousness 5.02 1.18 
Overall average perceived moral intensity  
 
4.88 0.97 
Summed perceived moral intensity 19.50 3.86 
Cronbach’s alpha = . 92   
 
 
 
6.4 Correlations among the variables 
Table 21 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations among the variables 
in the study. Pearson’s bivariate correlation was used to test the relationship among the 
independent, moderating and dependent variables. There were no significant 
relationships found between the dependent variables and demographic variables. The 
majority of the variables were multi-item scales that could be summed, but the average 
scores for the scales were used throughout this analysis. Despite the fact that several 
independent variables were highly correlated, a test for multicollinearity was conducted 
and it was found that the variance inflation factors (VIF) were low (below 2).  Thus, 
similar to prior research in this area (Schultz et al., 1993; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 
2001), the low variance inflation factors in this study indicate that multicollinearity 
may not be a major concern.22  Table 21 shows that all of the independent variables, 
                                                 
22  Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) noted that statistical problems created by multicollinearity occur when 
correlations are .90 and higher. However, Cronbach (1987) argued that multicollinearity does not 
negatively affect the power of multiple moderating regression. Aguinis (1995) suggests that predictors 
should be centered prior to creating the product term to avoid high multicollinearity problems. 
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except for desired moral approbation, were significantly correlated with internal 
whistle-blowing intentions (p < .05), but not with external whistle-blowing intentions 
(p > .05). The moderators were not significantly related to internal whistle-blowing 
intentions. Perceived organizational support, perceived moral intensity and group 
cohesion were significantly related to external whistle-blowing intentions (p < .05). 
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Table 21: Descriptive statistics and correlations among the control, independent, moderating and dependent variables 
 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Controls                  
1 SDB 8.23 4.18 (.75)               
2 Gender 1.55 0.50 .18** (-)              
3 Tenure 7.84 4.93 .07 -.22** (-)             
Dependents                 
4 IWB 4.96 1.47 .05 .03 -.11† (.91)            
5 EWB 3.45 1.22 .07 .12† -.07 .44** (.88)           
Independents                 
6 ATW 5.04 1.22 .07 .03 -.15* .14* .07 (.82)          
7 DMA 5.15 0.89 -.04 .06 -.06 .06 -.07 .38** (.80)         
8 PBC 4.57 1.43 .02 -.02 -.03 .13* .11† .67** .28** (.81)        
9 IC 4.93 1.29 .12† .07 -.12† .26** .07 .61** .31** .42** (.91)       
10 PRR a 4.76 1.44 .19** .01 -.06 .30** .08 .64** .37** .50** .69** (-)      
11 PCR a 3.26 1.61 -.05 .09 -.02 -.16* .09 -.16* -.01 -.17** -.13* -.15* (-)     
Moderators                  
12 POS 5.03 1.08 .02 .02 .01 .07 -.31** .30** .37** .23** .29** .40** -.07 (.87)    
13 GC 3.15 0.61 -.20** -.02 -.04 .01 .14* -.17* -.13† -.15* -.16* -.21** .-.04 -.16* (.92)   
14 TN 4.77 0.78 .21** .03 -.04 -.05 -.10 .16* .07 .14* .08 .18** .01 . 10 -.72** (.88)  
15 PMI 4.88 0.97 .10 -.05 .05 -.01 -.23** .14* .33** .10 .12† .19** .01 .58** -.36** .33** (.92) 
 
Notes: 
** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10. 
M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation. 
1 = Social desirability bias (SDB); 2 = Gender; 3 = Tenure; 4 = Internal whistle-blowing intentions (IWB); 5 = External whistle-blowing intentions (EWB);  
6 = Attitudes toward whistle-blowing (ATW); 7 = Desired moral approbation (DMA); 8 = Perceived behavioural control (PBC); 9 = Independence commitment (IC);  
10 = Personal responsibility for reporting (PRR); 11 = Personal cost for reporting (PCR); 12 = Perceived organizational support (POS); 13 = Group cohesion (GC);  
14 = Team norms (TN); 15 = Perceived moral intensity (PMI). 
Alpha reliabilities are shown in parentheses on the diagonal. 
(-) represents single-item variables for which reliabilities can not be computed. 
a  = single-item scales
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6.5 Results of hypotheses tests - Moderating multiple regression analysis 
6.5.1 Tests for main and moderating effects 
Hierarchical moderated regressions were conducted to test the main effect and 
moderating hypotheses proposed in the model.23 To test the main and moderating 
effects, control variables (social desirability bias, gender and tenure) were entered in 
step 1; independent variables in step 2 (main effect); moderators in step 3; and the 
interactions between the independent and moderating variables in step 4 (moderating 
effect). The changes in multiple squared correlation coefficients (R2) were evaluated to 
determine the significant influences of the variables on whistle-blowing intentions. 
Given that hypotheses 1a to 1f require an examination of main effects of the 
independent variables (prior to tests of moderation in the fourth steps), it was necessary 
to evaluate the second steps of the hierarchical regressions presented and discussed 
below, as these steps provide the information for the main effects.  
The study followed Cohen and Cohen’s (1983) recommendation for testing the 
interaction effects of the moderators. This study used hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis to separately test the moderating effects of perceived organizational support, 
moral intensity, group cohesion and team norms on the relationships between the 
independent variables and the dependent variables. Before the regression analysis was 
performed, the predictor variables (both independents and the moderators) were zero-
centred, based on the recommendation of Aiken and West (1991). 
An attempt was made to control for the possible influences of demographic and 
other variables in the analysis. Using univariate tests, these demographic variables were 
                                                 
23 Since the study had several single item constructs (i.e. personal responsibility for reporting and 
personal costs of reporting), structural equation modeling (SEM) was not used. Hair, Black, Babin and 
Anderson (2009) argued that “single-item measures can create identification problems in SEM; thus we 
suggest their use be limited. Given the nature of SEM, latent constructs represented by multiple items are 
the preferred approach” (p. 717). In addition, readers are directed to section 5.8.2 - Individual and group 
analysis, for the rationale for using moderated multiple regression (OLS) analysis in this study. 
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found not to be significantly related to the dependents or independent variables. Prior 
studies have used the non-significant relationships as justification for their exclusion 
from further analysis (Buchan, 2005; Shafer, 2008, p.830; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 
2001, p. 56). However, it was felt that certain variables such as gender, tenure (working 
experience) and social desirability bias were needed to be controlled for, given their 
theoretical influences from the literature (Sims and Keenan, 1998; Chiu, 2003; 
Flannery and May, 2000; Mesmer-Magnus and Viswevaran, 2005). For example, 
Flannery and May (2000) argued that the non-significant relationship between social 
desirability bias and other variables in their research may indicate that the managers in 
their sample were responding honestly to the issues. In any event, social desirability 
needed to be controlled for, given the criticisms levelled at self-report measures.  
To evaluate the form or pattern of the interactions, ModGraph-1 programme by 
Jose (2008) was used to plot the interaction graphs. This programme requires the user 
to extract from SPSS output, the unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
predictor, moderator, the interaction and the constant as well as the means and standard 
deviations of the centred predictor and moderator variables. As a result, a graph is 
drawn to reflect the interaction. To test if the simple slopes of the moderator (e.g. low, 
medium and high levels of perceived organizational support) differ significantly from 
zero, ModGraph-1 was used. To calculate the simple slopes, standard errors, t-values 
and related p-values, the data from the covariance matrix of the output from regression 
is inputted in ModGraph-1 (Adebayo, 2005).  
 
6.5.2 Main effects - Antecedents of whistle-blowing intentions 
In terms of main effect hypotheses, it was hypothesized that attitudes toward whistle-
blowing (H1a), desired moral approbation (H1b), perceived behavioural control (H1c), 
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independence commitment (H1d) and personal responsibility for reporting (H1e) would 
have positive relationships with whistle-blowing intentions, while personal cost of 
reporting (H1f) would have a negative relationship with whistle-blowing intentions. 
For the hierarchical regressions conducted (see Tables 22, 26, 29 and 32) in step 
2 (the independent variable), it was found that attitudes, perceived behavioural control, 
independence commitment, personal responsibility to report and personal cost of 
reporting significantly contributed to explained variance for internal whistle-blowing 
intentions (p < .05). Significant main effects were found for attitudes toward whistle-
blowing (β = .180, ∆R2 = .032, p < .05), perceived behavioural control (β = .179, ∆R2 = 
.032, p < .05), independence commitment (β = .233, ∆R2 = .054, p < .01), personal 
responsibility for reporting (β = .265, ∆R2 = .069, p < .01), and personal cost of 
reporting (β = -.169, ∆R2 = .028, p < .05). Thus, hypotheses H1a, H1c, H1d, H1e and 
H1f were fully supported for internal whistle-blowing intentions.  
Tables 23, 27, 30 and 33 show the results for external whistle-blowing In terms 
of external whistle-blowing intentions, a significant main effect was only found for 
perceived behavioural control (β = .137, ∆R2 = .019, p < .05). A marginally significant 
main effect was found for personal responsibility for reporting on external whistle-
blowing intentions (β = .118, ∆R2 = .014, p < .10). Therefore, only H1c (perceived 
behavioural control) was fully supported for external whistle-blowing intentions. 
Marginal support was found for personal responsibility for reporting. No support was 
found for desired moral approbation in explaining auditors’ intentions to whistle-blow 
internally or externally. Thus, hypothesis H1b was not supported. 
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6.6 Results of the moderation hypotheses  
6.6.1 The moderating effect of perceived organizational support on whistle-
blowing intentions 
Based on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recommendations for the order of entry of the 
predictor variables, the test for moderation was conducted using hierarchical regression 
analysis in four steps, consistent with Adebayo’s (2005) approach.  In the first step 
(step 1), the control variables, gender, tenure and social desirability bias, were entered.  
In the second step (step 2), each of the six independent variables (e.g. attitudes, desired 
moral approbation, perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) were entered to test for the 
main effects. In Step 3, the centered variable (e.g. in this case, perceived organizational 
support) was entered as a moderator (Adebayo, 2005). In Step 4, the interaction (the 
centered independent x centered moderator) was entered to test the study’s hypothesis 2 
that perceived organizational support moderates the relationship between the 
independent variable (e.g. attitudes) and the dependent variables (internal or external 
whistle-blowing intentions). Tables 22 and 23 show the results of the twelve 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses for the moderating effect of perceived 
organizational support on internal and external whistle-blowing intentions. Figures 12 
to 19 show the graphs drawn for those significant moderating effects. Table 24 show 
the simple slopes analyses for perceived organizational support. 
Perceived organizational support significantly moderated the effects of all of the 
independent variables, except desired moral approbation, on internal whistle-blowing 
intentions (see Table 22). Table 22 shows that five of the perceived organizational 
support interaction terms (the five independent variables x perceived organizational 
support) added significant incremental variance in internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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(attitudes, β = .373, ∆R2 = .132, p < .01; perceived behavioural control, β = .299, ∆R2 = 
.088, p < .01;  independence commitment, β = .271, ∆R2 = .071,  p < .01; personal 
responsibility for reporting, β = .295, ∆R2 = .084, p < .01; and personal cost of 
reporting, β = .309, ∆R2 = .089,  p < .01). These results indicate that the relationships 
between the independent variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, 
independence commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and internal 
whistle-blowing intentions were stronger and positive at higher levels of perceived 
organizational support than at lower levels. In contrast, the relationship between 
personal cost of reporting and internal whistle-blowing intentions was stronger and 
negative, when perceived organizational support was low. This finding shows that 
when personal cost is high, audit staff exhibit lower whistle-blowing intentions under 
low levels of perceived organizational support. 
Results from simple slope analysis confirmed all significant interactions derived 
from the regression analyses (see Table 24). In the case of attitudes toward whistle-
blowing, perceived behavioural control, independence commitment and personal 
responsibility for reporting, the pattern of their interactions as revealed by the graphs 
(Figures 12, 13, 14 and 15), showed that when perceived organizational support was 
high, there were significant and positive relationships between these variables and 
internal whistle-blowing. Table 24 further confirmed that when perceived 
organizational support was high, the effects of attitudes (t = 5.88, p < .01), perceived 
behavioural control (t = 5.02, p < .01), independence commitment (t = 5.29, p < .01) 
and personal responsibility for reporting (t = 6.03, p < .01) were significant.  
However, the relationships between the independent and dependent variables 
were different, when perceived organizational support was low. For example, when 
perceived organizational support was low, the effects of independence commitment (t = 
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-0.22, p > .05) and personal responsibility for reporting (t = -0.15, p > .05) were non-
significant, whereas the effects of attitudes and perceived behavioural control were 
marginally and significantly negative (p < .10).  In terms of personal cost of reporting, 
when perceived organizational support was low, there was a significant negative 
relationship between this variable and internal whistle-blowing intentions (t = -4.95, p 
< .01), but when perceived organizational support was high, the effect was marginally 
significant and positive (t = 1.86, p < .10; see Figure 16). 
In terms of external whistle-blowing intentions, perceived organizational 
support also significantly moderated the effects of only three of the independent 
variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control and personal cost of reporting) (p < 
.05). Table 23 shows that three of the perceived organizational support interaction 
terms (the three independent variables x perceived organizational support) added 
significant incremental variance in external whistle-blowing (attitudes, β = -.151, ∆R2 = 
.021, p < .05; perceived behavioural control, β = -.169, ∆R2 = .028, p < .05; and 
personal cost of reporting, β = .187, ∆R2 = .033,  p < .01). These results indicate that 
the relationships between the independent variables (attitudes and perceived 
behavioural control) and internal whistle-blowing intentions were stronger and positive 
at lower levels of perceived organizational support than at higher levels. This can be 
explained by the fact that potential whistle-blowers, who perceived low support from 
internal members, are more inclined to report to alternative external authorities or 
channels, if the issue has not been adequately resolved to their satisfaction. In contrast, 
the relationship between personal cost of reporting and external whistle-blowing 
intentions was stronger and positive (i.e. high personal costs associated with higher 
whistle-blowing intentions), when perceived organizational support was high. Desired 
moral approbation was marginally supported (p < .10). 
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Results from simple slope analyses in Table 24 confirmed the significant 
interactions derived from the regression analyses.  In the case of attitudes and perceived 
behavioural control, the pattern of the interaction as revealed by the graphs (Figures 17 
and 18) show that when perceived organizational support was low, there were 
significant and positive relationships between these variables (attitudes and perceived 
behavioural control) and external whistle-blowing. For example, when perceived 
organizational support was low, the effects of attitudes (t = 3.34, p < .01) and perceived 
behavioural control (t = 3.94, p < .01) were positive and significant on external whistle-
blowing intentions (Table 24). However, the relationships between these independent 
and dependent variables were different when perceived organizational support was 
high.  For example, Table 24 shows that when perceived organizational support was 
high, the effects of attitudes (t = 0.12, p > .05) and perceived behavioural control (t = 
0.28, p > .05) were non-significant (See Figures 17 and 18). In addition, when 
perceived organizational support was high, the effect of personal cost of reporting on 
external whistle-blowing was significantly positive (t = 2.83, p < .01) (see Figure 19).   
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Table 22: Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating effects of 
perceived organizational support on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
 
Notes: N = 226; SDB = Social desirability bias; POS = Perceived organizational support;  
IV = Independent variable; Standardized Beta-Coefficients are reported; ** p < .01; * p < .05;  
† p < .10; F values at the final step are reported. 
Internal whistle-blowing intentions 
  Attitudes toward whistle-blowing Desired moral approbation
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .180* .045* .032* .061 .017 .004 
3 POS .010 .045 .000 .050 .019 .002 
4 IV x POS .373** .177** .132** .113 .031 .012 
 F value 7.204** 1.085 
        
  Perceived behavioural 
control 
Independence commitment
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .179* .045* .032* .233** .067** .054** 
3 POS .028 .046 .001 -.006 .067 .000 
4 IV x POS .299** .134** .088** .271** .138** .071** 
 F value 5.190** 5.374** 
        
  Personal responsibility for reporting Personal cost of reporting 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .265** .083** .069** -.169* .041* .028* 
3 POS -.037 .084 .001 .052 .044 .003 
4 IV x POS .295** .168** .084** .309** .133** .089** 
 F value 6.762** 5.134** 
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Table 23: Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating effects of 
perceived organizational support on external whistle-blowing intentions 
 
Notes: N = 226; SDB = Social desirability bias; POS = Perceived organizational support;  
IV = Independent variable; Standardized Beta-Coefficients are reported; ** p < .01; * p < .05;  
† p < .10; F values at the final step are reported. 
External whistle-blowing intentions 
  Attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing Desired moral approbation
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .075 .026 .005 -.035 .022 .001 
3 POS -.310** .112** .086** -.280** .090** .068** 
4 IV x POS -.151* .134* .021* -.129† .105† .016† 
 F value 5.183** 3.946** 
        
  Perceived behavioural 
control 
Independence commitment
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .137* .040* .019* .081 .027 .006 
3 POS -.300** .125** .085** -.309** .113** .086** 
4 IV x POS -.169* .153* .028* -.076 .119 .006 
 F value 6.056** 4.529** 
        
  Personal responsibility for reporting Personal cost of reporting 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .118† .034† .014† .098 .030 .009 
3 POS -.346** .137** .103** -.249** .092** .061** 
4 IV x POS -.061 .141 .004 .187** .124* .033** 
 F value 5.498** 4.746** 
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Figure 12: Plot of interaction effect of attitudes toward whistle-blowing and perceived 
organizational support on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 13: Plot of interaction effect of perceived behavioural control and perceived 
organizational support on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 14: Plot of interaction effect of independence commitment and perceived 
organizational support on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 15: Plot of interaction effect of personal responsibility for reporting and perceived 
organizational support on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 16: Plot of interaction effect of personal cost of reporting and perceived 
organizational support on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 17: Plot of interaction effect of attitudes toward whistle-blowing and perceived 
organizational support on external whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 18: Plot of interaction effect of perceived behavioural control and perceived 
organizational support on external whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 19: Plot of interaction effect of personal cost of reporting and perceived 
organizational support on external whistle-blowing intentions 
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Table 24: Effects of independent variables on whistle-blowing intentions at low, medium 
and high perceived organizational support (simple slopes analysis)  
 
 Internal Whistle-blowing External Whistle-blowing 
Organizational support levels β SE t β SE t 
Attitudes toward whistle-blowing       
High level organizational support 0.691 0.1118 5.88 ** 0.012 0.100 0.12 
Medium level organizational 
support 
0.247 0.082 3.01 ** 0.161 0.074 2.18* 
Low level organizational support - 0.197 0.109 -1.81 † 0.310 0.093 3.34** 
Desired moral approbation       
High level organizational support NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Medium level organizational 
support 
NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Low level organizational support NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Perceived behavioural control       
High level organizational support 0.491 0.097 5.02 ** 0.023 0.080 0.28 
Medium level organizational 
support 
0.151 0.071 2.12* 0.182 0.058 3.14** 
Low level organizational support - 0.189 0.106 -1.78 † 0.341 0.087 3.94** 
Independence commitment       
High level organizational support 0.607 0.115 5.29** NS NS NS 
Medium level organizational 
support 
0.292 0.079 3.71** NS NS NS 
Low level organizational support -0.023 0.106 - 0.22 NS NS NS 
Personal responsibility for 
reporting 
      
High level organizational support 0.643 0.107 6.03 ** NS NS NS 
Medium level organizational 
support 
0.314 0.073 4.30 ** NS NS NS 
Low level organizational support -0.015 0.099 -0.15 NS NS NS 
Personal cost of reporting       
High level organizational support 0.172 0.092 1.86† 0.217 0.077 2.83** 
Medium level organizational 
support 
- 0.123 0.063 - 1.95† 0.069 0.050 1.40 
Low level organizational support - 0.418 0.084 - 4.95** -0.078 0.070 -1.11 
 
Notes: ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10; SE = Standard errors. 
Table only shows simple slopes for those variables with significant interactions. NS = non-
significant at p > .05. 
 
 
The results of this study show that there was a positive and significant 
relationship between the independent variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural 
control, independence commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and 
internal whistle-blowing intentions among auditors, who perceived moderate and high 
levels of perceived organizational support. There was also a negative and significant 
relationship between personal cost of reporting and internal whistle-blowing intentions. 
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This is consistent with social exchange theory and the norm of reciprocity, where 
external auditors felt more obligated to and were more willing to give back to the 
organization by developing positive attitudes and high whistle-blowing (i.e. prosocial 
behaviour to the organization) (Adebayo, 2005, p. 698). In contrast, those who 
perceived low support may be less inclined to report for fear of reprisals.  
It was also found that when perceived organizational support was low, there 
were positive and significant relationships between the independent variables (attitudes 
and perceived behavioural control) and external whistle-blowing. When perceived 
organizational support was high, there was a significant and positive relationship 
between personal cost of reporting and external whistle-blowing intentions. This 
indicates that when perceived organizational support was high, audit practitioners who 
perceived low personal costs were less likely to whistle-blow externally.  Overall, 
hypothesis 2 (H2) was partially supported insofar as perceived organizational support 
moderated the relationship between the independent variables (attitudes, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment, personal responsibility for reporting 
and personal cost of reporting) and internal whistle-blowing intentions. Furthermore, 
perceived organizational support moderated the relationship between the independent 
variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, and personal cost of reporting) and 
external whistle-blowing intentions (see Table 35). 
 
6.6.2 The moderating effect of group cohesion  
Hypothesis 3 posits that group cohesion would moderate the relationship of each on the 
six independent variables influence on whistle-blowing intentions. Tables 26 and 27 
show the results of the twelve hierarchical multiple regression analyses for the 
moderating effect of group cohesion on internal and external whistle-blowing 
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intentions. Figures 20 to 25 show the graphs drawn for those significant moderating 
effects. Table 28 shows the simple slopes analyses for group cohesion. 
Table 26 shows that group cohesion did not have a significant main effect on 
internal whistle-blowing intentions (p < .05).  It was also found that group cohesion 
significantly moderated the effects of four of the independent variables (attitudes, 
perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, and personal responsibility 
for reporting) on internal whistle-blowing intentions. Table 26 shows that four of the 
group cohesion interaction terms (the four independent variables x group cohesion) 
added significant incremental variance in internal whistle-blowing intentions (attitudes, 
β = -.243, ∆R2 = .056, p < .01; perceived behavioural control, β = -.158, ∆R2 = .024, p < 
.05;  independence commitment (β = -.211, ∆R2 = .042,  p < .01; and personal 
responsibility for reporting, β = -.223, ∆R2 = .048, p < .01). These results indicated that 
the relationships between the independent variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural 
control, personal responsibility for reporting and independence commitment) and 
internal whistle-blowing intentions were stronger and positive at lower levels of group 
cohesion than at higher levels. Desired moral approbation was marginally supported at 
p < .10 level.  
Results from simple slope analysis confirmed all significant interactions derived 
from the regression analyses. In the case of attitudes, perceived behavioural control, 
personal responsibility for reporting and independence commitment,  the pattern of the 
interactions as revealed by the graphs (Figures 20 to 23), showed that when group 
cohesion was low, there were significant and positive relationships between these 
variables and internal whistle-blowing (p < .01). For example, Table 28 shows that the 
effects of attitudes (t = 4.45, p < .01), perceived behavioural control (t = 3.53, p < .01), 
independence commitment (t = 4.63, p < .01) and personal responsibility for reporting 
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(t = 5.23, p < .01) were significant and positively related to internal whistle-blowing, 
when group cohesion was low. However, the relationships between the independent 
and dependent variables were non-significant, when group cohesion was high (p > .05).   
Group cohesion significantly moderated the effects of independence 
commitment and personal cost of reporting on external whistle-blowing intentions (p < 
.05). Tables 27 and 28 show the significant and non-significant interactions from the 
regression and simple slopes analyses, respectively. Table 27 shows that two of the 
group cohesion interaction terms (the two independent variables x group cohesion) 
added significant incremental variance in external whistle-blowing intentions 
(independence commitment, β = -.200, ∆R2 = .038, p < .01; and personal cost of 
reporting, β = .141, ∆R2 = .020, p < .05). Simple slopes analysis in Table 28 shows that 
under high levels of group cohesion, personal cost of reporting is positively associated 
with external whistle-blowing intentions (t = 2.48, p < .05) (see Figure 25). This may 
suggest that where individuals perceive high personal costs, the need for some form of 
group support could encourage external whistle-blowing. Table 28 also shows that 
when group cohesion was low, the effect of independence commitment was 
significantly and positively related to external whistle-blowing (t = 3.10, p < .01) (see 
Figure 24).  The variable, attitudes, was marginally supported (p < .10) (Table 27).  
Overall, group cohesion moderated the relationship between only four of the six 
independent variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independence 
commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and internal whistle-blowing 
intentions. In addition, group cohesion moderated the relationship of the independent 
variables (independence commitment and personal cost of reporting) and external 
whistle-blowing intentions. Thus, hypothesis 3 (H3) was partially supported (see Table 
35). 
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Social control theory (Hirschi and Stark, 1969) suggests that individuals’ 
personalities may be confined when there is high cohesiveness in groups. In high 
cohesive groups, audit staff’s views are likely to be highly influenced, whereas in low 
cohesive groups, individuals may be tempted to seek remedial action outside of the 
group. If there are no strong ties or affiliation with the audit team in terms of perceived 
solidarity (i.e. low cohesiveness) or perceived social support, an auditor who dissents is 
more likely to report outside of the group. At the same time, it is possible that where 
perceived cohesiveness is high, dissenters are more likely to step outside of the group 
and engage in critical thinking to make ethical decisions. At times, decisions are made 
based on how the group will most likely benefit from the action taken.  Groupthink 
may result in the making of ethical and unethical decisions as these decisions are often 
made in the best interest of the group. If the group stands to benefit, the group may 
sometimes encourage dysfunctional or unethical behaviours by individuals within the 
group, regardless of how ethical the act may appear.   
Membership in cohesive groups may remove the general inhibitions that 
prevent individuals from harming others by generating the perception that fellow group 
members will support their actions even when they are unethical. Narayanan et al. 
(2006, p. 129) argued that the level of cohesion has an influence on the individual’s 
perceptions of the ethicality of an action and his or her willingness to engage in 
unethical behaviour. Thus, cohesion may increase the individual’s intention to engage 
in unethical acts, given fellow group members’ validation of the action. Narayanan et 
al. (2006) further argues that membership in groups may foster a belief of shared 
responsibility when acting ethically or unethically. In more cohesive groups, members 
are more likely to engage in unethical behaviour that benefits the group and self (see 
Table 25). 
 
 
 
 229
Table 25: A typology of unethical actions 
 
 Benefits self No impact on self Harm self 
Benefits group Mutual Charitable Martyr 
No impact on group Self-interest Neutral Masochist 
Harms group Egoistic Vindictive Spiteful 
Adopted from Narayanan et al. (2006, p. 131) 
 
Cohesion can restrain the individual’s behaviour, if they belong to groups which 
have strong ties. For example, in the case of Enron, Sherron Watkins stepped outside of 
the group and reported to Kenneth Lay to seek redress, due to the perceived cohesion of 
that group. Some will view her as a martyr and others will view her act as being 
spiteful. In a situation where there is a perceived sense of betrayal, the group member 
may decide that he or she is no longer committed to the group. In this study, the low 
cohesiveness tended to have a positive influence on internal whistle-blowing. 
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Table 26: Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating effects of group 
cohesion on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
 
Notes: N = 226; SDB = Social desirability bias; IV = Independent variable; Standardized Beta-
Coefficients are reported; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10; F values at the final step are reported. 
 
 
 
Internal whistle-blowing intentions 
  Attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing 
Desired moral 
approbation 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .180* .045* .032* .061 .017 .004 
3 Group Cohesion .045 .047 .002 .021 .017 .000 
4 IV x Group 
Cohesion 
-.243** .103** .056** -.125† .032† .015† 
 F value 3.857** 1.116 
        
  Perceived behavioural control Independence commitment 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .179* .045* .032* .233** .067** .054** 
3 Group Cohesion .043 .047 .002 .047 .069 .002 
4 IV x Group 
Cohesion 
-.158* .071* .024** -.211** .111** .042** 
 F value 2.576* 4.182** 
        
  Personal responsibility for 
reporting 
Personal cost of reporting 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .265** .083** .069** -.169* .041* .028* 
3 Group Cohesion .052 .085 .003 .012 .041 .000 
4 IV x Group 
cohesion 
-.223** .134** .048** -.063 .045 .004 
 F value 5.167** 1.590 
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Table 27: Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating effects of 
group cohesion on external whistle-blowing intentions 
 
External whistle-blowing intentions 
  Attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing 
Desired moral 
approbation 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .075 .026 .005 -.035 .022 .001 
3 Group Cohesion .119† .040† .013† .101 .032 .010 
4 IV x Group 
Cohesion 
-.117† .053† .013† -.004 .032 .000 
 F value 1.863† 1.100 
        
  Perceived behavioural control Independence 
commitment 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .137* .040* .019* .081 .027 .006 
3 Group Cohesion .127† .055† .015† .117 .040 .013 
4 IV x Group 
Cohesion 
-.061 .059 .004 -.200** .078** .038** 
 F value 2.082† 2.831* 
        
  Personal responsibility for 
reporting 
Personal cost of reporting 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .118† .034† .014† .098 .030 .009 
3 Group Cohesion .122† .049† .014† .106 .041 .011 
4 IV x Group 
cohesion 
-.032 .050 .001 .141* .061* .020* 
 F value 1.751 2.159* 
 
Notes: N = 226; SDB = Social desirability bias; IV = Independent variable; Standardized Beta-
Coefficients are reported; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10; F values at the final step are reported. 
 
 
 
 
 232
Table 28: Effects of independent variables on whistle-blowing intentions at low, medium 
and high group cohesion (simple slopes analysis) 
 
 Internal Whistle-blowing External whistle-blowing 
Group cohesion levels β SE t β SE t 
Attitudes toward whistle-
blowing 
      
High level group cohesion -0.038 0.110 -0.34 NS NS NS 
Medium level group cohesion 0.246 0.103 2.38* NS NS NS 
Low level group cohesion 0.530 0.119 4.45** NS NS NS 
Desired moral approbation       
High level group cohesion NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Medium level group cohesion NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Low level group cohesion NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Perceived behavioural 
control 
      
High level group cohesion 0.018 0.102 0.17 NS NS NS 
Medium level group cohesion 0.181 0.082 2.19* NS NS NS 
Low level group cohesion 0.344 0.097 3.53** NS NS NS 
Independence commitment       
High level group cohesion 0.043 0.107 0.41 -0.089 0.090 -0.98 
Medium level group cohesion 0.299 0.101 2.95** 0.112 0.070 1.59 
Low level group cohesion 0.554 0.120 4.63** 0.312 0.101 3.10** 
Personal responsibility for 
Reporting 
      
High level group cohesion 0.052 0.098 0.53 NS NS NS 
Medium level group cohesion 0.292 0.092 3.18** NS NS NS 
Low level group cohesion 0.531 0.101 5.23** NS NS NS 
Personal cost of reporting       
High level group cohesion NS NS NS 0.187 0.075 2.48* 
Medium level group cohesion NS NS NS 0.075 0.051 1.46 
Low level group cohesion NS NS NS -0.037 0.075 -0.50 
 
Notes:   ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10. Table only shows simple slopes for those variables 
with significant interactions. NS = non-significant. SE = Standard errors. 
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Figure 20: Plot of interaction effect of attitudes toward whistle-blowing and group cohesion on 
internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 21: Plot of interaction effect of perceived behavioural control and group cohesion on 
internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 22: Plot of interaction effect of independence commitment and group cohesion on internal 
whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 23: Plot of interaction effect of personal responsibility for reporting and group cohesion on 
internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 24: Plot of interaction effect of independence commitment and group cohesion on external 
whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 25: Plot of interaction effect of personal cost of reporting and group cohesion on external 
whistle-blowing intentions 
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6.6.3 The moderating effect of team norms on whistle-blowing intentions 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) posits that team norms should moderate the relationship between the 
independent variables and whistle-blowing intentions. Tables 29 and 30 show the 
results of the twelve hierarchical multiple regression analyses for the moderating effect 
of team norms on internal and external whistle-blowing intentions. Figures 26 to 31 
show the graphs drawn for those significant moderating effects. Table 31 shows the 
simple slopes analyses for team norms. 
Team norms significantly moderated the effects of four of the independent 
variables (attitudes, desired moral approbation, independence commitment and 
personal responsibility for reporting) on internal whistle-blowing intentions.  Table 29 
shows that four of the team norms interaction terms (the four independent variables x 
team norms) added significant incremental variance in internal whistle-blowing 
intentions (attitudes, β = .184, ∆R2 = .032, p < .01; desired moral approbation, β = .135, 
∆R2 = .018, p < .05); independence commitment, β = .242, ∆R2 = .057, p < .01; and 
personal responsibility for reporting, β = .149, ∆R2 = .022, p < .05). These results 
indicated that the relationships between the independent variables (attitudes, desired 
moral approbation, independence commitment and personal responsibility for 
reporting) and internal whistle-blowing intentions were stronger and positive at higher 
levels of team norms than at lower levels.  
 Results from simple slope analyses confirmed all significant interactions 
derived from the regression analyses (see Table 31).  In the case of attitudes, desired 
moral approbation, independence commitment and personal responsibility for 
reporting, the pattern of the interactions as revealed by the graphs (Figures 26 to 29), 
showed that when team norms were high, there were significant and positive 
relationships between these variables and internal whistle-blowing (p < .05). For 
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example, the simple slopes analyses in Table 31 shows the significant effects of 
attitudes (t = 3.59, p < .01), desired moral approbation (t = 2.06, p < .05), independence 
commitment (t = 5.09, p < .01) and personal responsibility for reporting (t = 4.39, p < 
.01).  However, when team norms were low, attitudes, desired moral approbation, 
independence commitment and personal responsibility for reporting had non-significant 
effects on internal whistle-blowing intentions.   
Team norms significantly moderated the effects of attitudes and independence 
commitment on external whistle-blowing (see Table 30 and Figures 30 and 31). Table 
30 shows that two of the team norms interaction terms (the two independent variables x 
team norms) added significant incremental variance in external whistle-blowing 
intentions (attitudes, β = .165, ∆R2 = .026, p < .05; and independence commitment, β = 
.172, ∆R2 = .029, p < .05). Simple slopes analysis further confirmed that the effects of 
attitudes (t = 2.60, p < .01) and independence commitment (t = 2.73, p < .01) were 
positive and significant (Table 31). These results indicate that the relationships between 
the independent variables (attitudes and independence commitment) and external 
whistle-blowing intentions were stronger and positive at higher levels of team norms 
than at lower levels (Figures 30 and 31). 
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Table 29: Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating effects of team 
norms on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
 
Notes: N = 226; SDB = Social desirability bias; IV = Independent variable; Standardized Beta-
Coefficients are reported; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10; F values at the final step are reported. 
 
Internal whistle-blowing intentions 
  Attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing 
Desired moral 
approbation 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .180* .045* .032* .061 .017 .004 
3 Team Norms -.082 .051 .006 -.059 .020 .003 
4 IV  x Team 
Norms 
.184** .084** .032** .135* .038* .018* 
 F value 3.055** 1.327* 
        
  Perceived behavioural control Independence commitment 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .179* .045* .032* .233** .067** .054** 
3 Team Norms -.079 .051 .006 -.073 .072 .005 
4 IV  x Team 
Norms 
.050 .054 .002 .242** .129** .057** 
 F value 1.899† 4.970** 
        
  Personal responsibility for 
reporting 
Personal cost of reporting 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .265** .083** .069** -.169* .041* .028* 
3 Team Norms -.083 .089 .007 -.055 .044 .003 
4 IV x Team 
Norms 
.149* .111* .022* -.064 .048 .004 
 F value 4.188** 1.699 
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Table 30: Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating effects of team 
norms on external whistle-blowing intentions 
 
Notes: N = 226; SDB = Social desirability bias; IV = Independent variable; Standardized Beta-
Coefficients are reported; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10; F values at the final step are reported. 
External whistle-blowing intentions 
  Attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing 
Desired moral 
approbation 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .075 .026 .005 -.035 .022 .001 
3 Team Norms -.100 .036 .009 -.085 .029 .007 
4 IV x Team 
Norms 
.165* .062* .026* .014 .029 .000 
 F value 2.196* 1.004 
        
  Perceived behavioural control Independence commitment 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .137* .040* .019* .081 .027 .006 
3 Team Norms -.107 .050 .011 -.094 .036 .008 
4 IV x Team 
Norms 
.064 .054 .004 .172* .064* .029* 
 F value 1.921† 2.309* 
        
  Personal responsibility for 
reporting 
Personal cost of reporting 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .118† .034† .014† .098 .030 .009 
3 Team Norms -.101 .044 .010 -.086 .037 .007 
4 IV x Team 
Norms 
.069 .049 .005 -.074 .043 .005 
 F value 1.718 1.497 
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Table 31: Effects of independent variables on whistle-blowing intentions at low, medium 
and high team norms (simple slopes analysis) 
 
 Internal whistle-blowing External whistle-blowing 
Team norm levels β SE t β SE t 
Attitudes toward whistle-
blowing 
      
High level team norms 0.440 0.123 3.59** 0.266 0.102 2.60** 
Medium level team norms 0.204 0.083 2.46* 0.092 0.069 1.32 
Low level team norms -0.032 0.120 -0.26 -0.083 0.100 -0.82 
Desired moral approbation       
High level team norms 0.364 0.176 2.06* NS NS NS 
Medium level team norms 0.134 0.116 1.16 NS NS NS 
Low level team norms -0.096 0.157 -0.61 NS NS NS 
Perceived behavioural control       
High level team norms NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Medium level team norms NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Low level team norms NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Independence commitment       
High level team norms 0.600 0.118 5.09** 0.275 0.100 2.73** 
Medium level team norms 0.296 0.076 3.91** 0.097 0.065 1.50 
Low level team norms -0.008 0.108 -0.07 -0.081 0.092 -0.88 
Personal responsibility for 
reporting 
      
High level team norms 0.454 0.103 4.39** NS NS NS 
Medium level team norms 0.284 0.071 3.99** NS NS NS 
Low level team norms 0.113 0.105 1.08 NS NS NS 
Personal cost of reporting       
High level team norms NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Medium level team norms NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Low level team norms NS NS NS NS NS NS 
 
Notes: ** p < .01; * p < .05. Table only shows simple slopes for those variables with 
significant interactions at p < .05 level. SE = Standard errors. 
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Figure 26: Plot of interaction effect of attitudes toward whistle-blowing and team norms on 
internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 27: Plot of interaction effect of desired moral approbation and team norms on internal 
whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 28: Plot of interaction effect of independence commitment and team norms on internal 
whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 29: Plot of interaction effect of personal responsibility for reporting and team norms on 
internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 30: Plot of interaction effect of attitudes toward whistle-blowing and team norms on 
external whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 31: Plot of interaction effect of independence commitment and team norms on external 
whistle-blowing intentions 
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The norms, formed within groups, serve to regulate the behaviour of members. Thus, 
group norms may support ethical behaviour and/or unethical behaviour (Narayanan et 
al., 2006). These authors argued that groups that possess strong norms for acting 
ethically would be more likely to influence ethical behaviour. Norms of the team tend 
to govern the team’s behaviour and as such members will respond based on their 
expectations of the team’s consensus. These results show that the variable, team norms, 
as operationalised to include the testing of the ethical norms of the team, has a 
significant moderating effect on internal and external whistle-blowing intentions. This 
finding is important, given that Hooks et al. (1994) had suggested that group norms 
were likely to colour the perceptions of the seriousness of the wrongdoing, and possibly 
the ethical behaviour of the individual.  
In this study, team norms (inclusive of ethical norms) were found to have a 
positive influence on internal whistle-blowing intentions. Overall, team norms 
moderated the relationship of four independent variables (attitudes, desired moral 
approbation, independence commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and 
internal whistle-blowing intentions. However, support was found for the moderating 
effect of team norms on the relationship of only two independent variables (attitudes 
and independence commitment) and external whistle-blowing. Thus, hypothesis 4 was 
partially supported (See Table 35). 
 
6.6.4 The moderating effect of perceived moral intensity on whistle-blowing 
intentions 
Hypothesis 5 posits that moral intensity should moderate the relationship between the 
independent variables and whistle-blowing intentions. Tables 32 and 33 show the 
results of the twelve hierarchical multiple regression analyses for the moderating effect 
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of moral intensity on internal and external whistle-blowing intentions. Figures 32 to 37 
show the graphs drawn for those significant moderating effects. Table 34 show the 
simple slopes analyses for moral intensity. 
Moral intensity significantly moderated the effects of five of the independent 
variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, 
personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) on internal whistle-
blowing intentions.  Table 32 shows that the five moral intensity interaction terms (the 
five independent variables x moral intensity) added significant incremental variance in 
internal whistle-blowing intentions (attitudes, β = .287, ∆R2 = .077, p < .01; perceived 
behavioural control, β = .196, ∆R2 = .037, p < .01; independence commitment, β = 
.259, ∆R2 = .061, p < .01; personal responsibility for reporting, β = .242, ∆R2 = .056, p 
< .01; and personal cost of reporting, β = .179, ∆R2 = .031, p < .05). These results 
indicated that the relationship between the independent variables (attitudes, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment and personal responsibility for 
reporting) and internal whistle-blowing intentions were stronger and positive at higher 
levels of moral intensity than at lower levels. The relationship between personal cost of 
reporting and internal whistle-blowing intentions was stronger and negative at lower 
levels of moral intensity. Thus, audit staff who perceived high personal costs attached 
to whistle-blowing, were more inclined to hold lower internal whistle-blowing 
intentions, when the issue has low moral intensity. 
Results from simple slope analyses confirmed all significant interactions 
derived from the regression analyses. In the case of attitudes, perceived behavioural 
control, independence commitment and personal responsibility for reporting, the 
pattern of the interactions as revealed by the graphs (Figures 32 to 35) showed that 
when moral intensity levels were high, there were significant and positive relationships 
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between these variables and internal whistle-blowing (p < .05). For example, the simple 
slopes analysis in Table 34 shows the significant effects of attitudes (t = 4.95, p < .01), 
perceived behavioural control (t = 3.88, p < .01), independence commitment (t = 5.19, 
p < .01) and personal responsibility for reporting (t = 5.44, p < .01).  However, when 
moral intensity levels were low, attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independence 
commitment and personal responsibility for reporting were not significantly related to 
internal whistle-blowing intentions. In terms of personal cost, when moral intensity was 
low, personal cost of reporting had a negative and significant effect on intentions to 
whistle-blow internally (t = -3.58, p < .01), but it had no significant effect when moral 
intensity was high (Table 34 and Figure 36). 
Moral intensity significantly moderated the effect of desired moral approbation 
on external whistle-blowing. Desired moral approbation contributed significantly to the 
variance in external whistle-blowing intentions (β = -.141, ∆R2 = .018, p < .05) (Table 
33).  This result indicated that the relationship between desired moral approbation and 
external whistle-blowing intentions was stronger and positive at lower levels of moral 
intensity than at higher levels (Figure 37). Thus, when there was no perceived threat 
(low moral intensity), audit staff, with a high need for moral approval, were more likely 
to whistle-blow externally.  
Flannery and May (2000) theorized that harm represents strong situations, while 
little harm represents weak situations. Flannery and May (2000) found that: 
Managers made more decisions that we characterised as more ethical (as 
opposed to less ethical) when the magnitude of consequences was high than 
when it was low….Furthermore, the managers’ attitudes, subjective norms, self-
efficacy, organizational climates, and considerations of financial costs 
influenced their decision intentions more when the magnitude of consequences 
was low than when it was high. (p. 657) 
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The findings of the current study show the opposite, that where there is 
potential harm to the firm or probability of misstatement of the financial statements to 
users, the individual auditor will report internally, but externally becomes another 
matter. Hence, the non-significant findings of the moderating effect of moral intensity 
on the relationship between the majority of the independent variables and external 
whistle-blowing intentions. 
The findings also show that there was greater support for the moderating effect 
of moral intensity on the variables influencing internal whistle-blowing rather than 
external whistle-blowing. Overall, moral intensity moderated the relationship between 
five of the independent variables (except desired moral approbation) and internal 
whistle-blowing intentions, while it moderated only the relationship of desired moral 
approbation and external whistle-blowing intentions. Thus, partial support was found 
for hypothesis 5 (H5) with respect to internal whistle-blowing, but limited support for 
external whistle-blowing (See Table 35). The results show that moral intensity (as 
operationalised by magnitude of consequences, seriousness and probability of effect) is 
critical to whistle-blowing intentions. This study supplements the paucity of research 
that has tested for its moderating influence on whistle-blowing intentions. 
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Table 32: Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating effects of 
perceived moral intensity on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
 
 
Notes: N = 226; SDB = Social desirability bias; IV = Independent variable;  
PMI = Perceived moral intensity; Standardized Beta-Coefficients are reported; 
** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10; F values at the final step are reported. 
 
Internal whistle-blowing intentions 
  Attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing Desired moral approbation
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .180* .045* .032* .061 .017 .004 
3 PMI -.034 .046 .001 -.032 .018 .001 
4 IV x PMI .287** .123** .077** .008 .018 .000 
 F value 4.680** 0.615 
        
  Perceived behavioural control Independence commitment
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .179* .045* .032* .233** .067** .054** 
3 PMI -.026 .046 .001 -.045 .069 .002 
4 IV x PMI .196** .083** .037** .259** .130** .061** 
 F value 3.021** 5.014** 
        
  Personal responsibility for reporting Personal cost of reporting 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .012   .012   
 Gender .014   .014   
 Tenure -.112 .013 .013 -.112 .013 .013 
2 IV .265** .083** .069** -.169* .041* .028* 
3 PMI -.051 .085 .003 -.007 .041 .000 
4 IV x PMI .242** .141** .056** .179* .073* .031* 
 F value 5.497** 2.628* 
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Table 33: Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating effects of 
perceived moral intensity on external whistle-blowing intentions 
 
Notes: N = 226; SDB = Social desirability bias; IV = Independent variable;  
PMI = Perceived moral intensity; Standardized Beta-Coefficients are reported;  
** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10; F values at the final step are reported. 
 
External whistle-blowing intentions 
  Attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing Desired moral approbation
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .075 .026 .005 -.035 .022 .001 
3 PMI -.212** .070** .044** -.209** .060** .038** 
4 IV x PMI -.099 .079 .009 -.141* .078* .018* 
 F value 2.873* 2.847* 
        
  Perceived behavioural control Independence commitment
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .137* .040* .019* .081 .027 .006 
3 PMI -.213** .084** .045** -.215** .072** .045** 
4 IV x PMI -.111 .096 .012 -.041 .073 .002 
 F value 3.555** 2.651* 
        
  Personal responsibility for reporting Personal cost of reporting 
Step Variable β R2 ∆R2 β R2 ∆R2 
1 SDB .085   .085   
 Gender .078   .078   
 Tenure -.062 .021 .021 -.062 .021 .021 
2 IV .118† .034† .014† .098 .030 .009 
3 PMI -.221** .082** .047** -.198** .069** .039** 
4 IV x PMI -.035 .083 .001 .034 .070 .001 
 F value 3.027** 2.527* 
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Table 34: Effects of independent variables on whistle-blowing intentions at low, medium 
and high moral intensity (simple slopes analysis) 
 
 Internal Whistle-blowing External Whistle-blowing 
Moral intensity levels β SE t β SE t 
Attitudes toward whistle-
blowing 
      
High level moral intensity 0.569 0.120 4.95** NS NS NS 
Medium level moral intensity 0.234 0.081 2.89** NS NS NS 
Low level moral intensity -0.128 0.116 -1.11 NS NS NS 
Desired moral approbation       
High level moral intensity NS NS NS -0.172 0.148 -1.16* 
Medium level moral intensity NS NS NS 0..013 0.105 0.13 
Low level moral intensity NS NS NS 0.199 0.125 1.59* 
Perceived behavioural control       
High level moral intensity 0.362 0.093 3.88** NS NS NS 
Medium level moral intensity 0.159 0.070 2.25* NS NS NS 
Low level moral intensity -0.044 0.107 -0.41 NS NS NS 
Independence commitment       
High level moral intensity 0.595 0.115 5.19** NS NS NS 
Medium level moral intensity 0.280 0.076 3.68** NS NS NS 
Low level moral intensity -0.035 0.112 -0.31 NS NS NS 
Personal responsibility for 
reporting 
      
High level moral intensity 0.556 0.102 5.44** NS NS NS 
Medium level moral intensity 0.297 0.070 4.25** NS NS NS 
Low level moral intensity 0.038 0.097 0.39 NS NS NS 
Personal cost of reporting       
High level moral intensity 0.017 0.089 0.19 NS NS NS 
Medium level moral intensity -0.152 0.065 -2.32* NS NS NS 
Low level moral intensity -0.321 0.090 -3.58** NS NS NS 
 
Notes:   ** p < .01; * p < .05. Table only shows simple slopes for those variables with 
significant interactions. NS=Non-significant. SE = Standard errors. 
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Figure 32: Plot of interaction effect of attitudes toward whistle-blowing and perceived moral 
intensity on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 33: Plot of interaction effect of perceived behavioural control and perceived moral intensity 
on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 34: Plot of interaction effect of independence commitment and perceived moral intensity on 
internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 35: Plot of interaction effect of personal responsibility for reporting and perceived moral 
intensity on internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 36: Plot of interaction effect of personal cost of reporting and perceived moral intensity on 
internal whistle-blowing intentions 
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Figure 37: Plot of interaction effect of desired moral approbation and perceived moral intensity on 
external whistle-blowing intentions 
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6.7 Summary of the major findings based on the hypotheses  
Table 35 summarizes the results for the hypotheses tested in this chapter. Overall, 
support was found for the main effects of all of the independents variables (except 
desired moral approbation) on internal whistle-blowing intentions. However, support 
was found for only perceived behavioural control effect on external whistle-blowing. 
Partial support was found for the moderating effects of perceived organizational 
support, group cohesion, team norms and moral intensity on the relationship between 
the majority of independent variables and internal whistle-blowing intentions. Partial 
support was also found for the moderating effects of perceived organizational support, 
team norms, group cohesion, and moral intensity on the relationships between fewer 
independent variables and external whistle-blowing intentions. 
Given that the study found greater support for direct and moderating effects for 
internal whistle-blowing (rather than external whistle-blowing), it demonstrates that 
factors responsible for internal whistle-blowing may be more easily identifiable than 
those responsible for driving external whistle-blowing.  This is not surprising, given 
that prior evidence has revealed that auditors are reluctant to engage in external 
whistle-blowing (Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001) and the factors associated with this 
form of whistle-blowing are even more complex to grasp. External whistle-blowing 
may not be a simple or straightforward process, since there may be a myriad of 
extraneous variables that can account for the failure of moral intensity, team norms, 
perceived organizational support, and group cohesion to moderate the effects of most of 
the independent variables on external whistle-blowing.  
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Table 35: Summary of results of hypotheses 
Hypotheses Results for Internal Whistle-blowing Intentions 
Results for External 
Whistle-blowing 
Intentions 
Main Effects (Independent 
Variables) 
  
H1a Attitudes toward 
whistle-blowing 
Full Support  (+) No Support 
H1b Desired moral 
approbation 
No Support  No Support 
H1c Perceived 
behavioural control 
Full Support  (+) Full Support (+) 
H1d Independence 
commitment 
Full Support  (+) No Support 
H1e Personal 
responsibility for 
reporting 
Full Support  (+) Marginal Support (+)  
(p < .10) 
H1f Personal cost of 
reporting 
Full Support  (-) No Support 
Moderators   
H2 Perceived 
organizational 
support (POS) 
Partial Support 
When POS is high, 
1) Attitudes  (+) 
2) Perceived behavioural  
    control  (+)  
3) Independence  
    commitment (+) 
4) Personal responsibility for  
    reporting (+) 
 
When POS is low, 
5) Personal cost of reporting 
    (-) 
 
Partial Support 
When POS is low, 
1) Attitudes (+) 
2) Perceived behavioural 
    control (+) 
3) Desired moral  
    approbation (+)  
    (marginally supported  
    at p < .10) 
 
When POS is high, 
4) Personal cost of  
    reporting (+) 
H3 Group cohesion  Partial Support 
When group cohesion is low,  
1) Attitudes  (+)  
2) Perceived behavioural 
    control  (+)  
3) Independence  
    commitment  (+)  
4) Personal responsibility for  
    reporting  (+)  
5) Desired moral approbation 
    (+) (marginally supported  
    at p < .10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partial Support  
When group cohesion is 
low, 
1) Independence  
    commitment (+) 
2) Attitudes (+)  
    (marginally supported 
    at p < .10) 
 
When group cohesion is 
high, 
3) Personal cost of  
    reporting (+) 
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Hypotheses Results for Internal Whistle-blowing Intentions 
Results for External 
Whistle-blowing 
Intentions 
H4 Team Norms Partial Support 
When team norms are high, 
1) Attitudes  (+)  
2) Desired moral approbation  
    (+)  
3) Independence  
    commitment  (+) 
4) Personal responsibility for 
    reporting (+)  
 
Partial support  
When team norms are 
high,  
1) Attitudes (+)  
2) Independence 
    commitment (+) 
H5 Perceived Moral 
Intensity 
Partial Support 
When moral intensity is high,  
1) Attitudes  (+)  
2) Perceived behavioural  
    control (+)  
3) Independence  
    commitment (+) 
4) Personal responsibility for  
    reporting  (+) 
 
When moral intensity is low,  
5) Personal cost of reporting 
    (-)   
Partial Support 
When moral intensity is 
low,  
1) Desired moral  
    approbation (+)  
 
Notes: Partial support indicates where the moderator did not interact significantly with all of 
the independent variables. 
(+) Positive effect;  (-) Negative effect. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION OF QUALITATIVE AND 
QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS  
 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the interview stage of the research. The chapter 
first explores the meaning, willingness and channels of whistle-blowing. The chapter 
also illustrates the influence of individual factors (attitudes, desired moral approbation, 
perceived behaviour control, independence commitment, personal responsibility for 
reporting and personal cost of reporting) and the moderating effects of perceived 
organizational support, moral intensity, team norms and group cohesion on auditors’ 
whistle-blowing intentions. It further examines the perceived consequences of whistle-
blowing on the audit firm, the profession and society as well as the recommendations 
offered by interviewees.  
The results from the quantitative phase in chapter 6 are integrated and discussed 
with the qualitative findings. In presenting the results, every effort was made to feature 
the data collected in this section. The data collected tend to cut across themes. 
However, for this study, it was found that combining the data into manageable themes 
provided clarity and consistency and added to the understanding and meaning of the 
results. The themes were explored in relation to what was previously discussed in the 
literature review and the research questions. The aim of the qualitative phase of this 
study is to contextualize the findings from the quantitative stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 258
7.1 Research questions 
The following research questions were used to meet the research objectives. 
Research Question 1: How willing are external auditors to whistle-blow on 
wrongdoing committed by colleagues in the audit firm?  
 
Research Question 2: What are the preferred channels of reporting wrongdoing 
among external auditors? 
 
Research Question 3: What is the role of individual factors on external auditors’ 
ability to whistle-blow? 
 
Research Question 4: What is the role of team and contextual factors on external 
auditors’ ability to whistle-blow? 
 
Research Question 5: What are the perceived consequences of whistle-blowing 
among external auditors?  
 
Research Question 6: How can whistle-blowing be increased among external 
auditors?  
 
 
7.2 Willingness to report questionable acts 
Research question 1 (RQ1) sought to determine the willingness of external auditors to 
whistle-blow on wrongdoing committed by colleagues in the audit firm. There was 
clear consensus that whistle-blowing involves the internal and external reporting of 
unethical or illegal acts occurring within the audit firms. For example, respondents used 
terms such as unlawful, illegal, unethical, ethical violations and independence 
violations to connote an understanding of whistle-blowing. They felt that unethical or 
illegal acts encompassed how audit firms may conduct business, and how policies or 
principles observed by employees are likely to be manipulated within the audit firms. 
The accounting regulator stated: 
Whistle-blowing, really and truly is a matter of employees. People, who are 
aware of unethical acts that occur within the organization, report to a 
responsible individual who can take the remedial action, which is necessary 
to correct that unethical or illegal act (Accounting regulator - BDWB02). 
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The descriptive statistics from the quantitative phase in chapter 6 revealed that 
auditors perceived that they had a moderately high tendency to report internally. In the 
qualitative phase, most senior audit staff (i.e. the partner and managers) expressed a 
willingness to report wrongdoing. This willingness seemed to be motivated by factors 
such as moral obligation, preservation of the integrity of the profession and audit firm, 
public trust, position within the firm, level of materiality, actual evidence, the type of 
wrongdoing and the need to reduce acts of negligence. The regulators and practitioners 
took a moralistic stance, whereby they felt that auditors are expected to uphold the trust 
placed by society.  
The legal regulator argued that: 
There is a responsibility which is first owed to the people who stand to be 
hurt, when these things happen (Legal regulator - BDWB01). 
 
This was corroborated by the accounting regulator, who stated: 
It comes back to the same thing; knowing right from wrong and 
materiality. It truly relates to those factors (Accounting regulator - 
BDWB02). 
 
Thus, based on Rawls’ (1971) notion of justice, auditors should whistle-blow since they 
would be acting within the realm of free speech, based on their perceptions of justice 
and fairness to society. 
The need to preserve the integrity of the profession appeared to fuel the moral 
obligation to report. This is evident from the claim of a senior auditor, who explained: 
As an auditor, the onus is on me because the users and shareholders are not 
in a position to know what’s going on, unless I expose it in some way 
(Senior auditor - BDWB11). 
 
 
The regulators, partners and audit managers were willing to whistle-blow 
internally in order to uphold the integrity of the profession, the audit firm and maintain 
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high morals. This may support Kant’s (1964) deontological view that there are issues 
that are inherently right or wrong, since one has a duty to do what is right. These 
findings further support De George’s (2006) view that whistle-blowing may be morally 
driven. However, the focus groups, practitioners, juniors and audit seniors noted that 
the willingness to report wrongdoing was encouraged by the open-door policy within 
the audit firms, but moderated by their fear of reprisals and the need to have high 
organizational support.  
Some respondents felt that actual evidence of the wrongdoing and the need to 
avoid negligence claims in the firms could play a critical role in their intentions to 
whistle-blow. For example, one practitioner suggested: 
Quite willing, but it must be factual and not based on suspicion. There 
must be a supporting body of evidence to justify the claim (One 
practitioner - BDWB03).  
 
While an audit manager suggested: 
 
If it is a case of a gross negligent act, and if it affects wider society, it is 
ethical and necessary to say something (An audit manager - BDWB08). 
  
In contrast, fear of reprisals was a major concern and served as a deterrent for 
those respondents who expressed unwillingness to report questionable acts within the 
firms. These fears were particularly more noticeable among the junior staff, less 
experienced managers and a practitioner. Most of the junior members of staff, who 
were younger and less experienced than their senior counterparts, viewed loyalty to the 
organization and other staff as playing a secondary role to self-interest. This is 
corroborated by an audit junior (BDWB14), who commented: 
I would report if it is detrimental to me and other employees. Honestly, 
first though, I would say, ‘myself’ but eventually, outside of thinking about 
myself, I will start thinking about the other employees (Audit junior - 
BDWB14).  
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Self-preservation was also important for one practitioner, who had worked for a long 
time in an international accounting firm. He stated: 
I would not be keen to report it. Certainly, not in the firm! I’d probably be 
more inclined to make that declaration outside of the firm, due to fear of 
reprisals. The structure of the firm needs to be understood, especially due 
to promotion or advancement in the firm (Practitioner - BDWB03) 
 
This revelation appears to be based on the practitioner’s years of experience and 
sound understanding of the culture of the accounting firm, hence the reluctance to 
report. Members in both focus groups demonstrated a general reluctance to report 
wrongdoing (Kaplan, 1995). This reluctance to report seems to be influenced by the 
perceived high cost of reporting, and the impact of the report on the firm and the 
individual (perpetrator), who may be either a colleague or team member.  
Respondents were also asked whether they had observed any wrongdoing and 
their willingness to report. The majority reported that they had not observed any 
wrongdoing. Those respondents, who observed wrongdoing, reported that they were 
not significant enough to warrant a report or be investigated.24 A senior female 
manager, who had observed wrongdoing committed by a friend, shared:  
There was one instance where someone signed something that they should 
not have. Let’s say, sign a form that was meant for a particular person. We 
were friends but I thought about it and it was not right and I did report it. 
It was a struggle but I did the right thing (Senior female manager - 
BDWB08) 
 
This may illustrate the importance of maintaining high moral standards by some 
individuals, even in situations where the act of whistle-blowing may negatively affect 
relationships.  
Overall, the findings from both phases (i.e. quantitative and qualitative) support 
each other. With respect to RQ1, these results indicate a general reluctance to report 
                                                 
24 It is quite possible that respondents may have been unwilling to share sensitive information on actual 
wrongdoing and whistle-blowing experiences within the audit firms.  
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wrongdoing, especially among junior staff members. Table 36 summarises the 
willingness to report wrongdoing from the various groups. 
 
Table 36: Summary of responses on willingness to report wrongdoing 
 
Level of respondents Common themes 
Regulators Willingness to report  
Sole practitioners Mixed willingness to report 
Partner Willingness to report 
Audit managers Willingness to report 
Audit seniors Mixed willingness to report 
Audit juniors General unwillingness to report  
Focus groups Overwhelming unwillingness to report 
 
 
7.3 Channels of reporting wrongdoing 
The results in Chapter 6 found that auditors perceived that internal reporting was the 
more preferred channel to external reporting. Research question 2 (RQ2) explored these 
channels of whistle-blowing among auditors. The consensus amongst the various levels 
of audit practitioners was that the internal channel would be more appropriate for 
reporting wrongdoing within an audit firm. Reasons offered for choosing internal 
reporting included the need to discourage external whistle-blowing, a chance to resolve 
matters internally, the audit firm’s culture and the importance of maintaining 
anonymity and confidentiality.  
Both regulators felt that internal reporting was the preferred option. The legal 
regulator reported: 
Internal should be, at least, the first approach, because you really don’t 
want to encourage people to go outside as the first approach. That is why it 
is important to keep systems in firms or have an alternative channel to the 
main (Legal regulator - BDWB01). 
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While the accounting regulator stated: 
Internal is the most appropriate one to begin with and it also depends on 
the level. Because if something unethical or illegal happens, it is a matter 
for you to try to get the organization to change (Accounting regulator - 
BDWB02). 
 
Audit firms’ staff shared similar perspectives to the regulators. One member of a focus 
group argued: 
If you see something wrong within your organization, it is up to you to 
report it, because your superiors may not. It is then what is done when you 
report it. If you do nothing, it may become more serious. I think if it is your 
organization, it should be reported internally. That should be your first 
step.  
 
Being able to approach the risk and ethics managers and partners appeared 
encouraging for some respondents. A female audit senior shared: 
I would go internal, and then wait a while with our risk management 
partner, and then from there, go external. But I wouldn’t skip 
management. I don’t see the need to go through the anonymous hotline, if it 
will be dealt with appropriately. You have to trust in the process (Female 
audit senior - BDWB12). 
 
Similarly, another female audit senior corroborated this finding, but elaborated further 
by stating: 
I would most likely go to my manager first. In auditing, you always respect 
the chain of command. Nobody likes the idea of someone going over their 
head (Female audit senior - BDWB13). 
 
A male junior staff accountant pointed out: 
It depends on what outcome I want to achieve. Primarily internal first, I do 
not want to ‘air the dirty laundry’. I want to get it corrected first, 
internally (Male junior staff accountant - BDWB17). 
 
Several respondents alluded to the importance of control and anonymity of the 
internal reporting channel.  
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One male audit senior reported: 
Ideally, you should start with anonymous internal reporting. You do that 
internally first and then you will leave the external reporting for where the 
internal systems break down and they do not function (Male audit senior - 
BDWB10). 
 
Corroborating this finding, one senior female manager reported: 
 
Internal channel because I would hope that it is something that can be dealt 
with in-house. I would not want to be the person who ‘rats’ out on my firm. 
I would prefer anonymous (Senior female manager - BDWB08).  
 
Another experienced female manager suggested: 
Internal because it seems a little more sheltered. You feel like you can have 
a little more control over the whole process (Female manager - BDWB07). 
 
Thus, the results from the quantitative phase are supported by the responses 
from the interview phase, whereby the preferred channel for reporting wrongdoing by 
auditors in the sample was internal reporting. The preference for the internal channel in 
this study answers RQ2. This is consistent with the argument of Near and Miceli 
(1995), who suggested that internal reporting is preferred as it allows the organization 
to internally correct the wrongdoing before “airing its dirty linen in public.” 
Furthermore, this finding supports Miceli et al.’s (2009) argument that internal whistle-
blowing may be viewed as prosocial behaviour, exhibited by employees, who wish to 
protect the organization’s reputation. Internal whistle-blowing may be considered as the 
most effective control mechanism for amicable and effective resolution of 
organizational matters (Hooks et al., 1994) and a means of discouraging external 
reporting. This finding contradicts Jubb’s (1999) argument that internal reporting is not 
whistle-blowing. In addition, it is believed that an awareness of the reporting protocol 
of the audit firm may encourage and motivate persons to utilize the available internal 
channels. As a result, the external channels will more likely be engaged, if the internal 
systems fail to live up to their expectations or obligations.  
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Most respondents preferred anonymous internal reporting. The requirement for 
the channel to be anonymous was particularly noticeable among the younger, less 
experienced audit managers and the junior staff. This may signify that the internal 
channel is perceived to provide some measure of safety and control over the process, 
and allows the audit firm the opportunity to effect change. However, the preference for 
anonymous reporting may also suggest the need to allay fear of reprisals associated 
with whistle-blowing.  
 The findings also illustrated that the majority of managers and junior members 
of staff demonstrated a level of trust in their respective organization’s commitment to 
address such issues internally. This confidence may have been fostered by the culture 
of the organization that lends credence to whistle-blowing. As a result, there is the 
likelihood that internal reporting will be more readily utilised. However, most 
respondents felt that the decision to report within the firm might be reduced, if the 
perpetrator was a senior member of staff.   
 
7.4 The role of individual factors on auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions 
This section examined the role of antecedents (individual level factors such as attitudes, 
desired moral approbation, perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, 
personal responsibility for reporting, and personal costs of reporting) on external 
auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions (research question 3 (RQ3)). It further links these 
findings to hypotheses 1a to 1f from the quantitative phase.  
 
7.4.1 Attitudes toward whistle-blowing 
In chapter 6, hypothesis 1a was found to be supported for the main effects of attitudes 
having a direct relationship on auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions. In the interview 
phase, the majority of the respondents felt that the importance of whistle-blowing was 
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directly related to independence beliefs, integrity, trust and preservation of the audit 
firm’s reputation.  A female staff accountant reported: 
Extremely important. …. As an auditor, your responsibility is to be 
independent, to be a representative on behalf of stakeholders. If you see a 
situation going on, and you don’t go to the individual and tell them, it could 
affect the whole auditing profession. Your job is going to be jeopardized 
and your reputation is at stake (Female staff accountant - BDWB14). 
 
Most respondents felt duty bound to report wrongdoing, as failure to do so may 
be detrimental to the audit firm as well as their career prospects. The basic premise of 
the profession is that integrity is its main asset. Most respondents emphasized that the 
importance of being able to report without fear of reprisals could encourage whistle-
blowing. This is clearly evident in the report of one sole practitioner, who stated:  
It is important from the perspective that there must be an avenue where an 
employee can express his concerns without fear of reprisals. A person, who 
is aware that he has this privilege, tends to be more vigilant in his work 
performance because he has recourse (Practitioner - BDWB03).  
 
However, the legal regulator felt that auditors were not inclined to whistle-blow 
(Kaplan, 1995), and blamed the problems in the current global market for this 
reluctance. He stated: 
There is no way or hardly a challenge to find an explanation why these 
things could blow up suddenly and could not have been discovered earlier 
by auditors and accountants. Invariably, you find that auditors and 
accountants are either party to it or choose not to say anything, for 
whatever reason (Legal regulator - BDWB01).   
 
This regulator’s perception seems to agree with Hanlon’s (1994) view that audit firms 
are interested in profit making and that members of staff are indoctrinated to appease 
clients.  
The majority of auditors conceded that the branding of the whistle-blower (hero 
or traitor) may depend on whether the whistle-blowing act protects or damages the 
audit firm’s reputation. These perceptions were formed based on the consequences of 
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reporting, high moral principles and the need to preserve the integrity of the profession 
and the firm. From the accounting regulator’s perspective: 
Valuable information (which may be unethical) may be unearthed which 
could have remained virtually unknown and has the capacity to 
significantly affect the reputation of the audit firm and profession 
(Accounting regulator - BDWB02). 
  
Most respondents felt that labels such as traitor, snitch, rat or troublemaker 
(Near and Miceli, 1995; Camerer, 1996) were attributed to persons who reported their 
colleagues (internally and externally), because it is perceived as a breach of loyalty to 
the audit firm and colleagues. Therefore, any deviation from the perceived norm of 
loyalty by a colleague would be considered as betrayal. Labelling the whistle-blower 
appears to stem from the observer’s perceived consequences of reporting. This was 
especially evident among the junior members of staff, who reported that the whistle-
blower will be considered as a hero or traitor, depending on who stands to benefit. For 
example, if the reputation of the audit firm was preserved, jobs retained and the audit 
firm spared from litigation, then the whistle-blower may be perceived as a hero. 
However, it was felt that if major losses were experienced by the audit firm, then the 
whistle-blower may be considered as a traitor. A partner refuted the labelling by 
pointing out: 
I don’t know that I would use any of those two labels on him: hero or 
traitor. The person would be doing what is expected of him especially, if 
done properly (Partner – BDWB05).  
 
This comment suggests that there may be a vested interest for the partner to be 
informed of any wrongdoing within the audit firm. However, the question that lingers is 
which label (hero or traitor) should be attached, if one reports on a partner within the 
firm. It was noticeable within one focus group that there was a heated debate on the 
labelling of the whistle-blower. One elderly male auditor argued that the whistle-
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blower may be perceived as a traitor, if he or she reports the wrongdoing of top 
management to an external channel. He viewed this as a breach of loyalty, since the 
employee is morally obligated to report it to the owners (i.e. partners). 
 The results from the quantitative phase corroborated responses from the 
interviews in which attitudes toward whistle-blowing are perceived favourably and 
having a positive and direct relationship on auditors’ internal whistle-blowing 
intentions. However, both phases revealed respondents’ fears of the possible 
ramifications associated with whistle-blowing, which may negatively impact the 
profession, the audit firm and the individual’s future career in auditing. Overall, the 
majority deemed whistle-blowing as an important control mechanism in audit firms, as 
it may aid in the identification of any fraudulent or illegal activities within the audit 
firm (Hooks et al., 1994). In addition, respondents felt that the public expects auditors 
to be accountable to them and therefore whistle-blowing is deemed as acting in the 
public’s interest.  
The above findings show that audit staff and regulators agreed that the firm’s 
image should be protected and that auditors are expected to act with integrity and in the 
public’s interest, as supported by Tetlock’s (1985) accountability argument. However, 
there is a general feeling that auditors will be perceived as traitors by the audit firm’s 
hierarchy, if they blow the whistle on the audit firm, and its reputation is subsequently 
tarnished. For instance, the more senior and experienced managers believe that it is the 
client that will perceive the whistle-blower as a traitor, given the perceived loyalties 
and conflicts (ethical, legal and professional restrictions) of the profession, which are 
likely to prevent the reporting of certain information (Mitschow and Langford, 2000). 
Table 37 presents a summary of the responses of the various groups. 
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Table 37: Summary of responses on attitudes toward whistle-blowing 
Level of 
respondents Features of whistle-blowing Level of importance 
Regulators • Unlawful acts 
• Unethical acts 
• Internal and external reporting 
Absolutely important– 
internally and externally 
 
Practitioners 
• Illegal 
• Unethical 
• Unprofessional 
• Internal and external reporting 
• Independence impairment 
 
Mixed importance 
(divided on internal and 
external reporting) 
 
Partner 
• Ethical violations/violations of law 
• Ethical breaches in profession  
• Impaired relationship 
• Reporting to appropriate authority 
within the audit firm 
 
Important - prefers internal 
only 
 
Audit managers 
• Unethical 
• Fraud 
• Ethical issues 
• Unwanted behavioural issues 
• Fraudulent activity 
• Wrongdoing 
• Internal/external reporting 
 
Important - prefers internal 
only 
 
Audit seniors 
• Illegal 
• Unethical 
• Ethical issues 
• Breaches in organizational policies 
and procedures 
• Fraud and theft 
• Internal and external reporting 
 
Important - prefers internal 
only 
 
Audit juniors 
• Breaches in corporate governance 
• Fraudulent activity 
• Impropriety 
• Wrongdoing 
• Reporting to higher authority 
within the firm 
 
Mixed importance, but  
prefers internal only and 
anonymous channel 
 
Focus Groups 
• Illegal 
• Unethical acts  
• Wrongdoing 
• Internal and external reporting 
 
Mixed importance, but  
prefers internal only and 
anonymous channel  
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7.4.2 Desired moral approbation 
In chapter 6, it was hypothesized that desired moral approbation would have a 
significant and positive relationship with whistle-blowing intentions (H1b). The 
quantitative results showed that no support was found for the main effect of this 
variable. The results of the interviews showed that the majority of the respondents 
indicated that self-approval was important for reporting questionable acts and attributed 
this need to their moral upbringing. A practitioner stated:  
The starting point is your internal mechanisms and decisions are based on 
how I was brought up. That is the estimate of how I make my 
determination (Practitioner - BDWB03).  
 
At the same time, the need for approval from others was required by these 
respondents. This is supported by one senior audit manager’s statement:  
Ok, I would say my superiors and family. I guess it is everybody to take 
into consideration. Barbados is small. Your name appears in the papers 
and everybody knows and secondly, because of the trust they have in me 
(Senior audit manager - BDWB08).  
 
There was a noticeable difference in attitudes among less experienced junior 
members of staff, who reported that they needed approval from others to be guided in 
the right direction. This suggests that this group’s apparent uncertainty and 
inexperience about the organizational procedures will result in the need for guidance, 
but most importantly to seek approval from others to remain in a favourable position. 
This sentiment was corroborated by a junior member of staff, who reported: 
Myself. My peers. I guess my close, trustworthy peers because obviously 
they are working with me. To some extent being an auditor, observing the 
rules of the organization, and following my superiors. I would look at that 
for guidance to say, ‘Yeah, it is really my duty to do this’ (Junior member 
of staff - BDWB15). 
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Overall, a significant portion of the audit managers, audit seniors, juniors and focus 
group members needed approval from key referent groups such as superiors, work 
colleagues, peers, and family rather than self approval. 
The results from the quantitative phase support the responses from the interview 
phase, where there was an apparent conflict between the need for self approval and the 
need for approval from others. At times, the need for approval from others (e.g. 
superiors in the audit firm) seemed to take precedence over the need for self-approval. 
For example, the interview results revealed that the more powerful and experienced 
audit staff needed moral approval from themselves and others, while the junior staff 
needed the approval from others to make ethical and whistle-blowing decisions. This is 
consistent with the research of Ryan and Riordan (2000) and Jones and Ryan (1997), 
who focused on individuals’ inability to be congruent, as well as Aristotle (trans. 1934), 
who asserted that people will seek the guidance of significant others in making ethical 
decisions. 
Most respondents agreed that their internal decisions were influenced by 
significant others (May 1992). These findings were consistent with Jones and Ryan’s 
(1997) argument that desired moral approbation (moral approval from oneself and 
others) influenced ethical decision-making. In addition, these findings lend some 
support for the impact of social influences on whistle-blowing intentions (Hooks et al., 
1994). Table 38 summarises the responses from the various groups. 
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Table 38: Summary of responses on desired moral approbation 
 
Level of respondents Common themes 
Regulators Need approval from self -  Moral upbringing 
 
Practitioners Need approval from self  
  Moral upbringing 
  One’s moral compass 
  Concept of right and wrong 
Need approval from self and others – family, work 
colleagues 
 
Partner Need approval from self 
 
Audit managers Need approval from self  
  Moral upbringing  
  Moral compass 
  Strong religious core  
Need approval from others - partners, superiors and 
family 
 
Audit seniors Need approval from self  
  Moral upbringing 
Need approval from others – family and superiors in the 
firm 
 
Audit juniors Need approval from self  
  Moral upbringing  
Need approval from others (family, friends, church, 
peers, and superiors in the firm) 
 
Focus groups Need approval from others – family, work colleagues, 
superiors in the firm 
 
 
7.4.3 Perceived behavioural control 
In chapter 6, hypothesis 1c was found to be supported for the main effect of perceived 
behavioural control having a positive and significant relationship on auditors’ whistle-
blowing to internal and external channels. In the interview phase, the results indicated 
that the majority of respondents reported that they have some measure of control in 
reporting questionable acts. Some of the reasons offered for this apparent difficulty in 
whistle-blowing included the level of the observer and perpetrator within the firm (e.g., 
the difficulty of reporting a partner or superior), loyalty to colleagues, refusal to report 
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out of an abundance of caution, others’ perceptions of reporting the act, negative 
consequences for the whistle-blower,  feelings of discomfort experienced by reporting, 
the degree of anonymity and confidentiality and the close relationship between the 
perpetrator and the recipient of the report.  A junior accountant commented: 
It will be harder to report someone of higher authority than you because of 
fear of victimization. Obviously, if I see something, I would definitely go to 
who I think I could trust in the organization and who can deal with it 
(Junior accountant - BDWB14). 
 
Difficulty in reporting is perceived to be encountered, when the individual 
being reported is on the same or higher level and the process of transmitting the 
information becomes sensitive, as there is the need to approach the matter delicately 
without appearing to have malicious intent. The probability of being able to 
successfully perform such a task is analogous to Bandura’s (1977) concept of self-
efficacy. Hence, there may be the need for caution.  A partner shared: 
Out of an abundance of caution, you wouldn’t want to report something, 
unless you are absolutely sure that the suspicion is correct (Partner - 
BDWB05). 
 
The senior audit director stated: 
I think it is difficult, because the person might really have done something 
wrong. But you think of all the ramifications. You think of the 
consequences of their actions that they would now have to suffer, once you 
make the report, especially if it is someone that you are close to (Senior 
audit director - BDWB07). 
 
This impression can be aligned to Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behaviour, which 
assesses the difficulty in carrying out certain behaviours. In short, a senior audit 
manager, with religious beliefs, summed up the general reluctance (or difficulty) in 
reporting by stating:  
I don’t want to ‘rat out’ on anybody. I mean, I am a nice person. If I tell 
them, they would try to deal with the situation (Senior audit manager - 
BDWB08). 
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These findings suggest that when individuals contemplate reporting 
wrongdoing, a formal assessment of the effect of the personal cost of reporting is 
conducted before action is initiated. This seems to corroborate Latané and Darley’s 
(1968) bystander effect theory which postulates that individuals must 1) be aware 
(cognition) of the wrongdoing, 2) make a decision to act, 3) decide if the bystander has 
personal responsibility to act, 4) choose the appropriate intervention technique and 5) 
perform the required action.25  Therefore, in the process of contemplating whether to 
act or not, the whistle-blower takes into consideration the impact of reporting on the 
perpetrator’s life, and the possible feelings of guilt. 
Of paramount importance is the issue of confidentiality and anonymity, which 
must be guaranteed, due to fear of victimization. If it is perceived that the 
organizational culture does not support whistle-blowing, individuals would be less 
likely to whistle-blow. An audit manager believed that the ability to link the report to 
the whistle-blower and the lack of trust and confidence in the report recipient, are likely 
to make reporting a difficult task. The audit manager commented: 
It depends on whom you are reporting to. Because you are reporting to 
people who are closely linked, you would think longer before you report it. 
Because you would think about whom you are reporting it to. Suppose you 
are working with the same person you want to report on, how would that 
work? (Audit manager - BDWB11).  
 
 
The majority of respondents reported that they did not have absolute control in 
reporting questionable acts. Respondents cited various reasons for this limitation, 
which included the influential position of the perpetrator, anonymity and confidentiality 
                                                 
25 Bystander effect theory arose as a result of the Kitty Genovese 1964 murder in New York City, where 
38 bystanders stood by and watched the murder taking place without intervening, or even calling the 
police (Latané and Darley, 1968). Bystander intervention theory postulates that the greater the number of 
bystanders, the less likely that any bystander will engage in a response. The theory proposes that 
bystanders may justify non-intervention, if they perceive diffusion of responsibility. For example, within 
an audit firm, an individual auditor may not feel responsible for reporting wrongdoing. The justification 
for this inaction may arise due to the auditor’s belief that other members in the firm may either be 
responsible for reporting or may have already reported.  
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of the reporting channel, and the observer’s position in the hierarchical structure of the 
audit firm.  The moderate level of control was evident, when the accounting regulator 
reported: 
Not directly. When you are dealing with a professional, on a professional 
basis, you do not necessarily have that control. But because there is a 
certain amount of respect professionally, you are able to use moral suasion 
to effect change. You don’t want it going further. Once in the public’s eyes, 
it is bad for the profession (Accounting regulator - BDWB02). 
 
Similarly, one audit manager shared: 
I have general control over the behaviour, but not absolute. There is the 
possibility that someone can ignore it or sweep it under the carpet (Audit 
manager - BDWB06). 
 
The general feeling of lack of absolute control filtered down the hierarchical structure 
to the junior members of staff whose perceived notion is that control over reporting is 
not within their mandate. One female junior accountant reported: 
I can only take it to a certain level. But beyond that, I don’t think I have 
any control. The individual that I speak to, of a higher authority, will have 
to go and deal with the situation (Female junior accountant - BDWB14). 
 
This was corroborated by a male junior staff accountant, who reported: 
Only the initial report, but not over what happens after that. It is up to the 
managers after that (Male junior staff accountant (BDWB17). 
 
This assessment was also formulated by the members of the focus groups, who 
reported that they do not have control over reporting wrongdoing, especially if the 
report is being made on the partner. Given the vested interest that partners have in 
clients, focus group members felt that it is the responsibility of the partner to ensure 
that the client acts responsibly, and the partner should lead by example by behaving 
ethically. There was agreement by some senior audit staff, who perceived that they had 
some control over reporting questionable acts.  
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This is supported by one audit senior who stated:  
Yes, our open door policy and our bosses are very receptive to any 
concerns we have (Audit senior - BDWB11). 
 
Another audit senior remarked: 
Our partners, basically, lead by example. They do as they say and are 
exemplary in their care and concern that they extend to others. I don’t see 
any obstacles (Audit senior - BDWB12). 
 
Overall, respondents felt that they did not have absolute control over reporting. 
It is possible that the culture of the audit firm could encourage whistle-blowing, 
increase the feelings of perceived behavioural control to report internally (Park and 
Blenkinsopp, 2009) and in the process increase positive feelings about reporting (self-
efficacy). This is comparable to Broadhead-Fern and White (2006), who envisaged 
self-efficacy as a strong indicator of the intention to follow procedures. Table 39 
summarises the responses for the groups. 
 
Table 39: Summary of responses on perceived behavioural control 
 
Level of respondents Common themes 
Regulators Limited Control 
Practitioners Control 
Partner Control  
Audit managers Some control  
Audit seniors Some control  
Audit juniors No control 
Focus groups No control 
 
 
7.4.4 Link between independence and the ability to report questionable acts 
 
In chapter 6, hypothesis 1d was found to be supported for the main effects of 
independence commitment having a significant and positive relationship on auditors’ 
whistle-blowing intentions internally, but not externally. In the interview phase, the 
majority of respondents conceded that there is a link between being independent and 
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being able to report questionable acts. Mitigating factors reported to illustrate the 
linkages included the core values of audit firm and the profession (e.g. objectivity, 
integrity, independence), and perceived relationships that exist (proximity). The audit 
director reported: 
The more independent you are, perhaps, it makes it a little easier as people 
look to you for your independent stance. It becomes a little more difficult, if 
you are close to the person and there is some kind of attachment (Audit 
director - BDWB07). 
 
While another senior manager elaborated: 
Certainly, I think that, as an auditor, there are certain principles that you 
live by: objectivity, independence, integrity, and being independent almost 
being drilled into you, that this is how you need to be (Senior manager - 
BDWB08). 
 
The junior staff accountants (BDWB14, BDWB15 and BDWB17) respectively 
reported: 
I believe it is easier to rat on somebody you don’t like.  
If it is just your friend, it is going to be hard.  
You are supposed to be objective and act with integrity. If you do not know 
the person, you are more inclined to be questioning. 
 
The respondents pointed out that the individual auditor needed to remain 
independent (objective), although they are hired and paid by the audit firm. This belief 
is based on the profession’s requirements that auditors be independent at all times, even 
if this is in conflict with any unethical acts occurring within the audit firm. The 
majority of the respondents felt that independence is a state of mind that should not 
only be confined to the final audit report, but to all aspects of the audit engagement, 
which will include what happens in the audit firm. 
A partner suggested that integrity played an integral role in reporting 
questionable acts. Given the profession’s requirement to be independent (Gendron et 
al., 2006), interviewees felt that independence commitment influences whistle-blowing 
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intentions, with the likelihood that the individual would be able to withstand any 
pressure. DeAngelo (1981a) has argued that greater independence is likely to result in 
higher audit quality. However, an important finding was the revelation that although 
independence was a motivational factor for reporting within the audit firm, it did not 
have the same effect on reporting externally. 
Thus, the results of the quantitative phase corroborated the findings from the 
interviews. These findings highlighted the importance of independence as a significant 
factor likely to influence the reporting of questionable acts internally, but not 
externally. The closeness of relationships may impact on the ability to report (Gendron 
et al., 2006). Although independence is not necessarily a criterion for whistle-blowing, 
respondents acknowledged that whistle-blowing can be enhanced by independence. 
Table 40 presents the summary responses from the various groups. 
 
Table 40: Summary of responses on independence commitment 
 
Level of respondents Common responses  
Regulators Very important  
Practitioners Very important  
Partner Very important 
Audit managers Very important 
Audit seniors Very important 
Audit juniors Very important 
Focus groups Very important 
 
 
 
7.4.5 Personal responsibility to report questionable acts  
In chapter 6, hypothesis 1e was found to be supported for the main effects of personal 
responsibility having a significant and positive relationship on auditors’ whistle-
blowing intentions internally (p < .05), and marginally significant on external whistle-
blowing intentions (p < .10). The findings in the interviews indicated that the 
 
 
 
 279
respondents agreed that there is a personal responsibility towards others (society, 
shareholders and clients) to report questionable acts, which is not limited to internal 
reporting. These feelings of personal responsibility were derived from a sense of moral 
obligation and the trust placed by society in auditors. One male audit senior reasoned: 
If we agree that the auditor is the watchdog for the shareholders or other 
persons, who may be lacking in knowledge or not have access to 
knowledge, then he is responsible for reporting questionable acts. He is 
acting in the interest of the ignorant (Male audit senior -  BDWB10). 
 
While a highly moral practitioner declared: 
 Yes, I have a responsibility to report. As an external auditor seeing things 
that are irregular in the audit firm and I do not bring it up, what am I 
doing? I’d be acting unprofessionally (Practitioner - BDWB04). 
 
The importance of maintaining public trust was further echoed by one senior 
manager, who stated: 
We do, in terms of the public’s perception and the trust that the public 
place in us. We do have a personal responsibility to do it (Senior manager - 
BDWB08). 
 
 The need to uphold the integrity of the profession and audit firms seemed to 
propel the feelings of personal responsibility.  For example, one audit senior stated: 
Yes. Because, we are basically representatives of the accounting body, and, 
to me by default, that requires us to uphold the integrity of the profession. 
We need to be accountable for each other as well as ourselves (Audit senior 
- BDWB12). 
 
 Overall, the findings of the interviews suggest that there is a certain level of 
trust placed in auditors by society, with the expectation that auditors will act ethically 
as they are basically representatives of society (Cowton, 2009). The feelings of 
personal responsibility to report wrongdoing in an audit firm may stem from the 
respondents’ beliefs that users of financial statements could lose their investments as a 
result of a poor audit opinion. It is perceived that the auditor’s responsibility is to report 
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wrongdoing committed by other audit staff as a means of protecting the public’s 
interest (Tetlock, 1985; Curtis, 2006). 
 The results of the interviews also revealed that there is an obligation to maintain 
auditor-client confidentiality. For example, an experienced partner perceived that there 
is a duty to report internally (but not externally) any wrongdoing within the firm, since 
the act of reporting externally breaches auditor-client confidentiality. This respondent 
stated: 
There is a responsibility to the client, a duty of confidentiality to the client 
that may be breached by reporting something outside of the client and 
similarly within the firm now (Partner - BDWB05). 
 
Perhaps, this mindset may be indicative of the respondent’s role and vested interest in 
the client rather than society.  
Overall, the findings from the quantitative phase indicate that there is an 
obligation to report internally, but not externally. The interviews support the findings 
from the quantitative phase. Specifically, these results support the influence of personal 
responsibility for reporting on whistle-blowing intentions, similar to prior research 
(Graham, 1986; Schultz et al., 1993; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). Table 41 
summarises the common themes. 
 
Table 41: Summary of responses on personal responsibility to report 
 
Level of respondents Common themes 
Regulators Responsibility to report 
Practitioners Responsibility to report  
Partner Responsibility to report 
Audit managers Responsibility to report 
Audit seniors Responsibility to report 
Audit juniors Responsibility to report 
Focus groups Responsibility to report 
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7.4.6 Personal cost of reporting  
In chapter 6, hypothesis 1f was found to be supported for the main effects of personal 
cost of reporting having a significant and negative relationship on auditors’ internal 
whistle-blowing intentions, but not externally. In the interview phase, most respondents 
acknowledged that whistle-blowing would have negative consequences, which could be 
the determinant factor in the unwillingness to report wrongdoing. They all agreed that 
whistle-blowing could be detrimental to one’s career and highlighted the areas of 
apprehension such as negative effect on the auditor’s career, legal ramifications, fear of 
inaction by management, fear of discrimination or reprisals (alienation, ostracism, 
harassment, lack of trust, demotion, cut in pay, lack of promotional opportunities, lower 
job satisfaction, labelling, tarnished reputation), disruptive family life, lack of 
confidentiality and anonymity and strained relationships (Schultz et al., 1993; 
Ponemon, 1994; Curtis, 2006). 
 The results illustrated that fear of reprisals and the negative impact on one’s 
career were common themes highlighted by the respondents. The legal regulator 
declared: 
Death to your future in the business world! If you are known to be a 
whistle-blower, your colleagues are not going to be comfortable with you. 
So you are not likely to make it too far in the corporate environment (Legal 
regulator - BDWB01). 
 
While a male audit senior divulged: 
 
Fear of reprisal. Demotion becomes part of the whole discrimination 
process. When you take an opportunity to get out of the organization, they 
may make life difficult for you to find another job elsewhere, by 
scandalizing your name (Male audit senior - BDWB10). 
  
These sentiments were corroborated by the managers and junior members of 
staff who also added their concerns about being labelled and the level of job 
satisfaction.  
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A female senior audit manager shared: 
I think you will get some persons calling you a traitor and saying that you 
have no right. There is a code of solidarity in place and how dare you break 
that code. I don’t think you could continue in Barbados, being small as it is. 
I don’t think that you can continue working at that organization because 
you broke the code entirely (Female senior audit manager - BDWB08). 
 
There appears to be an invisible built-in code of solidarity that exists within 
audit firms. If this code of solidarity is broken, it may become detrimental to one’s 
career. This may be so, given the ethical, legal and confidential requirements of the 
profession (Mitschow and Langford, 2000). In essence, this may signify that firms in 
their pursuit of profits are likely to ignore or bury the reports, since they want to 
appease clients (Hanlon, 1994). It may appear that profits take precedence over morals, 
and may be the reason why the whistle-blower is perceived in a negative light. In 
addition, the potential whistle-blower may weigh the benefits and consequences of 
reporting to the organization and the related effect on all aspects of one’s life.  
Fear of discrimination was corroborated by a sole practitioner, who stated: 
Retaliation. You might be singled out. The boss might give you a hard time. 
You might have to leave the firm and expect some resentment (Sole 
practitioner - BDWB04).  
 
Some of the junior staff accountants (BDWB14 and BDWB17, respectively) shared 
similar sentiments, such as:  
Losing your job, whether or not there is victimization, the consequences, 
like if you are going to cut my pay, not promote me when I am supposed to 
be promoted, if you’re going to fire me, if you are going to pressure me and 
then put me on all the bad audits, bad review, stopping my goal (Junior 
staff accountant - BDWB14). 
 
Victimisation. May lose your job; less job satisfaction (doing the dirty box 
jobs); may be overlooked for promotions (Junior staff accountant - 
BDWB17). 
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 Respondents felt that the manner in which previous reports were handled and 
the extent to which the organization embraces whistle-blowing could influence 
reporting of wrongdoing. For example, a female audit senior reported: 
Previous experiences showing that even if I reported, nothing was done, or 
know of other persons who have reported situations and nothing was done. 
I would find that very discouraging (Female audit senior - BDWB13).  
 
In addition, the issue of confidentiality and the nature of the relationship of the 
perpetrator with the person to whom the report is being made, may discourage whistle-
blowing. The audit director stated: 
If there is some way in which they could link the report to the person who 
whistle-blew. The more direct the link and if you felt that any information 
you give would not be that confidential as you would like, that certainly 
would be a source of discouragement (Audit director - BDWB07).    
 
Fear of reprisals may explain the preference for anonymous channels of 
reporting, thus emphasizing the importance of self-preservation. It would appear that 
the sample felt that if no measures are implemented to protect the identity of the 
perpetrator, then the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing will decrease. Junior 
employees were more likely to refrain from reporting, due to fear of reprisals for 
having to report a colleague, and in particular, a superior. 
Overall, these findings may suggest that audit staff, regardless of level, may be 
less willing to report wrongdoing, due to the negative psychological, social and 
emotional impact on their well-being. The stress of living in fear and social isolation is 
a significant deterrent to reporting. It appears that peace of mind was paramount for 
these respondents, as they contemplated how their reporting behaviours could 
negatively influence their careers within the profession. While the fear of reprisals or 
discrimination was consistent across the various levels of respondents, it appeared to be 
heightened among the junior members of staff. This may be due to the fact that these 
junior members are seeking future advancement or promotional opportunities within 
 
 
 
 284
the audit firm.  This finding is similar to Near and Miceli’s (1985) argument that more 
powerful observers (i.e., persons higher up in the hierarchy) are more likely to whistle-
blow. Thus, the qualitative results support the quantitative findings. Specifically, 
support was found for the negative relationship between perceived personal cost of 
reporting and whistle-blowing intentions (Arnold and Ponemon, 1991; Schultz et al., 
1993; Hooks et al., 1994; Kaplan, 1995; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). 
 
7.5 The moderating role of team and contextual factors on auditors’ whistle-
blowing intentions 
This section looks at research question 4 (RQ4), which explores the moderating role of 
team and contextual factors (perceived organizational support, team norms, group 
cohesion and perceived moral intensity) on external auditors’ whistle-blowing 
intentions. In answering RQ4, the qualitative results are linked to the hypotheses, H2, 
H3, H4 and H5 in the quantitative findings.  
 
7.5.1 Perceived organizational support 
In chapter 6, hypothesis 2 (H2) was found to be partially supported for the moderating 
effects of perceived organizational support on the relationship of the independent 
variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, 
personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and internal 
whistle-blowing. Specifically, when perceived organizational support was high, the 
relationships of the independent variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, 
independence commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and internal 
whistle-blowing intentions were stronger and positive. However, when perceived 
organizational support was low, the relationship between personal cost of reporting and 
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internal whistle-blowing intentions was stronger and negative. Support was also found 
for the moderating effect of perceived organizational support on the relationship 
between the independent variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural control and 
personal cost of reporting) and external whistle-blowing. When perceived 
organizational support was low, the relationships of the independent variables (attitudes 
and perceived behavioural control) and external whistle-blowing were stronger and 
positive. However, when perceived organizational support was high, the relationship 
between personal cost of reporting and external whistle-blowing intentions were 
stronger and positive. 
In the interview phase, respondents felt that the level of perceived 
organizational support may influence the intentions to whistle-blow. The majority of 
respondents felt that the culture of the audit firm and clearly defined reporting policies 
could encourage whistle-blowing. This is supported by the legal regulator, who shared: 
It matters, because if there is no support, the person is discouraged from 
coming forward, when they discover anything else. And other people, who 
are aware of that case, will also not come forward to say anything. 
However, where the support has to come from the people, who are not 
doing anything, it is not likely that they’ll get that support (Legal regulator 
- BDWB01). 
 
These sentiments were corroborated by the partner, who reported: 
I know enough about human nature to know that people tend to keep quiet 
(Partner - BDWB05).   
 
 Respondents, who perceived high level of organizational support, attributed it to 
the audit firm’s culture (e.g. open-door policy) which encourages reporting. This is 
evident in the statement of the senior audit director, who reported: 
 I believe so. I think we encourage a lot of consultation and discussion 
(Senior audit director - BDWB07). 
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A male audit manager shared: 
I think they would support me. They are looking at the bigger picture, 
about what can happen to the firm. The firm has a vested interest to ensure 
that all acts, that can have a detrimental effect, are reported (Male audit 
manager - BDWB09).  
 
An audit senior’s statement reinforced this by saying: 
Yes, I think they would support me. Risk management, partner, 
everything. I would be guided on what channel to use. We don’t sweep 
things under the rug. We’re not supposed to (Audit senior - BDWB12). 
 
Perceived organizational support may reduce high personal cost of reporting, 
which is a deterrent to whistle-blowing, and may grant the individual a sense of greater 
perceived behavioural control and higher personal responsibility to report. This is 
consistent with prior research (Hooks et al., 1994; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001), 
which argued that there is a strong relationship between the level of organizational 
support and the acceptability of whistle-blowing. The junior staff and the focus group 
members believed that support would not be forthcoming, if one had to report 
wrongdoing committed by higher level staff such as a partner.  
Members of the focus groups proposed sending in their letters of resignation, 
because they felt that the reporting of any wrongdoing committed by top management 
may not be welcomed. They believe that this may be the best option available to them. 
This course of action directly correlates with Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran’s 
(2005) suggestion that potential whistle-blowers could leave the organization, blow the 
whistle or remain silent. 
Respondents reported that there were mechanisms to support whistle-blowing 
within the audit firms. The sample identified mechanisms to promote whistle-blowing 
which included the use of anonymous hotline and email services, suggestion boxes, 
having an independent group or person to handle reports (e.g. ethics or risk partners 
and managers) open-door policy, training and education programmes, counselling for 
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staff, and the ethical codes of conduct. These mechanisms are analogous to normative 
isomorphism of institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), whereby the 
organization may set the appropriate structures in place for regulating the acceptable 
behaviour.  
Audit staff cited that the culture of the organization and the availability of the 
hotline services were important mechanisms used to support whistle-blowing in their 
audit firms. The senior audit director reported: 
A culture of discussion …. We talk about how the junior auditors should 
escalate things to the supervisors, managers, and so forth (Senior audit 
director (BDWB07). 
 
This suggests that an audit firm’s culture, which is supportive of whistle-blowing, 
could be instrumental in encouraging whistle-blowing by reducing personal costs of 
reporting, and increasing personal responsibility and attitudes to reporting. Table 42 
presents a more detailed picture of the mechanisms in place in the sample of audit 
firms. 
 
Table 42: Mechanisms of perceived organizational support 
 
Mechanisms in place within the audit firms 
• Annual training in ethics/ education programme  
• Suggestion box 
• Culture of discussion 
• Anonymous emailing  
• Reporting to risk manager, ethics and independence partner  
• Ethics champions 
• Codes of conduct 
• Provision of ethics manual 
• Open door policy 
• Ethics partner 
• Anonymous hotline 
• Face-to-face meeting with partners and managers 
• Counselling for staff 
 
 
 
 
 288
In contrast, the regulators did not believe that mechanisms have been effectively 
implemented or even enforced to adequately address the issues of whistle-blowing. 
This is supported by the legal regulator, who stated: 
I am not sure that there are lots of mechanisms. Simply because I do not 
think that most people want whistle-blowing, even though they say so. 
Accountants believe their responsibility is to the person who pays them, 
and therefore they report to that person and nobody else. There is no 
protection, except the goodwill of the employer (Legal regulator - 
BDWB01). 
 
In spite of the differences in opinions of the regulators and the auditors, the 
findings in the interview phase were consistent with the results for hypothesis 2 (H2) of 
the quantitative phase. Both phases of this study revealed that perceived organizational 
support was the variable that influenced the preferred channel of reporting (internal or 
external), and significantly influenced the individual’s attitudes, perceived behavioural 
control and personal cost with respect to internal and external whistle-blowing. This 
supports Eisenberger et al.’s (1986) theory of perceived organizational support, which 
proposes that individuals are more likely to act favourably to the organization, where 
they perceived high levels of support, based on the norms of reciprocity and social 
exchange theory. In addition, Brennan and Kelly (2007) found that the presence of 
formal reporting structures in audit firms were more likely to influence reporting of 
wrongdoing by audit staff, without fear of jeopardising their careers.   
  
7.5.2 The influence of cohesiveness of team members on whistle-blowing 
In chapter 6, hypothesis 3 (H3) was found to be partially supported for the moderating 
effects of group cohesion on the relationship of the independent variables (attitudes, 
perceived behavioural control, independence commitment and personal responsibility 
for reporting) and internal whistle-blowing. Support was found for the relationship 
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between the independent variables (independence commitment and personal cost of 
reporting) and external whistle-blowing. It was found that when group cohesiveness 
was low, there were positive and significant relationships between the four independent 
variables and internal whistle-blowing. This indicates that when group cohesiveness is 
low, audit staff members were more likely to step out of the group to whistle-blow. 
When group cohesion was low, it was also found that there was a positive significant 
relationship between independence commitment and external whistle-blowing. 
However, when group cohesion was high, there was a positive and significant 
relationship between personal cost of reporting and external whistle-blowing.   
In the interview stage, it was found that the intention to report was likely to be 
influenced by factors such as group members’ personalities, relationships with peers, 
the degree of cohesiveness and group size. To be considered part of an in-group, human 
beings may compromise their ethical principles to fit in. For example, one audit senior 
stated: 
Depends on how strong you are and how dependent you are on that team 
for identity (Audit senior - BDWB10). 
 
The partner (BDWB05) added: 
If the culture of the group is that they respect high ethics, then that makes 
whistle-blowing easier. But if the culture of the group tends to turn a blind 
eye on wrongdoing, then it is more difficult to whistle-blow in that culture 
(Partner - BDWB05). 
 
A junior female staff accountant corroborated this by reporting: 
It depends on the make-up of the group, because if you have people in your 
organization with stronger personalities than yourself, that person will be 
likely to overpower you. If the person is at a higher level, they may even 
threaten you with your job (Junior female staff accountant - BDWB14). 
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This suggests that fear of reprisals and group pressure may influence reporting 
intentions. Hence, respondents requested anonymity and confidentiality, when 
reporting wrongdoing. This was evident in the comment of the staff assistant, who 
shared: 
It is likely that close friendships will be formed within the groups. 
Therefore, that may make it difficult for you to report a matter because 
you may feel that you are being a traitor and that the information you 
provide would be leaked (Staff assistant - BDWB18). 
 
This may be indicative of the critical importance of confidentiality, which if not 
adhered to, may result in labelling and negatively impacting the individual’s career.  
The findings further showed that when an individual’s identity becomes fused 
with the group, independence may be compromised. An audit manager divulged: 
If your friends are on the team.... Because everybody on the team would 
not be as strong as others, that could be an influence on whether to speak 
out or not. You do not want to affect the relationship (Audit manager - 
BDWB06). 
  
This supports Abdolmohammadi et al.’s (1997) argument that the more dominant and 
capable members of a group are likely to influence the group’s ethical decision-making. 
The majority of respondents perceived that there was a low level of 
cohesiveness in audit teams. For example, one junior auditor argued that she would not 
report on her friend in the group, but would report on others. This was further evident 
by different responses in the focus groups such as “acting independently within the 
group”, “individuals will be looking to me (the leader) to resolve it”, “persons with 
stronger personalities than yourself will overpower you… even threaten you” and 
“I was never influenced by groups or persons on ethical issues.” A manager clearly 
summed this low level of cohesiveness up by stating that “it is just that these persons 
were put together to work on this particular job and are not very close.” This may 
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point to the fact that audit teams are always changing as they work on multiple 
engagements.26  
There also seems to be evidence of ‘forced solidarity’ within the groups. 
Alluding to the impact of peer relationship or cohesiveness of the group, another audit 
manager shared: 
This is your team, your management group. It would be hard. It is almost 
like an unsaid code that you need to pledge some solidarity (Audit manager 
- BDWB08). 
 
A male audit manager reported: 
 
You are going to be less willing to report a questionable act or somebody 
that you are close to, based on the friendship that would have been formed. 
You are less likely to report that person than some person you have a 
passing relationship with. Unfortunately, we are human, so you will treat 
each case differently. The level of cohesiveness of the teams tells us that we 
do things this way. It would influence whether you report it or not (Male 
audit manager - BDWB09).  
 
 The need for team input in decision-making was further acknowledged by a 
junior male member of staff, who stated: 
To a certain extent, it boils down to the individual. The team will evaluate 
the situation and determine if it is worthy of reporting. We would eliminate 
all other possibilities and get group consensus on what to do (Junior male 
member of staff - BDWB09). 
 
The findings suggest that there is a process of negotiation within the group 
setting (Janis, 1972). It appears that whistle-blowing, without the full support of the 
team, is given careful consideration in the assessment phase, similar to arguments made 
by Finn (1995). For example, the severity of the act may be heavily scrutinized and the 
whistle-blower’s life circumstances are reviewed.  
Finally, it was important to note that two female members emphasized the 
importance of individuality and indicated that their ethical decision-making was not 
                                                 
26  Three informal follow-up interviews (staff accountant, audit senior, and audit manager who were not 
in the original sample of interviewees) were done to confirm the low cohesiveness levels and high team 
norms obtained in the quantitative phase of the research. These informal interviews corroborated the 
results from both phases of this study. 
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easily swayed by the audit team. The decision to take a stance that goes against the 
values of the group may be an indication of high moral principles, which are not likely 
to be compromised by the group. Despite these views, the findings of this research 
show that groups can influence reporting intentions. Thus, these results further support 
hypothesis 3 (H3), and demonstrate that low cohesiveness in audit teams is more likely 
to influence whistle-blowing behaviour.     
 
7.5.2.1 Importance of the influence of team norms on whistle-blowing 
In chapter 6, hypothesis 4 (H4) was found to be supported for the moderating effects of 
team norms on the relationship of the independent variables (attitudes, desired moral 
approbation, independence commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and 
internal whistle-blowing. It was found that when team norms were high, there were 
positive and significant relationships between these four independent variables and 
internal whistle-blowing. However, support was only found for the significant positive 
relationships between two independent variables (attitudes and independence 
commitment) and external whistle-blowing.  
In the interview phase, the majority of respondents conceded that team norms 
were likely to influence whistle-blowing.  An experienced practitioner remarked: 
They influence you in a big way. You have to work with these people, and 
sometimes, their modus operandi can become yours, ‘groupmind’. Their 
behaviour can influence the way you behave, especially when in that group. 
To that extent, it is very easy to go down the road with the guys. Outside of 
that group, you might not do the things that you would normally do in that 
group. Based on group norms, the group can definitely impact upon the 
tendency to whistle-blow (Practitioner - BDWB03). 
 
This may highlight the way in which an individual’s values can become fused with the 
norms of the group (Janis, 1972). However, it was noticeable that the focus groups (i.e. 
in a group setting) tended to report that they would behave ethically, and would try to 
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steer any deviants on the right course of action.  This is also evident in the statement of 
another practitioner, who reported: 
There is some measure of influence. If you have a team, and you can take 
the advice of the members, then the team operates well as a group 
(Practitioner - BDWB04).  
 
This finding supports Nichols and Day’s (1982) argument that groups normally reach 
more ethical decisions than individuals. It is expected that the norms of the group 
would influence or regulate behaviour of the individuals within the group.   
It was further found that the group may force individual members to conform to 
the group’s norms. Junior accountants (BDWB14, BDWB15 and BDWB18) shared:  
Yes. Then you’ll be the lone man. You’ll be the cast away (Junior 
accountant - BDWB14).  
 
You, in turn, can get a bad review or you can get stain. People will shun 
you if you are a teller (Junior accountant - BDWB15)  
 
Yes, if you decide to report. You would have to come to a personal decision 
of whether to go ahead and report (Junior accountant - BDWB18) 
 
The level of the members in the team was also cited as an influential factor in 
the whistle-blowing intentions of individual group members. A female audit senior 
reported: 
It all depends on the levels of the persons in the team as well. It is easier to 
discuss with some person on your level or above you. Some people are 
easily persuaded to back down and there are other persons who want you 
to believe this is the right thing to do. They will at least go, and it is to some 
point, higher (Female audit senior - BDWB13) 
 
A male junior accountant addressed this point by arguing: 
We look to senior people in the group to provide guidance. You still have to 
have enough sense to know what is right from wrong (Male junior 
accountant - BDWB17). 
 
Based on the above findings, it appears that peer pressure from superiors in the group 
can guide or shape the team’s norms on what constitutes acceptable behaviour. Thus, 
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this finding supports Hooks et al.’s (1994) argument that group norms may colour 
one’s perception of the seriousness of the wrongdoing.  
The element of moral norms was cited as one of the key motivators for ethical 
behaviour within groups. Most respondents felt that the audit teams’ norms were 
shaped by moral principles, professional codes, and the firm’s core values. For 
example, several respondents highlighted that these core values (e.g. integrity and 
objectivity) are displayed in prominent places throughout the offices, thus encouraging 
adherence to ethical norms. This lends support to the findings of the quantitative phase 
(chapter 6), where high team norms moderated the relationship between the majority of 
the independent variables and internal whistle-blowing. This finding is consistent with 
Narayanan et al.’s (2006) argument, which suggested that individuals will value their 
membership in a group and wish to stay in the group. De Jong et al. (2005) also argued 
that the norms of the group determine the appropriate behaviour. Table 43 summarised 
the common themes arising out of the interviews for group cohesion and team norms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 295
Table 43: Summary of responses on team norms and group cohesiveness 
 
 
7.5.3 The influence of perceived moral intensity on whistle-blowing 
In chapter 6, hypothesis 5 (H5) was found to be partially supported for the moderating 
effects of moral intensity on the relationship of the independent variables (attitudes, 
perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, personal responsibility for 
reporting and personal cost of reporting) and internal whistle-blowing. Specifically, it 
was found that when moral intensity was high, there were significant positive 
relationships between the independent variables (attitudes, perceived behavioural 
control, independence commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and 
internal whistle-blowing. When moral intensity was low, there was a significant 
Level of 
respondents Common themes 
Level of 
cohesiveness 
Level of team 
norms 
Regulators Need for affiliation  with group  
Relationship with peers in the 
  team 
 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Practitioners Modus operandi of team  
  becomes fused (lose  
  individual identity) 
Groupthink occurs  
 
Low High  
Partner Ethical norms and group culture   
 
High High  
Audit managers Independence of the individual  
Relationship with team 
  members 
 
Moderate   High  
Audit seniors Depends on the culture of the  
  group (ethical or unethical) 
Relationship with peers 
Personality/individuality 
Influence of levels of persons in  
  the team 
 
Mixed (high and 
low) 
High  
Audit juniors Need for affiliation with group. 
Consequences of dissenting 
Personality of individual  
  members 
Levels of persons in the team 
 
Low High 
Focus groups Influence of group members on  
  the final decision 
Groupthink, discussion 
Low High  
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negative relationship between personal cost of reporting and internal whistle-blowing. 
Support was only found for the relationship between desired moral approbation and 
external whistle-blowing. When moral intensity was low, there was a significant 
positive relationship between desired moral approbation and external whistle-blowing.  
In the interview phase, the respondents generally felt that moral intensity may 
influence the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing. Respondents conceptualised ‘moral 
intensity’, using themes such as the act itself, the consequences of the act, materiality, 
magnitude of consequences, seriousness, effect of the act on the financial statements, 
risk of discovery and discipline to the auditor, and the pervasiveness of the act. These 
themes are similar to dimensions of Jones’ (1991) moral intensity construct. For 
example, several respondents emphasized the importance of magnitude of 
consequences (similar to materiality), which is likely to influence whistle-blowing 
intentions. For example, a practitioner stated: 
It influences your tendency, based on your circumstances. The greater the 
magnitude of the act, the more you are likely to report the act. Size is 
important (Practitioner - BDWB03). 
 
Another practitioner shared:  
It does not make sense to trigger an event that could cost any person to be 
out of pocket for an insignificant act. It is the materiality of the act 
(Practitioner - BDWB04). 
 
The junior audit staff also felt that materiality was influential in whistle-
blowing. This may be due to audit methodologies which highlight materiality as part of 
the audit process. For example, a junior reported:  
It would have to be the level of materiality. I would seriously have to think 
hard about going outside of the firm (Junior - BDWB14). 
 
While another junior stated: 
If it affects more individuals, myself included, it will determine whether or 
not I report it. However, I am not going externally (Junior - BDWB15). 
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It was noticeable that individuals were not likely to report externally, no mater the level 
of moral intensity. 
In contrast, the moral side of the act (equivalent to seriousness) was important 
for two managers (BDWB06; BDWB07). One audit manager reported: 
You still have to look at the act. If it is something unethical, no matter the 
magnitude of it, it is the act that matters. It is not the dollar value, it is the 
effect (Audit manager - BDWB06).   
 
Similarly, this sentiment was corroborated by the audit director, who also reported: 
If something goes against the grain, whether immaterial or not, there is a 
potential that it could be repeated at a material level. The materiality of a 
wrongdoing might not suggest that we close our eyes to it. It is the act, as 
well as the materiality (Audit director - BDWB07). 
 
Overall, these findings suggest that the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing will 
increase in situations, where the act is perceived as being material, serious, morally 
wrong, and has the potential to harm others. These factors are similar to Jones’ (1991) 
construct of moral intensity, which included magnitude of consequences, probability of 
effect, concentration of effect and proximity. However, while these perceptions may 
motivate internal reporting, an apparent conflict arises for the individual, when faced 
with the option to report externally. Thus, these results partially confirm hypothesis 5 
(H5), and demonstrate that reporting unethical acts will increase when moral intensity 
is high only for internal whistle-blowing, but will be quite marginal for external 
whistle-blowing. Minor acts of wrongdoing are more likely to be ignored, while major 
acts may be reported internally, but not externally. Table 44 summarises the responses 
of the various groups. 
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Table 44: Summary of responses on perceived moral intensity 
 
Level of respondents Common themes 
Regulators Level of materiality  
Magnitude of the act 
 
Practitioners Magnitude of the act 
Level of materiality 
Size of the act 
 
Partner Level of seriousness of the act 
 
Audit managers The act itself 
Materiality 
 
Audit seniors Materiality 
Pervasiveness of the act 
 
Audit juniors Level of materiality 
 
Focus groups Materiality 
Seriousness 
Harms the public 
 
 
7.6 Consequences (effects) of whistle-blowing on the audit firm, profession and 
society 
7.6.1 Positive consequences (effects) of whistle-blowing  
Research question 5 (RQ5) sought to determine the perceived consequences of whistle-
blowing among external auditors.27 There was unanimous agreement among the 
respondents that whistle-blowing can have positive consequences for the whistle-
blower, the audit firm, profession and society. The common themes that emerged to 
support the notion of positive consequences to the individual whistle-blower included 
having a clear conscience, maintaining independence, positive self-esteem, being 
perceived as ethical, and bringing to light unethical practices that would have remained 
virtually unknown and unresolved. Having a clear conscience took precedence over all 
                                                 
27 This research question deals with the consequences (effects) on the individual, the firm, profession and 
society, after the whistle-blowing behaviour. The argument here is that section 7.4.6 personal cost of 
reporting, as an antecedent in the model, looks at one’s considerations prior to whistle-blowing; whereas, 
the effects in this section refer to what could happen after whistle-blowing. 
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the other factors and was consistent across all levels of respondents. For example, the 
audit director stated: 
You can clear your conscience because you have spoken up in the face of 
something that you see which could have been very harmful to a lot of 
parties. You might be able to save a company, help keep it afloat, or the 
employees who might also be about to lose their jobs (Audit director - 
BDWB07). 
 
While the male audit manager simply stated:  
You are ridding the firm of bad apples, and preventing eventual disaster 
(Male audit manager - BDWB09) 
 
It was also perceived that whistle-blowing could enhance the credibility and 
image of the audit firm.  The accounting regulator reported: 
Once they establish independence from the client, they will be seen as a 
more ethical firm. If it ever gets to the public domain that these are the 
actions that they have taken or these are the values that they have instilled 
within themselves, within that firm, and that’s the way they carry on 
business, I guess it would be a positive for them (Accounting regulator -  
BDWB02). 
 
The majority of respondents perceived whistle-blowing as having a positive 
impact on the profession. Common themes emerged such as increased self-regulation 
and vigilance, maintenance of ethical principles or standards, credibility, 
implementation of control mechanisms to deter wrongdoing, preservation of the 
profession, prevention of outside intrusion, greater trust and increased responsibility to 
others.   One practitioner added: 
It upholds the standards and preserves the integrity of the organization. 
Once you are able to take out the bad elements, persons who are 
fraudulent, greedy, and violating laws, in the long run it will be better for 
the profession and help the firm get back on its feet (Practitioner - 
BDWB04). 
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An audit senior, who proposed that whistle-blowing may have positive 
consequences for society, reported: 
Society suffers from the lack of whistle-blowing because investors make up 
part of society as well. As long as whistle-blowing is not being abused, it has 
a positive consequence. The ramification of this negligence is the 
implementation of regulations that must be adhered to by everyone (An 
audit senior - BDWB13). 
 
Overall, respondents believed that whistle-blowing can have positive 
consequences for the individual whistle-blower, the audit firm, profession and society, 
by making the profession more credible, trustworthy and accountable (Tetlock, 1985). 
This may suggest that whistle-blowing is essential to the image maintenance of the 
profession and can increase public trust (Cowton, 2009). As a result, failure to report 
wrongdoing may result in more harm than good.  
 
7.6.2 Negative consequences (effects) of whistle-blowing 
All respondents conceded that whistle-blowing can result in negative 
consequences for the individuals, audit firms, profession and society. The perceived 
negative consequences included alienation, reprisals, labelling, tarnished reputation, 
loss of employment and lack of trust. The firm’s reputation was a major concern for all 
respondents. One practitioner shared: 
Loss of reputation which is fundamental to the organization can result in 
reduced audit work (Practitioner - BDWB03).  
 
This sentiment was elaborated by a female audit senior, who reported: 
If you whistle-blow in an audit firm, of course, it would cause clients to 
seek auditors elsewhere. Because if you think that an audit firm is not 
doing something that is reputable, you would not want them. It would 
make you question the head of the firm, question previous jobs they 
worked on, current jobs and it will affect any prospective jobs (A female 
audit senior - BDWB11).  
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One member of a focus group felt that whistle-blowing externally can have a 
negative impact on the firm by tarnishing its reputation. It was felt that one should 
handle the issue of reporting with care and serious consideration. This member’s 
concern was shared by the group, and further corroborated by the practitioners and 
junior members. For example, one practitioner highlighted: 
Let us say that whistle-blowing has caused the organization to fail. All the 
suppliers and clients will also suffer, but you have to weigh that up against 
the costs of whistle-blowing. The entire profession is brought sharply under 
the microscope. The general public’s perception to the profession can be 
tainted and the time to restore that confidence to the profession can take a 
while (Practitioner - BDWB03). 
 
 
  Overall, respondents reported that there are negative consequences of whistle-
blowing to the profession. The findings indicate that although there are benefits 
associated with whistle-blowing, it is recognized that costs to the profession are also 
derived from whistle-blowing, which may far exceed the benefits. For example, the 
tarnished reputation of the profession may increase the cost of regulation, dampen the 
desire of future entrants into the profession, increase criticism and foster lack of trust 
(Cowton, 2009). The entire profession has been heavily scrutinized by the public since 
Enron’s debacle, and thus there is sufficient justification for having whistle-blowing as 
an internal control mechanism in audit firms (Hooks et al., 1994). Table 45 summarises 
the perceived consequences of whistle-blowing.  
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Table 45: Summary of perceived consequences of whistle-blowing 
To whom Positive consequences Negative consequences 
To the Individual Clear conscience  
Positive self-esteem 
Being perceived as moral or 
  ethical 
Maintaining independence 
Bringing to light unethical  
  practices 
Integrity 
Increased trustworthiness 
Financial (loss of employment 
  security) 
Negative impact of future career  as 
  an  auditor 
Alienation/ostracism 
Labelling 
Tarnished reputation 
Fear of reprisals 
Lack of trust 
Loss of job satisfaction 
Harassment 
Lack of promotional opportunities  
  and discrimination 
 
To the Audit 
Firm 
Credibility 
Self-regulation 
Maintenance of ethical  
  standards 
Increased trust 
Prevention of political  
  intrusion and   legal action 
Preservation of firm’s  
  reputation 
Increased responsibility to  
  others 
 
Firm’s reputation may be tarnished 
Lack of independence and trust 
Loss of confidence in the firm’s 
  mandate  
Ostracism 
To the Profession Increased self-regulation  
   and vigilance  
Maintenance of ethical  
  principles or standards  
Credibility  
Implementation of control  
  mechanisms to deter 
  wrongdoing 
Prevention of outside  
  intrusion 
 
Tarnished reputation 
Labelling 
Loss of respect 
Loss of employment and revenues 
Firm splitting  
Issues of confidentiality 
 
To the Society Upholding the core values of  
   the organization 
Increased public trust  
Loss of employment 
Loss of clients 
Negative image of the organization 
 
 
 
7.7 Recommendations for increasing whistle-blowing intentions among auditors  
Research question 6 (RQ6) sought to obtain recommendations for increasing whistle-
blowing among external auditors. The interviewees recommended the implementation 
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of penalties for unethical behaviour, formalising and documenting the policies and 
procedures for whistle-blowing in the firms, enacting legislation to protect whistle-
blowers, providing more ethics training, facilitating necessary counselling, and offering 
financial rewards for whistle-blowing (Ponemon, 1994). They further suggested the 
updating of the code of ethics, emphasizing the importance of the codes, setting up of 
independent committees or person to evaluate whistle-blowing reports, displaying 
visual reminders in strategic locations on how to make reports, promoting use of the 
hotline, the establishment of confidentiality codes to help maintain anonymity and 
further promotion of the open-door policy. For example, a female audit senior stressed 
the importance of having an independent committee oversee the evaluation of the 
report. She reported: 
Because the whistle-blower is going to be seen as the one who is wrong, you 
can have an independent committee set up so that in case you whistle-blow, 
your case can be heard. You show your evidence, they show theirs. We 
need something more transparent in place that could probably assist the 
process (Female audit senior - BDWB11). 
 
However, both regulators held differing opinions on recommendations proposed 
by audit staff.  The accounting regulator proposed: 
It comes back to the organization setting up documented policies and 
procedures. Procedures that are actually there to protect the employee, 
who has reported any whistle-blowing, which should be backed up by some 
legislation that would protect the job or financial security of those persons 
(Accounting regulator - BDWB02). 
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In contrast, the legal regulator stated: 
I don’t think they are going to see whistle-blowing coming out of the 
accounting fraternity, unless there is a penalty for not doing it…bearing in 
mind that business people are in business to make money and compliance 
with ethical standards is not going to be a money-making exercise. 
Anything that is not making money, people are willing to overlook. I think 
I know them so well that I am not sure that anything will make a difference 
other than maybe having some penalty. Other than that they are not going 
to. Once they stand to lose business by being known as a whistle-blower, 
they are not going to and that’s one of the things they look at as a 
significant deterrent. I don’t think they will report even if the law says if 
you don’t, you will go to prison. They would risk it because anything that 
gets in the way of making money they will ignore (Legal regulator - 
BDWB01). 
 
This may suggest that audit firms may be more interested in profit making and 
as a result, the partners (owners) may choose to overlook ethical considerations that 
add no value or profit to their cause. This supports the literature which has shown that 
auditors tended to be reluctant to whistle-blow (Kaplan, 1995). Table 46 presents the 
recommendations made by the respondents for increasing whistle-blowing among 
external auditors. 
 
Table 46: Summary of recommendations for increasing whistle-blowing 
       
• Institute penalties for not reporting wrongdoing. 
• Formalise and document policies and procedures for reporting. 
• Enactment of legislative protection for whistle-blowers. 
• Educate and provide more training on ethics and whistle-blowing. 
• Provide counselling.  
• Provide financial rewards.  
• Review and periodically update the code of ethics. 
• Set up independent committee to evaluate reports. 
• Display visual reminders of how to make reports.  
• Promote the use of anonymous channels such as the hotline. 
• Ensure confidentiality and anonymity. 
• Promote open-door policies. 
• Encourage independence. 
• Emphasise the importance of adhering to the code of ethics. 
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7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the factors influencing whistle-blowing intentions among 
auditors in Barbados and used 18 auditors and 2 focus groups to accomplish this goal. 
The results from the quantitative phase in Chapter 6 were integrated and discussed with 
qualitative results in this chapter. In the second phase of this study, auditors’ perceived 
whistle-blowing as the internal and external reporting of unethical or illegal acts that 
occur within audit firms, and therefore, regarded whistle-blowing as an important 
control mechanism. This phase found that individual factors (attitudes, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment, personal responsibility to report and 
personal cost of reporting) were extremely influential on auditors’ whistle-blowing 
intentions. A surprising finding was the mixed results for the influence of desired moral 
approbation. Although respondents indicated that self-approval was important and their 
decisions rest on their moral upbringing, this study showed that the majority still relied 
on the approval of other referents (e.g. superiors or partners in the firm), thus resulting 
in a potential conflict. Being independent was found to be imperative for auditors as it 
helped to diminish conflicts of interest and enhanced the amount of control that 
auditors possessed in reporting questionable acts. In this way, auditors will be 
perceived as upholding the core values of the audit firms as well as demonstrating their 
perceived responsibility to society.   
In addition to the individual factors, constructs such as perceived organizational 
support and moral intensity were found to be instrumental in increasing the likelihood 
that auditors would engage in reporting wrongdoing. It was also found that group 
factors significantly influenced whistle-blowing intentions. For example, high team 
norms (inclusive of ethical norms) and low cohesiveness of audit teams influenced the 
auditors’ intentions to report internally, but with limited impact on reporting externally. 
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Independence and need for affiliation by groups were found to be influential on the 
individual’s ability to whistle-blow.   
Overall, this study found that the recommendations can be considered as being 
instrumental in encouraging whistle-blowing. The findings indicate that despite the fact 
that there is awareness of the importance of whistle-blowing, audit members are apt to 
be reluctant to take the initial step to report, due to fear of reprisals. Most respondents 
felt that the personal costs of whistle-blowing are high. The findings show that whistle-
blowing is likely to occur if audit firms provide adequate reporting mechanisms and 
demonstrate that they welcome whistle-blowing. Table 47 summarises the factors likely 
to encourage and discourage whistle-blowing. 
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Table 47: Respondents’ perceptions of factors encouraging and discouraging whistle-
blowing 
Respondents Encouraging factors Discouraging factors 
Regulators Personal Factors 
   -Honesty 
   -Truthfulness 
Negative effect on one’s career   
Risk to financial security  
Legal ramifications 
Fear of inaction and discrimination 
Unethical culture of organization 
 
Practitioners Magnitude/seriousness of the act  
 
Negative impact on business (ruined  
  reputation) 
Discrimination (i.e., retaliation,  being 
singled out) 
 
Partner Personal integrity  
Ethical culture of the organization 
Anonymity of the person  
  reporting 
 
Unethical culture of the organization 
Discrimination 
Audit managers Morals (concept of right and wrong) 
Impact/consequences of reporting or  
  not reporting on the organization  
Self-preservation 
Severity of the act  
Poor relationship with the  
  perpetrator 
 
Negative impact of reporting on the  
  perpetrator and family 
Lack of confidentiality (being able to  
  identify the whistle-blower) 
Ostracism 
Good relationship with the  
  perpetrator   
Audit seniors The seriousness of the act 
Financial rewards for the whistle- 
  blower 
Individual morals 
Self-preservation 
Integrity 
Firm’s reputation 
Core values 
Knowledge that remedial action  
  will be taken 
Level of organizational support 
 
Financial security (loss of job) 
Heavy personal cost and peace of  
  mind 
Nature of the relationship to the  
  perpetrator or the person to whom the  
  report is made   
Level of materiality 
Culture of organization (failure to take 
  action) 
Fear of victimization (being singled  
  out) 
Audit juniors Culture of the organization 
Relationship to perpetrator  
Financial reward for whistle- 
  blower 
Level of perpetrator in the firm  
  (will not report senior level staff) 
Personal values 
Level of organizational support 
 
Fear of reprisals (loss of employment 
Victimization: (pay cut, bad reviews, 
  lack of promotional opportunities, bad  
  reviews, placed on bad audits) 
Good relationship with perpetrator 
Loss of confidentiality 
Ostracism 
 
Focus groups Personal responsibility to report 
Level of organizational support  
Negative effect on the team 
Ostracism  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This thesis examined the whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors in 
Barbados. Specifically, this thesis sought to determine the factors (individual, 
contextual and organizational) that were hypothesised to influence whistle-blowing 
intentions among external auditors. The thesis further explored the meaning of whistle-
blowing, the willingness to whistle-blow and the preferred reporting channels. Finally, 
the perceived consequences of whistle-blowing on the firm, profession and society 
were investigated, with recommendations offered for encouraging whistle-blowing in 
the audit profession. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  The first section summarizes the theory 
and presents the hypotheses and research questions, as well as the research approach 
taken in this study. The second section presents a summary of the quantitative and 
qualitative (interview) findings. The third section addresses the theoretical and practical 
implications and contributions of the study. Section four focuses on the limitations of 
the study, while the final section offers suggestions for future research. 
 
8.1 Theory and hypotheses development 
Chapter 2 highlighted the important features of the audit profession. These features 
include auditor independence and ethical decision-making. Chapter 3 reviewed prior 
research on whistle-blowing in organizations and the relevance to the audit profession. 
Chapter 4 proposed a conceptual model to examine whistle-blowing intentions among 
external auditors by measuring the influence of potential moderators (perceived 
organizational support, team norms, group cohesion and moral intensity) on  individual 
factors (i.e., attitudes, desired moral approbation, perceived behavioural control, 
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independence commitment, personal responsibility and personal costs of reporting) as 
depicted in Figure 38. This model was derived from the literature, which included 
behavioural psychology, auditing, ethics, management and sociology. It draws upon the 
work of Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour, Graham’s (1986) Model of 
Principled Dissent, and desired moral approbation (Jones and Ryan, 1997) and 
independence commitment (Gendron et al., 2006) as individual–level antecedents. The 
moderators were perceived organizational support (Eisenberger et al., 1986), perceived 
moral intensity (Jones, 1991), group cohesion (Price and Muller, 1986) and team norms 
(De Jong et al., 2005). 
 
8.1.1 Research approach and objectives 
Chapter 5 presented the research approach taken in this study. The research design 
implemented a triangulated approach, which encompassed the use of surveys and 
interviews to meet the research objectives in two phases. In the first phase, responses 
were received from a sample of 226 external auditors working in small, medium and 
large audit firms to test the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Attitudes toward whistle-blowing will have a positive, direct effect 
on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Desired moral approbation from others and from self will have a 
positive, direct effect on whistle-blowing intentions among external 
auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Perceived behavioural control will have a positive, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1d:  Independence commitment will have a positive, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 1e:  Personal responsibility for reporting will have a positive, direct 
effect on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
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Hypothesis 1f:   Personal cost of reporting will have a negative, direct effect on 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Perceived organizational support will moderate the relationships 
between individual-level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral 
approbation, perceived behavioural control, independence 
commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost 
of reporting) and whistle-blowing intentions among external 
auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Group cohesion will moderate the relationships between individual-
level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.  
 
Hypothesis 4:  Team norms will moderate the relationships between individual-
level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Perceived moral intensity will moderate the relationships between 
individual-level antecedents (attitudes, desired moral approbation, 
perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, personal 
responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors.  
 
In the second phase, the study used 18 interviews and 2 focus groups to explore 
whistle-blowing among external auditors. Specifically, the interviews were conducted 
to determine the willingness of auditors to report wrongdoing, the choice of reporting 
channels, the influence of individual and moderating factors on whistle-blowing, 
perceived consequences and recommendations for increasing whistle-blowing. Thus, 
the objectives were achieved by using the following research questions: 
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Research Question 1: How willing are external auditors to whistle-blow on 
wrongdoing committed by colleagues in the audit firm?  
 
Research Question 2:  What are the preferred channels of reporting wrongdoing 
among external auditors? 
 
Research Question 3:  What is the role of individual factors on external auditors’ 
ability to whistle-blow? 
 
Research Question 4: What is the role of team and contextual factors on external 
auditors’ ability to whistle-blow? 
 
Research Question 5:  What are the perceived consequences of whistle-blowing 
among external auditors?  
 
Research Question 6:  How can whistle-blowing be increased among external 
auditors?  
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Figure 38:  Conceptual model of whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors 
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a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
adopted from Ajzen (1991);  
adopted from Jones and Ryan (1997); 
adopted from Gendron et al (2006); 
adopted from Graham (1986) and Schultz et al. (1993); 
adopted from De Jong et al. (2005); 
adopted from Price and Mueller (1986) and Schminke and Wells (1999); 
adopted from Jones (1991) moral intensity; 
adopted from Eisenberger et al. (1990); 
adopted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) 
The rest of the model is based on the review and understanding of how external audit works. 
 
 
8.2 Summary of key findings 
This section summarises the key findings from the research. It briefly presents the 
results from the quantitative and qualitative phases similar to the structure of the 
conceptual model. Specifically, the section highlights findings for the willingness to 
whistle-blow (intentions), the influence of individual-level and moderating factors on 
auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions. 
 
8.2.1 Willingness to blow the whistle 
The results of this study show that most auditors were quite willing to blow the whistle 
internally rather than externally. Respondents argued that issues needed to be corrected 
first internally. This is consistent with Near and Miceli’s (1995) view that internal 
reporting provides the organization with an opportunity to internally correct 
wrongdoing and avoid ‘airing their dirty laundry’ in public. 
 
8.2.2 The role of individual-level factors on auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions 
The study found mixed results for the influence of individual-level factors on external 
auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions. For example, there was substantial support for the 
main effect of attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, 
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personal responsibility and personal cost of reporting on whistle-blowing internally. 
However, support was found only for the impact of perceived behavioural control on 
auditors’ whistle-blowing externally. Marginal support was found for personal 
responsibility for reporting on auditors’ whistle-blowing externally (p < .10). 
This study found that attitudes and perceived behavioural control (Ajzen, 1991), 
independence commitment (Gendron et al., 2006), personal responsibility for reporting 
and personal cost of reporting (Graham, 1986) were strong predictors of auditors’ 
intentions to whistle-blow internally. This suggests that these variables are important 
drivers in the whistle-blowing process. It is important to note that factors such as 
independence commitment, personal responsibility and attitudes may be shaped by the 
auditors’ code of professional conduct or socialization process for entry into the 
profession. These findings are not surprising, based on prior research on whistle-
blowing (Park and Blenkinsopp, 2009; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). In addition, 
auditors, who perceived high personal costs, were less likely to report internally and 
externally.  
Another important finding from the research is that desired moral approbation 
did not have a significant impact on auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions. It was 
proposed that people would need approval from oneself and others to drive ethical 
action. However, it was found that an ethical dilemma arose as a result of respondents 
requiring approval from themselves as well as approval from their colleagues and 
superiors. This may indicate that subordinates make their ethical decisions based on the 
need to have their actions approved by superiors (senior members in the firm). A 
troubling issue may arise in situations where the superiors may be condoning unethical 
practices.   
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Overall, most respondents deemed whistle-blowing as being an important 
control mechanism which could help to preserve the integrity of the audit firm. This 
may explain why factors such as attitudes, personal responsibility and independence 
commitment were significantly related to whistle-blow internally. However, the results 
show a general reluctance to report externally. 
 
8.2.3 The influence of moderators on individual-level factors and whistle-blowing 
intentions 
Perceived organizational support was found to have a significant moderating effect on 
the individual-level factors (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independence 
commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) and 
internal whistle-blowing intentions. However, perceived organizational support 
moderated the influence of the individual-level factors (attitudes, perceived behavioural 
control and personal cost of reporting) and external whistle-blowing. These findings 
show that whistle-blowing is likely to occur in an audit firm, where audit staff members 
perceive that there is some measure of support to buffer potential reprisals.  
Based on the moderating effect of perceived organizational support, auditors 
demonstrated more willingness to engage in whistle-blowing internally, if they believed 
that there is the likelihood of full support of the audit firm’s management. For example, 
support may be manifested in the culture of the organization which encourages ethical 
behaviour. Whistle-blowing is likely to occur in an organization, which shows that the 
wrongdoing will be corrected and that no form of discrimination will be taken against 
the whistle-blower. This illustrates the importance of personal cost to the auditor and 
the importance of self-preservation. It further highlights the importance of perceived 
organizational support as a catalyst for whistle-blowing and the choice of reporting 
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channel which is more likely to be used. This finding is consistent with Blau’s (1964) 
social exchange theory and Gouldner’s (1960) norm of reciprocity. These theories 
suggest that if workers feel that the organization will support them, they are more likely 
to show loyalty and commitment by doing what is necessary to protect it. This may 
explain why external auditors in the sample would not report externally. It was 
expected that the audit firm will implement the appropriate institutional arrangements 
(mimetic and normative isomorphisms) that will influence the acceptable ethical 
behaviour and norms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 It was found that when group cohesion was low, there were significant positive 
relationships between the individual factors (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, 
independence commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and internal 
whistle-blowing. However, support was only found for the significant positive 
relationship between independence commitment and external whistle-blowing, when 
group cohesion was low. When group cohesion was high, support was found for the 
significant positive relationship between personal costs and external whistle-blowing. 
The findings showed that potential whistle-blowers tended only to report in less 
cohesive groups. This may indicate that, in high cohesive groups, (through groupthink, 
in which the group stands to benefit), members tend to stick together and are more 
likely to cover up for each other (Janis, 1972; Finn, 1995). 
The results also indicate that when team norms were high, there were significant 
positive relationships between the independent variables (attitudes, desired moral 
approbation, independence commitment and personal responsibility for reporting) and 
internal whistle-blowing. However, support was found for only significant positive 
relationships between the independent variables (attitudes and independence 
commitment) and external whistle-blowing. This current study lends support to Nichols 
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and Day’s (1982) claim that groups may reach more ethical decisions than individuals. 
It may be that the firm’s culture and the profession’s norms are influencing the 
perceptions of ethical norms in the teams within this study. However, limited support 
for many of the variables for external reporting may suggest that the reluctance to 
report externally may be guided by the audit teams’ norms for appropriate behaviour, 
which may not include external whistle-blowing (Hooks et al., 1994; De Jong et al., 
2005; Narayanan et al., 2006).  
This study found that when moral intensity was high, there were significant 
positive relationships between the individual-level antecedents (attitudes, perceived 
behavioural control, independence commitment and personal responsibility for 
reporting) and internal whistle-blowing.  When moral intensity was high, there was a 
negative significant relationship between personal costs and internal whistle-blowing. 
The findings suggest that as the severity of the act or the potential to harm others 
increases (Jones, 1991; Shafer et al., 2001; Brennan and Kelly, 2007), there is an 
increased likelihood of reporting of wrongdoing internally. Thus, at higher levels of 
moral intensity, auditors will have stronger attitudes of perceived behavioural control 
(Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1997), a greater sense of personal responsibility and greater 
independence commitment in judging whether to report unethical acts internally, which 
may also be heavily influenced by the costs to self (personal cost) and the organization 
(Curtis, 2006). In contrast, when moral intensity was low, support was found only for 
the significant positive relationship between desired moral approbation and external 
whistle-blowing intentions.  
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8.3 Implications of findings 
8.3.1 Theoretical implications of findings on the proposed conceptual model in the 
context of Barbados 
Whistle-blowing is perceived as a control mechanism within organizations as a 
means of detecting and preventing wrongdoing (Hooks et al., 1994). Specifically, 
whistle-blowing can be used as a corrective mechanism embedded within audit firms to 
correct unethical practices committed by audit staff. This study found that auditors 
were more inclined to report internally rather than externally, thus providing the audit 
firm with the opportunity to correct the wrongdoing. Surprisingly, respondents held 
extremist views by seeking to choose loyalty to audit firms over acting in the public’s 
interest, which may have been reinforced by the firm’s and the profession’s codes of 
conduct and professional training. In De George’s (2006) view, there should be no 
extremist stance taken between basic liberty and duty of loyalty. It is imperative to 
acknowledge the importance of being dutiful to one’s organization, by adhering to the 
basic fundamental principles that guide the operations of the organization. Thus, these 
principles are deemed necessary for the preservation of the organization (be it the audit 
firm) and the protection of employees.  In other words, if whistle-blowing is permitted, 
then there should be protocol that clearly defines the reporting process.  
Another important finding was that auditors were less likely to report 
externally, due to fear of reprisals. De George (2006) believes that external whistle-
blowing should be instituted under the following conditions: (1) when there is a 
possibility of harm to the society, 2) a serious threat to the public, and 3) when internal 
reporting mechanisms have been exhausted.  In other words, without consideration of 
these three factors, it would be deemed unjustifiable to report publicly. Thus, De 
George’s (2006) view is that the prime duty of loyalty is owed to the organization.  
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In contrast, the Rawlsian’s view of justice purports that freedom of speech 
overrides any duty of loyalty even to the organization, and in doing so, makes whistle-
blowing acceptable as it truly represents the practice of freedom of speech. In this 
study, most auditors appear to be seeking to avoid harm to the audit firm rather than the 
public, and that is where a moral dilemma is being experienced. Harm should not be 
weighed based on where one’s loyalty lies (i.e. place of employment) (De George, 
2006). Lindblom (2007) further argues that, based on Rawls’ theory of justice, where 
there is a right to freedom of speech including the right to whistle-blow, there should be 
no moral dilemma between loyalty to the organization and whistle-blowing. In other 
words, duty of loyalty to the organization should not restrict the right to whistle-blow.  
This ideology is based on the premise of Rawlsian’s theory, in which there is supposed 
to be freedom of speech that is granted to all individuals based on the constitution.  
However, the reluctance to commit to this freedom of speech may be influenced by the 
power of those who control the economic resources (such as the employer) which in 
effect creates a moral dilemma. This may explain why auditors are reluctant to whistle-
blow externally, due to a perceived sense of loyalty to the employer, as well as to the 
lack of state-sponsored social security for those who may lose their livelihood for 
standing up for the interest of the public.  
Prior research has found that there are cultural differences on the acceptability 
of whistle-blowing (e.g. Keenan, 2002; Patel, 2003). This study revealed that, while the 
wrongdoing was perceived as being serious and unethical, whistle-blowing was 
perceived as being ethical. However, despite these views on the ethicality of whistle-
blowing and seriousness of the wrongdoing, many auditors were not motivated to take 
action. The mean scores in this study tended to be around the middle of the scale of 1 to 
7 for internal reporting, but on the low side for external reporting. This reluctance may 
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also be driven by audit staff’s tendency to accept the status quo and a general 
unwillingness to speak out on unethical issues (Zhang et al., 2009). 
In Barbados, the apparent reluctance to whistle-blow externally may be further 
explained by the influence of its culture. Punnett, Dick-Forde and Robinson (2006) 
suggested that the culture of Barbados is individualistic, hierarchical and one of seeking 
security. The individualism may be a direct result of the colonial past and Christianity. 
These authors also argued that Barbadians can be considered as more oriented to 
“being” rather than “doing”, which suggests a need to be a part of one’s personal and 
professional ties. In addition, they argued that Barbadians accept unequal distribution 
of power as appropriate (Punnett et al., 2006). This may be directly linked to the 
colonial past, where plantation societies were the order of the day.28 Similarly, Stoddart 
(1995) argued that institutions such as religious and educational bodies, which 
encourage obedience, reinforced the beliefs and practices required to maintain status 
quo in society. 
Barbados, a democratic society, allows freedom of speech, but there appears to 
be a limitation to that freedom which may be steeped in colonial mentality and 
obedience to powerful figures. The relationship may be regarded as a love-hate 
relationship, in which there may be total dislike for unethical practices, but yet blinded 
by allegiance to the audit firm or power responsible for the livelihood of the individual 
whose family members may be dependent on them and therefore, any decisions 
engaged in will require the approval of these significant others. This finding is 
consistent with Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005), who argued that what people 
propose to do and actually do is often incongruent. However, if the wrongdoing 
                                                 
28 Beckford (2001) argued that “modern Caribbean society displays structural forms that are a direct 
legacy of the slave plantation system” (p.139). A plantation society is a political order, dominated by 
plantation owners. In other words, a plantation society is one in which the power is in the hands of the 
planter class (owners), who are directly responsible for making top down decisions.  
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negatively affects the potential whistle-blower, then there is the likelihood that action 
may be taken.  This supports Rawls’ (1971) belief that human beings have the ability to 
choose their own ends.  The findings show that with respect to the democratic rights of 
Barbadians to speak freely, citizens may accept the limitation of such freedom within 
organizational settings, which diverges from Rawls’ theory that justice and free speech 
should be allowed within any institution.29  There is recognition that one has a duty of 
loyalty to the organization, but duty to the firm should never surpass the duty to report 
acts of wrongdoing. 
In Barbados, respect means not being confrontational, challenging and bringing 
shame to individuals which may result in the loss of self-respect and the respect of 
others (Barrow, 2001). However, the demonstration of acts of respect to an individual 
may not be indicative of one’s true feelings. Any feelings of discord may be conducted 
behind closed doors or ‘behind one’s back’, hence, the reason why whistle-blowing 
may not be publicly discussed. In addition, direct questions, reference to names or 
source of information are avoided, thus corroborating the responses of the respondents, 
who indicated their preference for internal and most of all, anonymous reporting. This 
confirms the concerns shared by respondents with regard to fear of reprisals such as 
demotion, ostracism, lack of promotional opportunities, lower job satisfaction and 
family life being disrupted. Barrow (2001) further argued that Barbadian culture may 
be viewed as being suspicious, maintenance of status quo and a ‘façade of politeness 
and friendliness.’  
The reporting of unethical acts may incur the wrath of others in the firm, 
profession and society as a result of upholding the ethical codes of the profession.  For 
                                                 
29 The limitation of freedom implies the lack of support (e.g. financial, psychological, social and moral) 
by the state and other macro institutions in the country. Hence, if the state and the profession have 
adequate protection plans or appropriate mechanisms in place, the practice of freedom to make decisions 
will be much stronger. 
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example, one may be labelled a traitor, not being a team player or accused of having ‘a 
good face and a bad mind’, of being ‘malicious’ and ‘low-minded’ (Barrow, 2001).  
Barbadians are mindful of the perceptions that others form of them, because it directly 
reflects on their families and friends which sustains their feelings of pride and shame.  
This may justify the need for some respondents to seek the approval of significant 
others when making ethical decisions. Barrow (2001) further argues that the 
importance of family within the Barbadian society, which may seem to be slowly 
dissipating, still has remnants of traditional values from older generations which have 
filtered down to the present society. However, there were instances in which some 
practitioners were firm in their decisions to whistle-blow, based more on the guidance 
of superiors (e.g. partners) and colleagues in the firm.  
The significant findings of the majority of antecedents in the conceptual model 
confirm that practitioners in Barbados have the tendency to be autonomous, perceived 
equal liberty and felt rationally capable of acting ethically, as suggested by Kant (1964) 
and Rawls (1971). However, the findings suggest that acting ethically in the form of 
whistle-blowing is perceived to be very costly (high personal cost). Thus, it may be the 
consequences of whistle-blowing that determine whether to blow the whistle or not.  
Should whistle-blowing be duty-based or voluntary-based? If whistle-blowing is 
perceived as being duty-based, the practitioner should ignore factors such as moral 
intensity, personal cost and perceived behavioural control.  If it is seen as a voluntary 
behaviour, practitioners would consider moral intensity, personal cost and perceived 
behavioural control, and then decide on whether to act or not.  
The findings of this study contradict the duty-based argument. It is assumed that 
whistle-blowing may be often exercised because (i) it is a voluntary-based act and (ii) it 
is often associated with low personal cost. However, the findings suggest that whistle-
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blowing is seen by the profession as being duty-based (not voluntary), and hence it 
makes whistle-blowing to be very costly to do, which is contrary to the code of ethics 
(e.g. see AICPA, 2007). Hence, this implies that on the one hand, the profession 
considers whistle-blowing as being a noble duty to act in the public’s interest, but on 
the other hand, makes it very costly and also makes the audit environment to be less 
controllable or autonomous (i.e. low perceived behavioural control). 
This study also shows that whistle-blowing internally among auditors in 
Barbados is more likely to occur when there is higher organizational support, higher 
team norms, lower cohesiveness in groups and higher moral intensity. Institutional 
theory offers an explanation for these findings. For example, mimetic and normative 
isomorphisms are appropriate here, as audit firms should put mechanisms in place to 
enhance compliant behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The findings from this 
study show that, where audit firms create the appropriate environment for encouraging 
sound ethical behaviour, audit staff is more likely to perform honest whistle-blowing. 
For example, the majority of respondents reported the existence of an open-door policy, 
the presence of ethics and risk managers and anonymous hotlines as avenues for 
whistle-blowing. An important finding in this study was the presence of an open-door 
policy, which could create trust among audit staff. If audit practitioners are 
uncomfortable with the firm’s policy, then the possibility exists that whistle-blowing 
will not be performed. The issue of an open-door policy is in direct contrast with Miceli 
et al. (2008), who argued that an open-door policy is insufficient to bring about 
compliance. However, these findings show that an open door policy can work among 
auditors.  
This study provides ample evidence that the majority of the constructs of prior 
ethical decision-making models can predict whistle-blowing intentions. Specifically, 
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support was found for key variables (personal cost of reporting and personal 
responsibility for reporting) of Graham’s (1986) model of principled dissent. In 
addition, it was seen that attitudes and perceived behavioural control of Ajzen’s (1991) 
theory of planned behaviour were useful predictors of whistle-blowing behaviour. 
Limited quantitative support was found for desired moral approbation used in this study 
as a substitute for subjective norms, a variable in the theory of planned behaviour. 
Given that the interviewees showed a need for approval from different referents, future 
research can use other constructs that measure social influences and test for the 
importance of these significant others.  
 
8.3.2 Practical implications in the Barbadian context 
8.3.2.1 Individual practitioners 
The results of this study offer important insights for audit practitioners. It was 
found that internal reporting was preferred to external reporting. Interestingly, audit 
staff felt that there were sufficient liberties within the organization to whistle-blow. For 
example, these could be done through the use of anonymous hotlines, an open-door 
policy and availability of ethics and risk managers for reporting the wrongdoing. 
Evidence in this study also indicates that even when these mechanisms are 
implemented and exhausted, external whistle-blowing may still not be performed by 
audit staff. Most practitioners were resolute in their decision not to engage in external 
whistle-blowing, with a resounding preference for internal reporting. This may explain 
the absence of publicized cases of whistle-blowing among auditors in Barbados.30  
                                                 
30 Certainly, there may be cases of internal reporting and with the significant number of corporate 
failures in the global market, it is interesting that there are no known cases of auditors’ whistle-blowing. 
It is possible that the corporate scandals could be outliers, with the vast majority of potential scandals, 
being resolved through internal whistle-blowing. The possibility may also exist that junior staff may have 
reported any irregularities up the chain of command, thus leaving their superiors to resolve the issues. 
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In the United States, whistle-blowing tends to be sensationalized, whereas in 
Barbados, it may have the opposite effect, depending on who stands to benefit or lose.31 
It is quite possible that potential whistle-blowers in this sample may consider the 
consequences of their actions which could lead to loss of jobs, closure of businesses, 
and a negative effect on the economy and image of a small developing country. In 
addition, there is recognition that moral and societal obligations, which are instrumental 
to the process of reporting, could be thwarted based on the culture of the firm which 
may be oriented towards profit-making. These results demonstrate an overwhelming 
avoidance to whistle-blow externally and may strengthen the call for the selection and 
retention of auditors to be taken out of the hands of the clients, who are responsible for 
paying the audit firms. This should avoid any undue pressure being placed on the 
auditor to satisfy the client.  
The study also found that individual practitioners perceive the importance of 
whistle-blowing as a control mechanism within audit firms, given the seriousness of the 
wrongdoing. Hence, this importance necessitates that the profession must respond and 
meet the needs and expectations of practitioners.  The results also suggest that whistle-
blowing is an action or process that requires the appropriate level of professional 
attitudes, perceived behavioural control, personal cost of reporting, personal 
responsibility for reporting and independence commitment.  Thus, the profession in 
Barbados needs to pay more attention to enhancing these personal qualities as a means 
of ensuring that the practitioner follows ethical practices. Specifically, practitioners 
need to be instilled with more perceived behavioural control, personal responsibility for 
reporting, and independence commitment as well as low personal cost of reporting to 
                                                                                                                                              
Given that audit staff work on multiple engagements, these staff members may not spend sufficient time 
on the engagement to see the eventual outcome of the whistle-blowing complaint.  
31 Miceli et al. (2008, pp. 381-382) argued that whistle-blowing was more acceptable in the United States 
than in any other culture, and this is reinforced by laws that protect the whistle-blower.  
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encourage whistle-blowing. This can be achieved through purposive ethics training and 
creating a supportive and ethical culture in the organization. 
From a practitioner’s perspective, two additional points can be deduced from 
these findings. Firstly, the practitioners did not perceive external whistle-blowing as 
unethical or unprofessional (anti-profession attitude), but instead they ranked it as a 
secondary option to internal whistle-blowing. This may imply that the practitioner can 
utilize the required channels to effect satisfactory resolution to any wrongdoing. This 
can be considered as an adequate control mechanism. Secondly, the findings suggest 
that external whistle-blowing could be preferable when perceived behavioural control 
is high. That is, the practitioner perceives some measure of control over external 
whistle-blowing, when the potential harm to the practitioner is minimal. This finding 
has a profound implication for the profession in Barbados. Hence, perceived 
behavioural control may be a major issue that needs to be addressed by the profession, 
if it wants to be perceived as being highly independent and well respected. Perceived 
behavioural control should be explored in future research by the profession, as it is 
beyond the limit of this study to further the understanding on how perceived 
behavioural control may affect the image of the individual, firm and accounting 
profession. 
 
8.3.2.2 The profession (including the firms) 
This study found that the majority of antecedents in the conceptual model were 
significantly associated with whistle-blowing. This suggests that the profession 
currently comprises individuals who share similar personal characteristics. These 
characteristics portray an individual, who is not willing to whistle-blow externally, and 
certainly will not challenge the unsatisfactory or inappropriate response of a superior or 
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colleague. Thus, there is a clear need for staff development. Audit firms need to ensure 
that the recruitment process selects individuals who are ethically sensitive, have the 
capacity to stand up for their beliefs and be able to report questionable acts committed 
by colleagues. For example, the recruitment process can include the use of personality 
and integrity testing which should assist in improving the quality of potential entrants 
to the profession.  In addition, human resource departments in the audit firms can use 
training programmes designed to sensitise staff on the steps required to resolve ethical 
conflicts, and raise the level of moral development, enhance professional attitudes and 
increase personal responsibility for reporting (Zhang, Chiu and Wei, 2009). 
The majority of respondents proposed that the audit firm’s protocol on whistle-
blowing should be formally documented, and made available to members of staff. 
Visual reminders on how to use the hotline or to report anonymously should be placed 
at strategic points within the audit firm to help facilitate the process. Further emphasis 
was placed on the importance of an open-door policy, need for confidentiality, 
anonymity (hotline), greater use of ethics and risk managers, offering financial 
incentives, performance review systems (Miceli et al., 2008), psychological support for 
the whistle-blower, provision of on-going education and training, updating of the code 
of ethics, and the promotion of independence. These findings are consistent with Miceli 
et al. (2008), who suggested that control mechanisms should be implemented to support 
whistle-blowing. An ethical corporate culture can also be created and guided by top 
management in the firm. The firm can set policies for what constitutes acceptable 
behaviour, the consequences of engaging in wrongdoing as well as for not reporting.  
This study found that many of the respondents in the interview phase felt that 
their ethical decisions were influenced by their important others (peers, superiors and 
family). Hence, management in the audit firms needs to find ways of encouraging these 
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referents to support ethical behaviour. Gibson and Frakes (1997) suggested that public 
recognition could be given to those referents for supporting ethical practices. For 
example, public recognition may include the granting of awards and publicity in the 
media.  
The study’s findings also inform the profession as well as the accounting firms 
that the required personal qualities of individual practitioners should consist of high 
attitudes, perceived behavioural control, independence commitment and personal 
responsibility for reporting, and low personal cost. Individuals, with these personal 
values, will be more likely to blow the whistle internally. Arguably, with more 
perceived behavioural control, the preferred channel of reporting could be extended to 
include external channels. However, an investment in organizational support for 
internal reporting is necessary, as it responds to the moral needs of practitioners. High 
perceived organizational support and high organizational commitment should 
encourage the practitioner to do all that is possible in avoiding harm to the firm, 
profession and society. 
The results indicate that the Barbadian audit profession may not be receptive to 
external whistle-blowing. Therefore, it may be necessary for audit firms to pay more 
attention to the further development of internal rather than external reporting 
behaviours, as suggested by Chiu (2003).  For example, there could be better use of the 
anonymous reporting channels (e.g. the hotline). The internal reporting channels could 
be more refined to include clearly defined procedures, which could prevent any 
potential damage to the reputation of the firm and the profession. 
This study also found that independence is critical to whistle-blowing, which is 
consistent with Rawls’ (1971) and Kant’s (1964) views, which point out the importance 
of self-control, self-direction and freedom of expression. These findings show that audit 
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firms need to implement measures and the appropriate interventions, which can 
improve attitudes towards whistle-blowing, the level of control over reporting, and 
personal responsibility in an effort to reduce fear of reprisals. Audit firms’ top 
management must ensure that the right values (e.g., morality, openness and ethics) are 
entrenched within the firm, so that audit staff can feel that there is a personal 
responsibility to report. Firms should implement procedures and policies to prevent 
retaliation by possibly creating an independent committee outside of the firm for staff 
to make their reports. These interventions can assist in creating an ethical environment 
which can only lead to the enhancement of the firm’s image and reputation. 
Personal cost was found to be a major factor influencing auditors’ whistle-
blowing intentions.  A review of personal cost and how it may be minimised can 
provide due assurance to the practitioners, who may have the ambition to improve the 
image of the profession, but find it too costly to do so.  One may ask why is whistle-
blowing perceived as being costly in the profession?  Is this policy still appropriate for 
today’s social, technological and economic age?  It would be appropriate to change the 
practitioners’ code of professional conduct to highlight the rights of the practitioners 
when they blow the whistle.  Hence, having perceived organizational support alone 
may be sufficient as long as personal cost remains high and the code of ethics remains 
silent on enforcing and protecting the practitioners’ rights in reporting wrongdoing. The 
profession stands to benefit from supporting ethical behaviour rather than enabling 
wrongdoing, which may cost the firm in the long term. 
This study highlighted an important finding that affects how groups should 
operate.32 The results show that auditors are more likely to whistle-blow in less 
                                                 
32 Audit engagements are performed by audit teams. It is expected that the team should be a cohesive 
unit. However, one auditor argued that in an audit firm, one is usually working on many engagements, 
and with time being an important factor, there is not much time for social interaction, hence the absence 
of high group cohesion. 
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cohesive teams.  While it may seem to be disruptive, making the group less cohesive 
may be a step in the best direction to facilitate whistle-blowing. However, this may not 
be generalized to other professional and product driven organizations that depend on 
high group cohesion to deliver services or manufacture products. The audit firm may 
need to direct the cohesiveness effort at getting the job done rather than creating an 
atmosphere of close in-groups that will enable unethical behaviour.  
 
8.3.2.3 Society (Barbados) 
The findings indicated that practitioners still consider religion, family and 
friends as valid sources for ethical approval.  However, the profession seems to have 
embraced materialism as part of its doctrine.  Hence, society may need to determine the 
tolerable level which it will accept for its value system. The state should find ways to 
ensure that its members engage in moral behaviour. This is similar to coercive 
isomorphism, in which the state can impose mechanisms (e.g. revising the ethics and 
moral codes, governance systems, enact legislation) in society to regulate behaviour 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Given that the image of the profession and the quality of 
life in the society may be at stake, state intervention could improve the ethical and 
spiritual needs of practitioners, which may be in the best interest of all concerned. For 
example, churches and schools could play significant roles in developing the quality of 
people and the appropriate moral values in the society. 
 These findings corroborate the argument of Zhang et al. (2009) for Chinese 
culture, which emphasized the importance of respect for the decisions of the elderly 
and authority figures in their organizations and society at large, while making every 
attempt to live and work in harmony with others. Similarly, any deviation from these 
norms in Barbadian society may be interpreted as disrespectful and the whistle-blower 
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may be perceived negatively. Thus, the state can create regulatory mechanisms as well 
as provide avenues for potential whistle-blowers to report wrongdoing. These 
mechanisms can include the establishment of special reporting units, with members of 
the judiciary and clergy on board.  
 
8.4 Limitations  
There are several limitations to this research. This study focused primarily on external 
auditors in audit firms to determine their willingness to report on colleagues. The study 
did not examine whistle-blowing among internal and government auditors. Thus, a 
limitation exists with respect to its generalisability to other professions and other forms 
of auditing within the audit profession. Although every attempt was made to make the 
sample representative of the population, there is still potential for sampling error.  
This study sought to measure whistle-blowing intentions and not actual 
behaviours. Ajzen (1991) argued that intention is a proxy for actual behaviour. 
However, there were no publicized cases of whistle-blowing in Barbados that the 
researcher could use to compare the findings in this study. Furthermore, whistle-
blowing, being an ethically sensitive topic, may have evoked feelings of uneasiness or 
fear of reprisals among respondents. Indeed, respondents were apprehensive when 
asked to discuss actual whistle-blowing experiences, and have noted that they were not 
aware of such cases. This may indicate a reluctance to share sensitive information, 
which may be explained by the national culture of Barbados. In addition, this study did 
not examine the influence of national culture on whistle-blowing intentions, given that 
some cultures, such as the USA, sensationalise the phenomenon.  
This researcher took every precaution (for example, anonymity and 
confidentiality) to ensure honest reporting of responses. Although social desirability 
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bias was controlled for, the possibility exists that respondents may have embellished 
their responses to portray themselves and the profession in a favourable light. Social 
desirability bias was possibly further experienced in the interviews and focus groups, in 
which respondents may have been more guarded in their responses since anonymity 
would have been significantly lowered. Although informed consent was obtained and 
confidentiality was assured, the ability to identify individuals may influence social 
desirability bias.   
A further limitation to this study was the small size of the groups and the lack of 
significant between-group variability in the dependent variables, which did not 
facilitate the full utilisation of hierarchical linear modelling (HLM). This may limit the 
generalisability of the findings to larger groups or teams. For instance, the average size 
of the groups in the study was 3 to 5 members, and as a result, based on arguments 
made in chapter 5, HLM may be more appropriate for large sample nested designs.  
 
8.5  Suggestions for future research 
Beside individual factors, the conceptual model incorporated the impact of teams or 
groups on ethical decision-making (whistle-blowing). Dukerich, Nichols, Elm and 
Vollrath (1990) suggest that “because problems that pose moral dilemmas are often 
addressed by groups such as boards of directors, crisis management teams, disciplinary 
boards, or city councils, it is important to understand how decision-makers collectively 
consider and resolve moral problems” (p.473). Indeed, Trevino et al. (2006) support the 
call for more studies on the influence of groups in behavioural ethics. In addition, the 
several studies that researched decision-making among groups used convenient student 
samples rather than actual members from client organizations and audit firms. Thus, 
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future research may empirically consider looking at the impact of groups on the 
whistle-blowing process in actual work settings.  
Another potential rich area for future research is in the use of institutional 
theory to understand whistle-blowing behaviour.  There has been little research which 
utilises institutional theory in the whistle-blowing literature. It is important to 
understand the impact of isomorphic mechanisms (corporate governance structures) 
such as audit committees, non-executive directors and other strategic institutional 
processes on the whistle-blowing phenomenon.  While isomorphic mechanisms are the 
result of increase pressures from the government or the profession to adopt certain 
professional and bureaucratic designs to increase homogeneity among audit firms, the 
impact of such pressures may also result in some elements of the personal antecedents, 
described in the model, not to change. Hence, this may demonstrate resistance to the 
institutional, team and issue-specific pressures. 
The theoretical arguments in designing the model utilize Rawls’ (1971) theory 
of justice and Kant’s (1964) moral duty. Rawls proposed justice as fairness based on 
societal liberties, while Kant proposed justice based on a deontological perspective. 
Future research could use this framework of whistle-blowing among audit practitioners 
to look at justice from the societal level as well as the organization level. This is critical 
given that there is a difference between Rawls’ theory of justice and organizational 
theory of justice as well as between deontological and teleological ethical perspectives. 
Thus, there is a need to identify which justice notion is the preference of the profession.  
Rawls’ justice looks at the society as a whole, while organizational justice deals with 
the specific aspects such as distributive and procedural justice. Hence, much research is 
needed in both areas.  
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Most of the research on whistle-blowing has been conducted using 
questionnaires, experiments and student samples. Future research could study whistle-
blowing in field settings. As stated previously, the use of workplace samples could help 
to create real life understanding of whistle-blowing behaviour. Specifically, a critical 
incidents approach could be used where organizational members could be asked to 
recall whistle-blowing incidents and how they resolved them. In addition, rich 
information can be obtained from using other qualitative methodologies such as focus 
groups. 
The present model attempts to bring greater depth of understanding to auditor 
decision-making in audit reporting issues by looking at individual, team and contextual 
(issue-specific) factors. Further testing of this model can aid policy-makers and 
professional bodies in developing and incorporating adequate ethics requirements in the 
codes of professional conduct to increase auditors’ ethical awareness. Specifically, 
future empirical research on this model can also help auditors and audit firms to decide 
on appropriate training needs for staff. Given the high personal costs of reporting in 
some societies, future work can also be conducted on testing for the influence of 
national culture on whistle-blowing. 
 Finally, it is hoped that this model can assist in gaining insights about the 
extent to which auditors perceive themselves as moral agents. The study contributes to 
the ongoing public debate of ethics in the auditing profession. The issue is how can one 
ensure or improve the integrity of the auditing profession such that members are able to 
discharge their social function of acting in the public’s interest. To address this issue, 
empirical research on the psychological and behavioural aspects of whistle-blowing is a 
necessary (if by no means sufficient) element in the developing the understanding 
required. This thesis begins to develop this understanding. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
General Instructions Letter 
 
Philmore Alleyne 
Lecturer in Accounting 
Department of Management Studies 
University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, Barbados 
Tel: (246) 417-4295   Fax: (246) 438-9167  Cell: (246) 256-6695 
 
December 26, 2008 
 
Dear Participant 
 
Study of whistle-blowing intentions among auditors – Barbados  
General Instructions for Completing Questionnaires 
 
This study examines whistle-blowing being done among auditors in Barbados. I would like to 
set out the following brief guidelines to assist in the completion of the attached questionnaire. 
 
a) Since the study focuses on audit groups/teams, each team (e.g. partner, and other 
varying levels of staff) can collect questionnaires to be filled out by each member of 
the usual audit team (e.g. the team that worked on the last engagement(s)).   
b) Each team should choose their own specific 4-digit alpha-numeric code (e.g. AY23) for 
each team member to write in the space provided on Page 1 marked “Team Code” on 
each questionnaire that is filled out. This is done to facilitate the aggregation of 
individual responses into an overall average score for each team during the data 
analysis stage. The questionnaires for each team should be bundled together with a 
paper clip or staple or any other device for ease of tracking the group’s responses.  
c) A preferred approach could be that each team can sit together in a room and allow 
individual members to fill out a questionnaire without interruption. Alternatively, team 
members can fill them out at their leisure but they need to agree on the team code to 
put on each member’s questionnaire. 
d) Please do not put your name or name of the organization or the name of any individual 
on the questionnaire. When the questionnaires are completed, please drop each team’s 
stack of questionnaires that are bound together in the box provided. Do not disclose 
your team code to anyone outside of your team. Confidentiality and anonymity must be 
maintained. 
 
I look forward to your participation. Please enjoy. 
 
Yours sincerely  
 
Philmore Alleyne 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
Team code………………… 
 
The University of Bradford 
 
A Study on Factors influencing Whistle-blowing Intentions among Auditors in Barbados 
 
Dear Participant 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. This questionnaire should take 
approximately 25-30 minutes to complete.  There are no right or wrong answers, as I am 
seeking to gain your perceptions on a range of issues.  
 
Description: The purpose of this research is to explore the issue of whistle-blowing, and to 
gain a deeper understanding of ethics among auditors in Barbados. The attached questionnaire 
is part of my PhD research. 
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity: Responses to the survey are anonymous and all completed 
survey material is strictly confidential.  In this regard, no names of individuals or 
organizations will be collected or used in the survey.  To ensure anonymity and 
confidentiality, please do not put any identifiers on to the questionnaire. You should only write 
your independently selected 4 digit coded number in the top right hand corner of the first page 
of each questionnaire instrument, so as to link your responses to your group’s questionnaires. 
No one from the organization will see any of the completed questionnaires. Feedback will be in 
the form of reports or presentations that include summary results on the group level only.  
 
Informed Consent:  According to the University’s Research Ethics guidelines, by completing 
this survey, I understand that you are giving your informed consent to participate in this study. 
You consent to voluntarily participate in this study, and therefore you can withdraw at anytime. 
 
When you have completed the questionnaire, please put it in the prepaid, addressed envelope, 
seal it and drop it in the mail or the box placed in your organization. 
 
Thank you very much for your consideration of my request. Should you wish any more details 
on the research, please ask the undersigned. Your assistance will be very important and 
valuable in the successful completion of this study. Please enjoy. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Philmore Alleyne 
Lecturer in Accounting 
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SECTION 1: DESIRED MORAL APPROBATION 
 
 Instructions: 
 
Please answer the questions below 
by circling the number that best 
corresponds to your chosen 
response. 
(Adapted from Ryan & Riordan, 
2000) C
om
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y 
di
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gr
ee
 
M
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y 
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 d
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y 
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e 
DMA-
OP 
Desired moral approbation from 
others – praise      
  
1. I want others to think that my 
decisions are ethical. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
2. I want others to view me as a moral 
person.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
3. I hope others view my behaviours 
as ethical 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
4. I want others to support my 
decisions on moral issues.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
5. I want others to praise my choices 
in ethical situations. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
DMA-
OB 
Desired moral approbation from 
others – blame      
  
6. I do not want to be criticized when I 
do not do the right thing. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
7. I do not like others to blame me 
even when I am in the wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
8 I do not like to be criticized for 
doing something wrong 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
DMA-
S 
Desired moral approbation from 
self      
  
9. I do not care what other people 
think as long as I know that I have 
done the right thing 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
10. I do what I think is right, no matter 
what anyone else thinks 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
11. I do not worry about what other 
people think when I do something 
that I know is right  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
12. I do not worry about others’ 
opinions as long as I feel confident 
about the ethical decisions that I 
make. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
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SECTION 2: INDEPENDENCE COMMITMENT,  PERCEIVED ORGANIZATIONAL 
SUPPORT, TEAM NORMS, GROUP COHESION,  
 
 
 
 
Instructions: 
 
 
Please answer the questions 
below by circling the number 
that best corresponds to your 
chosen response 
 
Independence Commitment 
(Adapted from Gendron et al., 
2006) 
C
om
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el
y 
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sa
gr
ee
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el
y 
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 d
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e 
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y 
ag
re
e 
13. I believe that independence is one 
of the main foundations of the 
accounting and auditing 
profession. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
14. I believe that the profession’s 
independence requirements need 
to be strictly enforced in every 
sphere of activities in which public 
accounting firms are involved. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
7 
15. I think the profession would be 
more highly regarded if the 
profession’s independence 
requirements for auditors in public 
practice were more rigorous 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
7 
16. I think that stakeholders in general 
(e.g. business community) would 
benefit if the profession’s 
independence requirements in 
public practice were more 
rigorous.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
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Instructions: 
 
Please answer the questions below 
by circling the number that best 
corresponds to your chosen 
response 
 
Perceived organizational support 
(Eisenberger et al., 1997) 
C
om
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 d
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17. My organization cares about my 
opinions. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
18. My organization really cares about 
my well-being. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
19. My organization strongly considers 
my goals and values. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
20. Help is available from my 
organization when I have a problem. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
21. My organization would forgive an 
honest mistake on my part. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
22.  If given the opportunity, my 
organization would take advantage 
of me.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
23. My organization shows very little 
concern for me.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
24. My organization is willing to help 
me if I need a special favour. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
25 My organization values my integrity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions: 
 
Please answer the questions below by 
circling the number that best 
corresponds to your chosen response 
 
Team Norms (De Jong et al., 2005) C
om
pl
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y 
di
sa
gr
ee
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 d
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C
om
pl
et
el
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26. Our audit team develops standards over 
and above those specified by the firm to 
judge our performance by.  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
27 Our audit team members share common 
expectations about the behaviour of all 
work group members. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
28. Our audit team members have identified 
the strengths and weaknesses of 
individual work group members. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
29. Our audit team members share common 
expectations about the behaviour of 
particular work group members with 
specific responsibilities 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
30. Our audit team members share common 
expectations that the behaviour of the 
group will be ethical 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
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Instructions: 
 
Please answer the questions below by 
circling the number that best 
corresponds to your chosen 
response,given the highlighted (bold) 
items in each question below 
 
Group Cohesion (Price and Mueller, 
1986) 
1-
 N
ot
 a
t a
ll 
2 3 
4 
– 
N
eu
tr
al
 
5 6 
7-
 V
er
y 
 
31. To what extent do you trust the 
members of your audit team? 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
7 
32. To what extent are the people in your 
audit team helpful to you in getting 
your job done? 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
7 
33. To what extent are people in your audit 
team friendly? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
34. To what extent do people in your audit 
team take a personal interest in you? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
35. To what extent do you look forward to 
being with the members of your audit 
team each day? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
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SECTION 3: ETHICAL SCENARIOS 
 
Read the following scenario carefully, and answer the questions below.  
Scenario 1 –  
You are a junior auditor, working for an auditing firm and you are conducting an annual audit of a highly 
valued client, a machinery manufacturer that was about to go public. During the audit, you discovered 
that the manufacturing company had received a large loan from the local savings and loan association. It 
was illegal for a savings and loan association to make a loan to a manufacturing firm; they were 
restricted by law to mortgages based on residential real estate. You took the working papers and a copy 
of the ledger showing the loan to the engagement partner. The engagement partner, Tom Jones, listened 
to you, and then told you, “Leave the papers with me. I will take care of this privately.” You later learn 
that Tom has shredded the papers and has taken no further action.  If one was to shred the papers, 
this would be in direct violation of the principle of “Integrity” of the IFAC’s Code of Ethics.  Adapted 
and modified from Rau and Weber (2004). 
 
 
Instructions: Please circle the number that best corresponds to your chosen response. 
 
 Scales adapted: Moral intensity (Coram et al., 2008), 
seriousness, personal responsibility and personal 
cost (Schultz et al., 1993) 
 
Very 
low 
     Very 
high 
1 Please assess the performance of Tom’s  act  leading 
to an incorrect audit opinion (probability of effect to 
financial statement users). 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
2 What is the probability that Tom’s act of shredding 
the paper will be discovered by higher management?  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 If the act of shredding the papers was discovered, 
what level of disciplinary action would an auditor face 
for committing the same act of shredding the paper?   1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
4 Please assess the seriousness (i.e the amount of social 
harm done) of  Tom’s act of shredding the papers.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 Please assess the personal costs to you as an audit staff 
person (i.e trouble, risk, discomfort) of informing  
higher management of Tom’s act of shredding the 
papers  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
6 Please assess your personal responsibility (i.e duty or 
obligation) for informing higher management of 
Tom’s act of shredding papers.  
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately 
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 Attitudes  Not very 
True 
     Very 
true 
 How true do you think that the 
following statements are with regard to 
you reporting Tom’s act of shredding 
the papers in an audit firm? 
       
7 Blowing the whistle on Tom would 
help prevent serious harm to the audit 
firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 Reporting Tom’s action is helpful in 
controlling unethical behaviour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 Whistleblowing on Tom enhances the 
public interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 Reporting Tom’s action in the 
workplace is a way for an employee to 
do his or her duty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 Whistleblowing on Tom is the moral 
thing to do 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
 If you reported Tom’s action, how 
important do you think the following 
consequences would be to you? 
Not very 
important 
     Very 
important 
12 Prevention of harm to the audit firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 Control of unethical behaviour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 Enhancement of public interest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 Performing one’s duty as an employee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 Moral satisfaction on one’s part 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
 Subjective norms        
 How proud of you do you think the 
following persons would be if you 
reported Tom’s action? 
Not  very 
much 
     Very much 
17 Members of one’s family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 Co-workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19 Immediate supervisor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 Friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21 Neighbours 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
 How much do you care whether the 
following persons would approve or 
disapprove of your reporting of Tom’s 
action? 
Very little      Very much 
22 Members of one’s family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23 Co-workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24 Immediate supervisor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25 Friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26 Neighbours 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately 
 
Scales adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009). 
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 Perceived behavioural control        
 If you report Tom’s action in an audit 
firm, how likely do you think the 
following are? 
Not  very 
likely 
     Very likely 
27 The audit firm will hinder/ignore my 
reporting every step of the way 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28 The difficulties to be faced in the 
process of my reporting will be too 
great for me to endure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29 My reporting won’t make any 
difference 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30 I will be subjected to retaliation from 
the audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 If you report Tom’s action, how 
important do you think the following 
are to you? 
Not very 
important 
     Very 
important 
31 The audit firm’s hindering reporting (or 
ignoring it) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32 Difficulties to be faced in the process of 
reporting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33 No chance to correct wrongdoing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34 Retaliation by the audit firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Reporting intentions        
 With respect to Tom’s act of shredding 
the papers, 
Extremely 
unlikely 
     Extremely 
likely 
35 How likely is it that  you would inform 
higher management of Tom’s act ?  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
36 How likely is it that other auditors in 
the office who have become aware of 
Tom’s act  would inform higher 
management? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
7 
37 How likely is it that you would inform 
persons outside of the firm of Tom’s 
act? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
38 How likely is it that other auditors in 
the office inform persons outside of the 
firm of Tom’s act? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
39 How likely is it that you would perform 
Tom’s act of shredding the papers? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately 
 
Scales adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009), Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) and Gibson and 
Frakes (1997).
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 Not 
at all 
     Very 
much 
40 How much would you want to perform 
Tom’s act of shredding the papers? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
41 I would report Tom’s act to the 
appropriate persons within the audit 
firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42 I would use the reporting channels 
inside of the audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43 I would let upper level of management 
know about Tom’s act 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44 I would tell my supervisor about Tom’s 
act 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
45 I would report Tom’s act to the 
appropriate authorities outside of the 
audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46 I would use reporting channels outside 
of the audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
47 I would provide information to outside 
agencies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
48 I would inform the public of Tom’s act 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately 
 
Scales adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) and Gibson and Frakes (1997). 
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Read the following scenario carefully, and answer the questions below. 
Scenario 2 
 
You are Paul Smith, the Audit Senior. John Ellis, a partner in an audit firm, and you are both completing 
the December 31, 2008 audit of Simpson Stores, Inc (SSI), a privately owned company that operates a 
chain of retail clothing outlets. The owner of SSI, Bob Simpson, owns several businesses and is one of 
the firm’s largest tax and auditing clients. Simpson is currently negotiating to sell SSI. A tentative sales 
price has been agreed upon, but is contingent upon the audit verification of the net realizable value of 
accounts receivable and inventory. SSI has total current assets of $5,000,000 and pretax income (before 
audit adjustments) of $500,000. 
 
Near the end of the audit, you are aware that Ellis, the audit partner has a disagreement with Simpson 
regarding the adequacy of the allowance for doubtful accounts. Based on SSI’s historical collection 
experience, the auditors’ best estimate of the allowance is $300,000. However, Simpson contends that, 
due to an improving economy, the recorded allowance of $100,000 is adequate. Although there has been 
some improvement in economic conditions in SSI’s market areas, Ellis feels it is unlikely to significantly 
impact the collectibility of their receivables. You later learn that because Simpson is a valued client 
of the firm, Ellis, the partner, agreed to accept the recorded allowance of $100,000 and gave an 
unqualified (clean) audit opinion on the financial statements.  If the auditor was to give an 
unqualified opinion based on client’s pressure even though the auditor has serious reservations regarding 
the client’s aggressive accounting treatment (i.e collectibility of the accounts receivable), this would be 
in direct violation of IFAC’s principles of objectivity and integrity. (Adapted from Shafer et al., 1999).  
 
 
 
 
Instructions: Please circle the number that best corresponds to your chosen response. 
 
 Scales adapted: Moral intensity (Coram et al., 2008), 
seriousness, personal responsibility and personal cost 
(Schultz et al., 1993) 
 
Very 
low 
     Very 
high 
1 Please assess the performance of Ellis’ act  leading to 
an incorrect audit opinion (probability of effect to 
financial statement users). 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
2 What is the probability that Ellis’ act of overly 
accommodating the client’s request for aggressive 
accounting treatment will be discovered by higher 
management?  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
3 If the act of overly accommodating the client’s request 
was discovered, what level of disciplinary action 
would an auditor face for committing the same act?  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
4 Please assess the seriousness (i.e the amount of social 
harm done) of  Ellis’ act of overly accommodating the 
client’s request for aggressive accounting treatment.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
5 Please assess the personal costs to you as an audit staff 
person (i.e trouble, risk, discomfort) of informing  
higher management of Ellis’ act of overly 
accommodating the client’s request for aggressive 
accounting treatment. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
7 
6 Please assess your personal responsibility (i.e. duty or 
obligation) for informing higher management of Ellis’ 
act of overly accommodating the client request.  
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately 
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 Attitudes  Not very 
true 
     Very 
true 
 How true do you think that the 
following statements are with regard to 
you reporting Ellis’ action of overly 
accommodating the client’s request in 
an audit firm? 
       
7 Blowing the whistle on Ellis would 
help prevent serious harm to the audit 
firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 Reporting the action of Ellis is helpful 
in controlling unethical behaviour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 Whistle-blowing on Ellis enhances the 
public interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 Reporting Ellis’ action in the 
workplace is a way for an employee to 
do his or her duty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 Whistle-blowing on Ellis is the moral 
thing to do 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
 If you reported Ellis’ action, how 
important do you think the following 
consequences would be to you? 
Not very 
important 
     Very 
important 
12 Prevention of harm to the audit firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 Control of unethical behaviour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 Enhancement of public interest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 Performing one’s duty as an employee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 Moral satisfaction on one’s part 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
 Subjective norms        
 How proud of you do you think the 
following persons would be if you 
reported Ellis’ action? 
Not Very 
much 
     Very much 
17 Members of one’s family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 Co-workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19 Immediate supervisor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 Friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21 Neighbours 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
 How much do you care whether the 
following persons would approve or 
disapprove of your reporting of Ellis’ 
action? 
Very little      Very much 
22 Members of one’s family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23 Co-workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24 Immediate supervisor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25 Friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26 Neighbours 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately 
 
Scales adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009). 
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 Perceived behavioural control        
 If you report Ellis’ action of 
overly accommodating client’s 
request in the audit firm, how 
likely do you think the following 
are? 
Not very 
likely 
     Very likely 
27 The audit firm will hinder/ignore 
my reporting every step of the way 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28 The difficulties to be faced in the 
process of my reporting will be too 
great for me to endure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29 My reporting won’t make any 
difference 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30 I will be subjected to retaliation 
from the audit firm  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 If you report Ellis’ action, how 
important do you think the 
following are to you? 
Not very 
important 
     Very 
important 
31 The audit firm’s hindering 
reporting (or ignoring it) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32 Difficulties to be faced in the 
process of reporting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33 No chance to correct wrongdoing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34 Retaliation by the audit firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Reporting intentions        
 With respect to Ellis’ act of overly 
accommodating the client’s 
request, 
Extremely 
unlikely 
     Extremely 
likely 
35 How likely is it that you would 
inform higher management of 
Ellis’ act ?  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
36 How likely is it that other 
auditors in the office who have 
become aware of Ellis’ act  would 
inform higher management? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
37 How likely is it that you would 
inform persons outside of the firm 
of Ellis’ act? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
38 How likely is it that other 
auditors in the office inform 
persons outside of the firm of 
Ellis’ act? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
39 How likely is it that you would 
perform Ellis’ act of overly 
accommodating the client’s 
request? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately  
 
Scales adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009), Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) and Gibson and 
Frakes (1997).
 
 
 
 372
 
  Not at 
all 
     Very 
much 
40 How much would you want to 
perform Ellis’ act ? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41 I would report Ellis’ act to the 
appropriate persons within the 
audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42 I would use the reporting 
channels inside of the audit 
firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43 I would let upper level of 
management know about 
Ellis’ act 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44 I would tell my supervisor 
about Ellis’ act 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
45 I would report Ellis’ act to the 
appropriate authorities outside 
of the audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46 I would use reporting channels 
outside of the audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
47 I would provide information to 
outside agencies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
48 I would inform the public of 
Ellis’ act 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately  
 
Scales adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) and Gibson and Frakes (1997).
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SECTION 4: SOCIAL DESIRABILITY  
 
 
Instructions: 
Please answer the questions below by 
circling the number that best 
corresponds to your chosen response. 
Social desirability scale (Paulhus, 1989) 
impression management 
 
N
ot
  t
ru
e 
  
So
m
ew
ha
t t
ru
e 
  
V
er
y 
tr
ue
 
1. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I never cover up my mistakes.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. There have been occasions when I have 
taken advantage of someone 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
4. I never swear.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I sometimes try to get even rather than 
forgive and forget. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
6. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely 
to get caught 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
7. I have said something bad about a friend 
behind his or her back. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
8 When I hear people talking privately, I 
avoid listening 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
9. I have received too much  change from a 
salesperson without telling him or her 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I always declare everything at customs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. When I was young I sometimes stole 
things  1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
12.  I have never dropped litter on the street 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I sometimes violate traffic or pedestrian 
laws. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
14. I never read sexy books or magazines.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 I have done things that I don’t tell other 
people about 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
16 I never take things that don’t belong to 
me 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
17 I have taken sick-leave from work or 
school even though I wasn’t really sick 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
18 I have never damaged a library book or 
store merchandise without reporting it. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
19 I have some pretty awful habits.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. I don’t gossip about other people’s 
business 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
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SECTION 5: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
 
1)  Gender 
 Male   Female 
            
 
2) What is your age? ________ years 
 
3) Organizational position 
 
           Junior           Senior           Manager              Partner                Other 
                                                                              
 
Other (please specify) __________________________________________________ 
             
4)  How many years were you employed in this organization?  ______________________ 
 
5) Please indicate the highest level of education you completed? (please tick appropriately) 
 
 Primary    Secondary     Diploma       Bachelor’s        Master’s    PhD    Other   
                                                                           Degree            Degree   
                                                             
 
Other Qualifications (please specify)__________________________________ 
 
 
6) Professional qualification (education)  (please tick appropriately) 
  
       ACCA  ACA             CGA         CPA         CMA              Other 
                                                      
 
Specify other____________________________________ 
 
 
7)  Professional work experience (number of years) ________________ 
 
8)  Number of months spent working in a current team ______________ 
 
9)  Team size:  no of persons within the current team  ______________ 
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SECTION 6: SCENARIO 3 
 
Read the following scenario carefully, and answer the questions below. 
Scenario 3:  Modern Appliances case 
You are the senior assigned to the audit of Modern Appliances. This is the first year you have been 
assigned to this audit engagement.  The manager on the audit is Michael Jenkins. Michael has been on 
the Modern Appliances audit for the three previous years and is well liked by the client. Modern 
Appliances is a publicly held company that manufactures a complete line of commercial and residential 
water heaters.  Your firm has conducted the audit for the past 4 years during which an adequate working 
relationship with Modern Appliances has been established. The current Financial Controller was leaving 
soon, having accepted a position to be Chief Executive Officer of a small appliance manufacturer. While 
making inquiries with the Assistant Financial Controller, you were surprised to learn that the 
audit manager, Michael Jenkins, has been offered the position of financial controller for Modern 
Appliances. You are also told that he is still deciding whether to accept the position. Michael 
Jenkins has continued in his role as audit manager for Modern Appliances. The concern is that 
being offered employment by the client may be viewed as impairing independence. In fact, an Ethics 
Ruling on this issue has stated that “the individual must remove himself or herself from the engagement 
until the employment offer is rejected or employment is no longer being sought, in order to prevent the 
appearance that integrity or objectivity has not been impaired.” 
Adapted from Curtis (2006, p.198-199). 
 
Instructions: Please circle the number that best corresponds to your chosen response. 
 
 
 
 
 Scales adapted: Moral intensity (Coram et al., 
2008), seriousness, personal responsibility and 
personal cost (Schultz et al., 1993) 
 
Very 
low 
     Very 
high 
1 Please assess the performance of Jenkins’ act  
leading to an incorrect audit opinion (probability of 
effect to financial statement users). 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
2 What is the probability that Jenkins’ act of 
continuing to work on the engagement after receiving 
an employment offer, will be discovered by higher 
management?  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
3 If the act of continuing to work on the engagement 
after receiving an employment offer was discovered, 
what level of disciplinary action would an auditor 
face for committing the same act? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
 
4 
Please assess the seriousness (i.e the amount of social 
harm done) of Jenkins’ act of continuing to work on 
the audit engagement after receiving an employment 
offer  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
5 Please assess the personal costs to you as an audit 
staff person (i.e. trouble, risk, discomfort) of 
informing  higher management of Jenkins’ 
employment offer 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
6 Please assess your personal responsibility (i.e. duty or 
obligation) for informing higher management of 
Jenkins’ employment offer.  
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately 
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 Attitudes  Not very 
True 
     Very 
True 
 How true do you think that the 
following statements are with regard to 
you reporting Jenkins’ act of continuing 
to work on the engagement after 
receiving an employment offer, in an 
audit firm? 
       
7 Blowing the whistle on Jenkins would 
help prevent serious harm to the audit 
firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 Reporting Jenkins’ action is helpful in 
controlling unethical behaviour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 Whistle-blowing on Jenkins enhances 
the public interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 Reporting Jenkins’ action in the 
workplace is a way for an employee to 
do his or her duty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 Whistle-blowing on Jenkins is the moral 
thing to do 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
 If you reported Jenkins’ action, how 
important do you think the following 
consequences would be to you? 
Not very 
important 
     Very 
important 
12 Prevention of harm to the audit firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 Control of unethical behaviour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 Enhancement of public interest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 Performing one’s duty as an employee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 Moral satisfaction on one’s part 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
 Subjective norms        
 How proud of you do you think the 
following persons would be if you 
reported Jenkins’ action? 
Not  very 
much 
     Very much 
17 Members of one’s family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 Co-workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19 Immediate supervisor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 Friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21 Neighbours 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
 How much do you care whether the 
following persons would approve or 
disapprove of your reporting of Jenkins’ 
action? 
Very little      Very much 
22 Members of one’s family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23 Co-workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24 Immediate supervisor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25 Friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26 Neighbours 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately 
 
Scales adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009).  
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 Perceived behavioural control        
 If you report Jenkins’ action in an 
audit firm, how likely do you think the 
following are? 
Not very 
likely 
     Very  
likely 
27 The audit firm will hinder/ignore my 
reporting every step of the way 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28 The difficulties to be faced in the 
process of my reporting will be too 
great for me to endure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29 My reporting won’t make any 
difference 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30 I will be subjected to retaliation from 
the audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 If you report Jenkins’ action, how 
important do you think the following 
are to you? 
Not very 
important 
     Very 
important 
31 The audit firm’s hindering reporting 
(or ignoring it) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32 Difficulties to be faced in the process 
of reporting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33 No chance to correct wrongdoing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34 Retaliation by the audit firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Reporting intentions        
 With respect to Jenkins’ act of 
continuing to work on the 
engagement, 
Extremely 
unlikely 
     Extremely 
likely 
35 How likely is it that  you would 
inform higher management of 
Jenkins’ act ?  1 2 3 4 5 
 
6 
 
7 
36 How likely is it that other auditors in 
the office who have become aware of 
Jenkins’ act  would inform higher 
management? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
37 How likely is it that you would inform 
persons outside of the firm of 
Jenkins’ act? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
38 How likely is it that other auditors in 
the office inform persons outside of 
the firm of Jenkins’ act? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
39 How likely is it that you would 
perform Jenkins’ act of continuing to 
work on the audit engagement? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately 
 
Scales adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009), Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) and Gibson and 
Frakes (1997).
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  Not at 
all 
     Very 
much 
40 How much would you want to act 
as Jenkins in continuing to work 
on the audit engagement? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
41 I would report Jenkins’ act to the 
appropriate persons within the 
audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42 I would use the reporting channels 
inside of the audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43 I would let upper level of 
management know about Jenkins’ 
act 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44 I would tell my supervisor about 
Jenkins’ act 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
45 I would report Jenkins’ act to the 
appropriate authorities outside of 
the audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46 I would use reporting channels 
outside of the audit firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
47 I would provide information to 
outside agencies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
48 I would inform the public of 
Jenkins’ act 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
NB: 2 = Moderately; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Moderately 
 
Scales adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) and Gibson and Frakes (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
Thank you also for participating in this project.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
Whistle-blowing Interview Schedule 
 
 
Demographics 
1. Gender:        Male                       Female        …………… 
2. Age:    Under 20 yrs    20-29 yrs    30-39 yrs    40-49 yrs     50-59 yrs  Over 
60 yrs   
3.   Years of professional experience……………. 
4.   Qualifications ……………….. 
5.  Position……………………….. 
 
General 
 
6. In your words, what do you know about “whistle-blowing”? 
 
7.  To what extent, do you think that whistle-blowing is important to an auditor?  Why? 
Assess the seriousness of committing questionable acts? 
 
8. In your opinion, how is whistle-blowing perceived (as a hero or traitor) by the 
profession? And outside the profession? Why? 
 
Specific 
 
9.  In general, to what extent are you willing to report questionable acts? 
 
10.  In your view, which one is more important for reporting questionable acts? Approval 
from others? Or self approval?  Why? Which referent group is important to you? 
(supervisor, co-workers, neighbours, friends and family) 
 
11a. In your opinion, how easy or difficult would it be for you to report a questionable act  
(e.g. whistle-blowing on a colleague who signed off a clean audit report on misleading 
financial statements)?  
 
11b. Do you believe that you have control over the behaviour of reporting questionable acts? 
Any obstacles or opportunities? 
 
12. In your opinion, can you tell me what is the link between being independent and able to 
report questionable acts? Why?  
 
13. In your view, do you believe that auditors have a personal responsibility towards others 
(e.g. the audit firm, profession, shareholders, society) to report questionable acts? Which 
one is more important? Why? 
 
14a. In your opinion, to what extent do you believe that your organization would support you 
if you decided to report unethical practices or wrongdoing? (i.e. superiors, etc.) (Please 
give reasons).  
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14b  What mechanisms do your organization have for supporting ethical behaviour or 
whistle-blowing (reporting questionable acts)? 
 
14c. What do you know about your organization’s code of ethics? How will it affect your 
ability to report questionable acts? 
 
15a. In your opinion, to what extent do you think that team mates have on your intentions to 
report questionable acts?  
 
15b.  How important is the influence of cohesiveness and team norms?  Why? 
 
16.  In your opinion, to what extent is material harm in influencing you to report 
questionable acts? 
 
17.  In your opinion, if you had observed wrongdoing in your organization, what are the 
main factors that would motivate you to report it to the appropriate person(s)? 
 
18.   In your opinion, if you had observed wrongdoing in your organization, what are the 
main factors that would discourage you from reporting it to the appropriate person(s)? 
What are the personal costs (i.e. trouble, risk, discomfort) to you?  
 
19.  If you had observed wrongdoing, which channel of reporting would you take [i.e. 
internal channels (senior management, ethics committee) and/or external channels 
(media, regulatory bodies)]?) (Anonymous reporting (hotline)? (Please give reasons for 
your choice of channel) Why? 
 
20. Have you ever observed and/or reported wrongdoing? Explain what happened. 
 
21.  What do you think are the positive and negative consequences of whistle-blowing in 
your organization? You?  The organization?  Profession? To Society? 
 
21a.  To you (Positive consequences) 
 
21b.  To you (Negative consequences) 
 
21c.   To the audit firm (Positive consequences) 
 
21d.  To the audit firm (Negative consequences) 
 
21e.  To the profession (Positive consequences) 
 
21f.   To the profession (Negative consequences) 
 
21g.   To the society (Positive consequences) 
 
21h.  To the society (Negative consequences) 
 
22.  What other observations can you make about whistle-blowing within the audit 
profession? 
 
23.  What recommendations can you make about encouraging whistle-blowing? 
 
 
Thank you 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
I volunteer and consent to participate in the current study captioned “Towards a conceptual 
model of whistle-blowing intentions among auditors.”  
  
This study is being conducted by Philmore Alleyne, who is a doctoral (PhD) candidate in 
Accounting at the School of Management, University of Bradford, Yorkshire, United Kingdom 
and a Lecturer in Accounting in the Department of Management Studies, University of the 
West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, Barbados. 
 
I understand that I will be asked to read a series of hypothetical auditing scenarios and answer 
questions related to these scenarios. I also understand that I will be required to complete a 
survey questionnaire, which has a time commitment of approximately 30 minutes. My 
participation will be totally voluntary and I can decide to withdraw at anytime. My responses to 
the questions will be held in the strictest confidence. My name or the name of my 
organization will not be disclosed in this study’s results.  In the event that I experience any 
anxiety when responding to the questionnaire, I understand that I can contact Philmore Alleyne 
about any discomfort that I may be experiencing.  
 
I also understand that there are several benefits to be gained from participating in this research. 
Firstly, my knowledge about whistle-blowing may be increased. Secondly, I will be providing 
auditing ethics researchers with important insights into whistle-blowing decisions and their 
development. This research can help them in better understanding the function of auditing firms 
and their members in relation to situations involving whistle-blowing decisions. 
 
I also understand that I may withdraw my consent to participate in this research without any 
prejudice. I also have the right to inquire about the nature of the research. All questions about 
the study have been satisfactorily answered.   
 
I am aware that I can get in touch with Philmore Alleyne, Department of Management Studies, 
University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, (246) 417-4295 or (246) 256-6695 for 
answers to any questions about this research.  
 
I fully understand the contents of this consent form. 
 
 
 
Participant………………………………… Date………………….  
 
 
